

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
A Monthly Journal, under Episcopal Sanction

VOLUME X.
JULY TO DECEMBER, 1901

Fourth Series

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"Ut Christiani sitis et Romani scitis." "As you are children of Christ, so be you children of Rome."
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GIRALDUS MOLLOY, S.T.D.
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Imprimatur.

✠ GUILIELMUS,
Archiep. Dublin.,
Hiberniæ Primas.

BROWNE & NOLAN, Limited

Publishers and Printers, 24 & 25
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
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION :

A CRITICISM

WELL-NIGH fifteen hundred years ago the novel doctrines propounded by a stranger monk in the very citadel of Christian unity created confusion for a time and bitter dissensions in the religious world, and called forth, perhaps the ablest of the many able men who have devoted themselves to the defence of the Catholic faith. But, though Pelagius and his opponents have long since passed away, the errors and the doctrines still remain—the one to be accepted and sustained by those who think, as Pelagius thought, that man is self-sufficient; the other to be upheld by all loyal children of the Church. The same war is still being waged, though, doubtlessly, the weapons are somewhat changed. The enemies may not profess to be followers of Pelagius; they are evolutionists, philologists, ethnologists; but what matters the name under which they appear if they endeavour to capture the very position against which Pelagius vainly struggled. The truth, in itself always one, may be attacked in numberless ways; one species of error makes its appearance when another is disappearing before the light. Yesterday the Christian apologist had to meet Pelagius and his school; to-day he must defend his doctrines against the anthropologists.

The anthropologists tell us that progress is the universal law of nature; that man himself is but the development

and, in a certain sense, the perfection of lower and less perfect forms of animal life, differing from the brutes of the field in degree only, not in kind; and that what he is to-day and what he has, he is and he has only through the natural process of evolution. What is true in the physical world, they say, holds good for every other department. The family is but the civilized outcome of the days of 'free intercourse,' for the existence of which McLennan boldly contends; the primitive hide-covered tents of patriarchal days, or the blackened caves in which dwelt the Odullamites of old, have given way to the neatly-kept cottage or the princely mansion; the complex system of government now adopted in the Old World, as well as in the New, may be traced back, step by step, to the ages when the clan was in itself the state, and each chieftain a royal dictator; the code of laws regulating the administration of justice which is the pride of the English jurist to-day, as it was the pride of the Roman in the days of the Emperor Justinian, once differed little from the summary procedure of a mining court in California or Western Australia. Where be they who were once the leaders of thought in the arts and sciences? How have their conclusions fared at the hands of modern scholars? Their cherished theories are rudely thrown aside as the day-dreams of inexperienced children; and who can say but another generation may deal with the moderns as they have dealt with those who have gone before? Could one of the men who once roamed the sloping plains of Asia, before the Aryan race had separated for the west and the south, be brought to life again, and visit some of the great industrial centres of England, or Germany, or America, he could hardly believe that this was the world of his boyhood and his manhood, these the people with the manners of whose ancestors he was conversant.

If natural development be the rule in every other department, argues the anthropologist, why should other forces be invoked to explain the growth of religions? The present great religious systems of the world can only be the result of evolution; and, as in the animal world the more complex and perfect organisms can be traced back through gradually

deteriorating forms of life, till at last one arrives at the simple and almost inorganic protoplasm, so, too, the most highly developed systems of worship are but the steady growth of ages, and the many phases through which they have passed may be evident to every student of the science of religion.

Religion, then, they assert, has had its developments. One system has given place to another; but the general tendency, in spite of occasional lapses, has always been towards something higher and better. All are agreed about the general proposition; but when they come to discuss the order in which these different forms appeared, there are as many theories put forward as there are writers on the subject. Herbert Spencer's may be taken as typical of all the others. He asserts that animism, or the worship of spirits and the souls of departed ancestors, was the primeval and lowest form of cult; that from this beginning idolatry, fetichism, and nature worship were gradually developed during the lapse of ages. In this latter stage men paid their homage to the sun and moon and stars, to the earth, the mountains, the great rivers and the rushing torrents. Carried away by the fervour of their imagination, they soon endowed these inanimate creatures with all the attributes of real, living human beings like themselves; and thus religious worship assumed the form of anthropomorphism, from which were soon evolved the higher kinds of Polytheism. Polytheism, however, could not satisfy the cravings of the philosopher's heart; it could not stand before the researches of his logical mind. The multitude of gods dependent on one another was not susceptible of rational defence, and so men began to centre all power in the highest of their deities, and him they made king and ruler of the rest. Thus Monotheism appeared upon the scene, and who knows into what this may develop with the development of civilization? Pantheism or materialism may be, they say, the religion of the future.¹

In explaining particular forms of worship they are

¹ Spencer's *Sociology*; 'Religion: A Retrospect and Prospect,' *Nineteenth Century*, January, 1884; *Religion and Morality*, Rev. James Fox, D.D. A very valuable work from which we have quoted freely in this Essay.

equally dogmatic. Judaism, as they call the system contained in the Old Testament, is but the development of idolatry and Polytheism, traces of which may be found even in the Sacred Books. From Judaism, according to some, the transition to Christianity required but the presence of a great reformer, such as Christ; whilst others prefer to find the origin of the Christian worship in the Buddhism or Parseeism flourishing in India centuries before. Just as Christ appeared in Judea, and by the sheer force of His towering intellect formulated a creed eminently suited to the tastes and aspirations of His fellowmen, so, too, in other circumstances, and with further developments of civilization and culture, other leaders may arise who will sweep Christianity before them, as it has swept the pagan rites. Thus religion is the work of man, and no place can be found for revelation—at least for revelation understood as Catholics understand it.

Max Müller, Kuhn, and the philological schools of which they are the leaders, put forward other systems and other arguments; but their opinions shall be better discussed in another paper. It is better, then, to deal directly only with the evolutionary theories, though, no doubt, many of the arguments adduced will apply with equal force to both.

The question between the Catholic theologian and the anthropologist is whether there can be real progress in religious knowledge, so that mankind, or even a great body of the human race, could ever attain, by their own natural powers, a fairly correct idea of God and the moral law. The anthropologist asserts that the existence of the fact precludes all discussion as to its possibility. History, he says, shows us that men have begun with the lowest and crudest notions of divinity and morality, and have gradually risen, by their own unaided efforts, to that Monotheism and moral code which is the fruit of modern civilization. No doubt the progress has not been without interruption. Frequent and almost inexplicable retrogressions are only too apparent; but the general tendency has been ever upwards. As the incoming tide appears to the onlooker at one time to advance, at another to recede, whilst the current,

setting shorewards steadily, rolls its way, so, too, the religious tendencies of the world seem to the student of history to suddenly rise to a wonderful height, and as suddenly to fall back again to the lowest stages, without any real interruption of the steady movement towards perfection and truth. It may be necessary, in the course of this essay, to determine clearly what is meant by progress in religion ; but here it is sufficient to accept the notions put forward by the opponents. The several stages of growth have been already indicated.

Now, Catholics may freely concede that in a certain sense there has been evolution of worship just as there may have been evolution in the physical world, but not an evolution that is independent of Divine interposition. They admit that Judaism was not the work of a day ; that from Moses to the Machabees the system was being built up piece by piece ; that Christ appeared only to develop and perfect what had already been in existence for centuries ; and that even in Christianity there is a certain capability of exposition and development. Again, they may freely grant that independently of revelation there can be and there has been an evolution of doctrine, at least, there has been change ; but, leaving aside for the moment the religions of the Jews and Christians, they may well deny that the change has been towards something better. It has been, generally speaking, degeneration not progress. Not indeed that the truths themselves exceed the powers of the human intellect, or that the philosopher who has devoted his attention to their discovery could not formulate a moderately perfect system, but that the difficulties retarding their propagation are so enormous that it is impossible for his teaching to seriously affect any race or body of men. In other words, whatever about the individual, for mankind generally religion has degenerated rather than progressed. This is the doctrine which may be opposed to the anthropological theories. Let us now examine the proofs adduced in favour of their views.

The very foundation of the system is that evolution is the law everywhere we turn ; why should it not also hold good for religion ? Indeed, we are not left to surmise that

this was the principal motive which urged them to pursue their researches in the domains of religion, or the principal proof to which they would refer all who might be inclined to waver. Herbert Spencer tells us in his system of 'Synthetic Philosophy' that he will never rest content till he had applied the principles of evolution to every other science; and how successfully he fulfilled that promise his works on Biology, Psychology, Sociology, Ceremonial and Ecclesiastical Institutions amply prove. Huxley, a master, no doubt, in his favourite study of Biology must need square all other departments to fit in with his theory. Brinton is even more explicit when he gravely informs us, after he had been forced to admit the non-existence of the most important link in his chain of argument, that though he was unable to offer any proof, it must have been so because evolution demanded it.¹ That really puts their case in a nutshell. There must have been evolution in religion; therefore there has been evolution. So confident is Dr. Menzies on this point that he asserts the evolutionists need offer no proof; it devolves upon the other side to show that religion has been exempted from the general law of human progress.²

Now, surely evolution, at least evolution such as Darwin, Huxley, and their disciples would have us accept, has not yet been proved in a way that forces or even demands our assent. Do not scientists of equal ability and equal research openly scout it? and if they do why should men be forced to part with their own cherished beliefs, with the beliefs, it may be, of their fathers for countless generations, to accept what is at best but the conclusions of an unproved, and, as most people would contend, an unprovable hypothesis? Their theories on the religion of man are but the natural consequence of their doctrines of his origin, for the latter of which no better proof than the 'it must be so' of its authors has yet been offered.

Again, even if it were freely admitted—as it should be admitted—that there has been marvellous progress in

¹ *Religion of Primitive Peoples*. New York: 1897.

² *History of Religion*, Allan Menzies, D.D. London: 1900.

social institutions and in arts and sciences, it ought to be remembered, too, that progress in civilization and culture does not always entail progress in religion. Indeed, looking at the matter historically, whatever may be the explanation, the contrary would seem to be nearer the truth. The Romans of the days of Cæsar Augustus, were not surely less civilized and less cultured than were their rude forefathers of five centuries before, and yet who would compare the simple, moral, worshipful lives of the people of the early Roman Republic with the lives of their descendants in these later days of corruption, debauchery, and sin. Grecian religion, too, fell before the spread of Grecian culture; and in a land far removed from both the same effects may be observed. Writers, for example, on Central America, tell us how the rudest and least civilized tribes of that country possessed a system of religion comparatively pure, whilst, on the other hand, the Aztecs, a highly cultured race with a governing constitution which many modern states might usefully imitate—freely indulged in the most hideous excesses under the name of worship.¹

‘Anyhow,’ says Max Müller, no advocate of the Catholic teaching, ‘even if it could be proved that there has been a continuous progress in everything else, no one could maintain that the same applies to religion.’² The reason of the difference is evident. Man, though eager in the pursuit of secular knowledge, is but little disposed to accept truths which impose a serious obligation and restraint unless they can be forced upon him by incontestable evidence, and from the nature of the doctrines themselves it is clear that such proofs cannot be forthcoming. Doubt and denial are always possible. Hence, the most cherished doctrines of one generation are rudely rejected in the next; inquiry is begun anew, other conclusions are arrived at only to be set aside by another age, and so the endless examination proceeds without fruit and without advance. Thus, the very foundations of the anthropological contention are far from certain.³ Let us see the direct evidence.

¹ *The Making of Religion*, Andrew Lang. London: 1900.

² *The Origin of Religion*, p. 68. London: 1882

³ St. Thomas's *Summa*; Mazzella, *De Religione et Ecclesia*.

Surely the anthropologists should admit that there are enormous difficulties to be overcome by the student of religions, difficulties such as would prevent anyone but the most prejudiced theorist from laying down dogmatic definitions. Though we are separated from 'the primitive man' by a stretch of time compared to which, as Spencer says, twenty thousand years seem relatively small, and though, according to their own concessions, man has been undergoing a constant change during all these centuries, the anthropologist will confidently undertake to do what a friend could not do with his living friend—to lay bare in its entirety his religious consciousness.¹ *A priori*, then, one might well be inclined to consider their task an impossible one, but a careful examination of the argument put forward will show into what curious positions their preconceived notions have led them.

Since the primitive man about whose religion they feel so confident is so far separated from our days, only two methods of proving their case were possible. They could take up the accounts of savage life left us by explorers who had discovered and studied their habits, and from the religious convictions therein recorded argue back to the religious convictions of mankind. What these tribes are to-day, they contend, all our forefathers once were, and the several stages through which we watch them passing, as we watch a hive of bees busily constructing their honeycomb, represent the several stages through which mankind has advanced. Or, they might select the great nations of antiquity, and from a careful study of their records produce proofs of the gradual progress which they advocate. Now, it can be shown beyond the shadow of doubt that either method of argument involves a fatal fallacy, and does but little credit to the logical abilities of its propounders; and, besides, even if this style of demonstration were perfectly valid, a serious examination whether of savage life or of ancient records serves only to overthrow and discredit their theory.

¹ *Religion and Morality*, Rev. J. Fox, D.D. New York: 1899.

The first method is one in which many anthropologists seem to glory, and yet it appears to be perfectly evident, according to their own admissions, that no conclusive argument can be drawn from such a source. What right have they to assume that the savage of to-day, rude and depraved as he may be, is a fair specimen of the primeval man? Is he not as far removed from the common source as we ourselves are, and through what interminable processes of advancement and degradation may he not have gone in all these ages? They admit themselves that there might have been retrogression—Spencer certainly does¹—and how, then, can they deduce any argument in favour of their view from the religion of the savage? What if that religion were but the corruption of an earlier and a better day?

The habits of savages without a history [says Le Page Renouf], are not in themselves evidences which can in any way be depended upon. To take it for granted that what the savages now are, perhaps, after milleniums of degradation, all other peoples must have been, and that modes of thought through which they are now passing have been passed through by others, is a most unscientific assumption. You will seldom meet with it in any book or essay without also finding proof that the writer did not know how to deal with historical evidence.²

Tylor³ is constrained to admit that the degeneration theory may claim such belief—no doubt, in some cases with justice, as mutilated and perverted remains of a higher religion—whilst Max Müller condemns, in no unmeasured terms, such an illogical method of arguing.⁴ Surely, then, one may well be excused for venturing to question its validity.

The very same fallacy appears to be involved in their arguments drawn from the great nations of antiquity. Long before the dawn of history, according to themselves, ages upon ages may have rolled by, race may have succeeded race, religion followed religion. How, then, can they build up so confidently from the records of history that progressive religious system which they propound? Might not the

¹ *Sociology*, p. 106.

² *The Religion of Ancient Egypt*, Lect. iv.

³ *Primitive Culture*. New York: 1899.

⁴ *Lectures on the Origin of Religion*, p. 68.

advocates of 'Degeneration' say that these lowly forms which you assume to be the beginning of religions are but the deteriorated beliefs that have trickled down through ages of error? One position seems to be as reasonable as the other.

Again, even the argument drawn from the manners and customs of savage tribes were perfectly valid, yet the difficulties in obtaining reliable information about their religious beliefs are so overwhelming that one wonders how light-heartedly the anthropologist proceeds to construct his 'religious tree.' Few men care to publish to the world their religious convictions; and the savages are no exception to the general rule. They will make no suggestions themselves, but will agree with everything that their interviewer proposes, be he a traditionalist or anthropologist, and the representatives of both schools go their way rejoicing that now, at last, proofs unassailable have been found. A savage,' says Max Müller, 'is the most obliging creature in the world, for he will do all that any anthropologist wishes him to do.'¹ In proof of this difficulty of obtaining reliable evidence one might well cite the numerous varying and oftentimes contradictory reports left us by different writers about the manners and customs and religions of the very same races. Let us see how they agree among themselves about the facts.

If their theory be true, that progress in religion is in proportion, generally speaking, to progress in culture and civilization, it would be natural to find no traces of religion among the very degraded races, the peoples most closely resembling the brutes of the field, from which they persistently claim descent. Indeed, many anthropologists contended that this was so, and appealed to the testimony of explorers in favour of their views. Sir John Lubbock² adduced numerous examples of tribes without any religious worship, and Sir John is quoted approvingly by Herbert Spencer. Darwin, too, held that there were races without a

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 212.

² *Origin of Civilization and Primitive Condition of Man*. New York: 1890.

God. Payne, in his history of America,¹ appears to make the same assertion, and Payne is relied upon as a trustworthy witness for other parts of their theory. Now, let us place in juxtaposition to all that, the opinions of their own brother anthropologists, critics whom they must admit to be neither unscientific nor unfavourably disposed.

Quatrefages, an eminent ethnologist, and Professor of Anthropology in one of the French universities, says:—

We nowhere meet with Atheism except in an erratic condition. In every place and at all times the mass of the population have escaped it; we nowhere find either a great human race, or even a division, however unimportant, of the race, professing Atheism. Such is the result of an inquiry which I am justified in calling conscientious, and which was begun before I assumed the Professorship of Anthropology. It is true that on these researches I have proceeded and I have formed my conclusions, not as a believer, or as a philosopher, who are all more or less under the influence of an ideal which they accept or oppose, but exclusively as a naturalist whose chief aim is to seek for and to state facts.

The statement [writes Professor Tiele] that there are nations or tribes who possess no religion rests either on inaccurate observation, or on a confusion of ideas. No tribe or nation has yet been met with destitute of a belief in any higher being, and travellers who asserted their existence have been afterwards refuted by facts.²

The same opinion is expressed in almost similar terms by Flint, Tylor, Revéillé; and even Brinton quails before the facts, though he sorrowfully declares that it must have been so even though the traces have disappeared. It might be added that De Harlez, in his address to the Parliament of Religions assembled at Chicago, in 1895, unhesitatingly declared that there is no people without a religion, however low it may have fallen in the scale of civilization. If, then, the anthropologists have been deceived about such an important point as this, they can hardly expect that men must accept their hypotheses as infallible utterances.

But examining for ourselves the accounts given us of savage customs, we find that Monotheism—which they

¹ *History of America*, vol. i. p 389.

² *The Outlines*, p. 6; *ap.* Max Müller, *The Science of Religion*.

contend to be the perfection of civilization and culture, the latest development of evolution—flourished amongst the rudest specimens of humanity when they were first discovered; nay more, that the knowledge of the moral law, of their duties to God and their fellowman, universal amongst the people, was as correct as may be found among the most highly cultured races. Where, then, be their theories of progress?

The Australian tribes are, perhaps, the lowest, in the grade of civilization. Having no houses or settled abodes, ignorant of even the rudiments of agriculture, possessing no knowledge of metals, or pottery, or bows and arrows, they might certainly sit as the models for Rousseau's 'primitive man.' Yet amongst these wild rovers of the wood we find a worship of a Supreme Being who can and will punish all transgressions against the tribal ordinances. He is spoken of only in whispers. His name is far too sacred to be introduced into every idle conversation; and it is only the initiated who are permitted to know him and to learn his moral code. At this ceremony of initiation, writes Palmer, advice is given so kindly, fatherly, and impressive, as often to soften the heart and draw tears from the youth who is being received. He is exhorted to guard against selfishness, to love all mankind, to see no one suffering where he could furnish relief. That the Australians had but little confidence in the 'Progress Theory' may be gathered from the fact that the elders thought it necessary to put the young men through a form of purification, in order to banish the selfish and irreligious spirit learned from their more civilized guests. They are warned to obey the old, to share with all their friends, to live peaceably, not to interfere with young girls or married women, to observe the laws regulating food. No doubt mixed up with these doctrines may be found foolish mythological stories. Yet, here we see amongst the rudest people a religion that, according to the anthropologists, should only be associated with the highest form of culture. How do they explain this apparent contradiction? Herbert Spencer does not even deign to mention the Australian Supreme Being. Tylor, in his lengthened treatise, entitled

Primitive Culture, devotes but little space to this Australian belief, whilst Huxley boldly denies its existence in the face of all evidence to the contrary. 'Theology,' he writes, 'in its simplest form, such as may be met with among the Australian tribes, is a mere belief in the existence, powers, and dispositions, generally malignant, of ghost-like entities who may be propitiated or scared away, but no cult properly so called can be said to exist.'¹ Yet these are the infallible scholars whose teaching men must accept.

Again, if we search the accounts left us by travellers who have lived in the closest intercourse with the African tribes, we shall find everywhere traces of the belief in one God, the great lawgiver who will reward and punish men according to their works. In Guiana, among the Zulus and Hottentots, away in the depths of Central Africa, the story is still the same. Sometimes this belief is a strong and living reality, sometimes it is fast disappearing before the worship of the family spirits, who are far more easily propitiated than the great Just Ruler who is above. Even the anthropologists themselves admit the prevalence of such an idea. Do they contend that it is the result of evolution? If it is, it should be the latest, the best, the most agreeable to the nature of man, the object of worship that should be uppermost in his mind. Why, then, should the notion of the Great Ruler be gradually fading from view whilst the worship of departed ancestors is spreading and developing? Which does the evidence seem to favour—progress or retrogression?²

In America, too, the anthropologists can find little ground for rejoicing. From north to south the story is ever the same—one Supreme Being who rules all mankind and watches their every action. In Greenland, amongst the North American Indians of Virginia, the Pawnees of Kansas, the Blackfeets of the Missouri, in Mexico and Peru, even in distant Terra-del-Fuego, there is the clearest evidence for asserting a belief in one great master who has laid down the law for his children, and who would be angry if they did not observe it. To him they looked for help in all their

¹ *The Making of Religion*, Andrew Lang.

² *Opus cit. supra.*

difficulties, and how far their notions differed from ours may be gathered from the fact that the Pawnees of Kansas, for example, addressed in prayer their Great Spirit as Atius-ta-Kawa, 'Our Father Who art in all places.' Such doctrines as these found amongst the most primitive savage tribes do not seem to lend much support to the theory of 'Progress.'

Now, turning to the great nations of antiquity let us begin with Egypt. It surely is a land which deserves the attention of the ethnologist. Centuries before the Christ appeared in Judea, aye, centuries before Abraham crossed over from Ur of Chaldea to Palestine, Egypt was the garden of civilization. It was the home of learning and culture when the great nations of modern days had not yet emerged from the darkness of barbarism. No wonder, then, that scholars should have turned their attention to unravel the mysteries of this favoured land, and to dig out from the depths of its dry and sandy soil the monuments of the past.

It cannot be denied that according to the ancient records Polytheism was the external form of worship. The principal gods number, at least, seventy or eighty, whilst there were thousands of other deities, each of whom had to be propitiated by sacrifice and prayer. Neither, however, can it be denied that amidst their confusion of gods and Goddesses, traces of Monotheism can be detected at every turn. Thus, in the *Maxims of Ptatopeh*, which is regarded as the most ancient piece of writing in the world, its author having lived before the building of the first pyramid, God simply, not this or that god, is spoken of. One may find such expressions as the following: 'If anyone bear himself proudly he will be humbled by God; God loveth the obedient and he hateth the disobedient; the field which the great God has given thee to till.' In a very ancient papyrus, now preserved at St. Petersburg, we find: 'Praised be to God for all his gifts; God knows the wicked; he smites the wicked unto blood.' Again it is said:—

In making thy oblations to God beware of what he abhors;
Thou shalt adore in his name; It is he who granteth genius with

¹ *The Making of Religion*, A. Lang.

endless aptitudes ; Who magnifieth him who becometh great ; Thou art come to man's estate, thou art married and hast a house, but never do thou forget the painful labour which thy mother endured, nor all the salutary care which she has taken of thee ; Take heed lest she have cause to complain of thee, lest she should raise her hands to God and he should listen to her prayer.¹

Was it here a case of Monotheism striving to supplant Polytheism, or was it not rather an example of pure Monotheism vanishing before its own degenerate offspring? On this point scholars are divided into hostile camps. Maspero maintains that the Egyptians were only struggling after the unity of God, while such eminent scholars as Pierret and Emmanuel Rougè fearlessly assert that Monotheism was the primal element from which the other degenerate forms have sprung. Le Page Renouf, if he does not embrace the doctrine of Rougè, certainly clearly indicates that all his sympathies tend in that direction.² It may then be fairly claimed that the weight of authority favours the priority of Monotheism ; and, if we consider for a moment that all the great deities were but the most astonishing external manifestations of the Supreme Creative Being, we can easily understand how the people may have at first worshipped the one God under each of these aspects, and afterwards as the unity of God gradually faded from the minds of their descendants each one of these was regarded in its turn as Supreme. Philological developments, too, seem to favour the same conclusion. Besides, the whole story of Egyptian religion in after days is one fearful downward rush, and why should it not be assumed that the same is true from the beginning?

Whatever may be said on this question, there can be no doubt about the purity of the moral code. Man is dependent upon God whose law he is bound to obey. If he does so he shall be well rewarded ; but if he fail to comply dire punishment awaits him. In the Book of the Dead the judgment immediately after death is clearly portrayed. There is Osiris, the God of Justice, with the scales in his hands, in

¹ *Religion and Morality*, Dr. Fox.

² *Lectures on Religion of Egypt*.

one of which is placed man's heart as representing his nature and works, and in the other is placed justice. Attendant deities stand around to accuse or defend. The soul trembles before its judge, and loudly calls for mercy. If it is found free from fault it passes into bliss; if guilty it passes into prison where it is punished not only by 'the gnawing worm' of the Scriptures, but also by fearful bodily sufferings which last, if not for ever, at least for ages, when the soul suddenly ceases to exist. Lenormant clearly proves that not only were the more grievous sins, such as murder, adultery, unchastity, calumny, injustice, forbidden, but the working a labourer too hard, wilful exaggeration, thoughts unworthy of God, idle words, were crimes sufficient to merit the gravest punishments. The duties of parents and children are frequently inculcated; temperance, justice, sobriety, are held up as things to be striven after, while slothfulness, pride, and strife are explicitly reprobated. The inscriptions on the tombs are at least useful in determining what a man should be, though there is sometimes a wide difference between 'the was' and 'the ought to have been.' Here are a few specimens: 'I was bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothes to the naked, a refuge to him that was in want. That which I did to him, the great God has done to me.' 'My heart inclined to the right while I was yet a child, not yet instructed as to the right and good, and what my heart dictated I failed not to perform, and God rewarded me for this, rejoicing me with happiness.'¹

Gradually, however, a change came over the country. Polytheism became more and more corrupt till, at last, Pantheism takes its place. If Pantheism is to be the religion of the future, we are far behind the Egyptians of old. The notion of a Supreme Ruler—author of a pure moral code—seems to have steadily vanished from the people's minds. In the religious hymns and in the epitaphs Pantheism is clearly indicated after the nineteenth dynasty, whilst the idea of right and wrong does not seem to have been any longer prevalent. The worship of animals, of cows, bulls, sheep, cats, mice, always flourishing to some

¹ *Religion and Morality.*

extent, now became the real worship of Egypt; and with the disappearance of a divine sanction for the moral code all restraints appear to have been removed. The corruptions of Egypt in these later days were hardly equalled by the corruptions of the worst days of Pagan Rome. The goddess Hathor, so popular with the degenerate Egyptians, is called by Juvenal the Isiac procuress, and Ovid in his *Ars Amatoria* recommends her temples as the proper place for a man to provide himself with a concubine.¹ Perhaps, our opponents, in spite of their previous admissions, would contend that the path from Monotheism to Polytheism, from Polytheism to Pantheism, and Rationalism, and Materialism; from a pure moral code, sanctioned and maintained by a Supreme Eternal Being, to a corruption and degradation of which one is almost afraid to speak, is the path of progress. If they do, the history of Egypt is the ground on which they should fight their battle. Others may not see in this the evolution for which they contend, but an evolution which is steadily making towards the less perfect, so that the general tendency is ever downwards. Are they not justified by the facts?

China is another interesting land, but the unravelling of Chinese history is not a work to be lightly undertaken. Here, it will be possible only to briefly sketch the religious development in so far as it bears directly on the present discussion, and the difficulty of the undertaking may be understood if we but remember that, while the early missionaries claimed to have found the clearest traces of the great mysteries of the Catholic faith, the anthropologists have not feared to assert that Materialism was the religion of China long before the dawn of history. Perhaps the truth lies between.

The Chinese sacred books, three in number—the *Shu King*, the *Shi King*, and the *Yi King*—do not profess to be religious treatises in the same sense as the Christian Bible. They are rather historical records, dealing with religion only incidentally. In these it is clearly indicated that from

¹ *Religion and Morality*, p. 62.

the earliest time the worship of the one Supreme Being flourished throughout the country. Shangti—the name given to their god—watches over all things, rewarding and chastising. He loves those who act according to his laws, and invites them to live for ever with him after death. Strange to say, there is no mention of any punishment for sin in the next world; and, however one is to account for it, the omission can hardly be accidental. There is, too, the clearest evidence of the existence of a highly developed moral code. Reverence and obedience towards God and all whom He sets up to rule are inculcated, love of parents and attention to their wishes, temperance, justice, truth, humility, forgiveness of injuries, are highly recommended. Nor is it the mere external act alone of which there is question; the internal spirit is principally required, and all sins of thought and desire are strictly forbidden.

The existence of this pure moral code cannot be denied, but the personality of Shangti has been often questioned by those with whose theories his existence cannot be easily squared. Legge, the Professor of Chinese at Oxford, who has devoted his abilities to unravelling the many problems presented by the history of China, has collected together innumerable texts to prove that Shangti was the exact synonym for our name, God. For example: 'King Wan is on high; oh! bright is he in heaven. King Wan ascends and descends upon the right hand of God.' Surely this god looks like a personal being. No doubt alongside the name Shangti we find Tien, the heaven, also recognised as a divinity, and put on the same level as Shangti; but Legge proves conclusively that Tien was the equivalent of Shangti only when it was used metaphorically, as we ourselves sometimes use it, for example, when we say, 'Heaven's will be done;' but when it merely signified the material heavens it was not treated as a divinity, or as synonymous with Shangti. Others, perceiving the weakness of this argument, prefer to admit the personality of Shangti, but contend that he was only the god of the rich and the learned. Unfortunately, however, for the defenders of this view texts can be adduced from the sacred books to prove that Shangti was

also the god of the poor and the ignorant, else why should it be stated that 'the poor people with their wives and their children made moan to Shangti against their oppressors' ? Thus, in the very opening of Chinese history, we find the people believing in one Supreme Being and that belief in him as a patron of virtue was reflected in the purity of their lives.¹

Gradually, however, Shangti fades away from view. Another power became dominant in China. The sun and the earth are the principal objects of worship, while the spirits of the mountains and the woods are not left unhonoured. With the disappearance of an All-seeing Ruler, the moral code steadily declines. Outward forms take the place of the worship of the heart, and the favour of the gods is no longer secured by exemplary lives, but by magic, sorcery, and witchcraft.

It was in these days of degeneracy that Confucius appeared, and tried to introduce a reformation. He was a scholar, a philosopher, a historian, a writer, an ambitious statesman ; but he never claimed to be a saint or a prophet. Divine inspiration was not catalogued amongst his many qualifications. His aim was to recall to the minds of the people the doctrines that had been the pride of their fathers. The moral code which he introduced was certainly high. Humility, charity, obedience, reverence, were strongly enforced ; but even in the system of Confucius, so highly praised by the hostile critics of Christianity, we miss most of the beautiful maxims of the Gospel. Forgiveness of offences, or returning good for evil, were doctrines unknown to Confucius.

Confucius, however, aimed at being too practical and too material. The idea of a supreme, personal ruler was left entirely in the shade. About his existence Confucius observed the strictest silence. All indications of a future life, whether of joy or sorrow, were carefully excluded. Man was to attend to his present comforts without discussing such unimportant issues. Thus, his code of law, a

¹ *Religion and Morality ; La Religion en Chine*, Mgr. De Harlez. Gand, 1889.

medley of high principles and senseless traditional formalities, was left without any authoritative sanction, and, like all such efforts at influencing the lives of a people, it went the way of degeneration. The human mind—even that of the Chinese—longed for something higher and more inspiring. Taoism, so called after Lao-tse, its presumed founder, was introduced as a rival system; and about Taoism it is sufficient to say that though its standard of morality was high, the doctrines about Tao, the way and the principle from which all men are sprung, and to which they must all eventually return, was far too subtle for the ordinary intellect. If Confucianism was too material, Taoism was too metaphysical. It, too, soon degenerated from its early purity, and is now but a mixture of idolatry, alchemy, and the worship of spirits. Lao-tse himself is now regarded by his followers as a god. Later on Buddhism makes its appearance on the Chinese religious stage, but not the Buddhism of India, which shall be explained immediately, but a Buddhism which has its gods and its goddesses, its idols, its spirits, its deified mortals, a Buddhism which panders to the passions of the people rather than restrains them. China is to-day the battle-ground of these three great religious systems, or rather of the rival priesthoods, for the people are content to profess or despise any form, according as adversity or good fortune overtakes their undertakings. This, briefly, is the religious history of China; and that the Chinaman of to-day is more religious, more perfect, more progressive than were his fathers in the ages when Shangti watched over the destinies of the Celestial Empire, and laid down his law for the people, is certainly not evident to anyone but the anthropological theorist. The contrary would appear, rather, to be the truth.¹

It is almost an impossibility to give within a short space anything like a connected idea of the development of religious opinions in India. The *Veda*, their oldest book, professing to contain the word of God, is our only guide in

¹ *Religion and Morality; L'Histoire des Religions*, 3rd edition. Paris: 1897.

determining the early beliefs of the people; and the *Veda* seems to clearly indicate that Polytheism or Henotheism was the religion flourishing in the country at the dawn of history. Varuna, Indra, Mitra, Aditi, are all the objects of worship; but, as Max Müller has clearly shown, when the Indians invoked these gods or goddesses, they invoked each in turn as supreme. Each was infinite, each all powerful.¹ Writers in the *Revue de l'histoire des Religions* strongly contend that throughout the earliest literary documents Monotheism is evidently indicated. Max Müller himself has shown that before the Indian races had reached the banks of the Ganges, away north in the plains of Asia their fathers ages before had invoked with tremulous accents their god as Dyaus Pater—'Heaven Father.' How then explain the multitude of gods in after ages? In another place, the eminent philologist supplies a reasonable solution. He admits that language in these days had few if any terms to express abstract ideas; that our notions of God were inexpressible except by borrowing the name of some cognate concrete thing. How, then, could God be better referred to than under the name of His greatest visible work, the sky, and how could His attributes be better expressed than by the names of the great natural phenomena, the sun, the stars, the clouds, the dawn? In a later age the metaphorical character of these was forgotten. The sky was looked upon as God, and the other wonderful phenomena, representing merely the perfections of the divinity, came to be considered in themselves as infinite beings.

These great gods were all-powerful and omniscient. They scrutinized the most secret thoughts and actions of men—rewarding the good by a life of bliss, punishing the sinful in a prison of darkness. The morality of such a people was naturally high. Recognizing that the state must be what the family is, the lawgivers sought to guard the purity of family life as carefully as it could be guarded even in the most Catholic state. Benevolence, and works of mercy were earnestly inculcated, whilst the most severe

¹ *The Development of Religion.*

dennunciations are directed against gambling, stealing, robbery, and deceit.

With the lapse of ages, however, a new worship appears in India—the worship of Brahma. The Brahmins or priests, constituting the highest of the great castes into which the Indians were divided, had full charge of the sacrifice and all liturgical rights. They were superior to all others because they had sprung from the head of Brahma, whilst the warriors, the merchants, and the artizans were sprung only from his shoulders, his belly, and his feet. It is difficult to determine the nature of Brahma. Sometimes he is represented as an intelligent being, sometimes as a blind material force—and this latter would seem to be the more correct idea. The doctrine of Metempsychosis was pushed to an extreme degree. All created things appear only to pass away, and all things pass away only to appear under another form. Thus every object pursues its endless round of existence, unless it be delivered from the never-ceasing revolution; and it was this deliverance which was the goal of all Brahminical desires. Deliverance from change was obtained only by conjunction with Brahma the immovable, and men could arrive at such conjunction only by knowledge and the practice of virtue. This religion, far too metaphysical for even the subtle Indian mind, was never very popular except among the more learned classes, and against it Buddha soon openly preached rebellion.

To meet the attacks of Buddha and his disciples, the Brahmins endeavoured to reform and popularize their teaching. The grossest anthropomorphism, idolatry worse even than the worst days of the Roman Empire, together with a species of savage fanaticism, were the dominant features of the new creed. It was, then, that the god Vishna comes down upon earth and becomes man as the hero, Krishna, and stranger still Krishna, Siva, and Brahma began to be looked upon and worshipped as a kind of Trinity; but the lives of the deities were not such as would be likely to promote morality among their followers. Siva is represented as a highwayman and debauchee, whilst the story of Krishna's younger days spent among the shepherd

folk would scarcely bear repetition. Rites of worship the most cruel, revolting, and obscene were introduced; the gods were depicted in the most shameful and disgusting attitudes and positions, whilst hideous statues were erected representing their friends, their mothers, sisters, and wives, whilst the motley array of minor deities, in the most fantastic shapes, with their almost countless array of heads, and hands, and feet, to represent the full extent of their power and attainments, cannot soon be forgotten by the visitor to an Indian Brahminical temple.

So degrading had their worship become that the English Government, even at the risk of exciting a fearful racial war, was forced to interfere and forbid some of their practices, such as human sacrifice and the voluntary suicide of the widows. Surely a change has come over the religious of India since the days when men prayed to the god Varuna.

Forgive the wrongs committed by our fathers.
When we ourselves have sinned in mercy pardon;
My own misdeeds, do thou, O God, take from me,
And for another's sin let me not suffer.¹

Who will contend that the change is for the better?

It now remains to briefly sketch the worship that sprung up in opposition to Brahminism. Buddha, which merely signifies a learned man, was the name given to the monk Siddhartha or Guatama, a descendant of the royal house of Cakia. Born about the year 557 B.C., he passed his earlier days in the mansions of his father; but when he arrived at man's estate, disgusted with the fleeting pleasures of the court, he bade good-bye to his friends and to his former mode of life, and betook himself to the desert where he gave himself up to the most extreme mortifications. His own good sense, however, soon forced him to moderate his early excesses. After seven years of prayer and study, he discovered, as he himself tells, the true method of arriving at complete human felicity. This secret he communicated at first only to his disciples, but later on he boldly proclaimed

¹ For full account of Religion of India, *vide*, *The Development of Religion*, Max Müller; Abbé de Broglie's *L'Histoire des Religions*; *Religion and Morality*, Fox; *La Religion, sur Origine et sa Définition*, G. Van Der Gheyn.

his doctrines to the people along the banks of the Ganges, and in the country of Oude. He brought together and established rules of government for the many communities of Buddhist monks, and to these he committed the solemn duty of preaching his doctrines when he himself should be no more. He died, according to the best accounts, about the year 477 B.C. : and, if we are to believe the stories of his opponents, the cause of death was a stomach disease brought on by eating a whole dish of pork and a mess of rice.

From the accounts left us of his life, it would seem that Buddha himself was a philosopher and philanthropist, as well as an ascetic. His religious teaching is of the greatest importance, especially in modern times when rationalists hold it up as the great rival of Christianity, as, in fact, the system of which Christianity is but the faint imitation. It might be useful to remark, in the beginning, that Buddhism as found in the sacred books of India is very different from the Buddhism which is spread amongst the people. So marked is this that though the missionaries and explorers had visited Tartary, Japan, China, India, Ceylon, centuries ago, yet it is only about sixty years since scholars discovered that Buddhism was the common foundation on which all these other rites were built.

Buddha does not assert or deny the existence of a God. He confesses that he cannot put forward any decided answer. His position exactly corresponds with that of the modern agnostic or positivist. If there be a God, he maintains, it is not necessary to worship him, to pray to him, to look to him for guidance in doubts and difficulties. But, though there may exist no personal, supreme ruler, there is a fatal, necessary law, a law from which no creature, not even Buddha himself, can hope to escape ; a law by which happiness is attached to the practice of good works, misery is unerringly attendant upon bad. Metempsychosis is put forward as the means of punishment and reward. Existence implies continual change, and as the Brahmins sighed for deliverance, so too did Buddha, but Buddha places the deliverance, not in the conjunction with Brahma, the unchangeable, but in the state which he calls the Nirvana.

About the nature of the Nirvana scholars are divided. The weight of authority, however, seems to assert that it was not a place of rest and calm, but a state of complete annihilation. This would certainly be the logical outcome of Buddha's doctrine about the mutability of things; and that he himself accepted the conclusion, may be gathered from the words which he addressed to his disciples on the night before his death. 'My brethren,' he said, 'remember that the principle of continual change involves that of destruction.'¹

In examining his moral code, it is necessary to bear in mind that Buddhism is essentially a monastic religion, so that, unlike Christianity, the monks form the principal part of the church, in fact they seem to entirely constitute it. They are not bound by any vows, but they are commanded to lead celibate lives, to not accept or retain in their possession even a single coin, to live entirely upon the alms of the people. How strictly this latter rule was observed in the beginning, may be gathered from the fact that in one of the early great Buddhist councils it was long and warmly debated whether the monks were obliged to eat the meat as it was given to them in alms, or whether they might not add a little salt to give it a savoury taste. They are to fast from mid-day till sun-rise the next morning, and when not engaged in begging among the people, they are to constantly meditate on the nothingness of all earthly things. Self denial was the method enjoined that a follower might become an 'arhat' or perfect man. Frequent meditations, confessions of sins, spiritual direction were earnestly recommended.²

In addition to the monks there was another class, the Upsakas or simple faithful. Besides being commanded generally to deny themselves, they were forbidden to steal, to lie, to commit adultery, to indulge in intoxicating liquor, to kill any living being. This, however, is only the negative view of Buddha's system; there is also a positive side embracing charity, kindness, benevolence towards all. In the Christian system, where God is considered as a Father

¹ De Broglie, *L'Histoire des Religions*.

² *Idem*.

and all men as His children, these feelings are easily understood, but with a system so egoistical as Buddhism, where a man's only thought is how to escape suffering, they can only be the result of philosophic thought, and were never really grasped by the followers of Buddha. Even Oldenburg, himself a rationalist, is forced to admit that in this respect Buddhism is but the dimly outlined shadow of Christianity.

Buddhism, however, as a popular religion, was something very different. Its principal features were Polytheism, magic, and idol worship. Not alone were the Brahminical gods, already described, retained, but the Buddhas past and future, of whom the chief was Guatama, were deemed worthy of the highest form of divine worship. Their statues were placed in all the temples. So much attention came to be paid to magic that large books have been written about this time upon the subject; in fact, India has long been noted as the land of sorcerers. As the religion spread into other countries and amongst other races, it soon lost its characteristic traits; it seems to have followed the usual downward course, if there could have been any descent from such a level. Polytheism degenerated into anthropomorphism and anthropomorphism into fetich worship. Buddhism, instead of elevating the people among whom it flourished, was calculated to retard their progress. The idle, aimless, good-for-nothing lives recommended to the early monks, the doctrine of complete annihilation, the absence of any inspiring motive which might urge them to make an effort, were amply sufficient to produce that lethargy and torpor which is so evident in their literature as well as in their social institutions. Polyandria, polygamy, and divorce flourish in the countries over which it has sway. No wonder, then, that even Kuenen and Revéillé have scouted the idea of comparing Buddhism with Christianity.

It is not necessary, here, to review in detail the history of the development of religions amongst the Greeks and Romans. Even the anthropologists themselves would hardly dare to cite these nations in proof of their theory of progress. Few would be deceived by such assertions, and hence it is

that they prefer to pursue their researches in lands comparatively unknown.

Now, independently of the Biblical narrative, we have endeavoured to prove, according to their own principles of demonstration, that, though there has been constant change, there has been nothing indicative of real popular progress. Indeed, rather the contrary is evident. Nations and peoples have gradually lost the idea of one Supreme Ruler, which their fathers possessed, while their standards of morality have been constantly on the wane. Egypt, China, India, Greece, and Rome may be cited in proof of these statements.

If, then, we find that everywhere men have fallen from the level attained at the earliest periods of which we have any historical records; if the notions of a Supreme Being who established the law, and insisted on its being fulfilled, was gradually disappearing; if the ideas of the ordinary natural virtues have become corrupted in the lapse of ages, is it not reasonable to say that human ingenuity did not invent what human abilities could not retain? No doubt Catholics freely grant that man by his own unaided efforts could obtain a moderately perfect notion of God and of His moral law, but when we find that these notions were accepted in the beginning by whole nations and peoples, that the ablest intellects of every age have been devoted to the solution of the religious problem, and that, despite all this, the general tendency, according to their own standard, was ever downward, is it not difficult to assert that these same natural powers can account for the primeval universality of belief.

Again, might not one reasonably ask some explanation of the fact that when the nations of the world, some of them highly civilized and highly cultured, were gradually sinking deeper and deeper into the mire of anthropomorphism, idolatry, and fetichism, one rude, uncultured, shepherd race, dwelling in a secluded corner of the earth, brought into contact in their wanderings and exiles with all the flourishing empires of antiquity, should have jealously guarded the Monotheism and moral code of the earliest days, and were as prepared to fight for it and to die for it in the days of

Herod Agrippa as they were under the leadership of Moses or Solomon. No doubt we may be told that the Religious Books of the Jews are but the forgeries and fabrications of a later age, but waiving that question for the present, is it not an historical fact that the Jews were professing Monotheism in the very earliest periods, and that they clung to that Monotheism throughout the centuries when every other people—even those among whom they lived as exiles—were plunging into the most appalling excesses? How are the progressionists to explain this phenomenon?

Again, it is a strange fact that everywhere throughout the world, in India, Egypt, China, Babylonia, Irania, amongst the wild wood-rangers of Australia, the tribesmen of Africa, the Red Indians of North America, we find the same doctrines—some of them strange, indeed—commonly accepted by the people. Everywhere, as has been shown, there existed the belief in the one Supreme Ruler, who, if He did not create the earth, at least, organised it, and gave it its present form. He laid down the laws for His people which, if they observed, they received reward, but if otherwise condign punishment awaited them. The Book of Death amongst the Egyptians, the monuments of Chaldea and Babylonia, the most ancient poetry of Greece and Rome, all alike bear witness to the judgment that is to follow after the passage from this world. Everywhere, too, this great God is worshipped by His children, and worshipped, strange to relate, in the very same way—by sacrifice. Sometimes it is the fruit of the earth that is offered up, sometimes the juice of the vine is poured out upon the ground to signify His universal dominion, whilst in the generality of cases He is honoured and propitiated by the slaughter of animals, and in not a few cases human beings were the victims. Stranger still the very same rites, at least in essentials, are easily recognisable amongst peoples the most widely separated. All men appear to have believed in a wicked spirit who opposes himself to the good principle and is supported in his opposition by a myriad of subordinate agents. His struggle with the powers of heaven, and his final overthrow may be found in the literatures of India

and Greece. Everywhere, too, the idea of a state in which their forefathers were once completely happy, and which they lost through their own fault, is clearly visible. Some of the early Indian Sacred Books assert that man fell because he sinned by eating a forbidden fruit; nor is the serpent's part in this strange, sad drama forgotten. The tradition of a flood or of some other great catastrophe by which mankind was destroyed on account of its wickedness is found in nearly all the ancient literatures, besides being prevalent amongst the tribesmen of Australia, Africa and America.¹ Away in the great nations of the East there is clearly discernible a belief and a hope in a saviour, who is to come and redeem men from their present fallen state; but it is only at a comparatively later period, not earlier than five or six centuries before Christ, that this belief makes its appearance in the Sacred Books. Stranger still, almost at the same period, something closely resembling the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity may be met with, at least in the literature of India.²

How are the evolutionists to explain the presence of such strange doctrines, not in one land alone or amongst one race of people, but in every country and nation of the world, and that, too, at the very earliest times of which we have any historical records? The tradition prevalent amongst all peoples that God has spoken directly to His creatures, and communicated to them many truths which they were to jealously guard, would supply an intelligible solution. Waitz narrates how the wildest Australian bushmen tell how formerly heaven was nearer men than it is now, that the highest God, the Creator Himself, formerly gave lessons of wisdom to human beings but that afterwards He withdrew from them and now dwells far away in heaven, whilst the Sacred Book, *Rig Veda*, bears witness to the existence of a similar belief among the Hindoos of India.³ Do not these beliefs resemble very closely the narrative contained in the Sacred Books of the Jews? They would certainly serve to

¹ It is strange that amongst the Negro races there have been found as yet no traditions of a Deluge.

² The Abbé de Broglie's *L'Histoire des Religions*.

³ *The Making of Religion*, Lang; *L'Histoire des Religions*.

explain a phenomenon with which the anthropologists have not yet seriously grappled.

Lastly, how are they to explain the rise, spread, and development of Christianity? Christ was a philosopher, they say, of giant intellect. He scrutinised the doctrines of the great masters who had gone before, carefully selecting what was consonant with human reason, and which tended to elevate mankind, and rejecting whatever appeared contradictory and degrading. It was thus, by borrowing from Judaism, Brahminism, Buddhism, that he was enabled to build up the system which has been the pride of the philosopher as well as of the uneducated for the last nineteen hundred years. Search Christianity, ay, Catholicity if you will, and you can never point to a single doctrine or practice that may not be found in other creeds. These are the works of men, you say; why should you claim a different authorship for your Christianity? Thus argues the anthropologist.

It is undoubtedly true that Christianity resembles pagan religions, even in their minor details. Thus in the Sacred Books of India we find mention of a saviour: 'How-tscih, born of a pure virgin who had trodden in the footsteps of God, and whose delivery was without pain.'¹ After birth he was exposed in a narrow place, where the oxen and sheep protected him. Again, Guatama, or Buddha, according to the legendary accounts, was born of a virgin princess, was brought shortly afterwards to the temple, and while there one of the old priests, on seeing him, foretold the glorious career that lay before him. He lived in the bosom of his family till he had reached the twenty-ninth year of his age. Then he fled to the desert with a few disciples, and in the desert gave himself up to the most rigorous fasts for a number of days, at the end of which Mara, the enemy of mankind, appeared, to tempt him to withdraw from his designs for human salvation; and, though his followers fled in terror, he put the wicked one to flight. In his public career of preaching miracle after miracle—some of them strange, indeed—were wrought by him. The touching interviews with Magdalen and the Samaritan woman find

¹ *American Quarterly Review*.

something of a parallel in Buddha's life. It is recorded that he ascended into heaven in a chariot drawn by a million gods, and descended each day to promote his work on earth. Again, Buddha forbade adultery, robbery, lying, deceit, intemperance, murder. Amongst his monks he encouraged chastity, poverty, and obedience, whilst he preached charity, benevolence, kindness, towards all. Are not these the beautiful maxims of the Gospel ?¹

In India, too, we find flourishing such practices as confession of sins, spiritual direction, frequent meditation on the vanities of earthly things. The ritual of the Mass, as it exists to-day in the Eastern Church, may be found included in the Chinese liturgy, the words of consecration having been replaced by some magic spells. The Catholic doctrine about receiving the Body of the Lord under the appearance of bread was evidently flourishing away in the depths of Mexico before the Spanish missionaries had visited the country. Beads and incense, and torches and priestly vestments, are to be met with in many of the Eastern religions. Stranger still, in the very heart of Central Asia, a land little visited by explorers, the missionaries suddenly came upon a scene which filled them with awe and wonder. They found a race of people with a pope, a college of cardinals, bishops, priests, abbots, deacons, believing in the doctrine of Transubstantiation, paying reverence to the Holy Virgin, frequently confessing their sins, fasting at stated periods, praying for the souls in purgatory. These are but examples of the striking resemblances which one may be prepared to meet in the study of religions. How are they to affect our opinions about the origin of Christianity?

Let us suppose that Christ was a mere philosopher who strove to construct a religious system on the model supplied by previous reformers. The question would still remain, how was it possible that a poor countryman in Judea could have studied the works of Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, not to mention a thousand other religious documents—

¹ For full account of Buddha's teaching, vide Dr. Aiken's excellent work, *The Dhamma of Gottona the Buddha, and the Gospel of Jesus Christ*. Boston: Marlier & Co., 1900.

works the very existence of which was not even dreamt of within the boundaries of the Roman Empire for centuries afterwards—how could He have drawn together, from such a confused and often contradictory medley, the beautiful and harmonious system which even the adversaries admit Christianity to be; and, above all, how could He have succeeded in spreading His doctrines throughout so many nations and peoples, with different manners and customs, and languages and ideals, and spread it without allowing it to be changed to suit the tastes of these various races? Buddha doubtlessly built up an imposing religious system; but Buddha failed to win support, except by permitting his followers to retain all their old beliefs, and change the new ones to suit their wishes. Catholics do not deny to the individual the power of evolving a religion comprising many of the natural truths; but they do assert that he can never succeed in inducing a great body of the people to accept his teaching, and in proof of this assertion they may confidently appeal to the testimony of history. The religion of Christ, on the contrary, swept before it all traces of the older worship; it spread throughout the world in a comparatively short space of time, despite the opposition of emperors and priests and philosophers; its followers were not divided into a thousand warring sects, as were the adherents of Buddha or Confucius; but they were united into one solid body, all believing the same doctrines, all obeying the same sovereign power. It was not without life or energy, as are the Eastern religions of to-day, but a great, living reality in the world, always advancing—at least always struggling—and to-day it shows as little signs of breaking up as it did in the days of Pepin or Constantine the Great. What all philosophers before Him had failed to do, what was opposed to the whole history of mankind from the beginning, Christ succeeded in doing. Surely, then, the anthropologists must admit that it devolves upon them to put forward some explanation of this remarkable phenomenon.

The explanation given is well worthy of their school. All the doctrines of Christianity, they say, were taught before in one or other of the earlier creeds. These were

confessedly the work of man ; such, therefore, must also be the religion of Christ. Never was a more feeble argument advanced in defence of any theory. Even on their own principles that like effects presuppose like causes does it not clearly follow that Christianity cannot be the work of man, because they themselves admit that it combines in one all that is best in the previous worships without containing any of their revolting features. It is, therefore, immensely superior to all others, and must be referred to a superior cause. Again, the very essence of the difficulty which they have got to explain is—how *this collection* was made? Does it follow that because Zoroaster, Confucius and Buddha, Socrates and Plato, were each able to construct a system containing a few of the great truths of Christianity mingled or rather overlaid with masses of superstition and error that the Christ who preached a religion combining all the scattered glimpses of truth without at the same time any of the blunders which had disfigured previous systems—that he must be merely a man as these masters were? Such an argument as this would hardly bear the test of logic.

But, cannot the resemblance between Christianity and Pagan worship be explained on any other hypothesis except that Christ was a mere plagiarist? Surely the anthropologists might deign to listen to the opinions of those who differ with them. In the first place many of the apparent difficulties vanish if we but bear in mind that some of these religions were developed long after the days of Christ and are only reproductions of Catholic worship. Thus, it can be proved that the pope, cardinals, bishops, priests, fasts, prayers, confessions, purgatory, of the people of Thibet, are but the importations of the Nestorian Christians of the fifth or sixth century. They had intercourse with India and China, and this, too, will serve to explain the presence of the Catholic ritual of the Mass in the liturgy of the Chinese. Might not their narratives of the life and actions of the Redeemer have given rise to the numberless legends which have been since woven round the name of Buddha?¹

¹ See Professor Aiken's work as quoted above. He proves that many of these legends were woven round the name of Buddha long after the Preaching of Christ.

Again, many of the apparent resemblances are purely accidental and do not demand any explanation. Were we to devote our attention to mere coincidences there is hardly anything we might not be able to demonstrate. Thus, M. Jacolliat has undertaken to prove from the likeness between the word Krishna—the name of an Indian god—and Christ that Christianity is the product of Parseeism, though Krishna is a Sanskrit word meaning black, and Christ is the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Messiah, which signifies anointed. A French writer in reply to M. Dupuis, who rates very highly this method of argument, undertook to prove in the same way that Napoleon never existed because Napoleon is only a legendary hero identical with Apollo. This he proved not only from the apparent resemblance between the names but also by citing several of the historical facts recorded in the life of the dethroned emperor which almost exactly correspond with the legendary tales told of Apollo.¹ It was a fair reply to such a method of demonstration but like everything else it could be carried too far. It does not serve to completely explain the difficulty.

With regard to the external worship of Christianity, its liturgy, its rites and ceremonies and processions and priestly vestments, why should it be thought strange if these once flourished in pagan lands? Why could not Christ adopt in His new religion those outward forms that are so well suited to express the religious emotions of the heart? Many Egyptian scholars, for example, are inclined to believe that most of the Mosaic ceremonial had been flourishing for centuries in Egypt before the law was given on Mount Sinai. Circumcision certainly did—and, yet, who would dare to assert from this fact alone that Judaism was not divine? Judging *a priori* would we not say that if Christ were God, and, hence necessarily a prudent reformer, He would permit His followers to retain the external forms to which they had been accustomed from their childhood—sanctifying only

¹ *L'Histoire des Religions*,

and giving to God what had been devoted for ages to the worship of idols?

Again, it is not Catholic teaching that Christ came to destroy the natural law, but rather to develop and perfect it. Why, then, should the presence in His system of the mere natural truths be used as an argument against the divinity of His religion? Nor are we disposed to deny that the followers of Christ had recourse to the philosophical ideas and forms of language then flourishing in order the better to clothe and explain the great dogmas of Christian faith. Where is the preacher or orator to-day who has his mind set upon success and does not first carefully study the ideals, the modes of thought, the peculiar linguistic forms to which his audience are accustomed, and prepare himself accordingly to win their attention. Would that be considered plagiarism in him? if not, why should it be in the case of Christ and the early preachers of His Gospel?

Those who maintain a primitive revelation have no reason to fear these resemblances between Christianity and pagan creeds; they ought, rather, to seek for them. They assert that all races and peoples are descended from a common forefather, to whom God, speaking directly, communicated all the great truths afterwards embodied in Christianity. In the course of ages men became less and less mindful of their Creator; this body of truths was gradually becoming corrupted, and it was only when Christ appeared on earth that the knowledge of them was again universal. This, certainly, appears to be the view followed by St. Augustine when he says:—

What is now called the Christian religion has existed amongst the ancients, and was not absent from the beginning of the human race until Christ came in the flesh, from which time the true religion began to be called Christian.

There are, however, serious difficulties to be overcome by those who would assert that Christianity in its entirety as embracing all its great dogmas was thus revealed in the beginning. Were one to assert that a revelation was made in the beginning, not, indeed, a revelation of the whole Christian

dogmas, but rather of the seeds of the doctrines afterwards embodied in the teaching of Christ and His followers, he would have escaped these apparent difficulties. In the lapse of ages, however, these truths were differently developed by different peoples, according to their peculiar bent of mind. No doubt, even in these developments, one might be prepared to meet some striking resemblances, since all forms of worship spring from the deep religious feeling common to human nature, and have as their object the expression of man's sentiments towards his Supreme Ruler. Palaces, for example, however much they may differ, have many striking points of agreements, because they are all built for the same purpose. Why should not the same be true in religion? This view serves at once to guard the primeval revelation, and escapes the difficulties which might be advanced against it if put forward in its extreme form.

J. M'CAFFREY.

DR. SALMON'S 'INFALLIBILITY'

III

DR. SALMON said in his Introductory Lecture, 'I have an advantage in addressing an audience all of one way of thinking, that I am not bound to measure my words through fear of giving offence' (page 15). This is really a very questionable advantage: and it is more than counter-balanced by the risk of its begetting a confidence which would make the lecturer as indifferent to the measure of his facts and doctrines as to that of his words. Unfortunately for Dr. Salmon, and for his students also, the 'advantage' has had precisely this effect upon him. He had no fear of hostile criticism—no fear that even one of his statements would be questioned by any one of his audience, and, he neither measured his words, nor felt his way, but went on headlong, caricaturing facts and doctrines and arguments in such a way as to suggest grave doubts as to his own sincerity. He informed his students that our great argument for Infallibility was its necessity, though he could have learned from any of our dogmatic theologians that this was not our great argument; and having made this statement, he proceeds to construct for us a profession of faith, sufficiently meagre to dispense with the necessity of an infallible guide; and the 'audience all of one way of thinking,' was, of course, enlightened, delighted and convinced.

Dr. Salmon says: 'For thus holding that the list of truths, necessary to be known in order to salvation, is short and simple, we have the authority of the Roman Church herself' (page 91). And behold the proof:—

What is it [he asks], that for their souls' health they are bound to know? A popular little manual circulated by thousands, and called, 'What every Christian must know,' enables us to answer this question. It tells us that every Christian must know the four great truths of faith, namely:—1. There is one God. 2. In that God there are three Persons. 3. Jesus became Man and died for us. 4. God will reward the good in heaven, and punish the wicked

in hell.' This list of necessary truths is not long, but some Roman Catholics have contended that it might be shortened, pointing out that, since men were undoubtedly saved before Christ's coming, without any explicit faith in the Incarnation or in the doctrine of the Trinity, an explicit faith in these doctrines cannot be held to be necessary to salvation (page 95).

In a note Dr. Salmon attributes this view to Gury, on the authority of Dr. Littledale, and he then proceeds as follows: 'Nor does such faith seem to be demanded in a certain Papal attempt, to define the minimum of necessary knowledge. Pope Innocent IV., in his Commentary on the Decretals, lays down that it is enough for the laity to attend to good works; and for the rest to believe implicitly what the Church believes' (pages 95, 96). Now, when young men, not overburdened with knowledge, are listening day after day to teaching of this sort, it is no wonder that it takes hold of their minds; they come to believe it; they rest satisfied with it; they rely on their teacher; and they go out into the world with the conviction that Catholics are very illogical and absurd, and very wicked also. They have been listening all along to a one-sided story, and they never realise that there is another side, which may be very different. Dr. Salmon warned his students against identifying the statements of particular divines with 'the authorised teaching of the Roman Catholic Church' (page 13). And yet this is precisely what he has himself been doing, in the extracts just given. They are his proof that 'we have the authority of the Roman Church herself for holding that the list of truths, necessary to be known in order to salvation, is short and simple' (page 91). Now, Father Furniss is not 'the Roman Church herself,' neither is Father Gury, nor Innocent IV. in the work quoted, or rather misquoted. Catholic theologians would smile at finding the Regius Professor of Divinity quoting — (misquoting) — a penny book, written by a hard-worked missionary priest, and intended for children, as if it had been a standard Catholic theological work, and 'the authority of the Roman Church herself.' No wonder that the Doctor's pupils become such profound theologians, such formidable controversialists,

such a terror to the Church of Rome! The Doctor, then, is inconsistent. But he is much more than inconsistent; he is grossly unfair to the writers quoted, for neither of them held the doctrine attributed to them by Dr. Salmon.

When a passage is taken out of its context and used in a sense different from that of the writer, that writer is as much misrepresented as if words had been attributed to him which he did not use at all. To falsify a writer's meaning is just as bad as to falsify his words. The view attributed to Gury is a good illustration of this. He is represented as teaching that our obligatory profession of faith 'might be shortened'; limited to belief in God, and in future rewards and punishments; and Catholics are represented as holding the necessity of an infallible guide for so short a creed. Now, if Dr. Salmon believes in St. Paul's teaching, he must be satisfied that belief in the two articles mentioned was absolutely necessary before the Church was founded at all. And does he fancy that an astute Jesuit theologian is so simple as to maintain that an infallible church is necessary for the teaching of truths, that had been believed for several centuries before the Church came into existence. Is he, in his anxiety to make out a case against the Catholic Church, abandoning the old Protestant theory about the Jesuits? He quotes Gury from Dr. Littledale. It would have been much better if he had quoted from Gury himself; for then, he would have seen that the passage referred to, had no more reference to the doctrine of Infallibility than the *Aurora Borealis* has. What sort of necessity does Gury contemplate in the passage referred to?

It becomes necessary again to remind Dr. Salmon of the distinction made by theologians between the necessity of means (*necessitas mediæ*), and the necessity of precept (*necessitas præcepti*). In strict theological language a thing is said to be a means (medium) of salvation, when it contributes something positive towards the securing of salvation; and, it is a necessary means, when this positive influence contributed by it, cannot be otherwise supplied. A thing, then, that is necessary as a means (*necessitate mediæ*) of salvation, is so necessary, that in no circumstances can

it be dispensed with ; it does for us something for the saving of our souls, which nothing else (in the present dispensation) can do. The necessity, therefore, is strict and absolute and indispensable. On the other hand, when a thing is said to be necessary, by necessity of precept (*necessitate praecepti*), the necessity arises solely out of the precept ; the thing commanded or prohibited has, of itself, no positive influence on our salvation ; it does nothing positive for us ; but if we violate the precept we sin, and thus put a bar to our salvation. It is clear, then, that the necessity of precept can affect only adults in the possession of their reason, for such only are capable of fulfilling a precept ; and it is clear, also, that circumstances may exempt one wholly, or partly, from the obligation of a precept. And since we are bound to labour to save our souls, it follows that whatever is necessary as a means of salvation comes under that obligation, and is, therefore, necessary by necessity of precept also. Now, according to Catholic theology, faith is necessary as a means of salvation, absolutely and indispensably, for all without exception. Habitual faith infused in baptism suffices for infants who die before they come to the use of reason. But for all adults who have come to the use of reason, actual faith, supernatural in its principle and in its motive—that is, explicit belief in certain divinely revealed truths—is necessary as a means of salvation (*necessitate mediæ*), and from this stern necessity, no circumstances whatever, no ignorance however invincible, can excuse them. How many truths of faith come under this stern necessity of means, is not determined ; but all adults in the enjoyment of reason are bound by necessity of precept (*necessitate praecepti*) to believe all that God has revealed, and that His Church teaches. As already stated, circumstances may, to a large extent, affect the obligation of a precept, or may, altogether, exempt one from its observance. One, for instance, to whom the precept was never made known, cannot be expected to observe it, and does not sin by not observing it. A street arab who has been neglected by his parents, who has been the sport of adverse fortune from his earliest

days, cannot be expected to know his faith as well as a child, who has been trained carefully by religious parents. And a trained theologian—like Dr. Salmon—knows much more of revealed truth than an ordinary layman does, and is therefore bound to a greater measure of explicit faith in those truths that are necessary, by necessity of precept (*necessitate praecepti*). And the violation of the precept of faith, is a much greater sin, in the case of one who has a better knowledge of his obligation; for such a person sins against greater light. Thus then, while the precept of faith is the same for all, its obligation, as regards explicit faith, does not affect individuals with equal stringency. All this, Dr. Salmon could have read in any of our dogmatic theologians; and he should have read it somewhere before he ventured to lecture on so important and difficult a subject. But to misrepresent our theologians without reading them, appears to be Dr. Salmon's *forte*. Instead of looking, himself, at the text of Gury, he takes it from the extra-fallible Littledale, and tells his students that we require an infallible guide to a profession of faith, that is limited by one of our own standard theologians to two articles:—the existence of God, and future rewards and punishments. Now again, what sort of necessity does Gury contemplate in the passage referred to? Nothing can be clearer than Gury's own words. The passage occurs in his treatise, *De Virtutibus*, c. 1, art. 2, s. 1, and the section is headed—'On the truths necessary to be known and believed by necessity of means' (*necessitate medii*). He is, therefore, discussing what truths of faith are absolutely and indispensably necessary (*necessitate medii*) to be explicitly believed by all, whether in the Church or outside of it, in order that they may be saved. He states as certain that the two articles of faith mentioned by Dr. Salmon are necessary as a means (*necessitate medii*) and he gives the proof; and having done so, he says:—'But it is disputed whether there are not many other articles also necessary to be explicitly believed by this same rigorous necessity of means (*necessitate medii*) for salvation.' He states that some theologians hold that the Trinity and Incarnation

come under the same rigorous necessity, but, he himself thinks the opposite opinion more probable; that is, that only faith in God, and in future rewards and punishments, is necessary by necessity of means (*necessitate mediæ*) for salvation.

This, then, according to Gury, is the minimum of explicit faith to qualify an adult for entering into Heaven; and no circumstances whatever—no amount of invincible ignorance—would excuse from the stern necessity of so much at least of explicit faith. It holds for all without exception, whether in the Church or out of it. It has been necessary since revelation began, and a majority of theologians regard it as more probable that the Christian revelation has not altered this minimum. Thus, then, the opinion of Gury contemplates a most exceptional case:—that of one who has explicit faith in God, and who believes that He will reward those who serve Him; but who, through no fault of his own, is ignorant of all other revealed truths. And all that the opinion concedes is, that the salvation of such a person is not impossible. According to Gury, therefore, the salvation of one who has explicit faith in God and in future rewards and punishments, is, in certain most exceptional circumstances, not impossible. Therefore, says Dr. Salmon, Gury teaches that explicit faith in God and in future rewards and punishments is sufficient for all persons, at all times and in all circumstances. This is all 'that for their souls' health they are obliged to know' (page 95); and in this teaching of Gury 'we have the authority of the Roman Church herself' (page 91). Dr. Salmon's logic is worthy of his cause. In the chapter and article of Gury, already quoted, section 2 is headed: 'On the truths necessary to be known and believed by necessity of precept' (*necessitate praecepti*); and he gives in the list of such truths the Apostle's Creed, the Commandments, the Precepts of the Church, the Lord's Prayer, the Sacraments, and he adds such an explanation of them as includes our full obligation, both as to faith and morals. All this we are bound by the Church to know and believe, and for the simple and sufficient reason that our

Lord commissioned and commanded her to teach all this ; and it is in teaching all this that the Church's infallible authority comes to be exercised. This is a very different version of Gury's teaching from that given to his students by Dr. Salmon ; but it is Gury's own.

And bad as Dr. Salmon's treatment of Gury is, his treatment of Pope Innocent IV. is immeasurably worse ; for he represents the Pope as teaching that 'the laity' require no explicit faith at all. After misquoting Gury the Doctor adds :—

Nor does such faith seem to be demanded in a certain Papal attempt to define the minimum of necessary knowledge. Pope Innocent IV., in his *Commentary on the Decretals*, lays down that it is enough for the laity to attend to good works, and for the rest to believe implicitly what the Church believes (pages 95, 96).

The quotation begins with one of those sinister insinuations with which Dr. Salmon's book is literally teeming : 'a certain Papal attempt to define.' Now, when we speak of a Pope defining any doctrinal question, we understand that he is pronouncing a definite sentence, which Catholics are bound to accept as infallible ; and the expression used by Dr. Salmon suggests to his students that 'the minimum of necessary knowledge' has been definitely fixed for us by an infallible decision, that minimum being no explicit faith at all, at least for lay Catholics. Now (1), no Catholic believes that a Pope, when he writes a book, is acting in his official capacity as Head of the Church and teaching infallibly. Benedict XIV. has written several very learned and valuable works, which are frequently quoted by Catholic theologians, but never as infallible utterances. It is so with the work of Innocent IV. He was a very learned man ; but no one before Dr. Salmon represents him as defining, or attempting to define, the questions discussed in his book in the sense in which that word 'define' is used when there is question of the exercise of Infallibility. When a Pope writes such a work Catholics regard him as a private theologian giving his opinion ; and in such cases his opinion is weighed, like that of other theologians, on its merits. But (2) Innocent IV. did not give the opinion attributed to him by Dr. Salmon,

but the exact contradictory of it; and Dr. Salmon's manipulation of the text he professes to be quoting is one of the worst specimens of his controversial tactics. He suppresses what the Pope says, in order to represent him as saying what he did not say. 'Pope Innocent IV. lays down that it is enough for the laity to attend to good works, and for the rest to believe implicitly what the Church believes.' Now, if the Pope lays down that, this is enough; therefore, he lays down that no explicit faith is necessary for the laity. This is Dr. Salmon's version. But the opening words of the passage he professes to be quoting are as follows:—

There is a certain measure of faith to which everyone is bound, and which is sufficient for the simple, and, perhaps, even for all laics; that is, that each one coming to the faith must believe that there is a God, and that He rewards all the good. They must also believe other articles implicitly; that is, they must believe that whatever the Church teaches is true.

With his usual dexterity Dr. Salmon omits the passage in which the Pope insists on the necessity of explicit faith, and substitutes words which have no foundation in the text at all. The Pope says that explicit faith in God, and in future rewards, is necessary for all, even the most ignorant; but according to Dr. Salmon he lays down that the laity require no explicit faith at all. There is very little likelihood that Dr. Salmon's students will take the trouble of consulting the very rare and obscure book which he professed to quote; and so, the false impression created by his teaching will remain; and if the students really believe their professor, they will go out into the world with the conviction, that their Catholic neighbours are not bound to have explicit faith even in the existence of God! What a liberal and enlightened generation of clerics that must be, which has had the advantage of Dr. Salmon's special training.

The remainder of Dr. Salmon's reference to Innocent IV. is quite irrelevant. It is clearly intended to fasten on Catholic priests in the past, the charge of ignorance. Well, it is much to be regretted that religious teachers in any Church should be wanting in knowledge; but the Catholic

Church has not a monopoly of such teachers. A glance at the third chapter of Macaulay's *History of England*, or at Dean Swift's *Directions to Servants*, would show Dr. Salmon that he has some domestic difficulties to settle. And indeed, judging from his own lectures, those who have had the privilege of his own special training, are not likely to become prodigies of theological knowledge;—and certainly their time would have been better employed in learning to defend whatever revealed truths they still hold, than in learning to calumniate us. But even irrelevant as the quotation from Innocent IV. is, Dr. Salmon could not resist his habit of manipulating it. The cleric described by Macaulay, after securing the cook or kitchen-maid as partner of his missionary toil, was allowed by his Church to propagate the Gospel after his own fashion. No inconvenient inquisition was set up as to his positive knowledge of the truths he was supposed to teach. But the ignorant cleric contemplated by Innocent IV. was not let off so easily, as Dr. Salmon could have seen from the text before him. By dispensation of the Pope, or of a religious superior, such a cleric may be allowed to retain his position, only in the extreme case when he had neither time for studying nor the means of acquiring knowledge; when he was so poor that he should support himself by the labour of his own hands. But if he had facilities for acquiring more explicit knowledge he was bound to acquire it. And the religious superior, before imposing penance on such a cleric for culpable ignorance, was directed to ascertain whether the ignorance arose from weakness of intellect, or, as many of those alleged, from pressure of works of piety and charity. And in the case of one who had sufficient talent and the means of acquiring more explicit knowledge, Innocent IV. would not admit of such an excuse. No doubt the case contemplated by the Pope is an extreme one, and the standard is certainly low; but it is very far from being so low as Dr. Salmon represents it; and moreover, it was the result of the bad system of lay interference in ecclesiastical appointments—a system which the Popes always laboured to break down.

Amongst the myriad misquotations in Dr. Salmon's book, perhaps the most extraordinary is his reference to Father Furniss. The little book quoted, *What every Christian must know*, is one of a series of 'Books for Children.' The *Imprimatur* of the present learned Archbishop of Dublin on its first page, is an absolutely certain warrant of its orthodoxy; but, being intended for children, and for very young children, too, its style is the plainest and simplest imaginable, and its teaching of the most elementary character. That this penny book should be looked up to as an authority by the theological faculty of Trinity College, is an indication of the profound knowledge of theology which the faculty imparts; but, that so plain and simple a little book should be misrepresented, must be the result of an invincible propensity. This little tract, he says,

Tells us that every Christian must know the four great truths of faith, namely:—1. There is one God. 2. In that God there are three Persons. 3. Jesus became man and died for us. 4. God will reward the good in heaven and punish the wicked in hell (page 95).

And on the following page he adds that:—

Later editions add the doctrine of the Sacraments, namely:—Baptism takes away original sin; Confession takes away actual sin; and the Blessed Sacrament is the body and blood of Christ.

And he adds:—

But take this list of necessary truths at the longest, and it certainly has the merit of brevity But the main point is, that if the list of necessary truths is so short the necessity for an infallible guide disappears, the four great truths of faith named are held as strongly by Protestants who dispense with the guidance of the Church of Rome as by those who follow it (pages 96, 97).

All that we need believe then is the existence of God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, future rewards and punishments, with Baptism, Confession, and the Blessed Sacrament, and for this concise creed we require an infallible guide. This is Dr. Salmon's version of the teaching of Father Furniss. But when we consult Father Furniss himself, we find the Doctor playing his old game. The

very first sentence in Father Furniss' little book is a quotation from Benedict XIV. as follows :—' We affirm that the greatest part of the damned are in hell, because they were ignorant of those mysteries of faith which Christians must know and believe.' This does not look like minimising in the matter of faith. And the very next sentence, which is the first of Father Furniss' own text, is as follows :—' Every Christian, by the command of the Church, must know, at least :—1. The four great truths of Faith. 2. The Sacraments ; at least Baptism, Penance, and the Blessed Eucharist. 3. The Prayers, Our Father, Hail Mary, and the Creed, or, I believe. 4. The Commandments of God, and the Church.' And then under the heading of Faith, Father Furniss says :—' Be very careful to learn these four great truths, because no one can go to heaven without knowing them,' and he then gives the four great truths named by Dr. Salmon. It is clear, then, from Father Furniss himself, that the necessity for the four great truths is the necessity of means, whereas, in the previous sentence he contemplated the necessity of precept, and gave, under that heading, his substance of the Catholic profession of faith, which we are bound to take from the Church.

Father Furniss next gives the Sacraments :—Baptism, Penance, and the Blessed Eucharist, with a very short question and answer on each. And, strange to say, Dr. Salmon misrepresents only one of these answers ; but what is lost in number is made up for by the character of the misrepresentation. ' Confession takes away actual sin,' he says, whilst professing to be quoting from Father Furniss. No, Confession does not take away actual sin, and Father Furniss does not say that it does. The Sacrament of Penance takes away actual sin, and Father Furniss says so ; but of that Sacrament Confession is only one part, and that not the most essential or important. Such, then, are the authorities offered to his students by Dr. Salmon, to convince them, that we are required to believe very little, and, that for that little we require an infallible guide. For teaching of this sort it is no excuse that it is addressed to ' an audience all of one way of thinking.' This circumstance

only renders such teaching more reprehensible, for it keeps young men from thinking aright on a question involving the salvation of their souls. Now, when Dr. Salmon told his students that our obligatory profession of faith may, according to our own theologians, be cut down to two articles, and that we required an infallible guide even for these, did he make the slightest attempt to verify his statement? Does he fancy that we are fools to risk our souls on such a creed? Does he fancy us ignorant of the fact that the articles named were just as necessary before the Church was founded as they are now? Did he really believe his own statement regarding us? Either he did not believe his own statement about us, or, if he did believe it, then his ignorance is not only culpable, but contemptible; for a moment's glance at the authorities quoted by him would have convinced him of his error. There is no use in mincing matters with this Regius Professor. His loud sounding titles give him no license to misrepresent. While teaching respectable young men he takes his authorities at second hand from tainted sources; and, from false premises thus acquired he draws false conclusions, and sets them before his students as truths admitted by Catholics themselves. Instead of giving them reliable information, he crams them with error and with prejudices, and sends them on their mission, blind leaders of the blind, with, of course, the usual result. If our doctrines be false, surely they can be refuted without being misrepresented; and if they be true, Dr. Salmon and his young men have a very vital interest in knowing what they really are. 'The main point is,' he says, 'that, if the list of necessary truths is so short, the necessity for an infallible guide disappears.' The main point is just the reverse, for the list of necessary truths is not so short, and the necessity for an infallible guide does not, therefore, disappear. But Dr. Salmon must be again reminded that our argument for the infallible guide is grounded, not on its necessity at all, but on God's express revelation of it. It is our duty to take the truth from God, not to ask Him the reason why; though the conflicting opinions held by the leaders of Dr. Salmon's Church on

the most vital doctrines of Christianity afford a very strong presumptive proof of the necessity of an infallible guide for a much shorter creed than ours. A day will come for Dr. Salmon when he shall know a good deal more theology than he seems to know now; and as it is just possible that such knowledge may come too late, it may be more prudent for him to consider seriously in time whether in 'dispensing with the guidance of the Church of Rome' he may not be in reality casting in his lot with the heathen and the publican. He says his object is not victory but truth, and here is a matter in which truth and victory go hand in hand.

Not content with misrepresenting Father Furniss as to the list of necessary truths, Dr. Salmon seeks to bring ridicule on him for attempting to determine such a list at all. He says: 'And we may think it strange that a modern writer has succeeded in doing what the writers of the New Testament tried to do, and are said to have failed in' (page 96). Here he tells his students that the writers of the New Testament tried to draw up a complete list of necessary truths, to be, of course, handed down in the New Testament; and he insinuates, that we hold they failed in the attempt. Now, we deny emphatically, that the writers of the New Testament had any such intention, and they could not be said to have failed in doing what they never attempted to do. The Doctor offers no proof of his statement, except his confident assertion.

It was certainly, [he says], the object of the New Testament writers to declare the truths necessary to salvation. St. John (xx. 31) tells us his object in writing: 'These are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through His name' (page 96).

Now this assertion, and the text offered to prove it, fall far short of the Doctor's case. It is necessary for him to show that the object of the New Testament writers was to declare in their writings, all the truths necessary to salvation. The text of St. John refers to the Incarnation only, and it may be presumed that Dr. Salmon believes at least in the

Trinity. As already stated, the New Testament writings were called forth by circumstances. In one place it was necessary to counteract the tendency to Judaizing; in another place, the false principles of Pagan philosophy had to be checked; in another place professing Christians had to be censured for their wicked lives, or for the dissensions that were springing up amongst them. To meet such emergencies was the object of the writers of the New Testament, as Dr. Salmon is well aware. To this object their writings are mainly directed, and not in all these writings, taken together, have we stated the complete body of Christian faith. The Apostles, no doubt, declared to their followers all the truths necessary to salvation, but they did not insert all these truths in the inspired writings that have come down to us, and Dr. Salmon has not an atom of proof to the contrary. And, though he has offered no proof whatever, he proceeds, as if his case had been indisputably established, to say:—

Yet we are required to believe that these Apostles and Evangelists, who wrote under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, performed their task so badly, that one who should have recourse to their pages for guidance is more likely than not to go astray, and is likely to find nothing but perplexity and error. Strange indeed that inspired writers should fail in their task. Stranger still that writers who claim no miraculous assistance, should be able to accomplish it in a half-a-dozen lines (pages 96, 97).

No such extravagant demand is made on Dr. Salmon, at least by Catholics. We leave him in the full enjoyment of that liberty to believe, or not to believe, which his own Church gives. But if he make a ridiculous hypothesis, what follows from it must be his own affair. Catholics do not say that everything in Scripture is obscure and difficult; that no revealed truths are stated plainly in it; but they do say that the whole of God's revelation is not contained in it; whilst the conflicting Creeds professedly deduced from it, by men as earnest and 'prayerful' as Dr. Salmon, afford conclusive proof, that there is a great deal in Scripture that is obscure, and that a great many have gone astray, and have found little but 'perplexity and error' for seeking to find

their faith from it alone. The following extract is recommended to Dr. Salmon's consideration :—

Whence come the separation of antagonistic Churches and the multiplicity of dissentient sects ? The Romanist reads the Bible, and he finds in it the primacy of Peter, the supremacy of the Church, and the direction to 'do penance' for the forgiveness of sins. The Protestant reads it, and he discovers that Rome is the 'mystic Babylon,' the 'mother of harlots,' the 'abomination of desolation.' The Sacerdotalist reads it, and he sees priestly supremacy, Eucharistic Sacrifice, and Sacramental Salvation. The Protestant cannot find in it the faintest trace of Sacerdotalism, nor any connexion whatever between offering an actual sacrifice and the holy memorial of the Supper of the Lord. The Congregationalist reads it, and regards Sacerdotalism as an enormous apostasy from the meaning and spirit of the Gospel, and comes away convinced that every believer is his own all-sufficient priest. The Baptist looks into it, and thinks that in Baptism true believers must go under the water as adults. Most other Christians think that infants should be baptised, and that sprinkling is sufficient. Cromwell and his Roundheads read it, and saw everywhere the Lord of Hosts leading on his followers to battle. The Quaker reads it, and finds only the Prince of Peace, and declares 'He that takes the sword shall perish with the sword.' The Anglican Churchman was long persuaded that it taught the doctrine of passive obedience—the right-divine of kings to govern wrong—the Puritan dwelt on 'binding their kings in chains and their nobles with links of iron.' The Calvinist sees the dreadful image of wrath flaming over all its pages, and says to his enemies, 'Our God is a consuming fire.' The Universalist sees only the loving Heavenly Father, and explains the most awful forebodings, as Oriental tropes and pictorial rhetoric. The Mormon picks out phrases to bolster up his polygamy. The Monogamist cries out even against divorce. The Shaker and his congeners in all ages forbid and disparage all wedded unions whatever.¹

The writer of this extract is a Protestant quite as orthodox as Dr. Salmon, and like the Doctor an enthusiastic upholder of the all-sufficiency of Scripture. When Dr. Salmon and his 'prayerful' friends can find so many different religions in the same Bible, they are illustrating in the clearest possible way the result that comes of 'dispensing with the guidance of the Church of Rome.' While discussing the necessary articles of faith, Dr. Salmon

¹ Farrar, *The Bible, its Meaning and Supremacy*. 2nd ed. p. 143.

introduces the distinction between *explicit* and *implicit* faith, and uses it, with his wonted cleverness, to blindfold his students while professing to enlighten them. 'No one,' he says truly, 'is so unreasonable as to expect ordinary members of the Church to be acquainted with all the decisions of Popes and Councils' (page 91); and he goes on to enumerate some decisions that are difficult and obscure; and he states that, though it would be unreasonable to expect Catholics to know them, 'they are nevertheless obliged to believe them.' And again he adds: 'Of these and such like propositions which an unlearned Catholic is bound to believe he is not in the least expected to know even the meaning . . . He must believe that the Church teaches true doctrines but he need not know what these doctrines are' (page 92). If Dr. Salmon, before making the above statements, had explained to his students, the distinction between explicit and implicit faith, and applied it, his remarks would have lost their sting; but he allowed his statement to produce a false impression on his students, and then, he introduced the distinction in order to produce another impression even more false and detrimental. He told them that ordinary Catholics were bound to believe what they could not be expected to know, and, without a word of explanation, he quotes Cardinal Newman as an authority for this statement.

Dr. Newman, [he says], has been so good as to furnish me with an example. 'What sense,' he asks, 'can a child or a peasant, nay, or any ordinary Catholic, put upon the Tridentine Canons? . . . Yet the doctrinal enunciations,' he adds, 'are *de fide*.' Peasants are bound to believe them as well as controversialists, and to believe them as truly as they believe our Lord to be God (page 91).

It must have been a source of great satisfaction to Dr. Salmon's theologians, to find us convicted of such irreligious extravagance, and that too on the authority of Cardinal Newman. But their professor did not tell them that the quotation was taken from an objection which Newman proposed to himself; and still less did he think of telling them that Newman had answered the objection. It is difficult to suppress one's feeling in dealing with such

dishonest controversy as this. The Fifth chapter of the *Grammar of Assent* is the only one that is strictly speaking theological; and in its Third Section, Newman undertakes to deal with 'a familiar charge against the Catholic Church in the mouths of her opponents, that she imposes on her children, as matters of faith, . . . a great number of doctrines, which none but professed theologians can understand.'¹ The principle of the objection was urged long since by Jeremy Taylor, but Cardinal Newman expands it, and urges it with his wonted candour and ability. That Dr. Salmon should have borrowed his objection from Newman, is quite intelligible; for Newman was sure to put it with more precision, and with greater force than the Doctor himself could command; but that he should have led his students to believe that he was quoting Newman's teaching instead of Newman's objection; that he should have altogether suppressed Newman's answer; all this is, perhaps, one of the most glaring and discreditable specimens of even Dr. Salmon's controversial tactics. The Doctor could not have acted in good faith in thus misrepresenting Newman, for Newman distinctly states that he is putting an objection, and he states with equal distinctness that he answers the objection. In the very first sentence of the paragraph from which Dr. Salmon quotes, Newman says: 'I will suppose the objection urged thus.'² The last sentence but one of the same paragraph is the one quoted by Dr. Salmon, and to it Newman adds: 'How then are the Catholic *Credenda* easy, and within reach of all?' And in the opening sentence of the very next paragraph Newman says: 'I begin my answer to this objection by recurring to what has been already said,' etc. (page 142). Dr. Salmon, therefore, could not have mistaken the matter. He must have seen that Newman was putting an objection, and had given an answer (for Newman says so clearly and unmistakably). And yet, he puts before his students the words of the objection as Newman's teaching, which could only be got from the answer, to which he makes no reference

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, p. 138.

² *Ibid.*, p. 141.

whatever. Conduct of this sort needs no comment. No one has more reason to complain of the Doctor than his own students. He is indeed treating them badly. It is worth while to give Newman's answer at some length, for besides vindicating the Cardinal, it completely disposes of Dr. Salmon's second-hand sophistry. Dr. Newman makes some preliminary remarks on the relations between theological truths and the devotions that are grounded on them. He explains how the intellect acts on the deposit of faith, examining it, and systematising it into the science of Theology. He shows how the condemnation of false doctrines, as well as the definitions of true doctrines, enter among the Catholic *Credenda*, and he says :—

But then the question recurs, why should the refutation of heresy be our objects of faith? if no mind, theological or not, can believe what it cannot understand, in what sense can the Canons of Councils and other ecclesiastical determinations, be included in those *Credenda*, which the Church presents to every Catholic, and to which every Catholic gives his firm interior assent?

This is a re-statement of the objection, and the answer is as follows :—

In solving this difficulty I wish it first observed, that if it is the duty of the Church to act as the pillar and ground of the truth, she is manifestly obliged from time to time and to the end of time, to denounce opinions incompatible with that truth, whenever able and subtle minds within her communion venture to publish such opinions. Suppose certain bishops and priests at this day began to teach that Islamism or Buddhism was a direct and immediate revelation from God, she would be bound to use the authority which God has given her to declare that such a proposition will not stand with Christianity, and that those who hold it are none of hers; and she would be bound to impose such a declaration on that very knot of persons, who had committed themselves to the novel proposition, in order that, if they would not recant, they might be separated from her communion as they were separate from her faith. In such a case, then, her masses of population would either not hear of the controversy, or they would at once take part with her, and without effort take any test, which secured the exclusion of the innovators; and she, on the other hand, would feel that what is a rule for some Catholics must be a rule for all. Who is to draw the line, who is to acknowledge it, and who is not?

It is plain there cannot be two rules of faith in the same

communion ; or, rather, as the case really would be, an endless variety of rules coming into force according to the multiplication of heretical theories, and to the degrees of knowledge, and of sentiment in individual Catholics. There is but one rule of faith for all, and, it would be a greater difficulty, to allow of an uncertain rule of faith than (if that was the alternative as it is not) to impose upon uneducated minds a profession which they cannot understand. But it is not the necessary result of unity of profession, nor is it the fact that, the Church imposes dogmatic statements on the interior assent of those who cannot apprehend them. The difficulty is removed by the dogma of the Church's Infallibility, and of the consequent duty of implicit faith in her word. The 'One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church,' is an article of the Creed, and an article which, inclusive of her Infallibility, all men, high and low, can easily master and accept with a real operative assent. It stands in the place of all abstruse propositions in a Catholic mind ; for to believe in her word is virtually to believe in them all. Even what he cannot understand, at least, he can believe to be true ; and he believes it to be true because he believes in the Church. The rationale for unlearned devotion is as follows :—It stands to reason that all of us, learned and unlearned, are bound to believe the whole revealed doctrine, in all its parts, and in all that it implies, according as portion after portion is brought home to our conscience as belonging to it ; and it also stands to reason that a doctrine so deep and so various as the revealed *depositum* of faith, cannot be brought home to us and made our own all at once. No mind, however large, however penetrating, can directly, and fully by one act, understand any one truth however simple. What can be more intelligible than that 'Alexander conquered Asia,' or that 'Veracity is a duty,' but what a multitude of propositions is included under either of these theses ! Still if we profess either we profess all that it includes. Thus as regards the Catholic Creed, if we really believe that our Lord is God, we believe all that is meant by such a belief ; or else we are not in earnest when we profess to believe the proposition. In the act of believing it at all, we forthwith commit ourselves by anticipation to believe truths which at present we do not believe, because they have never come before us. We limit, henceforth, the range of our private judgment in prospect by the conditions, whatever they are, of that dogma. Thus the Arians said that they believed in our Lord's divinity, but when they were pressed to confess His eternity, they denied it ; thereby showing, in fact, that they never had believed in His divinity at all. In other words, a man who really believes in our Lord's proper divinity, believes *implicitly* in His eternity. And so in like manner of the whole *depositum* of faith or the revealed word ; if we believe in the revelation we believe in what is revealed, in all that is revealed, however it may

be brought home to us, by reasoning or in any other way. He who believes that Christ is the truth, and that the Evangelists are truthful, believes all that He has said through them, although he has only read St. Matthew and has not read St. John. He who believes in the *depositum* of revelation, believes in all the doctrines of the *depositum*; and since he cannot know them all at once, he knows some doctrines and does not know others; he may know only the Creed; nay, perhaps, only the chief portions of the Creed; but whether he knows little or much, he has the intention of believing all that there is to believe, whenever, and as soon as it is brought home to him, if he believes in revelation at all. All that he knows now as revealed, and all that he shall know, and all that there is to know, he embraces it all in his intention by one act of faith; otherwise, it is but an accident that he believes this or that, not because it is a revelation. This virtual, interpretative, or prospective belief, is called to believe *implicite*, and it follows from this, that, granting that the canons of councils and other ecclesiastical documents and confessions, to which I have referred, are really involved in the *depositum* or revealed word, every Catholic in accepting the *depositum*, does *implicite* accept these dogmatic decisions. I say 'granting these various propositions are virtually contained in the revealed word,' for, this is the only question left, and that it is to be answered in the affirmative, is clear at once to the Catholic, from the fact that the Church declares them to belong to it. To her is committed the care and the interpretation of the revelation. The word of the Church is the word of revelation. That the Church is the infallible oracle of truth is the fundamental dogma of the Catholic religion; and 'I believe what the Church proposes to be believed' is an act of real assent, including all particular assents, notional and real; and while it is possible for unlearned as well as learned, it is imperative on learned as well as unlearned. And thus it is that by believing the word of the Church *implicite*—that is, by believing all that that word does or shall declare itself to contain—every Catholic, according to his intellectual capacity, supplements the shortcomings of his knowledge, without blunting his real assent to what is elementary, and takes upon himself, from the first, the whole truth of revelation, progressing from one apprehension of it to another, according to his intellectual opportunities.¹

This is Newman's answer to the 'familiar charge against the Catholic Church,' which Dr. Salmon told his students was Newman's own teaching. If the Doctor had read this for his students, they would have seen at once that he was

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, pp. 144-49.

as unfair to Newman as he was to the Catholic Church. The Catholic, then, believes in truths which he does not know, but only with implicit faith, which is only another way of saying that he is really sincere and logical in his explicit faith. Explicit faith is the assent we give to truths that are actually present to our minds—known to us. These truths very often include, imply, much more than is actually before our minds ; but if we be really sincere in our explicit belief of the main truth, we take in also all that logically follows from it. As Newman says: ' We limit henceforth the range of our private judgment in reference to that truth, and are prepared to take in, by faith, the fuller meaning of it, when the knowledge of that fuller meaning is acquired.' In that fuller meaning, not yet known to us, we are said to have implicit faith. It is, then, a virtual, interpretative assent, implied, contained, in our actual assent to the truth which we believe explicitly ; and, if we were so disposed as to exclude this implicit belief, we should, by the very fact, be shown to be insincere in our profession of explicit faith, to have no real faith in the truth which we professed to hold explicitly. When, therefore, uneducated Catholics are said to believe the decrees of councils, obscure definitions of dogma, and condemnations of errors, the meaning is that Catholics, one and all, no matter how little educated, believe openly and explicitly in the authority and infallibility of the Church ; and by this act of explicit faith they take in and believe implicitly all that the Church teaches, and they condemn and reject all that she rejects and condemns. All this Dr. Salmon could have seen—he must have seen it—in the section of the *Grammar of Assent*, from which he took his quotation. But he did not tell his students that he saw it—of course, in the interest of truth. And in reality Dr. Salmon's own students are doing daily, the very same thing which he taught them to consider so extravagant and so impious in us. They profess to believe in the Bible, and let us hope they are sincere ; but it is surely not uncharitable to suppose that there are more truths in it than they are aware of. Are they prepared to believe these truths when they come to know them ? If so,

they are in a state of mind similar to that which their Regius Professor condemns in us. If they are not prepared to believe them, then they are in a much worse state of mind—prepared to reject God's revelation, and, of course, to take the consequences.

Dr. Salmon proceeds to illustrate implicit faith by a ridiculous story of the *Fides carbonarii*, which his highly intelligent audience must have enjoyed very much, probably regarding it as a 'new definition' by the Church of Rome. 'Such faith as this,' he adds, 'is held to be sufficient for salvation' (page 93). Such faith is not held to be sufficient by Catholics certainly, but probably even stranger things are held by those who are outside the Church, 'carried away by every wind of doctrine.' Again, according to Dr. Salmon, a Catholic 'may hold two opposite doctrines, the one explicitly, the other implicitly. . . . In this case it is held, his implicit true faith will save him, notwithstanding his explicit false faith' (page 93). What does Dr. Salmon mean by 'false faith' Faith comes to us on the authority of God revealing, and surely He can reveal nothing false. One of the 'opposite doctrines,' therefore, is only an opinion and the explicit rejection of a doctrine by any one, brings into grave doubt the reality of his belief in the doctrine in which the rejected one is supposed to be implicitly contained. Cardinal Newman has put it clearly in the extract already quoted. 'It is in this way,' Dr. Salmon says (that is by holding opposite doctrines), 'that the early Fathers are defended when their language is directly opposed to decisions since made by Rome' (page 93). The Fathers named would have spurned the Doctor's defence of them. He has prudently abstained from giving any reference to their words, but neither of them has used anywhere any words that would warrant Dr. Salmon's silly charge of 'material heresy,' against them. But he shall hear more of his reference to them later on.

The real aim of all this wretched, wearying, sophistry is to make a show of disproving the Infallibility of the Church, or at least of bringing that doctrine into doubt. Dr. Salmon understood his young theologians of Trinity very well.

With them it was an easy matter to discredit Catholic doctrine. The more grotesque the caricature of Catholic doctrine, the more likely it was to take with this 'audience all one way of thinking,' and that the Doctor's own way. There was no fear of contradiction, no risk of inconvenient cross-examination. All through his lectures he is impressing on the students, on the one hand, that our argument for the Infallibility of the Church is its necessity, and on the other hand, that our profession of faith is so meagre, that there can be no need of an infallible guide to arrive at it, and to retain it. Now, it has been proved already that Dr. Salmon misrepresents both our argument and our doctrine. We believe in the Infallibility of the Church, because God has expressly revealed that doctrine; and we believe in all the Church teaches, because God has commanded us to believe it. And this divine command to hear the Church binds Dr. Salmon and his theologians quite as stringently as it binds us. Bearing this in mind, we can appreciate the following pretty specimen of his logic. 'If our readiness to believe all that God has revealed, without knowing it, is enough for our salvation, there is an end to the pretence that it was necessary for the salvation of the world that God should provide means to make men infallibly know the truth.' But now, 'if our readiness to believe . . . without knowing' is not enough for our salvation, what provision is Dr. Salmon prepared to make for us? We are bound to know as well as believe all that the Church proposes to us—the principal mysteries, the Creed, the Sacraments, the Commandments, etc., and if, through our own fault, we are ignorant of these, 'our readiness to believe without knowing' can avail us nothing. And Dr. Salmon was not ignorant of our obligation in this matter when he so misrepresented it—'There is an end,' he says, 'of the pretence that it was necessary . . . that God should provide means to make men infallibly know the truth.' The pretence is all his own. No Catholic ever maintained that 'God should provide means to make men infallibly know the truth.' He has provided means to enable men, certainly, to know the truth, but He has not deprived them of their liberty; their wills are free, and

therefore, though they can know the truth, they are at liberty to reject it. And Dr. Salmon, not content with exercising this liberty himself, is labouring to get others to follow his example, and while doing so his logic is as unsound as his theology.

Here, [he says], is a specimen of what Roman Catholics call an act of faith: 'O my God, because Thou art true, and hast revealed it, I believe that Thou art One God; I believe that in Thy God-head there are three Persons; I believe that Thy Son Jesus, became man and died for us; I believe that Thou wilt reward the good in heaven and punish the wicked in hell; I believe all that the Catholic Church teaches; and in this belief I will live and die.' In other words, this act of faith, is a profession of explicit belief in the four great truths of faith, 'and of implicit belief in all the teaching of the Church' (page 97).

Now, Dr. Salmon by extending his search somewhat could have found in Catholic prayer-books acts of faith much shorter than the one quoted. He could have found the following:—'O my God, I believe in Thee; I adore Thee; I hope in Thee; I love Thee; I am sorry for all my sins; I will never offend Thee any more.' Now here is an act of faith, hope, and charity, with an act of adoration, an act of contrition, and a purpose of amendment; and all taken together are much shorter than the act of faith submitted to his theologians by Dr. Salmon. But Catholics in making such acts, have explicitly before their minds a great deal more than these words express. No Catholic regards such acts as a full and adequate profession of faith. Of this no one can be ignorant who has read even the most elementary Catholic catechism. Dr. Salmon must have known it, even from Father Furniss. His object in attributing to us so short a creed is, to show that there can be no need of an infallible teacher. But he has another object also here. 'Now' he says, 'substitute the word "Bible" for the word "Church," and a Protestant is ready to make the same profession. He will declare his belief in the four truths already enumerated, and in all that the Bible teaches' (pages 97, 98).

This special pleading of Dr. Salmon breaks down at every point. The profession of faith given does not satisfy the

obligation of either Catholic or Protestant. Each is bound to a great deal more of explicit faith. The Catholic is bound to know more, and he can learn it with the required certainty from the Church. The Protestant is bound to know more, and he cannot learn it with the required certainty from the Bible. There can be no faith explicit or implicit without a sufficient motive,—that is the authority of God brought home to the believer by a competent witness. The authority of God is brought home to the Catholic by the Church—the infallible interpreter of God's revelation. Her teaching has never varied, she has never contradicted herself; she teaches all her children the same truths. The Catholic's faith, both explicit and implicit, is fixed and definite, and for both he has the same adequate motive. But when Dr. Salmon's substitution of 'Bible' for 'Church' is made, what does the altered profession mean in the mouth of a Protestant? It means that he professes to believe all that he thinks the Bible teaches. Now, unless the real meaning of the Bible be, what the Protestant thinks it is, he does not really believe in God's revelation at all. If you put on the words of anyone a sense different from that person's own, they are no longer the person's words but your own. And this is true of God's word, as well as of man's word. Unless, then, you put on God's word, the true sense—His own sense—you are not really believing in God at all. You are believing yourself instead. God is not your authority; you are your own authority. Now how can a Protestant be certain that the real meaning of the Bible is what he thinks it is, when he finds ninety-nine per cent. of his neighbours contradicting him, and contradicting one another, as to its meaning on the most vital and important truths supposed to be contained in it? In England alone there are nearly three hundred contradictory creeds, all supposed to be taken from the same Bible, by 'prayerful men.' They all profess to 'believe all that the Bible teaches,' but they do not 'make the same profession of faith.' This is the result of the substitution of 'Bible' for 'Church,' and it is a most instructive illustration of the wisdom of that.

substitution. Another important result of the substitution of 'Bible' for 'Church' is the following:—

In fact if it were even true that a belief in Roman Infallibility is necessary to salvation a Protestant would be safe. For, since he believes implicitly everything God has revealed, if God has revealed Roman Infallibility, he believe that too (page 98).

Dr. Salmon's young men must have been startled by the announcement that they were in proximate danger of believing 'Roman Infallibility'; but since in believing the Bible they really believe only in themselves, and as they are not individually infallible, nor prejudiced in favour of Roman doctrines, there are no good grounds for apprehending that awkward result of their professor's wonder-working theory of implicit faith. The Doctor asks,

If a Roman Catholic may be saved who actually contradicts the teaching of his Church because he did not in intention oppose himself to her, why may not a Protestant be saved in like manner who is sincerely and earnestly desirous to believe all that God has revealed in the Scripture, and who has learned from the Scripture those four great truths of faith and many others which make wise unto salvation, even if there be some points on which he has wrongly interpreted the teaching of Scripture? (page 98).

The Doctor gives his Protestant friend credit for most acute spiritual intuition when he puts his shortcomings so lightly:—'Even if there be some points on which he has wrongly interpreted the teaching of Scripture.' It would be much less difficult to count the 'points,' on which he would have rightly interpreted the teaching of Scripture. But the Doctor's difficulty is a phantom. The Catholic may be saved if he believe with supernatural faith, in the truths named by Dr. Salmon, provided his ignorance of the other truths of faith be inculpable, and provided also that he be free from mortal sin. And a Protestant may be saved on exactly the same conditions. But then, the Doctor must see, that such a case is most exceptional, and that the doctrine of Infallibility is not affected by it all. The Protestant and the Catholic are bound to know and believe a great deal more than Dr. Salmon takes for granted, and the real question, which he cleverly ignores, is whether the Catholic

is not more likely to get the required knowledge from the Infallible Church, than the Protestant is to get it from the Bible, interpreted by his fallible self? The Catholic relies on God's explicit repeated promise to guard His Church from error in her teaching. Dr. Salmon relies on the spiritual intuition of the 'prayerful man,' though Scripture, tradition, experience, and common sense, contradict him. Conflicting creeds, almost innumerable, are the direct result of the substitution of Bible for Church as recommended by Dr. Salmon, and his special pleading cannot obscure that notorious fact.

Dr. Salmon has a way of disposing of Church authority, which his students must have regarded as decisive. If the Catholic theory be correct, then Dr. Salmon maintains that the Church, so far from being a guide to salvation, is an obstruction, a source of ruin to souls. Every fresh definition narrows the way to heaven, and things would have been better 'if the Church had but held her peace.' 'I cannot help remarking,' he says, 'in passing, how this theory represents the Church not as helping men on their heavenly way, but as making the way of salvation more difficult. Every fresh interposition of her authority closes up some way to heaven which had been open before' (page 94). And he illustrates this by the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and Papal Infallibility, which people were free to hold or reject before the definition, but which they are now bound to believe, 'on peril of forfeiting their salvation.' Now we shall invite the Doctor to go back some centuries in our history in order to test his argument. Let him test it at the time that our Blessed Lord Himself lived on earth. Dr. Salmon cannot deny that a greater measure of explicit faith has been necessary since our Lord's coming than was required before. Therefore, according to the Doctor's logic, the way of salvation has been only made more difficult. His coming 'closed up' a way to heaven which had been open before; and it would have been better that He had not come at all! The Regius Professor of Trinity is, no doubt, a great man, but he was not consulted as to the conditions on which souls are to be saved. He must take from God

the terms of salvation, just as humbly as the college scavenger. The Church is just what her Divine Founder made her. She is executing the commission she received from Him. Her mission is to teach the truth, not to please Dr. Salmon; and the Doctor's picture of her work and office is a caricature, a daub.

[To be continued.]

J. MURPHY.

THE SYNOPTIC PROBLEM

III

NEARLY all the various suggestions put forward in explanation of the Synoptic phenomena, can be recalled to the application of one or other of two principles: that the Evangelists made use of one another's writings, or all three drew upon some common source antecedent and originally external to the Gospels. The former principle, in its various modifications, we have already considered.¹ We were told of the close relationship of the Gospels, of their mutual dependence, and how each was used in the production and composition of the others. But when it came to determining the exact nature of the 'inter-use' whether it was epitomatory, expansive, or merely supplemental we saw what hopeless confusion there was among the patrons of the system. Even upon so fundamental and primary a question as the priority of the Gospels,² the order in which they first saw the light, they are not able to come to an agreement. And of the six and only possible combinations of the first three canonical Gospels, there is not one which does not still continue to secure for itself the patronage of a considerable section among those who have set their faces against tradition. But even were there the unanimity we desiderate, the 'use'-hypothesis should still for other reasons be far from general acceptance. It may be

¹ I. E. RECORD, June, 1901.

² By the Gospels in this connection we understand the 'Synoptic' Gospels. The Gospel of St. John stands on a different footing.

there is nothing inimical in the theory to the more orthodox views of inspiration, though it is not always easy to reconcile the variations of the later Evangelists with the inspirational character of the Gospels they made use of or borrowed from. But in its application it refuses to grasp completely the range and variety of the difficulties it was framed to solve. The material similarities it may account for, the coincidences, too, in order and arrangement, and perhaps in some measure the variations of both. But it has failed at least to grapple successfully with the peculiarly distributed and intermittent verbal agreements. And for this, were there no other reason, since the solution of a problem is to be sought at the point of greatest difficulty, the theory should be thought incomplete and inadequate.

There remains to be considered the second principle which supposes our Evangelists to have all drawn upon a common source which, owing to different circumstances, and particular needs, embodied itself somewhat variously in each. But was this source a written or oral one? was it documentary or merely the stereotyped or settled tradition of early apostolic teaching? And here we are met with the inevitable two opinions, which furnish us with the second and third methods of solution—what are technically known as the Original Gospel theory and the theory of Oral Tradition.

We shall treat of each separately :—

(2) THE ORIGINAL GOSPEL HYPOTHESIS

According to those who hold this theory the common source whence our Gospels are derived was a *written* one, though whether documentary or fragmentary, whether one fairly long and substantial narrative served as a basis, or an indefinite number of fragmentary records, all are not agreed. As in the case of the mutual dependence system the principle involved has come in for pretty free and fanciful application. But however variously applied or ingeniously disguised the fundamental idea is always easily discernible, that our Gospels are traceable to a common written source or sources. Briefly, the first three canonical

Gospels, they say, are but the expansions, the more fully developed forms of an Original Gospel which existed years before them, and which, though now unhappily lost, managed to incorporate itself somewhat variously in each. The first to put forward the idea with anything like distinctness was Le Clerc.¹ Semler who had already distinguished himself in the Old Testament only too gladly followed. And the same idea was more or less accepted, though not without considerable variation by Lessing, Niemeyer, Weber, Theiss and others.² It was not, however, until the time of Eichhorn that the system began to be seriously considered. His bold though calm and imperturbable assumptions could not but arrest attention, and the style and manner of his exposition won for it a popularity hitherto wanting. So much so, indeed, that the theory is commonly identified with his name and he is entitled to the dubious honour of being, if not the parent, the step-father of a system long since exploded and now commonly rejected.³

It appeared to Eichhorn that the features common to all three Gospels, the coincidences both material and verbal, could be traced to a common origin, to an Original Gospel or Document which was the starting point of all. The Synoptic narratives, as we now have them, are but the more highly-finished forms of that primitive proto-evangelium. Descended from a common parent they could not but bear a family likeness; and hence their strong similarity in matter and form, substance and style. Of this original Document or Gospel there were many copies. Even before the time of the Evangelists it had gone through many 'editions' and 'recensions.' And though all these were practically the same yet each had its own peculiarities, its own peculiar additions and omissions. The Evangelists did not use the original Document; nor were their copies exactly the same. And hence their dissimilarity. Substantially the same, yet each different and distinct, such are our Gospels to-day, and

¹ Davidson, *Introduction to N.T.*, vol. i. p. 381.

² Westcott, *Introduction to Study of the Gospels*, p. 203.

³ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. Eichhorn.

so also were the Original Gospel and its various editions in pre-evangelic times. Nothing could be simpler, nothing more natural. In all he assumed the existence of five documents, four altered copies or editions, besides the original Document. But granted these he could account for all the phenomena. He supposed :—

- (1) An original Aramaic Gospel or Document.
- (2) A revised edition of it, A, a copy of which St. Matthew used.
- (3) A second edition of it, B, the basis of St. Luke's Gospel.
- (4) A new edition made from A and B termed C, which was used by St. Mark.
- (5) Another revision, D, used by St. Matthew and St. Luke where they agree with one another, but differ from St. Mark.¹

Both the Original Gospel and its revised editions were all written in Aramaic or Syro-Chaldaic, the vernacular of Palestine at the time ; and when used by the Evangelists had not as yet been translated into Greek. It never occurred to Eichhorn that were our Gospels independent translations even of the same work, they could never be so strikingly like as in places they are. If all the original documents were in Syro-Chaldaic it was all but impossible that the Evangelists should agree, as they do so frequently, in the selection of strange and out of the way synonyms and archaic forms of expression.² And this, waiving for the moment the historical aspect of the supposition, was its weak point.

There was, of course, an easy way out of the difficulty—easy for here everything is gratuitous—to destroy the monopoly in Aramaic manuscripts, and call in the aid of one or more Greek documents. And this was actually the course suggested by the Anglican Bishop, Dr. Marsh. At the same time he showed his appreciation of the adequacy of his predecessor's theory by at once raising the

¹ *Speaker's Commentary, New Testament*, vol i. p. xi.

² Cornely, *Introduction*, vol. iii. p. 174.

number of documents from five to eight. He assumed the existence of¹:—

- (1) An Aramaic original Gospel designated κ .
- (2) A Greek translation of it $\bar{\kappa}$.
- (3) A new edition of No. 1, with lesser (α) and greater (β) additions: $\kappa + \alpha + A$.
- (4) Another edition of it with other lesser (β) and greater (γ) additions: $\kappa + \beta + B$.
- (5) A third edition made from the two preceding: $\kappa + \alpha + \beta + A + B$.
- (6) A fourth edition made from No. 3, but with additions: $\kappa + \alpha + \gamma + A + T$.
- (7) A fifth edition; this time made from No. 4, and with independent additions: $\kappa + \beta + \gamma + B + \Gamma$.
- (8) An Aramaic gnomology containing the precepts, sayings, and parables of our Lord used by St. Matthew and St. Luke. It may be designated z .

According to this elaborate genealogy St. Matthew's Hebrew Gospel was made from ($\kappa + z + \alpha + A + \gamma + \Gamma$); St. Mark's from ($\kappa + \alpha + A + \beta + B + \bar{\kappa}$); and St. Luke's from ($\kappa + z + \beta + B + \gamma + \Gamma + \bar{\kappa}$).

To this it is added

That the person who translated St. Matthew's Hebrew Gospel into Greek, frequently derived assistance from the Gospel of St. Mark, where he had matter in connection with St. Matthew; and in those places, but in those places only where St. Mark had no matter in connection with St. Matthew, he had frequently recourse to St. Luke's Gospel.²

But the German professor was not to be outdone. And again Eichhorn came forward, this time with a scheme at once more detailed and comprehensive, and which, though lacking the simplicity of his former effort, certainly put the Anglican Bishop's in the shade for complexity and ingenuity. Four recensions of the Syro-Chaldaic original were supposed; and these four formed the basis of the three canonical Gospels as we now have them. The three oldest of these recensions

¹ Smith, *Dictionary of the Bible*, art. Gospels.

² Marsh's *Dissertation*, p. 361.

were A, B, and D. A was enlarged with some of the greater additions in St. Matthew; and of it a Greek version or translation was soon made. B had besides other matters, much of the peculiar additions in St. Luke. Of it there was no early Greek version. D was similarly enriched by other additions from the same Gospel and had the additional advantage of being very early translated into Greek. C was a new recension made from A and B; but since in the first part the sections of the Original Gospel together with the additions with which it was enlarged from A and D were incorrect in regard to time and place; and since in the last part some of the additions taken from D were also misplaced, St. Matthew transposed them and brought them into a new connection with the Original Gospel by means of new transitions. Thus arose the Hebrew Gospel E of St. Matthew. The translator of St. Matthew made use of the Greek versions already existing of A and D. The recension C formed the basis of St. Mark's Gospel though he used also the existing version of A; but the additions which C had received from B he must have translated for himself. From B and D was made an Aramaic text which St. Luke translated. In doing so he was aided by the Greek version of D, but he must have rendered independently what belonged to B. He also translated several detached pieces, and these besides many additions of his own he inserted in his Gospel.¹

By this time the 'recensions' or 'editions' were becoming unmanageable as was seen every day in the stiff and capricious use to which they were put. A reaction was bound to set in against such wholesale assumptions, and soon the primitive documents began to disappear and fade away as mysteriously as a few years before they had been called into existence. Ewald² reduced the number to three: an original Greek Gospel, a Hebrew collection of 'Oracles,' and a History of St. Mark. Gratz was still less exacting and was prepared to be thankful for two, a Hebrew original and a Greek translation of it. St. Matthew used the Hebrew

¹ Davidson, *Introduction to N.T.*, vol. i. p. 354, *et seq.*

² Westcott, *Study of the Gospels*, pp. 206, 207.

document; his Greek translator the Greek version, as did also St. Mark and St. Luke. Whatever other difficulties remained, were, in his opinion, traceable to nodding scribes or venturesome copyists, who inadvertently misplaced events or deliberately altered words and phrasings to bring them more into conformity.

It was the same reactionary spirit which led to the introduction of the fragmentary form of the hypothesis. Hitherto, however else they might have differed, all had agreed in the supposition of an original and substantially detailed narrative, more or less altered copies of which had been in the hands of the different Evangelists. But for these constantly recurring copies and every varying editions Schleirmacher, the parent of the new form, substituted an indefinite number of fragmentary records. These were short narratives of distinct and separate events, memoranda of particular discourses or miracles or parables. They were variously written—some in Greek and some in Aramaic, and, best of all, there was an indefinite number of them. Different collections of these fragments came into the possession of the Evangelists, who after the manner of compilers rather than authors pieced them together and thus evolved their Gospels. Writing on St. Luke's Gospel, Schleirmacher¹ thus delivers himself:—

When I review the investigation which has thus been carried on step by step and sum up the whole, it seems to me that though several of the details may be more or less liable to objection, still the main position is firmly established that Luke is neither an independent writer nor has he made a compilation from works which extended over the whole course of the life of Jesus. For we meet with too many isolated pieces which have no relation to the rest, and the character of the several parts is too different to admit of either supposition. He is from beginning to end no more than the compiler and arranger of documents which he found in existence, and which he allows to pass unaltered through his hands. His merit in this capacity is two-fold: first that of arrangement; this, however, is the slighter of the two. For as he found much already connected, not only is the correctness of his arrangement dependent on his predecessors, and much may be assigned to a wrong place without fault of his, but also the arrangement was

¹ Schleirmacher's *Essay on St. Luke*, Bishop Thirlwall's translation, p. 313.

by this rendered much easier than if he had found all the parts separate. But the far greater merit is this, that he has admitted scarcely any pieces but what are peculiarly genuine and good; for this was certainly not the effect of accident, but the fruit of a judiciously instituted investigation and a well-weighed choice.

Schleirmacher himself only ventured to apply his theory to the third Gospel. But evidently there was just the same reason for its application to the others, inasmuch as they all partake of a more or less common character. And Renan was not without seeing this; for what the German had done for St. Luke's Gospel the versatile Frenchman took upon himself to do for St. Mark's, which he believed to have been the oldest, and the nucleus out of which grew the fuller narratives of St. Matthew and St. Luke.¹ St. Matthew and St. Luke acted in much the same manner as Renan himself, who embodied in his works the comments of the German rationalists, without apparently much examination, and less acknowledgment.

And here we may note, in passing, the skilful ingenuity and insidiousness of rationalistic methods. The authority of the Gospels is not openly denied, not even seriously questioned—at least *prima facie*; but the thin end of the wedge is skilfully and silently introduced. The theological aspect of the question is blurred and obscured, and made to appear as one of mere historical value and literary criticism. In a sense, though a poor one, the genuineness of our Gospels is admitted. Our Evangelists were not authors, but collectors—mere compilers of documents or fragments, about whose origin and history, and, therefore, authority, we know very little. Eichhorn's original Gospel had, indeed, Apostolic sanction, but was composed by some person or persons unknown; and the same is true of the recensional manipulations of Marsh and Gratz. The ultimate authority of the Gospels is shifted from the Apostles, and made to rest upon pre-Evangelic writers, whose names tradition has not thought fit to record. Instead of the testimonies of three independent witnesses whose names are familiar, and whose character for truth, honesty, and candour, are easily

¹ *Les Évangiles*, p. 177; 1877.

demonstrable, the scene is changed to a dim twilight and shadowy region, where all is darkness and mist, and everything unknown and unknowable.

We need have no fear in conceding that this hypothesis can be so manipulated as to account for most, if not all, of the coincidences and differences of the Gospels. It is just as easy to suppose fifty documents as five, and no more difficulty in having them in Aramaic rather than in Greek, if so we prefer. In both cases there is exactly the same and only proof—the feeble imaginings of theorists. Difficulties are no objection here; rather they would seem a speciality. There is always in stock a large and varied selection of documents of all shapes and sizes, and really no difficulty is insuperable. So far it may have the merit of adequacy as it certainly has of adaptability. But its truth does not, therefore, become apparent. It may be a possible solution, at most a probable, but not necessarily the true and correct one. Adequacy is not the only test of merit, and there are other conditions to be complied with before a theory so adaptable and capable of adjustment can be accepted. The question at issue is practically the origin of our Gospels, a purely historical matter; and, fortunately or unfortunately, there is little room, and less desire, for speculative or *a priori* reasoning. We want historical proofs. Facts are wanted, not empty statements or theoretic speculations; and the theory which would win for itself common acceptance must not merely account for the phenomena of the problem, but strike its roots into the historical environment of the years which saw the composition of the Synoptic Gospels.

But so far is this theory from having any historical foundation that all antiquity would seem in blissful ignorance either of Eichhorn's documents or Schleirmacher's fragments. The Gospels make no mention of them, nor do they show any trace of such a stiff and compilatory origin. Incomplete and inexhaustive they may be, fragmentary in a sense, if you wish; but running through each and all is a unity of purpose and unity of style entirely at variance with such a mosaic origin. Similar in general tone and character are

all three ; yet each is marked by its own individuality in style and composition and method of narration. Each was written for a special purpose, each addressed to a particular Church, and each called forth by distinct needs and exigencies.¹ And this individualism in style and character and purpose is in direct opposition and flat contradiction of a supposition which would lower them to the level of patch-work, and make them, as Sanday remarks, the product of scissors and paste. Even St. Luke, who, in the preface to his Gospel, speaks of the sources upon which he was dependent, is wholly silent about primitive documents or pre-Evangelic writings. And Theophilus, whom he addresses, is supposed to have been already instructed in the truth ; and not from books or writings, but from oral tradition or teaching (κατηχήθη),² which more than once is hinted at as the source or fountain whence our Gospels are derived.³

Nor are the fathers any more enlightened on the point. The Apostolic fathers, the immediate successors of the Apostles, and living as they did at the end of the first century and the beginning of the second, must have known, or at least have heard of such writings. Yet in their works, as far as they have come down to us, there is never a word, not even a mention, of such veritable treasures. And the same is true of their successors in the third and fourth and succeeding centuries. Nor does anyone, as far as history records, ever seem to have dreamed of such productions until we come to the present age of discovery and invention. A passage from Epiphanius⁴ may, at first sight, seem to give some colour to the hypothesis, where speaking of the origin of the Gospels he employs the expression ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πηγῆς — ‘from the same fountain.’ But, at the very most, the words are ambiguous, indecisive ; and in the context, if he is not speaking of the heavenly origin of the Gospels but of their earthly source, his words suit better an oral than a written one.⁵ On the contrary, what he, in harmony with

¹ Lamy, *Introduction*, Part II. chap. ii. pp. 213-234.

² St. Luke i.

³ Acts xx. 20 ; xxviii. 30, 31.

⁴ *Haeres*, 51, 6.

⁵ *Speaker's Commentary*, N. T., vol. i. p. xi ; Westcott, *Study of the Gospels*, p. 203.

the other fathers, does say would seem at once destructive of a written origin. Papias,¹ who lived not more than sixty years after the Evangelists, tells us that St. Mark derived his Gospel from St. Peter, whose interpreter he was. Irenæus² speaks of St. Paul as the illuminator of St. Luke, and there is no need to adduce the testimonies of Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Pantaenus, and John the Elder, for the independence and authenticity St. Matthew's Gospel.³ Historically there is not the slightest foundation, not the faintest glimmer of a proof worth consideration for the prolific assumptions of Eichhorn and his imitators. On the contrary, the little that can be gleaned from their writings seems steadily and decisively against the theory. So much so, that so careful and guarded a critic as Professor Norton unhesitatingly affirms that 'it is the uniform testimony of ancient writers that the narratives contained in the first three Gospels were such as had been orally taught by the Apostles, and that Matthew wrote down what he preached, and Mark and Luke what they had heard.'⁴

And this very silence is all the more remarkable when we come to consider the character and nature of these documents. The Original Gospel must have been a work of great authority. This is implied in the fact that it was so frequently copied, and finally made the basis of the canonical Gospels. That it was so, however, is distinctly stated by Eichhorn and Marsh. Eichhorn says it was a work sanctioned and approved by the Apostles; and Marsh, writing on the same subject, says 'it was drawn up from communications made by the Apostles, and, therefore, was not only a work of good authority, but a work which was thought worthy of furnishing materials to any of the Apostles who had formed the resolution of writing a more complete history.'⁵ Nor are Schleirmacher and Renan less exacting in their demands as to the reputable character of

¹ Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, second edition, vol. i. pp. 271-283.

² Eusebius, E.H.V. 8.

³ Knabenbauer, *St. Matthew, Introduction*.

⁴ *Genuineness of the Gospels*, vol. i. p. 280.

⁵ Marsh's *Dissertation*, p. 363.

the 'odds and ends' out of which they would compose our Gospels. The original work was frequently translated—copies of it in Greek or Aramaic were in possession of most, if not all, the Churches. It went through many editions, and must have been extremely popular. It enjoyed a pretty large circulation; it was highly thought of by the Apostles; it formed the nucleus of our present Gospels; and was everywhere received with joy by the early Christians. How is it that towards the end of the first century there is not the slightest trace, the faintest glimmer of a document so important, so valuable, and so widely spread and read? We hear and read of heretical corruptions, such as the Gospel of the Hebrews, or the Gospel of Marcion. Numerous apocryphal Gospels too have floated down to us, and so have many literary frauds and forgeries of little or no importance. Even our present canonical Gospels, which are but fifth-rate, or eighth-rate, transcripts have managed to survive. But of this Original Gospel, once the only Evangelic writing, copies of which were in existence wherever Christianity had been preached, which embodied for Christians everything and all things they held near and dear, there is now not the slightest trace. It has vanished quite. No such work has been preserved, no trace of such a work is to be found; it is not mentioned, or quoted, referred to, or made use of in any work of antiquity. It would have been the last work to perish had it ever existed, and, from its nature, the most likely to leave its impress behind. And the fact that there is no trace of it, no mention of it, no use of it, makes it all but certain that no such work ever existed outside the imaginations of men such as Marsh and Renan and their followers.¹

But it may be asked, was this constant editing and translating a likely method of procedure in the circumstances? At present it is but too true that of the making of books there is no end, when editions and revisions are appearing every other day in quick and rapid succession. But was it

¹ Olshausen, *On the Gospels*, vol. i. p. 33.

so in the early centuries? Was it so in the circumstances which saw the rise of our Gospels? Was it so in Palestine in the time of the Apostles? Not at all. There were not the facilities. Those were not the days of authors and publishers, or of printing presses and typewriters; and even if they were it is very uncertain how far their services might have been requisitioned. The Jews were never a remarkably literary people. They had no profane literature. For them their Scriptures, the Law and the Prophets and the Hagiographa, had been all sufficient and satisfying, and whatever intellect there was in the country had been always monopolised in their elucidation and interpretation. And in this as in other matters the Jews, like most people of the time, would have preferred to rely upon their retentive memories than trust to fading scrolls or perishable manuscripts. All along from the days of Moses the vowel sounds had been a matter of memory and oral tradition, so also had been their comments and interpretations upon the Sacred Books. It was not until many years after the time of Christ and the Apostles that they took with anything like frequency to writing, and then only on account of changed circumstances, the loss of their independence and consequent dispersion. From the time of Esdras, whatever writings appeared among them became known for the most part through Alexandrine translators, and in Greek; and the comparatively recent introduction of the vowel points, not to speak of the late origin of the Chaldaic Paraphrases, the Mishna and the Gemara, attest the same truth. At the time of Christ as of old the motto amongst the Scribes and Rabbins had been 'commit nothing to writing,' and when the ancient rule or custom was departed from it was only slowly and with much reluctance.

And if this were true of the learned, of the masters and teachers, it would be still more true of the humbler classes, whence, for the most part, though not exclusively, the early Christian converts were drawn. Among them the art of writing would necessarily be rare. Tradition, ever the dominant factor amongst the learned and the leisured would of necessity communicate itself to the people and stamp out whatever

promptings there might be to literary effort. Yet with everything exactly the reverse,¹ with a non-literary people and a people of very little literary activity, with none of the facilities and less of the needs of modern times, the patrons of this system would conjure up for us a nation and a people as much given to writing and publication as a country in the heart of Europe in the days of the newspaper and the printing press. No one will accuse Bleek ² of rigidity and rigorism in dealing with our Gospels or of bias and prejudice in favour of those who refuse to depart from tradition, but few will find fault with the truth of his judgment when he said that more had been done for this hypothesis by confident self-assertion than by satisfactory evidence.

We have spoken of the adjustability of this system, that it can be so manipulated as to account for most, if not all, of the Synoptic phenomena. But there will be need of considerable pressure, and in the strain it is not always easy to steer clear of contradictions.³ Of the pressure needed to bring it into touch with the difficulties it attempts to solve, it is only necessary to allude to its extreme artificiality, its jaggedness and angularity at almost every step. Where everything was gratuitous one might have expected a theory more carefully developed, less stiff and stilted, and at least free from inconsistencies. Yet the result is a series of skilful documentary manipulations, so arbitrary and fanciful as to at once arouse suspicion. On their own showing the Original Gospel was a document of great authority. It had been translated more than once. Copies had been made of it apparently without end, and in the space of a few short years it had passed through some several recensions and editions. It went wherever Christianity was preached and everywhere was apparently well received. Clearly it was a work of such a nature as would be jealously guarded and carefully watched over. Yet it was being constantly changed and altered, added to and subtracted from,

¹ Gieseler, p. 59, *et seq.*

² *Introduction to N. T.*, vol. i. p. 256.

³ Olshausen, *On the Gospels*, vol. i. p. 33.

notwithstanding its unique importance and the interests of which it treated. It was of such authority as everywhere to be received, yet so defective as to be changed by everyone into whose hands it chanced to come. Either it was highly thought of, or had little or no authority. If the latter, it could never have enjoyed the popularity it is credited with much less have been the basis of our present Gospels; if the former, how account for the constant alteration and repairing it seemed ever undergoing? Evidently the two assumptions are inconsistent, incompatible, and cannot possibly cohere together. Whichever way it turns the theory is beset with difficulties, and in any of its arbitrary forms lacks the cohesion necessary for acceptance.

The circumstances, too, which called forth this mysterious document, its aims and object, would seem strangely at variance with what we know of that period. It could not have been, as is sometimes hinted at,¹ to furnish materials for subsequent and more full and detailed narratives. If so, why translate it while still in such a crude and meagre state? and where was the need for hurry or anxiety, when the Apostles were still alive from whom more ample and fuller information could be had for the asking? And see, too, in what a strange mode of procedure the supposition would involve the first Evangelist. The Original Gospel, we are told, had Apostolic sanction, it was nothing more than a fragment of Apostolic teaching whose matter was therefore originally supplied by the Apostles. Is it likely that St. Matthew, coming to write his Gospel, would consult a document much of whose material he may himself have furnished. The Hebrew Evangelist was an eye and ear witness of most if not all of the events narrated in his Gospel of the miracles and discourses. Yet this theory would make him seek his facts, his knowledge of our Lord, from Jewish converts, of whom he himself may have been the father in the faith. And the same is true in a much similar sense of St. Mark and St. Luke. They had the Apostles, St. Peter and St. John, and the others to consult

¹ Marsh's *Dissertation*.

and seek information from. It is scarcely probable they would have contented themselves with second-hand evidence when they could so easily have obtained the testimonies of eye and ear witnesses as the Apostles were.

Nor are these the only inconsistencies. But enough has been said, we think, on a theory which is now referred to more as a landmark in the history of the question of the origin of our Gospels, rather than as a form of solution worthy of serious consideration and formal refutation.

THOMAS J. BUTLER.

DOCUMENTS

GLASGOW UNIVERSITY AND THE POPE

THE following is the text of the most graceful and elegant Latin letter in which the University of Glasgow, on the occasion of its Jubilee festivities, expresses its thanks to the Holy See for its foundation by Nicholas V., and invites his Holiness Pope Leo XIII. to honour its members by taking some share in their celebration. We give also the gracious reply of the Holy Father, who was much pleased to receive an address from a body that is almost exclusively Protestant:—

PONTIFICI MAXIMO

VIRO SANCTISSIMO, REVERENDISSIMO, ERUDITISSIMO

LEO XIII.

UNIVERSITAS TOTA GLASGUENSIS CANCELLARIUS RECTOR

PROFESSORES GRADUATI STUDENTES SALUTEM

In multo nostro gaudio—quippe mox ferias saeculares celebraturis—illud potissimum gratis animis recordari libet quod amplam hanc Universitatem, copiis omnibus hodie ingenii atque operum instructam, ab ipsa sede Apostolica profectam, et cum amantissima Pontificis Maximi commendatione institutam, a maioribus accepimus.

Devotissimus enim ille Pontifex, Nicolaus Quintus, anno incarnationis Dominicae millesimo quadringentesimo quinquagesimo primo, summum suum in Scotos atque artes amorem praeferens, luminibus ipse omnibus et ingenii et liberalium artium illustrissimus, studium apud nos Generale institui, et doctores magistros studentesque nostros libertatibus omnibus quae in studio civitatis suae Bononiensis concessae fuerant, gaudere atque uti voluit.

Quod tantum beneficium cum sicut pia filia matri carissimae acceptum referamus, illud nos decere arbitrabamur, ut Sanctitatem tuam participem fore nostris gaudiis speramus, meritasque Sedi Apostolicae grates pro tanto merito proferamus.

Oramus igitur ut hanc nostram felicitatem auctoritate tua

cumulare digneris; et si per tempora hæc iniqua, per tot maris et viarum difficultates, non poterit fieri ut Beatitudo tua adsistat feriantibus, optamus, saltem fore ut per alium quemdam benevolum tuum in nos animum significes, et Universitatem hanc nostram, ab erudito Nicolao erectam, a Jacobo Scotorum Rege fotam, a Gulielmo Episcopo Glasguensi curatam atque defensam, a multis denique regibus nostris multis auctam beneficiis, eruditissimus ipse, litterarumque Latinarum cultor elegantissimus, pro humanitate tua amplificare velis atque ad nova usque sæcula commendare.

Datum Glasguæ, Idibus Maiis MCMI.

PRAEFECTUS ET VICE-CANCELLARIUS.

V. C. HERBERTO STORY PRAEFECTO ET VICE-CANCELLARIO ITEM
RECTORI ATQUE AUDITORIBUS UNIVERSITATIS STUDIORUM
GLASGUENSIS (GLASGOW)

LEO PP. XIII.

Iucundas scito Nobis communes litteras vestras fuisse. Memoriam beneficiorum colere, multoque magis ferre prae se palam ac libere, virtus est non humilia nec angusta sentientis animi: atque istiusmodi virtutem libet quidem in vobis agnoscere, studiorum optimorum ingenique decora praeclare cumulantem. Quod enim Lyceum magnum, ubi vestra omnium desudat industria debet Apostolicae Sedi origines suas, idcirco sub solemnia eius saecularia ad romanum Pontificem vestra provolavit cogitatio memor, atque ultro arcessivistis Nosmetipsos in laetitiae societatem, tamquam desideraturi aliquid, si voluntatis Nostrae significatione in hoc tempore caruissetis. Equidem gratum habemus facimusque plurimi tale officium humanitatis cum iudicii aequitate conjunctum. Memoria autem vetera repetentes, utique diversamur apud vos animo per hos dies, reique tam utiliter a Nicolao V. Pontifice maximo institutae cogitatione delectamur. Quo quidem instituto certe magnus ille decessor Noster de Scotorum genere immortaliter meruit; praetereaque et ipse in aperto posuit, romani pontificatus virtutem in elegantiam doctrinae, in studia ingenuarum artium, quibus maxime rebus alitur humanitas gentium, ad incrementum suapte natura influere. Cetera istud maiorum disciplinarum nobile domicilium constanter florere cupimus salutarium ubertate fructuum et gloria nominis: Deumque omnipotentem comprecamur, ut doctos labores vestros

omnium genere ad veritatem dirigere, vosque universos perfecta Nobiscum caritate coniungere benigne velit.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die IX Iunii Anno MDCCCXI.
Pontificatus Nostri vicesimo quarto.

LEO PP. XIII.

JUBILEE VISITS MADE PROCESSIONALLY

LIMERICK, 4 *Maii*, 1901.

EMINENTISSIME DOMINE,

Quam in singulis hujus dioecesis parocciis ruralibus plerumque singulae tantum ecclesiae existant, et ex alia parte maxime conferat ad augendum volentium Jubilaeum lucrari numerum et ad pietatem fidelium fovendam si visitationes ecclesiarum processionaliter fiant, ausim ab Eminentia Tua exquirere utrum mihi liceat visitationum numerum reducere in favorem eorum qui ecclesiam suam parochialem, in locis ubi unica existat, hoc modo visitent, scilicet, processionaliter, duce paroco, in ecclesiam ingrediantur, tunc egressi circuitum ecclesiae, hymnos cantando, vel preces effundendo per viam aliquanto longiorem faciant, et sic deinceps donec quatuor visitationes singulis vicibus absolutae fuerint.

Quod si stricte loquendo fieri non potest, forsan Sanctitas Sua pro sua benevolentia, habita hujus regionis circumstantiarum ratione, illud tanquam favorem specialem concedere dignabitur.

Quae dum scribo, precor Deum ut Eminentiam Tuam diu sospitem servet.

Eminentiae tuae

Humillimus et addictissimus servus in Christo,

✠ EDVARDUS THOMAS,

Episcopus Limericensis.

Sacra Poenitentiaria, perlectis expositis, ad praemissa respondet: Ubi una tantum ecclesia potuit designari eaque processionaliter sit visitanda, non est opus ut introitu et exitu pluries eadem die visitetur.

Datum Romae ex Sacra Poenitentiaria die 30 Maii 1901.

Gratis.

D. MANNAJOLI, S. P. Canon.

R. OELLI, S. P. Substit.

THE CAPUCHINS AND THE HOLY OFFICE

E S. R. UNIV. INQUISITIONE

DECERNITUR PRIVILEGIUM OLIM MINISTRIS PROVINCIALIBUS ULTRA MONTES ORDINIS MIN. CAPUCC. CONCESSUM PROCEDENDI IN CAUSIS AD S. OFFICIUM PERTINENTIBUS, NON AMPLIUS EXISTERE

Minister Generalis Ordinis Min. Cap., sub die 12 Jan. 1900, S. R. et U. Inquisitioni exposuit, quod Ordo Cap. Decreto diei 3 Julii 1625 a S. Sede obtinuerat Indultum, vi cuius Ministris Provincialibus ultra Montes concedebatur facultas procedendi contra suos subditos in Causis ad S. Officium spectantibus in locis ubi haereses impune grassarentur, et Sanctum Officium Inquisitionis, nec per Inquisitores, nec per locorum Ordinarios exerceretur.

Exhibuit eidem S. Inquisitioni omnia documenta hocce Indultum concernentia, quae referentur in Bullario, Capuc. tom. I. pp. 73, 74, idest textum ejusdem Indulti, una cum variis instructionibus et notis, quibus determinatur modus, quo haecce facultas in praxim deducenda est, et etiam citantur casus, in quibus Ministri Provinciales ultra Montes tali privilegio usi sunt.

Cum vero subortum esset dubium, utrum in hocce privilegio comprehenderetur etiam casus sollicitationis ad turpia in Confessione etc., idem Minister Generalis hac super re authenticum a S. Officio imploravit responsum.

Porro, sub die 29 Januarii vertentis anni, S. Officium super expositum dubium sequens dedit Decretum, quo negative respondetur ad casum et simul declaratur, privilegium suppositum non amplius existere.

DECRETUM S. OFFICII

Roma li 29 Gennajo 1901.

Con lettera de 12 Gennajo dell'anno scorso la P. V. Rma nella supposizione che sia tuttora in vigore un privilegio accordata nel 1625 dalla Suprema Congregazione del S. U. a codesto Ordine Religioso 'ut in locis ubi haereses impune grassantur et S. Inquisitionis officium nec per Inquisitores nec per locorum Ordinarios exercetur, contra proprios subditos, in causis ad S. Officium spectantibus, procedere (Superiores) possint,' domandava se tal privilegio si estendesse anche al delitto di sollecitazione.

Discussa la Causa nella Congregazione di fer. IV. 23 corr., gli

Emi. e Rmi. Signori Card. Inqri. Genli hanno decretato : ' Negative, et privilegium de quo sermo, non existere.'

Tanto lo scrivente ha il dovere di portare a notizia della P. V. Rma e con sensi della più distinta stima ha l'onore di potersi raffermare.

Della P. V. Rma

Devmo servo

CASIMIRO ARCIVESCOVO DI LEPANTO, *Assessore.*

**LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE LEO XIII. TO THE CARDINAL
PATRIARCH OF LISBON**

EX ACTIS LEONIS XIII. ET E SECRETAR. BREVIUM

LEO XIII HORTATUR LUSITANOS UT RELIGIOSORUM COETUUM JURA
INCOLUMITATEMQUE NAVITER TUEANTUR

LEO PP. XIII.

DILECTO FILIO NOSTRO JOSEPH SEBASTIANO LIT. SS. XII APOSTO-
LORUM S. R. E. PRESBYTERO CARDINALI NETTO, PATRIARCHAE
LISBONEN., SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM

In praesenti rerum acerbitate, qua Religiosorum coetus etiam apud vos premuntur, solatium Nobis attulerunt singulare virtus et industria, quibus ad eorum incolumitatem et iura tuenda naviter incumbis, in id accitis Episcopis, atque annitentibus saeculari clero et fidelibus, ex omni Lusitania.

Quae et quanta sint profecto, in rem cum sacram tum civilem, eorumdem Institutorum merita, domi forisque comparata, non est cur multis prosequamur, quum ea non semel enucleaverimus praesertim vero in Epistola ad dilectum Filium Nostrum Cardinalem Archiepiscopum Parisiensem data die XXIII postremi Decembris.

Illud Nobis potius cordi est, Tibi ceterisque impense gratulari, impertiri laudes, animum addere, concordibus studiis vestris felicem ominari exitum. Nostra sane spes in ipsa primum causae bonitate consistit; deinde vero in coniunctione animorum arctiori, catholicos inter, in iis provehendis quae iusta et recta sunt, quaeque in patriae simul et Ecclesiae cedunt emolumentum.

Haec porro ut facilius vobis et prospere Lusitaniae eveniant, benedictionem Apostolicam Tibi, Episcopis collegis Tuis, utriusque ordinis clero et catholicis universis amantissime impertimus.

Datum Romae, apud S. Petrum, ipsa die Paschatis MCMI, Pontificatus Nostri anno vicesimo quarto.

LEO PP. XIII.

THE PAULINE PRIVILEGE

CASUS CIRCA PRIVILEGIUM PAULINUM

BEATISSIME PATER,

Episcopus N. N. ad pedes S. V. provolutus, humillime prout sequitur exponit.

Gulielmus R. protestans, promittens se catholicam fidem amplexurum fore, humiliter petit ut sibi *dispensatio ab interpellanda coniuge priore* concedatur, eum in finem ut cum Maria R. catholica matrimonium in facie Ecclesiae contrahere possit.

Praedictus Gulielmus matrimonium iniverat cum muliere protestantica coram magistratu civili. Nec ipse vir, nec ipsa mulier, unquam S. Baptismum susceperunt, ideoque eorum matrimonium simpliciter legitimum. Postea, obtento divortio civili, se separarunt, nec ullo modo constat ubinam terrarum mulier nunc versetur. Omnes conatus eam inveniendi frustra suscepti. Hanc ob causam dispensatio ab interpellatione enixe rogatur.

Et Deus, etc.

Feria IV, die 13 Martii 1901

In Congregatione Generali S. R. et U. Inquisitionis coram EEEmis. ac RRrmis. DD. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus habita, propositis praedictis precibus, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, iidem EE. ac RR. Patres respondendum mandarunt :

‘Curet Episcopus conversionem viri et, praevio baptismo, supplicandum SSmo. pro dispensatione ab interpellatione, quatenus ex processu saltem summario constet baptismum neque viro neque mulieri protestanticae collatum fuisse et interpellationem vel impossibilem vel inutilem fore.’

Sequenti vero feria VI, die 15 eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita audientia SS. D. N. Leonis Div. Prov. Pp. XIII a R. P. D. Adessore habita, SSmus. resolutionem EE. ac RR. Patrum adprobavit et gratiam concessit.

I. Can. MANCINI, S. R. et U. Inquisit. Notarius.

EFFECTS OF THE PAULINE PRIVILEGE

UTRUM VI PRIVILEGII PAULINI INFIDELIS CONVERSUS DERELIN-
QUERE POSSIT PRIOREM UXOREM, POSTERIOREMQUE RETINERE,
QUIN PRIOR INTERPELLETUR, PROPTER FERRE, IMPOSSIBILITATEM
BEATISSIME PATER,

N. N. annos circiter sexaginta natus, natione Maurus ex longinqua Mauritaniae Occidentalis provincia, olim mahumetanus,

nunc fidei catholicae catechumenus, gratiam Baptismi postulat ; at matrimonio quondam in sua patria valide inito cum uxore infideli sectae Mahumetanorum ligatus, novam uxorem eiusdem sectae ex hoc nunc a vigintiquinque annis in nostra regione migratus duxit, de qua sex filios filiasve adhuc vivos habuit, et quam proinde derelinquere illi durissimum esset, nec sine scandalo quodam posset.

Nulla prorsus possibilitas illi remanet primam uxorem in sua patria relictam, ibique alio viro nuptam, adeundi ad eam interpellandam : obstacula plane insuperabilia sunt, quia pars infidelis degit in longinquissimis, hostilibus ac barbaris provinciis, ubi nullo Christiano ne aditus quidem pateat ; et alia ex parte nulla adesset spes eam a suo secundo marito arripiendi christianamque ad fidem adducendi.

Et Deus, etc.

Feria IV, die 13 Martii 1901

In Congregatione Generali S. R. et U. Inquisitionis, ab EEmis. ac RRmis. DD. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus habita, propositis praedictis precibus, praeahabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, iidem EE. ac RR. Patres respondendum mandarunt :

‘ Modo ex processu saltem summario constet interpellationem vel impossibilem vel inutilem fore, supplicandum SSmo. pro petita dispensatione.’

Sequenti vero feria VI, die 15 eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita audientia SS. D. N. Leonis Div. Prov. Pp. XIII, a R. P. D. Adessore S. Officii habita, SSmus. resolutionem EE. ac RR. Patrum adprobavit et petitam gratiam concessit.

I. Can. MANCINI, S. R. et U. Iquisit. Notarius.

CONDEMNATION OF NEW DEVOTIONS

DAMNATUR QUILIBET CULTUS ERGA DEVOTIONEM SIC DICTAM
‘ MANUS POTENTIS ’ (MANO PODEROSA)

BEATISSIMO PADRE,

Il Vescovo della diocesi di L. in America, prostrato ai piedi della S. V. domanda, umilmente se possa considerarsi lecita una certa divozione detta della *Mano poderosa*. Essa consiste in immagini e medaglie, venute dall'Europa, che rappresentano una mano aperta con entrovi una piaga ed avente sulle punte delle dita

le immagini del Bambino Gesù, di Maria SS., di S. Gioacchino e di S. Anna.

Che ecc.

Feria IV, die 13 Martii 1901

In Congregatione Generali S. R. et U. Inquisitionis, ab EEmis. et RRmis. DD. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus habita, propositis suprascriptis precibus, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, EEmi. ac RRmi. Patres respondendum mandarunt :

‘Imaginem praedictam esse praedamnatam a Concilio Tridentino ; et curet Episcopus ut destruantur imagines, numismata et quodcumque scriptum, seu precandi formula, ad dictam devotionem pertinentia.’

Sequenti vero feria VI eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita audientia SS. D. N. Leonis Div. Prov. Pp. XIII a R. P. D. Adessore S. Officii habita, SSnus. D. N. resolutionem EE. ac RR. Patrum adprobavit.

I. Can. MANCINI, S. R. et U. Inquisit. Notarius.

CONDEMNATION OF NEW DEVOTIONS

NON PROBATUR NOVA DEVOTIO DICTA : ‘NOVA CRUX IMMACULATAE CONCEPTIONIS’

BEATISSIMO PADRE,

L'Arcivescovo di N. nelle Americhe, prostrato ai piedi della S. V., umilmente espone che un nuovo articolo di divozione è stato ivi messo in commercio sotto il nome di *Nuova Croce della Immacolata Concezione*. E' una medaglia in forma di croce, portante la immagine non di N. S. G. C., ma della Immacolata da una parte e de' Sacri Cuori col monogramma della B. V. dall'altra. Chiede perciò l'oracolo della S. V. se siffata divozione possa o pur no approvarsi.

Che ecc.

Feria IV, die 13 Martii 1901

In Congregatione Generali S. R. et U. Inquisitionis, ab EEmis. ac RRmis. DD. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus habita, propositis supradictis precibus, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto iidem EE. ac RR. Patres respondendum mandarunt :

‘Devotionem praedictam, uti est, non esse probandum.’

Sequenti vero feria VI eiusdem mensis et anni, in

solita audientia SS. D. N. Leonis Div. Prov. Pp. XIII, & R. P. D. Adessore S. Officii habita, SSmus. D. N. resolutionem EE. et RR. Patrum adprobavit.

I. Can. MANCINI *S. R. et U. Inquisit. Notarius.*

CERTAIN POWERS OF THE VICAR-GENERAL

CONCEDITUR VICARIIS GEN. EPI. N. UT IPSO ABSENTE VEL IMPEDITO,
DELEGARE POSSINT CONFESSARIOS AD EXCIPIENDAS DENUNCIATIONES SOLLICITATIONIS

BEATISSIME PATER,

Archiepiscopus N. N., ad Sanctitatis Vestrae pedes provolutus, humiliter quae sequuntur exponit :

Instructio S. C. Inquisitionis 14 Iulii 1753 negat Vicariis Episcoporum facultatem delegandi confessarium ut denuntiationem excipiat sollicitationis ad turpia. Iam vero saepe occurrit vel occurrere potest, ut Episcopus ab urbe residentiali absit, vel domi aegrotet, vel alio quocumque modo impediatur, et interim casus sit urgentior, ita ut confessarius qui delegationem petit, nequeat eum adire. Hac de causa a Sanctitate Vestra humiliter rogo praedictam, facultatem, qua Vicarii Generales huius Archidioeceseos delegare possint in casibus necessariis simplices confessarios ut denuntiationes excipiant.

Quod et Deus etc.

Feria IV, die 20 Martii, 1901

In Congregatione Generali S. R. et U. Inquisitionis ab EEmis. ab RRmis. DD. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus habita, propositis supradictis precibus, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, iidem EE. ac RR. Patres rescribendum mandarunt :

‘Supplicandum SSmo. juxta preces.’

Sequenti vero feria VI, die 22 eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita audientia SS. D. N. Leonis Div. Prov. Pp. XIII & R. P. D. Adessore S. Officii habita, SSmus. D. N. petitam gratiam benigne concessit.

I. Can. MANCINI, *S. R. et U. Inquisit. Notarius.*

POPE LEO XIII. PRAISES THE GREGORIAN CHANT OF
SOLESMES

LEO XIII PROBAT LAUDATQUE LABORES BENEDICTINORUM CIRCA
CANTUM GREGORIANUM, QUEM OMNES LIBERE COLERE POS
SUNT, ETC.

LEO PP. XIII.

DILECTO FILIO RELIGIOSO VIRO PAULO DELATTE O. S. B. ARBATI
SOLESMENSI.

Dilecte Fili, salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem.

Nos quidem et novimus et alias laudavimus positam a vobis
intelligenter operam in scientia eorum concentuum sacrorum, de
quibus memoriae est proditum, ad magnum Gregorium referendos
esse auctorem.

Similique ratione non potest Nobis non probari vester ille in
conquirendis vulgandisque veteribus de eo genere monumentis
tam operoso tamque constanter insumptus labor. Quorum labo-
rum fructus varios videmus iis consignatos voluminibus nec sane
paucis, quae Nobis grato admodum munere diversis temporibus
misistis, quaeque late iam, ut accepimus, in luce atque oculis
hominum versantur, ac multifariam quotidiano recipiuntur usu.
Omnino quidquid suscipitur studii in hac illustranda augendaque
rituum sanctissimorum comite atque adiutrice disciplina, dandum
laudi est, non solum propter ingenium et industriam, sed etiam,
quod longe maius, propter speratum divini cultus incrementum.
Siquidem gregoriana concentus prudentissime sunt sapientis-
simeque ad illuminandum verborum sententias inventi, atque
inest in eis, si modo adhibeantur perite, magna vis et mirifica
quaedam mixta gravitati suavitas, quae facile illapsa audientium
in animos pios ciere motus cogitationesque salutare alere tempe-
stive queat. Quotquot igitur sunt, praesertim ex alterutro ordine
Cleri, qui se posse aliquid in hac vel scientia vel arte sentiant, pro
sua quemque facultate elaborare omnes convenit sollerter et libere.
Salva quippe caritate mutua et ea, quae debetur Ecclesiae obtem-
peratione ac reverentia, multum prodesse multorum in eadem re
studia possunt, ut vestra ad hanc diem.

Divinorum munerum auspicem, itemque paternae benevolentiae
Nostrae testem tibi, dilecte fili, sodalibusque tuis apostolicam
benedictionem peramanter in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die XVII Maii Anno
MDCCCXI. Pontificatus Nostri vicesimo quarto.

LEO PP. XIII.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE LITANY OF LOBETTO. THE
PRAYER TO ST. JOSEPH DURING THE MONTH OF
OCTOBER. THE PRAYERS AFTER MASS

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE RITUM

BRUNEN

TRIA SOLVUNTUR DUBIA

Rmus. Dnus. Franciscus Salesius Bauer, Episcopus Brunensis, a Sacrorum Rituum Congregatione sequentium dubiorum solutionem humiliter expostulavit; nimirum:

I. Utrum Litaniae Lauretanae post tertium *Agnus Dei* rite ac recte absolvi possint, addito statim versiculo, responsorio et oratione, vel inserto prius *Christe, audi nos*, etc. prouti fit in Litaniiis Sanctorum, cum *Pater* et *Ave* vel uno alterove?

II. Oratio ad S. Ioseph, in mense Octobri ponenda est inter Rosarium et Litanias, an post Litanias rite absolutas?

III. Quandonam dicendae sunt cum populo preces post quamvis Missam sine cantu praescriptae, si S. Rosarium, Litaniae et oratio ad S. Ioseph non eodem cum Missa momento finiunt?

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, audito voto Commissionis Liturgicae omnibusque perpensis respondendum censuit:

Ad I. Litaniae Lauretanae concludendae sunt uti in Appendice Ritualis Romani, omissis *Christe audi nos*, etc.; versiculus autem, responsorium et oratio post dictas Litanias mutari possunt pro temporis diversitate.

Ad II. Oratio ad S. Ioseph in fine Litaniarum Lauretanarum adiungi potest, iuxta prudens arbitrium Episcopi.

Ad III. 'Preces a SSmo. D. N. Leone Papa XIII in fine Missae praescriptae recitandae sunt immediate expleto ultimo Evangelio,' ita ut aliae preces interponi nequeant, iuxta decisionem S. R. C. in una *Basileen.* N. 3682, diei 23 Novembris 1887; et si, Missa absoluta, Rosarium a populo recitandum non sit finitum, Celebrans dictas preces recitet cum Ministro solo.

Atque ita rescripsit. Die 7 Decembris 1900.

L. ✠ S.

D. Card. FERRATA, Praef.

D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen. Secret.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

LE CARDINAL MEIGNAN. Par l'Abbé Henri Boissonnot, Son Secrétaire Intime. Paris: Victor Lecoffre, Rue Bonaparte, 90.

To the number of interesting biographies of the great French ecclesiastics of the nineteenth century we have now to add that of the most learned man of them all, the late Cardinal Meignan. The biographies of Mgr. Dupanloup by the Abbé Lagrange, of Cardinal Pie by Mgr. Baunard, of Mgr. Darboy by Cardinal Foulon, and of Cardinal Guilbert by Mgr. Ricard give an outsider a very clear and vivid insight into the life and spirit of the Church in France. *The Life of Cardinal Meignan*, although written by his private secretary, is less of a eulogy than any of the works we have mentioned. It is more descriptive and historical. It allows letters and documents of unquestioned authenticity to speak for themselves and for the memory of the illustrious subject of the biography. The result is that he stands out, we shall not say greater than any of his ecclesiastical contemporaries, but with a marked individuality of his own, which distinguishes him from them by characteristics that give a very special interest to his career.

Every chapter in this volume is really full of interest. The family, the vocation, the school and college life of the future Cardinal reveal to us an aspect of French existence with which the newspapers do very little to make us familiar. But, perhaps, for those who take an interest in the same sort of studies as the Abbé Meignan the two most interesting chapters in the book are those which deal with his life at Munich and at Berlin. Nothing could well be more different than the atmosphere of a French seminary and that of a German university, and when the Abbé Meignan, fresh from Le Mans and St. Sulpice, found himself in the capital of Bavaria, he readily experienced the difference. It was no small advantage to him to study the methods of such active and influential men as Moehler, Görres, Haneberg, Klee, Dollinger, Philips, and Windischman. He was intended by his bishop to teach philosophy and he set to work at once to master the systems then in vogue and their relations to the Church and

revealed religion. The copious notes which filled his 'Cahiers' during this year of study served him well in after years, and enabled him to cope with opponents who drew their conclusions secondhand from sources that might well excite distrust. The strong and the weak points in the philosophy of Kant, Hegel and Schelling, are noted with great acumen and skill and weighed in the balance of a sound and capable mind.

But the advantages derived from the sojourn in Munich are if anything surpassed by those of the year spent in Berlin. Here, no doubt, even more than in Munich, the faith of the young French priest ran serious risks. Brought daily face to face with teaching of men like Rothe, Ritschl, Keil, Hengstenberg, Ewald, he knew what it was to live in the midst of anxiety and danger. But whenever the demon of doubt assailed him he thought of his happy home in France and of the lessons of philosophy and exegesis taught him at his mother's knee, and he recognised their superiority over the theories and contentions that seethed around him. It was his delight to witness with what ardour the contending schools in this atmosphere of free thought hastened to demolish one another, with what unerring glance they discovered a weak point in the armour of their opponents and proceeded there to effect a breach. Their exact and profound erudition helped him to see into the depths of questions which in other countries were touched only on the surface. He left the capital of Prussia not only unshaken in his faith but more convinced than ever of its truth, and brought with him a knowledge of German rationalistic methods that proved of no small utility to the Catholics of France when Renan published his *Vie de Jesus*.

When the Abbé Meignan returned to France he was induced by Monsignor Maret to settle in the diocese of Paris, where he occupied successively the post of curate at St. Jacques du Haut Pas, at St. Roch, and at St. Clotilde. The time spent at St. Jacques is particularly interesting, as it enabled the young priest to follow the arts' course of the Sorbonne, in close proximity to which he lived. At St. Roch his health broke down, and he was obliged to go southwards, first to Pisa, and then to Rome. His impressions of the Roman schools and of their attitude towards German rationalism; his experiences with Passaglia and Perrone; his theses for the Doctorate; above all his impressions of the social and political conditions of the Papal States as

revealed in his letters to Monsignor Maret, show that he was a man of no ordinary perception and penetration, and when read in the light of subsequent events clearly prove that he saw a long way ahead of him.

On his restoration to health the Abbé Meignan becomes prefect of studies in the Diocesan Seminary of Paris at Notre Dame des Champs. After the revolution of '48 he returns to parish work. But it was when Renan published his *Histoire des Langues Sémitiques* that Meignan's opportunity offered. He seized it with avidity. His *Prophéties Messianiques* placed him in the forefront of Christian apologists, and gave him a niche of honour in the great temple of French ecclesiastical learning.

The road to honours was now well open to the gifted young priest. He becomes a professor in the Sorbonne, Vicar-General of Paris, Bishop of Chalons, Bishop of Arras, and finally Cardinal Archbishop of Tours. He takes part in all the great movements of his time in Church and state. At the Vatican Council he was opposed to the definition of Papal Infallibility. He was convinced of the truth of the doctrine, but feared the world was not ready for its acceptance. This being his conviction he felt it not only his right but his duty to oppose the definition. He was the first, however, to recognize the validity of the great act of the Council once it was carried by the majority and confirmed by the Pope.

It would be quite impossible, in such a notice as this, to enter into the details of Cardinal Meignan's life as an ecclesiastical ruler. All we can say is that he lived in difficult and stormy times, and that the calm but resolute tenour of his life is well depicted in these pages. Such works are not sufficiently read in these countries. The government of the Church, carried out on the lines of the Concordat, is very different in France from that which prevails in English-speaking countries. It is in works like the present, with the official letters of nuncios, of ministers of state, and of bishops, that we see how it works out in practice.

Outside of France, however, Cardinal Meignan will be remembered chiefly as a Biblical scholar, as the author of the great works, *L'Ancien Testament dans ses Rapports avec le Nouveau et la Critique Moderne*, *Le Monde et L'Homme Primitif, selon la Bible*, *Les Evangiles et la Critique du XIX^{ème} Siècle*. These works embody the substance of Cardinal Meignan's contributions to literature. They represent the highest scholarship of the Church in France at the end of the nineteenth century.

J. F. H.

INTEMPERANCE : NATURAL REMEDIES, SPIRITUAL REMEDIES. By Professor Campbell, M.D., *Honoris Causa* R.U.I., Fellow Royal College of Physicians, Ireland, &c. London : Burns & Oates.

EVERYTHING that helps in the cause of temperance is welcome and deserves support. These two small pamphlets of Professor Campbell, one on the natural remedies, and the other on the spiritual remedies for intemperance, are full of useful and appropriate information regarding the evils with which they deal. Dr. Cruise, in his recently published pamphlet, shows in the clearest light the evil effects of alcohol on the heart, on the brain, and on the nervous system. Dr. Campbell shows how it affects the blood, the stomach, the intestines, and impedes the general machinery of the human system. He also dwells upon its effect upon the character, and whether its results are moral or material injury he supplies the simple and only remedy that is capable of effecting a genuine cure. We cordially recommend the two little pamphlets to all who are interested in the work of temperance.

FAITH AND FOLLY. By the Right Rev. Mgr. John S. Vaughan. London : Burns & Oates. 1901.

MGR. VAUGHAN treats in this volume in the very attractive manner and style with which readers of the *I. E. RECORD* are familiar, a great many questions of practical, and some of them of actual and vital interest. The chapters on 'Faith and Reason,' on 'Social Disturbances; their Cause and Cure,' on 'Civil Penalties for Religious Offences,' on 'The Ethics of Animal Suffering,' give us in a happy and popular style the solution of questions which exercise the minds of people at the present day to no small extent. Of all the essays on this volume the one which has, perhaps, caused the greatest stir is that on the 'Ethics of Animal Suffering.' On this question Mgr. Vaughan lays down sound Catholic principles, and applies them with great felicity. This, however, has not saved him from ignorant and stupid attacks. We have read some of the letters on this subject which have been admitted into the pages of so respectable an organ as the *Saturday Review*, and for illogical and offensive imputations we think it would be difficult to surpass them. The essay on 'Civil Penalties for Religious Offences' is most valuable and timely. The whole volume may safely be recommended. It will be a help to converts and a guide to all Catholics. J. B.

MEDITATIONS ON THE LIFE, TEACHING AND PASSION OF JESUS CHRIST. By Augustine Maria Ilg, O.S.F.C. Translated from the latest German Edition. Edited by Richard F. Clarke, S.J. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1901.

THIS work is compiled from an old book of meditations by a Capuchin monk of the eighteenth century named Alphonsus Von Zussmerhansen. It was remodelled for modern use by Father Ilg. We are not told very definitely whether the late Father Clarke, S.J., whose name is attached to the book, is himself the translator or whether he has merely edited somebody else's translation. The latter would seem to be the case.

We often hear it said that Italian books of devotion are not particularly suited to the tastes and temperament of English-speaking peoples. Why draw the line at Italian books? The same is true, in its way, of French books and of Spanish books. Here we have a German book and we confess that very many passages in it grate upon our senses. Why did not the translator or the editor expunge those passages which sound harshly in our ears and do for the English version what Father Ilg accomplished so successfully for German readers? We may be told that the most repellent passages like the swallowing of the wondrous book are mere reproductions of the Bible. That may be, but the Bible is the Bible, and things that come in there naturally and beautifully are very often disfigured and debased when applied to conditions of life entirely different from those to which they owe their origin.

J. B.

WHERE IS THE CHURCH OF CHRIST? By M. Van der Hagan, S.J. Translated from the Dutch by Alphonsus Canon Van de Rydt, Societé de S. Augustin. Bruges Desclée, De Browsers & Co. 1901. Price, 7½d.

THIS is a very valuable little book, and we can heartily recommend it. It is controversial; but its tone is so mild and persuasive that it leads, but does not seek to drive. It is remarkably clear, and does not shirk the difficulty of any objection that is urged against the Church.

The author, moreover, clearly understands the difficulties of Protestants born and bred in error. He sympathises with them

in their efforts to work out their salvation. He points out to them the only road that leads to it. The genial cordiality of the little volume, together with its limpid clearness of style and argument procured for it an immense success. In Holland four editions of it were quickly exhausted. It has been translated into French and German, and now it makes its appearance in English. We wish it all success.

TWELVE TRIOS FOR THE ORGAN. By P. Piel. Op. 37.
Düsseldorf: L. Schwann. Price, m. 2.40.

THREE part compositions for the organ, to be performed on two manuals and the pedals, are considered as belonging to the very highest class of organ music, inasmuch as in this arrangement the three parts can be brought out with the utmost distinctness, and the contrast of colours obtainable is one of the most legitimate effects of organ playing. The present pieces are melodious and in church-like style. They are also of moderate length, generally comprising about thirty or forty bars, so that they can suitably be rendered at services.

H. B.

FOUR LITANIES OF THE B. V. M. For equal voices with Organ or Harmonium accompaniment. By Fr. Koenen. Op. 59. Düsseldorf: L. Schwann. Score and separate Voice Parts.

THESE Litanies are so arranged that three invocations are combined, the response being invariably a very simple melody, which may either be sung in unison by the whole congregation, or, where that is not feasible, in harmony by the choir. Three of the settings are in three parts, the fourth is in four. They are, in this particular form, about the best compositions we have.

H. B.

"*Ut Christiani de et Romani sitis.*" "As you are children of Christ, so be you children of Rome."
Ex Dictis S. Patricii, In Libro Armacano, fol. 9.

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A Monthly Journal, under Episcopal Sanction.

Thirty-fourth Year]
No. 404.

AUGUST, 1901.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRUTH OF MIRACLES

THE study of ecclesiastical history, whether primitive, mediæval, or modern, is full of the suggestion that the principle : ' All revolutions begin in philosophy,' admits of an extension wider than that usually given it, that it is capable of being lifted out of the comparatively contracted sphere of purely secular politics, and may be applied to explain or to estimate many of these mighty movements which from time to time have rent the unity and threatened the life of the Church. In the early days of Christianity when some, at least, of the Apostles whose brows had been mitred with Pentecostal flame, were still preaching to Jew and Gentile the glad tidings of the Gospel of peace, the Church first encountered that most dangerous and persistent foe known as Gnosticism. Gnosticism was the name given to that method of rationalistic thought which was the unifying principle of all the widely different attempts to supersede humble belief in and faithful practice of all our Saviour's teaching by a blend in which the corrupt and perverted conceptions of Christianity were almost entirely absorbed in the theosophy of India and the mysticism of Alexandria. Even though, because it was advocated by many a disloyal son, and because it denied many a particular dogma, we speak of these revolts as Gnostic heresies ; yet, primarily, Gnosticism was a

philosophy rather than a theology. It was a theory of knowledge which entirely subordinated faith (*πίστις*) to science (*γνῶσις*) and claimed universal assent by professing to furnish a solution that none could gainsay to the old, ever-recurring problems of origin and of destiny, of pain, and sorrow, and death. It had as one of its central principles that matter was eternal and in its nature evil. Imbued with this gross philosophical error the Marcionites forbade marriage; the Basilidians taught transmigration of the soul; and the Docetae, ridiculing our idea of the Atonement as an illusion, held that it was only a phantom body that sweated blood in the Garden, and that it was a phantom that hung on the Cross. In the same category of theological error, originating in unsound philosophy, must be placed many of the controversies that agitated the Catholic world in the middle ages. Justly or unjustly the rise of false opinions on Matter, Predestination, and the Blessed Sacrament was attributed to the Neo-Platonism introduced into the west by our distinguished fellow-countryman, Scotus Erigena.

. . . done into Latin by that Scottish beast,
Erigena Joannes.

With the decline of scholasticism in the fifteenth century the same phenomenon repeats itself; and the new learning of the Renaissance matures into the unholy fruits of the Reformation. Now, while all these different forms of heresy share in the demerits of the particular system of philosophy with which they happened to be connected, either as principles or as conclusions, they may also have a value as independent propositions. And as independent propositions, should the examination so suggest, they may be rejected by reason of some defect which, though inherent to the particular proposition, may yet be quite accidental to the general system as such. Every such proposition is, of course, doubly condemned—condemned for its own sins, and for these inherited from its parent philosophy. But the detection of its weakness is certainly not facilitated by this method of examining it as it glories in all the imposing but illusive strength of splendid isolation. When we see it

co-ordinated with the other propositions in the system of which it forms part; when we see it arranged with its fellows in due perspective; when we see it clearly depending from some first principle that enunciates a philosophy which the Catholic heart instinctively repels, we shall be in a far better position for testing it; we shall be more confident in our scrutiny and more emphatic in our rejection. The method of examining it as an independent proposition must be supplemented by one more appropriate and more thoroughgoing; a philosophical error is most effectively coped with by a philosophical appreciation of its fundamental principles.

If the explanation of primitive and mediæval heresy by contemporary philosophy may be taken as a precedent, we may expect to find modern philosophy influencing the rise and development of modern unbelief. Almost since the termination of the doctrinal warfare with Protestantism, about two hundred years ago, while protecting her children from heresies such as Socinianism, which were merely the last convulsive efforts of a slowly dying cause, and from heresies like Deism, which were little better than the fashionable cult of the moment and passed away like any other society craze, the Church has been engaged with one of the most subtle and dangerous foes she has ever encountered. In the course of her history, over and over again, she has seen nearly every particular dogma impugned but, for the most part, the very basis of her existence, her faith in a living supernatural passed unchallenged. The glory of this attempt to eliminate the supernatural as an ever-present active element in the lives of men belongs to the Agnostics who follow the lead of Hume in his attack on the philosophical truth of miracles. It is scarcely necessary to remind our readers that a miracle is said to be true in a three-fold sense: it is said to be historically true; philosophically true; and logically true. The historical truth means that the fact purporting to be a miracle did really occur; as, for instance, that the Resurrection is an historical fact. The philosophical truth, that this historical fact is really a miracle. The logical truth, that this miracle was worked by

God in order to give His divine testimony to the truth of some doctrine or person. This latter being dependent on the other aspects comes last in order of proof and of interest. The evidence for the historical truth of many of the principal miracles to which Christianity is committed has been subjected to the most rigid and searching criticism. Times without number we have been told that it has been discredited as a conspiracy or explained away as an illusion. But despite the erudition and ability that marked the conduct of a series of prolonged assaults, assaults which varied often in method but never in intensity of purpose nor bitterness of party spirit, it emerged triumphantly from the ordeal and now stands in even greater relief and on firmer foundations. Even this is beginning to be recognised by the enemy who now desert positions such as the lateness of the date of composition of the Gospels, which, as essential to the prosecution of the campaign, they occupied not so long ago with infinite bluster and fanfarronade. Chronology, they tell us, is after all a very minor outpost, indeed. And while some go this way and some go that in their attempts to decompose the aureole of miracle which, like the Crown of Thorns, forever encircles our Saviour's sacred head, all repudiate the very notion of supernatural intervention. But even as the world has outgrown that stage of development in which its interpreters, from Celsus to Bruno, laughed away the works and words of our Lord as the fruit of the incantations of a forgotten magic, so the more astute of contemporary unbelievers perceived that the evolution of philosophy had progressed so far as to render it impossible to meet the assertion of the supernatural by a method so crude as that of insolent and cynical denial. Absolute affirmation and absolute denial were both equally regarded as bad form. They jarred upon the exclusive temperament of the new philosophy quite as much as an unrestrained, boisterous *parvenu*, on the haughty precisians of an eighteenth-century *salon*; altogether in the new scheme of things they were nearly as much out of place as Caliban in the fairyland of Prospero. With the Psalmist, whom they would hurl from his throne in the choir of inspired

song, they, too, would place dogmatic materialism under *anathema*, branding as fools those who said in their hearts 'there is no God.' Robed for the nonce in the mantle of a specious humility they insidiously whispered: 'We don't know; we cannot tell. Not for worlds would we dream of denying His existence and His power of influencing human affairs: but poor innocents, simple inquirers as we are, without prejudice or predilection, swayed solely by reason, we shall be unable to admit either one or the other until you compel us to do so by demonstrating both.'

Passing by for the present the questions of accurate definition of miracle and the justification we have for asserting the existence of any such thing as a law of nature, or a uniform mode of operation, we may follow St. Thomas and say that a miracle is an event divinely produced outside the accustomed order of nature. The objection to the philosophical truth or cognoscibility of miracle may be formulated somewhat after this fashion: We can never know for certain whether any event is a miracle or not, because as we neither know nor pretend to know all the laws of nature, this so-called miracle may, for all we know to the contrary, have been produced by some law of nature of whose existence or power we are ignorant. As Huxley puts it:—

'Nature' means neither more nor less than that which is: the sum of phenomena presented to our experience: the totality of events past, present, and to come. Every event must be taken to be a part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof is from the nature of the case, impossible.

Further on he says:—

In truth, if a dead man came to life, the fact would be evidence, not that any law of nature had been violated, but that these laws, even when they express the results of a very long and uniform experience, are necessarily based on incomplete knowledge, and are to be held only on grounds of more or less justifiable expectation.

And again:—

If a piece of lead were to remain suspended by itself in the air the occurrence would be a miracle, in the sense of a wonderful

event, indeed ; but no one trained in the methods of science would imagine that any law of nature was really violated thereby. He would simply set to work to investigate the conditions under which so highly unexpected an occurrence took place, and thereby enlarge his experience and modify his hitherto unduly narrow conception of the laws of nature.¹

The principle underlying this celebrated objection has, more than any other, given coherence and unity to the movement against the supernatural, which is one of the most pronounced features of our modern world. Alike in the rapidity and extent of dissemination and in the virulence of its infection, this revolt against Christian ideas has few, if any, parallels in the history of thought. Coming upon a society more or less sated with materialism, the finer spirits of the sceptics of the eighteenth century responded to its touch, and rejoiced in its infinite capacity for destruction. Permeating the science and philosophy of England, it was invested with a new and deeper significance when the evolutionary theories of Darwin and Spencer were transforming and destroying the old time-worn ideas of genesis and descent. Not a few educated Catholics were of opinion that it must be numbered with these sceptical arguments of which Hume said that they produced no conviction and admitted of no reply. On the other hand, not merely aggressive publicists, professional opponents of dogmatic theology, and flippant sciolists jumping at any pretext for formally renouncing the creed they never practised, but many a soul naturally Christian, many a lone student imprudently confiding in the strength of his dialectic, felt in the decay of their faith that it was an instrument of incomparable simplicity and power. When the idea of evolution grossly perverted or hopelessly misunderstood ; when discovery after discovery in the various fields of scientific inquiry appeared to exalt the power and extend the area of the blind, impersonal, immutable forces of nature and in corresponding ratio to depress, aye, even eliminate the influence of sovereign intelligence and will ; when they

¹ Huxley's *Hume*, chap. vii. See also *Biographical History of Philosophy*, by G. H. Lewes ; *History of Modern Philosophy in France*, Lévy-Bruhl ; *Grammar of Assent and Development of Christian Doctrine*, Card. Newman.

seemed to cut the ground of faith from the feet of mankind, it was then that the malignant nature of this objection fully revealed itself. 'That which the palmer-worm hath left, the locust hath eaten; and that which the locust hath left, the bruchus hath eaten; and that which the bruchus hath left, the mildew hath destroyed.'¹ It corroded whatever had escaped the ravaging materialism in which the literature of the period was steeped. It battered, like a loathsome parasite, upon the tissues of decaying supernatural life, and extinguished whatever faint, glimmering hopes might ever and anon light up the waste places of the Christless soul. The residue of spiritual resolution was sicklied o'er by the paralysing thought that if, after all, there existed a God Whose footstool was the earth and Whose dwelling was in the light of setting suns, He, too, was hemmed in by inexorable material conditions; that He was deaf to entreaty, insensible to pain; and that even if He were not, He could no more hearken to the passionate prayer wrung from souls that sorrow has made desolate than Baal and Astoroth, the dumb idols to whom of yore rebellious Israel knelt. It weakened where it did not destroy. It dimmed the lustre and soiled the freshness of belief in many who never outwardly separated from the Church. Its exponents captured the public by the press; its professors caught the student in the lecture-room. It inspired and coloured the literature of an epoch: every magazine was simply teeming with its germs, and became a centre of infection. Though there was essentially but one article in its Credo, it had amongst the reading public far more subscribers than the Thirty-nine Articles or the Confession of Augsburg; and the educated world rejoiced and found itself Agnostic.

The plausibility of the objection that we cannot know whether any event is miraculous because it may have been produced by any one of the many natural laws of which we are confessedly ignorant, has been frankly admitted by Catholic theologians. In refuting it they have generally examined it in itself, as it is enunciated in an independent

¹ Joel i. 4.

proposition. As is well known, they grant that we cannot know all the laws of nature *positively*; that is, that we have not that definite precision of knowledge which would enable us to give chapter and verse before the British Association for each and every one of the well-nigh infinite number of natural laws. But they deny that such accuracy is required; insisting that it is enough to know them *negatively*; that is, that if we are ignorant of what they can do, we know right well what they cannot do. But even with regard to this negative knowledge, applying it to a favourite example, can we be truly said to know, in the strict sense of the word, that a man by mere unaided natural force cannot move a mountain? If so, what are the various stages of the process? what is the middle term of our syllogism? Negative knowledge is still knowledge, be it ever so vague and indefinite. When we state that we have negative knowledge, that we know what an agent cannot do, does it not seem that we must necessarily have some idea of the extent of its powers, and that, so far at least, we implicitly assert that we have positive knowledge and know what it can do? Does it not then look like as if we were drawing the boundary line and, like Canute with the sea, bidding the forces of nature halt? And as the Jews of old asked our Saviour, the Agnostic may ask the Apologist: 'By what authority dost thou those things?'

If we turn from analysing this objection as it lies in our independent isolated proposition and endeavour to trace it to some philosophical system from which its author consciously or unconsciously may have derived it, what do we find? In the first place, we should naturally expect that this distinctively modern objection should originate in the philosophy that is distinctively modern, did such exist. Historians of philosophy tell us that by universal consent Descartes is revered as the father of modern philosophy. They are not insensible to the claims of the stupendous fabric built up with such power and erudition by the sages of the Fatherland. There can be little doubt, however, that it was Descartes' *Discourse on Method* that set in motion the stream of thought that reached high-water mark in Kant's

Criticism. By the beginning of the seventeenth century the destructive influences of the Renaissance and the Reformation were fully manifest. Everywhere, outside the Catholic schools—the dry bones of which, under the spirit of reform, came together in the fulness of a new and glorious life—speculation, though active, was in the highest degree unsettled and uncertain. For many minds the theory of life and knowledge that had grown up under the fostering care of the Church had been irreparably shattered, and as yet no adequate substitute had been provided. Bereft of explanations that could satisfy, blown about by every wind of doctrine, men eagerly longed for some scheme which would catch up and organise all their manifold opinions.

And so the era of reconstruction began. The mind of Descartes was completely permeated by this spirit. In the formation of his character it was more potent than the influence of the traditional philosophy that reigned in the great Jesuit college of La Flèche, where he was educated. Though he had there the best masters in the world, he left school despising their methods, and deliberately set about forgetting whatever they had taught him, excepting only mathematics, of which he was passionately fond. The anarchy that tore the schools, the fundamental differences of philosophers, destroyed at once his faith in their authority and in their ability to solve the problems to which they addressed themselves. Looking over the entire field of knowledge he saw almost everywhere at work the canker of scepticism. As it was in the present, so it had been in the past, even in the far away days when Plato meditated on immortality in the shades of the Academy, and Socrates buttonholed the gilded youth of Athens. In his review of more than twenty centuries of philosophical activity he saw generation after generation chasing the same old shadows, slaying the same old foes, and following the same impotent old routine. In the face of such results he not unnaturally concluded that nothing could be gained by the old methods; they had been tried and found wanting; and if no better could be discovered, then, indeed, was philosophy a foolishness. Could any better be found? That was the question.

We have seen that at school he was devoted to mathematics, and that when on graduating he pitched to the winds all the riches of his knowledge, mathematics was, like Pandora's gift, the only treasure he retained. Again, in his examination of the state of philosophy, he saw that mathematics was the one exception to the law of uncertainty that was otherwise universal. This phenomenon set him a-thinking. What distinguished mathematics from every other branch of learning? What gave mathematical conclusions their special simplicity and certainty? Was it not the peculiar method employed by mathematicians—that method of deduction by which each proposition is rigorously demonstrated, and by which truth succeeds truth in inevitable sequence? So reasoned Descartes, and he determined, in case he ever found a base of operations, to apply to the problems of metaphysics and of philosophy generally the methods of mathematics. This base he found in consciousness. Doubting of all things, he could not doubt his own existence, because in the very fact of doubting, existence was revealed by consciousness. Hence his celebrated *Cogito*—‘I think, therefore, I am.’ Consciousness, then, was the starting point of his philosophy. Its answers to his interrogations were borne in upon him with a clearness and power that necessitated assent. It thus became the basis of certitude. No proposition could win assent except it shared more or less in the essential qualities that made the verdict of consciousness irresistible; that is to say, except it was either a self-evident proposition or one evidently connected with such self-evident proposition. Evidence, then, is the motto of Cartesianism. Forgetting that the proposition ‘Whatever is evident is true,’ does not admit of simple conversion to the proposition, ‘Whatever is true is evident,’ Cartesianism made evidence the sole criterion of truth, and by it alone determined what must be accepted or rejected.

Nothing¹ can be admitted in science but what is evident, *i.e.*, nothing but what is so clear and plain as to leave no possible

doubt; or is soundly deduced from principles which rest on such evidence. The whole system of scholasticism—metaphysics, logic, physics—thus stands irretrievably condemned *in toto*. The so-called moral sciences, which cannot attain to a degree of certainty comparable to that of mathematics, and which have to content themselves with more or less strong probability, are likewise rejected by the Cartesian formula.

This formula, consequently, leads to the destruction of moral certitude, and admits only the exact sciences in which demonstration is attainable. Descartes wished to limit the sphere of his method to problems purely philosophical; and expressly desired to exclude religion and politics. But the human spirit would not be denied, and insisted on testing by the light of evidence and the method of mathematics the most ancient institutions and the most sacred beliefs. From this method originated the philosophy which made the French Revolution possible. Indeed, philosophical activity ever since has been to a great extent absorbed in applying to every department of knowledge this method which makes evidence the test of truth and rejects everything incapable of empirical verification. Such a method is obviously incompatible with sound Catholic teaching. It is, to say the least of it, inadequate; it excludes some of our most cherished convictions; and it makes no provision for truths about which we have not the slightest doubt, but whose certitude is moral, not mathematical. Any proposition, consequently, which is infected with the essential viciousness of this system, which involves the application of the mathematical method to questions in which the subject-matter does not permit it, is necessarily condemned, finding its death warrant in that time-honoured principle—*Innititur falso fundamento*.

Now, Hume's objection to the philosophical truth of miracles is nothing more or less than an utterly unjustifiable attempt to test moral sciences by what are practically mathematical criteria, to apply the Cartesian method to the evidences for Christianity. During the century following the death of Descartes his teaching obtained great and widespread influence. In France, partly because of its affinity with the logical temperament of the nation, and

partly because of its value as a destructive agent in the war against the Church, it won its greatest triumphs and gained its chief adherents; and so for once a philosopher was not without honour in his own country. Such a system, defiant of all tradition, enthroned in the high places of intellectual power, inculcated with passionate energy and with the very perfection of literary ability, appealing at once to the most diverse and the most potent emotions of our complex nature, is eminently calculated to throw an irresistible spell over students young and sympathetic. So when Hume, a mere boy of twenty-three, and already predisposed, crossed over to France to pursue his philosophical studies, it is no wonder, even though he spent the greater part of his three years' stay at La Flèche, the great Jesuit college where Descartes had been educated, that he fell a victim to its fascinations. Even if his line of attack may have been proximately suggested by Tillotson's argument against Transubstantiation, because of the preponderance of the direct evidence of the senses over the indirect authority of the testimony of the Apostles, there can be no doubt that in its essence his method was one with that of Descartes. Both required for certitude evidence that necessitated assent and excluded even unreasonable doubt. It was this question of evidence that united these two men whose habits of thought were entirely different, and became the point of contact and harmony between the mathematical and empirical methods; for of both methods the note is demonstration. This will become more apparent when we remember that the *Essay on Miracles* first appeared in the *Inquiry*, which was no more than an abridgment for popular use of his first work, composed during his early years in France, which was entitled *Treatise on Human Nature, being an attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning to Moral Subjects*. This sub-title comprises within itself the essential features of Hume's philosophy in so far as it affected evidence, and furnishes a clue that will safely guide us through the tortuous labyrinth of his objection. This experimental method, the method in which the various stages of the process inevitably follow

each other, the method whose inexorable logic leads to conclusions so irresistible in their evidence as to preclude even unreasonable doubt, this is the method which is to test the claims of our Saviour, and which, if it find Him wanting, will unhesitatingly depose Him from His throne in the conscience of mankind and divide His kingdom between the Materialist and the Agnostic. There is little necessity to point out that for the application of this method to Christian evidences or to any of the moral sciences there is not the shadow of justification. The conditions for its exercise are entirely wanting. Method in every form of inquiry is determined by subject-matter. If subject-matter permit, then by all means employ the experimental method and be content with no other. But if subject-matter will not permit, then the certitude which we seek must be attained by a method different but more appropriate.

Speaking of the variations which are found in the logical perfection of proof in various subject matters, Aristotle says, 'A well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subject according as the nature of the thing admits; for it is much the same mistake to put up with a mathematician using probabilities, and to require demonstration in an orator.'¹

And again :—

I follow him in holding that since a Good Providence watches over us, He blesses such means of argument as it has pleased Him to give us, in the nature of man and of the world, if we use them duly for those ends for which He has given them; and that as in mathematics we are justified by the dictate of nature in withholding our assent from a conclusion of which we have not yet a strict logical demonstration, so by a like dictate we are not justified, in the case of concrete reasoning and especially of religious enquiry, in waiting till such logical demonstration is ours, but on the contrary are bound in conscience to seek truth and to look for certainty by modes of proof, which, when reduced to the shape of formal propositions, fail to satisfy the severe requisitions of science.²

Now, the force of the objection lies in this, that, because we do not happen to have explicit knowledge of each and every law of nature, we can never be certain that there has

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, p. 414.

² *Ibid.*, p. 411.

been a miracle ; inasmuch as some law of whose existence or of whose power we are ignorant may have been in operation as the cause of this wonderful event which we are pleased to attribute to a special act of Almighty God and to call miracle. According to this teaching, we should have such skill in reading the book of nature as to be able to catalogue and tell the contents of every single law ; we should actually exhaust the entire list of the infinitely possible but inadequate explanations ; in our analysis of the supposed miracle we should eliminate every natural agent and finally come to a residue which is incapable of further resolution and refuses to be categorised as a new element, and which, consequently, must be the result of some unwonted personal action before we are justified in saying that the finger of God is here. In a word, to assert that any event is miraculous is unwarranted and immoral unless we can demonstrate it ; unless we can prove it in the same way and have the same certitude about it as we have that $(x + y)^2 = x^2 + 2xy + y^2$, or that water is produced by a certain combination of hydrogen and oxygen. But this is an entirely illegitimate proceeding. It exacts altogether too much proof. It requires for the establishment of a miracle precisely that irresistible evidence which in their respective subject-matters the mathematical and empirical methods exact and supply. But these methods are inapplicable here. The mathematical method has for its proper subject necessary truth. The experimental method sways its sceptre over the united kingdoms of fixed quantities and invariable laws : realms whose constitution is determined : and whose units can neither make, nor modify, nor resist the forces in which they live, move, and have their being. It has no jurisdiction over free agents. Like a Viceroy whose authority ceases with the coming of the King, it ceases to operate whenever Will encroaches upon the territory it had hitherto exclusively governed. Natural phenomena are undoubtedly the subject-matter of the natural sciences : and their method is the experimental. But here we are dealing with no merely natural phenomenon. The very hypothesis of miracle supposes the possibility of these invariable sequences, which it

is the function of science to demonstrate, being interrupted by a personal cause. Humanly speaking, in so far as we may predicate anything of the Infinite, He is free, His special actions have no more the character of inevitableness than the actions of men whom He has created. His actions, on account of His infinite perfections, have not the lower qualities proper to the agents subject to the physical sciences; they are not blind, irresponsible, determined, automatic. Hence, any attempt to apply to His actions the experimental method must be at once rejected as based on an entirely false principle. To test the fact of revelation by experimental criteria, or to insist that the works wrought in the excess of His love for His children who suffer and sin should conform to the laws by which lightning travels or microbes breed disease, is blasphemous rather than absurd.

This experimental method, which Hume would have us apply, while it is invaluable when the question is of the purely physical sciences, becomes most fallacious outside its proper and only sphere. Outside that sphere, in the moral sciences, nobody dreams of employing it except for impugning the credentials of Christianity. If we reflect a little on the moral sciences through which, although some of them have grown up only during the nineteenth century, so large a part of human knowledge is distributed we shall find a vast body of principles generally admitted as certain and which, nevertheless, cannot be verified by the experimental method. In ethics and economics, in philology and sociology there are a number of propositions to which we all, believers and unbelievers, firmly assent, which would have to be excluded were this method made universal. Not merely in the moral sciences but even in those immediately subject to the experimental method, demonstration is sometimes far to seek. Many, if not all, of the Agnostics are exponents of some form or other of evolution. Now, it is open to considerable doubt, to say the least of it, if any of them would have the hardihood to assert, could we eliminate the momentum derived from certain prepossessions, from certain little pseudo-scientific superstitions which linger round the laboratory as incense does round the sacristy, that they have the same certitude

about it that they have about any particular demonstrable proposition in mathematics or physics. It is, indeed, very doubtful if any of them would state that even the cumulus of the proofs of evolution, the suggestions of paleontology, of embryology, of homology of structure, of rudimentary organs, and of all the rest, constitute that irresistible evidence, the evidence that excludes even unreasonable doubt, the evidence that compels assent—the evidence, in short, that they demand for miracle. Of course, they may argue that the convergence of five or six different lines of proof to a point antecedently suggested by philosophy as at least not improbable and certainly not impossible, constitutes such evidence. Consequently, owing to our mental constitution, we cannot withhold assent from any proposition so fortified, and must place it in the same category as the fundamental propositions of algebra or chemistry. Unquestionably, we should do so in any particular instance were such the case. But directly and intrinsically such proof is probability—very high, perhaps, but still remaining within the species of probability—and capable of being transformed into the higher grade of certainty only by the aid of reflex principles.

Such is precisely the Catholic position with regard to miracles. We maintain that, if not in every individual case, at least in some, and this is especially true of the principal miracles to which Christianity is committed, we have at least that amount of proof which in similar fields of inquiry can produce and actually does produce assent. Taking into account, just as would be done were we discussing theories of descent, every fact that can bear on the subject, we maintain that there is not indeed mathematical nor metaphysical evidence, but proof sufficient to make every reasonable man honestly and carefully inquiring certain that in these events the forces of nature have been overcome by the intervention of supernatural power. This will come home to us more strongly if we do not confine our attention to an isolated case, if we cease to consider it merely under the aspect of an interruption of the uniformity of nature, if, taking, as we ought to take, a more comprehensive view of things, we remember that the

Creator of those secondary causes, He, who called them into being and gives them whatever life and efficiency they possess, is at the same time our Eternal Father who must have for mankind infinite pity and love. The Agnostic may protest against the introduction of a God in whom he does not believe as practically begging the question. We cannot help his protest. This aspect of our argument is not the survival of the crude anthropomorphism of the savage, nor the obtrusion of the silly cant of the devotee. The existence of a God, personal, loving His creatures, enjoying and sometimes exercising for their benefit the power of modifying the laws by which His Providence ordinarily proceeds, is a postulate of Revelation and its criteria. Without it we cannot entertain miracle even as an hypothesis. It is our strongest and most convincing argument, the keystone of the arch of faith. This is a feature of the case entirely overlooked by our opponents. Observing merely natural phenomena, eliminating all thought of a Power by whom such phenomena are controlled, they conclude that there is a presumption, amounting almost to an antecedent certainty, against any departure from the accustomed sequences. Were there no Creator presiding over the world, were the world one huge piece of mechanism in which motion succeeds motion with automatic precision, were natural phenomena but the manifestation of a blind, natural force in an eternal process of evolution; then, undoubtedly there would be an overwhelming probability against any such departure. But this conception is radically different from that which Christians entertain. We believe that in the beginning God created all things: that He made man to His image and likeness: that the firmament is His handiwork and that His glory the heavens declare. By such a thought the antecedent improbability of miracle is considerably diminished.

The better to subvert the Catholic position, this invariability of natural laws, which is the very backbone of the objection, is sometimes held by a happy inconsistency not to be established at all. What right have we to assert the existence of our order of nature? Because we have seen a few times the sun rise and set and the tide ebb and

flow, does it follow that so it always was in the past and so it ever shall be in the future? Multiply the instances : to the personal experiences of the individual add the accumulated historical experiences of the race, is not the generalisation still wild, the induction still imperfect? Insist on the uniformity of the past and infer the uniformity of the future. Is continuity a necessary inference? Are all our experiences, so many, yet how few, an infallible guarantee that in that future, whose term no man can foresee, the same antecedents will have the same consequents, and that nature will roll on for ever without change or the shadow of vicissitude?

Not one of these events (*e.g.*, that all men must die : that fire consumes tow) is more than probable. . . . Calling our after verified experience a 'law of nature' adds nothing to its value, nor in the slightest degree increases any probability that it will be verified again, which may arise out of the fact of its frequent verification. The day fly has better grounds for calling a thunderstorm supernatural, than has man, with his experience of an infinitesimal fraction of duration, to say that the most astonishing event than can be imagined is beyond the scope of natural causes.¹

If there be no order of nature, there can be no departure from it and consequently no miracle. St. Thomas, as if anticipating this objection, defines miracle as *Effectus qui divinitus fit praeter ordinem consuetum naturae*. He says nothing about laws of nature and their violation, and frames his terminology so cautiously that his order of nature need not necessarily mean, though, of course, it does mean, more than the invariable consequences of Hume. One of the most ridiculous aspects in the campaign against the Church is to see scientific men impugning the order of nature, in the demonstration of which their lives are passed. But they tell us that the order of nature is held by them merely provisionally, and that it cannot be demonstrated philosophically. The scholastics thought otherwise. They held that essence was the principle of activity, and, consequently, that in identical conditions essence would always manifest itself in the same fashion; or, in other words, that the note of its action would be uniformity. Without,

¹ Huxley, *loc. cit.*

therefore, being guilty of imperfect induction, and without having recourse to blind instinct, the uniformity of nature has been upheld by Catholics adhering to the principle *operari sequitur esse*.

Summing up, then, we may say that the objection to the philosophical truth of miracles is based on a false principle—the application of the experimental method of reasoning to moral subjects. It demands altogether excessive evidence when it requires that miracles should be demonstrated; that the arguments for the evidences of Christianity should be as irresistible as the proofs of geometry or natural philosophy. It owes its plausibility, in great part, to the fact that generally it has been examined as an independent proposition, detached from the utterly unsound system of philosophy to which it belongs. It was swept along by the tide of the great triumphs of this method in the material sciences, during the nineteenth century, to an apparently impregnable position. The experimental method, then, enjoyed unquestioned power and claimed universal sway. It instituted a kind of materialistic Reign of Terror. Men were in a perfect fever of unrest, dreading that at any moment some new scientific audacity should rob them of the most cherished portions of their spiritual inheritance, or destroy their supernatural life altogether. Happily this despotism is passing away. The testimony of an Apostle is beginning to be recognised as at least equivalent to the dictum of a scientist; disputants on things of the spirit are no longer referred, as to a court of ultimate appeal, to scientific discovery or to scientific pretensions. Outside its own sphere the experimental method is losing its authority, and Hume's objection will disappear in its train. In this new century, when, as events seem to indicate, there will be a higher value placed on spirituality than there was in the old, when the test of conflicting religions will be their perfect adaptation to human nature, their capacity for satisfying the deep, permanent needs of the soul, the blatant, self-sufficient adherents of the experimental method, the men who had the sun of science at their backs, will be as much out of place as Gnostic visionaries or Pagans suckled in creeds outworn.

PATRICK F. COAKLEY, O.S.A.

NOTRE DAME DE FOURVIÈRE.

IN the year 1870 the inhabitants of the city of Lyons found themselves threatened with the horrors of a siege. The tide of war which was then devastating some of the fairest provinces of France, rolled perilously near the gates of the ancient city ; destruction seemed inevitable. In this hour of mortal danger, the inhabitants had recourse to the Queen of Heaven who had so often in the past, extended her gracious protection to them.

On the 8th of October, Monsigneur Ginoulhiac, kneeling at our Lady's altar, in the old chapel at Fourvière, solemnly promised in the name of the priests and people of Lyons, that, if through the intercession of their great patroness the terrible danger with which they were threatened was averted, that they would spare no effort to cause a new sanctuary to be erected at Fourvière, where from time immemorial a shrine of our Lady had existed. Their prayer was heard.

On the 1st of March, 1871, the treaty of peace was signed. Neither the city nor diocese of Lyons suffered the slightest injury from the invaders. The magnificent basilica which dominates the city, testifies to the power of Mary's intercession and to her children's gratitude.

The origin of the shrine is completely lost in the mists of antiquity, and no date can be accurately assigned to its foundation. One thing is certain that from the moment when the dawn of Christianity dispelled the darkness of Paganism, devotion to the Mother of God has ever been a characteristic of the people of Lyons.

We read that Lyons, or Lugdunum, as it was called by the ancients, was founded in the year 43, B.C., by Munatius Plancus. So rapid was its growth, that in the reign of Augustus, it became the capital of the Roman province of Gaul, and possessed a senate, magistrates and an athenæum. It was in Lugdunum that the four great roads, which traversed Gaul, met as in a centre. In A.D. 53, the city

was destroyed in one night by fire. It was rebuilt by Nero, and later, it was enlarged and greatly embellished by the Emperor Trajan. In the fifth century Lyons had already become one of the chief cities of the kingdom of Burgundy, and in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it rose to great wealth and importance. To escape the tyranny of the nobility in 1307, the inhabitants placed themselves under the protection of Philippe-le-Bel, who united the city to France.

The first to sow the precious seed of devotion to the Queen of Heaven, destined to produce such a rich harvest, was St. Pothin, the first bishop of the Gauls. It might almost be said that the precious gift was bestowed directly by St. John the Evangelist, who received Mary as his mother from the dying Saviour, for St. Polycarp, the successor to St. John in the diocese of Smyrna, transmitted it direct to St. Pothin.

But it was not on the heights whence the gods of Pagan Rome seemed to dominate the two great rivers which joined their waters in the valley beneath that the flower of devotion to Mary was first planted. The infant church, with Mary's worship, must hide amongst the rushes of the marshy river banks. The summit and slopes of the hill, from Saint Just to Pierre-Scize were covered by the proud temples and palaces of the Romans, lifting their majestic heads to heaven. St. Pothin seeking a place whereon to erect the standard of the Cross, passed over the abode of human greatness and grandeur, and chose a lonely and unfrequented spot. Just before joining their waters, the two convergent lines of the Rhone and Saône formed a triangle, the base of which was formed by the hill, known at the present time by the name of La Croix Rousse.

This was the place chosen by St. Pothin whereon to found his Christian colony. Here, amidst the fogs and mists which enveloped those desolate marshes, the first Christians of Lyons practised their religion in lowliness and obscurity. Yonder, directly facing them, rose the eminence on which the proud Roman city was seated in regal beauty.

The humble followers of Christ crucified had the

stronghold of Paganism ever before them, in its power and magnificence, seemingly indestructible. And yet it would seem as if some prophetic instinct had guided St. Pothin in his choice. Before very long, many causes were to combine for the removal of that centre of life and action which had its home upon the height. By degrees, as Christianity triumphed, the attraction of the Cross was to draw Lugdunum down into the plain, and to gather round the sanctuary founded by St. Pothin, all the inhabitants of the Christian colony, just as the temples and monuments of Paganism were grouped around the Forum of Trajan. Consequently, one by one, the glories of the Pagan city would depart, whilst on the ruins of the forum Mary's sanctuary was to arise.

Thus once more was Mary Immaculate to crush the serpent's head, and from the hill of Fourvière, so long the stronghold of Paganism, the Queen of Purity watches over the new Lyons nestling at her feet.

Like all the saints, and like his beloved master, St. Polycarp, in particular, St. Pothin cherished the most tender love for our Lady, and he laboured unceasingly to enkindle the same ardent love and devotion in the hearts of the Christians of Lugdunum.

In a Bull of Pope Innocent IV. it is stated that the altar dedicated to our Lady by St. Pothin was the first raised in her honour on this side of the Alps. It would be impossible to doubt the evidence of a Pope so renowned for his learning, and who, moreover, had such abundant opportunity, during long residence in the city, of becoming acquainted with the traditions of the church of Lyons.

The soil was fruitful, and the Gospel of Christ spread rapidly in Lugdunum. Soon the marvellous progress of Christianity attracted notice. The Christians, warned by the storm of persecution which had burst in Rome and Smyrna, in which latter city St. Polycarp had suffered martyrdom, held themselves in readiness for the moment when they too would be called on to witness for Christ.

However, the Christian warriors who stood ready for the combat were not molested. The danger seemed to have passed away. Not until 177, nine years after the death of

St. Polycarp, did the thunderbolt fall on the Christians of Lyons. Several were at once thrown into prison. The venerable shepherd of the flock, St. Pothin, soon shared their captivity. They were tried publicly in the Forum of Trajan. A short distance from the forum, on the eastern side of the hill, rose the palace of the Cæsars. Here, in the underground dungeons of this palace, the first martyrs of Lyons were imprisoned, and here St. Pothin, with several of his companions, succumbed to their cruel suffering. At the Hospice of Autiquaille may be seen the gloomy dungeon, now converted into a chapel, in which St. Pothin, at the age of ninety, after enduring unheard of torture, breathed forth his soul to God.

The blood of the martyrs is ever fruitful. The religion of Christ, which was then so persecuted, has triumphed over her enemies. That palace, in the erection of which the Romans spared no expense, that magnificent abode, whence issued those bloody edicts against Christ's members: what now remains of all its splendour? A reservoir and a conduit which leads from this reservoir to the aqueduct: that is all. The palace of the Cæsars has vanished from off the face of the earth, while the dismal dungeon, in which the first bishop of Lyons expired, remains intact. The 2nd of June is regarded as the day on which the martyr-bishop received his crown.

St. Pothin was succeeded in the See of Lyons by St. Irenæus, who faithfully followed in the footsteps of his saintly predecessor, imitating him in his love for Mary and in his ardent zeal for the propagation of her worship. Twenty years after the death of St. Pothin, Irenæus, too, sealed his faith with his blood. During these persecutions thousands of all ages, and of both sexes, laid down their lives for Christ. Christian blood flowed in torrents, consecrating for all time the hill of Fourvière. But the God of Justice avenged the death of His saints. The proud Roman city was doomed to destruction. The gorgeous temples crumbled into dust, and when the last and most famous of all—the Forum of Trajan—lay prostrate, the Chapel of Fourvière rose upon its ruins.

The little colony founded by St. Pothin grew and prospered in the shadow of Mary's altar, which he had consecrated. The remains of this first oratory are still preserved for the veneration of the faithful in the crypt, recently restored, of the church of St. Nizier. The pagan city, destroyed by the persecutors themselves, was destined to have a new and Christian birth in the plain at the foot of the hill, which had been the seat of its pagan splendour. Septimus Severus reduced the city to a heap of ashes, after which the imperial palace was never rebuilt. In 357, and again in 413, Lyons was seized by the Germans and the Burgundians, who, in the fifth century, became masters of the city. In 732 the Saracens completed the work of destruction, and in 840 the remains of the majestic porticoes, which had hitherto defied the efforts of the destroyers, suddenly fell to the ground.

We read the following in a portion still remaining, of a manuscript written by St. Benignus of Dijon: 'In that year, the famous monument called *Forum vetus*, built by Trajan in Lugdunum, fell in the beginning of Autumn after having lasted seven hundred years.' These ruins were called by the people the old Forum or *Foro vetere*, which then became *Forverium*, *Forviel*, and finally in the sixteenth century the place became known as *Forvière* or *Fourvière*.

The chroniclers of Lyons agree in fixing the ninth century as the date of the construction of our Lady's Chapel. Pieces of marble and stones belonging to the Roman buildings are still to be found in the foundations, but this early shrine was a very humble effort. A very small enclosure, an altar built into the wall facing the East, and a door opening to the North, such was the simple plan of this primitive sanctuary. But, although the exact date of its origin is wrapped in obscurity, it is impossible to doubt that the shrine is of great antiquity. Abundant proof of this is to be found in the charter of the foundation of the collegiate church, written in 1192.

Our Lady of Good Counsel was the title under which our Lady was at first honoured on the hill of *Fourvière*. Some chaplains were appointed for the service of the altar,

and vines were cultivated to defray the expenses. For three centuries the shrine remained humble and unpretentious. Numerous other shrines of greater renown attracted the devotion of the people of Lyons, who in their love and gratitude multiplied Mary's altars everywhere. The most celebrated of those were the crypt of St. Pothin, Notre Dame des Grâces à l'Ile Barbe, and the basilica of Ainay, which last can boast the happy privilege of being the first place in Gaul where the Immaculate Conception was honoured.

But the chapel of Fourvière was destined to emerge from its poverty and insignificance. The hill which the blood of martyrs had sanctified formed the first patrimony of the arch-diocese of Lyons, it being recorded in the Archives that the Emperor Lothaire, in 850, bestowed it upon the Church. Olivier de Chavannes, Canon of the Chapter of Lyons, conceived the desire of enlarging the humble oratory. Accordingly, in 1168, we find him beginning to build a long nave which was to be dedicated later to St. Thomas of Canterbury.

Regarding this dedication there is an old tradition which is mentioned repeatedly in the Archives of the Chapter. When St. Thomas à Becket quitted England at the command of the tyrannical Henry, he took refuge in the monastery of Pontigny, of which Guichard was abbot. Shortly afterwards, Guichard was raised to the See of Lyons, and persuaded the exiled archbishop to accompany him thither, and to take up his abode in the cloister of St. Jean where the Chapter had generously offered him an asylum. The tradition relates that Thomas à Becket, Archbishop Guichard, and Olivier de Chavannes were, one day, walking together. The conversation turned on the building then in course of construction at Fourvière. The exile raised his eyes and fixed them on the hill. 'Who will be the Patron of the new Cathedral?' he asked, turning to his hosts. 'The first martyr who sheds his blood in defence of the Church,' was the answer. Was it some prophetic instinct as to the fate of the illustrious guest which induced this answer? If so, its verification was not long delayed. Very

shortly, all Europe thrilled with horror to hear of the murder of the saintly archbishop, at the foot of the altar, in the very shadow of the sanctuary. The miracles worked at the martyr's tomb; the marvellous sanctity of his life, Henry's remorse and penitence; all combined to hasten the decision of the Church. In 1173 the supreme Pontiff declared Thomas à Becket Blessed.

Faithful to their promise, Guichard and Olivier dedicated the nave which was just finished to the sainted archbishop. Our Lady of Fourvière was pleased to permit that henceforth the name of him who from infancy had been the object of her maternal care, should be associated with her own sweet Name—her faithful son whose last words when struck by the assassin's dagger had been 'I recommend my soul and the cause of the Church to God and to Mary.'

Devotion to the martyr spread rapidly. Ex-voto offerings multiplied, amongst the first being one from Louis VII., in gratitude for the recovery of his son from a dangerous fever which had brought him to the gates of death.

Jean de Bellesme, who succeeded Archbishop Guichard, completed the work of the latter by erecting a collegiate church at Fourvière. The Provost of the Chapter of St. Jean was also Provost of Fourvière. On great festivals, the clergy of Fourvière were always present at the ceremonies in the cathedral. In turn, the chapter ascended to the sanctuary, on the 29th December, to assist at the celebration of the feast of St. Thomas à Becket.

In an old charter of 1263, bearing the signature of Philip of Savoy, then Archbishop of Lyons, we find mention of innumerable rich offerings to the shrine at Fourvière. The devoted clients of Mary, in the fulness of their gratitude for her intercession, laid upon her altar the most costly offerings. Vessels of gold for the use of the sanctuary, rich stuffs, precious jewels; all were brought to our Lady's feet.

In 1244, Pope Innocent IV. sought refuge in Lyons from the continued persecution of the Emperor Frederic. For six years the exiled Pontiff found an asylum amongst the faithful at Lyons. It was at the council convoked by this Pope, during his stay in the latter city, that an octave

was decreed to the Feast of our Lady's Nativity. By order of the Pope, the feast was celebrated for the first time at Lyons, with the greatest magnificence. Thus the inhabitants can claim for their ancient city the privilege of being the first place in Gaul where the feast of Mary's birth was celebrated, just as it was at the shrine of Ainay, that her immaculate conception was first honoured.

Innocent IV., in various Bulls, repeatedly acknowledges the generous hospitality which he received from the people of Lyons, and he testified his grateful recognition of their devoted loyalty by conferring upon them innumerable favours.

In 1336, Philippe-le-Bel formally confirmed the magistrates of Lyons in their office, and bestowed upon them great privileges. Those officials, whose duty it was to administer the affairs of the city and to provide for its defence, desired by public act to acknowledge our Lady as their suzerain, and to render her their homage. One of the city gates was at Fourvière, and they gave the keys of this gate into the hands of the chapter, only reserving the right to appoint the sentinel, who from an elevated tower kept vigilant watch. It was also the duty of this sentinel to open and close the gate at Fourvière, and he it was who sounded the *réveille*, and rang the curfew for the citizens. At eight o'clock in the evening, one of the bells at St. Jean tolled twice; then the bells of the cathedral and of St. Nizier pealed fourth during a quarter of an hour, at the end of which the sentry on guard at Fourvière blew a loud blast on his trumpet; this was the signal to all that the city was closed for the night.

In the thirteenth century Lyons was a prey to the horrors of civil war. Fourvière suffered considerably from the efforts of the rival combatants to seize a place of such great strategical importance. The arrival of Pope Gregory X. in Lyons at last put a stop to the struggle. The Pope ordered the citizens to pay seven thousand pounds to the monasteries of St. John and Fourvière, in compensation for the damages inflicted during the conflict. Gregory convoked a council in 1274, at Lyons, to celebrate the reunion with the Greek Church. During this council the holy

Cardinal Bonaventure died. The sixteenth century proved a period of mourning for the Church. Heresy, led by Luther, the apostate monk, reared its hydra head in the greater part of Europe. France did not escape the pestilential invasion. Our Lady's city was too near Geneva, the very centre of religious dissension, not to be disturbed. The fanatical hatred of the so-called reformers displayed itself in its most violent form at Lyons. In 1551, sacrilegious hands forced open the tabernacle in the church at Fourvière, and carried off the Blessed Sacrament, together with the sacred vessels. This was but the beginning of the abomination of desolation which swept over Lyons. In April, 1562, the Comte de Sault, governor of the city, either through weakness or treachery, delivered the city into the hands of the reformers. All the churches were pillaged; many of them were utterly destroyed, among the number being the ancient basilica of St. Irenæus. The church at Fourvière was the first to be destroyed, the walls alone being left standing. The church of St. Just, which the passage of a thousand years had left uninjured, was also levelled to the ground.

In 1563, order having been restored, the exiles returned to their beloved sanctuary, or rather to the hallowed spot where it had once stood. It was a sad home-coming. All was ruin and desolation. No part of the shrine had escaped the destroyer's vengeance. Even the bells had been melted for the construction of cannons.

For ten years Fourvière was left destitute of church or chapel. The chapter of the cathedral, which had suffered terribly at the despoiler's hands, had no means to help their brethren at Fourvière. By degrees, however, the church was roofed; the belfry restored, and the altar of our Lady re-erected. The restoration of the sanctuary caused universal joy. The people flocked in daily increasing crowds to the altar of their dear patroness. As many as twenty-five Masses were said daily at the shrine, and the offerings became more numerous and costly than ever. But days of terrible calamity were in store for the people of Lyons.

In 1628, the plague, which had on several previous occasions nearly decimated the city, re-appeared with more

appalling violence than ever. In fifteen days ten thousand people perished. The members of the various religious orders worked with the most heroic devotion and self-sacrifice; tending the dying, burying the dead, and endeavouring to calm the panic-stricken.

Meanwhile the plague increased to such an extent that it was calculated that three hundred persons died in the space of an hour. Prayers and supplications were offered unceasingly that God might have mercy on the stricken city. The magistrates deputed two friars to carry a silver lamp to the shrine of Loretto. It was with difficulty that the religious accomplished their pilgrimage owing to the terror inspired by their presence everywhere, on their journey. At the end of eight months the awful visitation ceased. It was calculated that thirty-five thousand persons perished, including seventy-two doctors.

The mourning city turned its tear-dimmed eyes to our Lady of Fourvière. The crowds which thronged to the shrine became so great that in 1630 another door had to be made, which was afterwards walled up when the chapel was enlarged. As late as 1838, the position of the door was plainly visible, and the inscription over the arch 'Notre Dame de Bon Conseil' could be easily deciphered.

In 1643, Lyons was again visited by the plague. This time the outbreak was even more appalling in its ravages than the preceding one. In their dire extremity the people turned once more to our Lady of Fourvière. The magistrates of Lyons resolved in council to proceed in solemn procession to Fourvière and there, by public vow, consecrate their city for ever to the Mother of God. The text of this resolution is still preserved in the archives at the Hotel-de-Ville. The solemn consecration took place on the 8th September, 1643. Mary accepted the trust, the plague ceased, and never again appeared in Lyons.

A beautiful white marble statue of our Lady was placed on the bridge crossing the Saône, bearing on the pedestal an inscription which recorded the gratitude of the people of Lyons to their great patroness for their deliverance from the awful scourge. This statue was seriously damaged by an

accident, and was taken nearly two hundred years ago to the church of the Hotel Dieu where it is still preserved in a niche above the altar in the rosary chapel. Another statue was erected on the Place de Change at the same time, but the stone of which it was formed was too perishable to resist the ravages of the climate, and it had to be removed.

In faithful fulfilment of the vow made in 1643, the magistrates of Lyons went every year to Fourvière. Amongst other offerings, they invariably presented a gold crown piece, as token of vassalage. This pious custom was only discontinued in 1789, when the first mutterings of the awful storm of bloodshed and godlessness, so soon to burst over France, was heard.

Mary proved herself the faithful liege-lady of her devoted servants. Since the city was thus solemnly placed under her protection, no contagious epidemic has ravaged Lyons. The cholera which scourged the greater part of France, stayed its course several times almost at the very gates of our Lady's city. Now, that the civic authorities no longer fulfil their sacred obligations two delegates from each of the thirty-six parishes of Lyons, proceed to Fourvière on the 8th September annually, and kneel at our Lady's altar, while the priest pronounces, in their name, the ancient act for consecration.

Fourvière experienced the full force of the revolutionary storm. Sacrilegious hands despoiled the altars, and carried off all the rich offerings which for centuries had been laid at the shrine by the grateful clients of the Queen of Heaven. The chapel was then closed. It seems a special intervention of heaven that the sanctuary escaped destruction at the hands of Couthon and the band of ruthless destroyers who left Lyons a heap of ruins.

The chapter having refused to take the oath imposed by the impious legislators, were obliged to seek safety in exile. M. Groboz, vicar of Sainte Croix, was peremptorily ordered to leave Lyons on the 30th August, 1793. The good priest, unwilling to abandon the fold wherein were still to be found so many faithful souls, sought refuge on the hill of Fourvière; where he remained concealed for several months in the

house of two pious ladies. During this time he celebrated daily Mass and heard confessions in the bare and desolate sanctuary. One morning two commissioners presented themselves at the shrine, their errand being to make a valuation of the sacred vessels which still remained. M. Groboz calmly finished the Mass he was just saying, when thus disturbed. The emissaries of the Revolution then demanded the key of the Tabernacle that they might ascertain the weight of the Sacred Ciborium. The priest trembled with horror. He refused to comply. No hand should touch the sacred vessel until he had first removed the Holy of Holies. One of the miscreants swore a fearful oath that they would carry out their design without giving the priest time to effect the removal of the Blessed Sacrament. The sacrilegious wretch would have carried his threat into execution but for the intervention of his Protestant companion. M. Groboz was denounced to the Committee of Public Safety and was obliged to fly.

In spite of threats and dangers, dauntless pilgrims still braved all to kneel in prayer at the gates of the deserted chapel, though by doing so they ventured into the jaws of death, for the neighbourhood of the shrine was carefully watched by infamous spies.

During the darkest days of the reign of terror faithful priests contrived to celebrate Mass in secret in the houses of the faithful, who joyfully opened their doors to give them shelter. Thus did pastors and people assemble in far more danger of their lives than were the early Christians in the Catacombs, and more than once both priests and people paid the forfeit of their blood for their faithfulness to God.

The death of Robespierre in 1794 caused a slight lull in the storm. The chapel of Fourvière was re-opened, but, alas, only to suffer fresh profanations. On the 11th July, 1796, it was sold for £29,000 to a lady who devoted all her efforts to the establishment of the constitutional form of worship. The ancient statute of our Lady having disappeared, another was purchased and set up in its place, while two constitutional priests were appointed to the care of the chapel. Well might the faithful regret the days

when the chapel was closed, and the grass grew in the deserted sanctuary. Far better so than to behold it in sacrilegious hands. But the love of Mary was too deeply rooted in the hearts of the people of Lyons to be destroyed by the fiercest persecution.

In 1799 two priests, brothers, M.M. Caille, opened a school on their own estate, not far from Fourvière. The drawing-room of the mansion was converted into a chapel, where Mary's faithful clients came to offer their Queen the worship which they were forbidden to offer at her ancient shrine. In 1803 the Abbé Fesch, Archdeacon of Ajaccio, and uncle of Napoleon, who had been appointed first consul, was consecrated Archbishop of Lyons. In 1804 Pope Pius VII. passed through Lyons on his way to Paris. He was received most enthusiastically by the faithful of Mary's city. They seized the opportunity to plead for the restoration of their liege-lady's chapel, which had, indeed, been rescued from the hands of the schismatics, but which had not been yet re-opened from prudential motives. Cardinal Fesch and the clergy of Lyons were equally anxious for the restoration of Mary's sovereignty over the city. A subscription was opened. Money flowed in from all sides. The work of restoring the shrine was at once begun. To the great joy of all, the statue of our Lady, so long missing, was found uninjured beneath a heap of ruins. Some of the former canons of Fourvière testified to its authenticity. During the days of terror a pious gardener had contrived to carry away the sacred image, which he carefully concealed, thus saving it from destruction at the hands of the demons of the Revolution, and later from the profanation of schismatical worshippers.

On his return, in 1805, from Paris, Pius VII. halted a second time at Lyons. At Cardinal Fesch's request, the venerable Pontiff, in person, performed the ceremony of re-opening the doors of the church at Fourvière, after which he celebrated the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. An inscription, placed on the principal door of the church, recorded the re-opening of the shrine by the Sovereign Pontiff, and also the numerous indulgences wherewith it was enriched.

This inscription is now in the interior of the new church. Pius VII. attributed his deliverance from captivity, and his safe return to the Eternal City, to the intercession of the Blessed Virgin, and to commemorate these favours he instituted the Feast of our Lady, Help of Christians, which is observed on the 24th May.

During the revolution of 1830 the shrine narrowly escaped destruction from the firing of the insurgents' cannon; some parts of the church being struck by the balls, one of which penetrated the wall just below the niche wherein stood our Lady's statue. In addition to the horrors of the insurrection, Lyons was threatened with another scourge. The dreaded *cholera morbus* once more invaded Europe, and had already attacked Paris. The second city of France trembled before the approach of the dread destroyer. Stringent sanitary measures were adopted, and every precaution taken to avert the threatened danger. But it was to the holy hill of Fourvière that the people turned their eyes, imploring of their Sovereign Lady that help which she had so often accorded them in the hour of danger. A public novena was begun at the altar of our Lady of Fourvière, at which it was calculated ten thousand persons assisted daily. Their confidence was not in vain, once more Mary spread the ægis of her protection over her loyal subjects, and the destroying angel passed by, not venturing to enter the city shielded by the Queen of Heaven.

In 1835, the pestilence re-appeared, ravaging the south of France and Piedmont, and advancing as far as Valence. Again, the people of Lyons poured forth their supplication at the shrine of Fourvière, and again the destroying angel sheathed his sword at the very gates of Mary's city. A marble tablet, with the following inscription, records the gratitude of the people:—

Lyons to our Lady of Fourvière in gratitude for having been preserved from the cholera in the years MDCCCXXXII and MDCCCXXXIV.

In 1838, the Sovereign Pontiff accorded to the church at Fourvière the same privileges as those bestowed by his predecessors upon the holy house of Loretto. A great and

glorious privilege, and a striking testimony to the veneration felt for the ancient shrine by the head of the Church. In 1839, the Confraternity of the Most Holy Heart of Mary was established in the church at Fourvière, and was affiliated to that already existing in the church of Notre Dame des Victoires at Paris. In 1839, during the month of November, the Rhone and the Saône overflowed their banks, causing great devastation in Lyons, many houses and several bridges collapsed, and for days locomotion was only possible in boats. There was but one refuge in those hours of dire calamity. The archbishop, the priests, and the people ascended the hill of Fourvière, and with fervent prayer invoked the aid of their Queen. At the intercession of Mary, God's wrath was appeased. The angry floods rapidly subsided, and marvellous to relate, not more than two or three lost their lives. Again, the people of Lyons recorded their gratitude by a painting which was placed in our Lady's chapel. In 1848, the people solemnly renewed the consecration of their city to the Blessed Virgin.

On the 21st November, 1848, Cardinal de Bonald, at that time Archbishop of Lyons, having celebrated Mass in the Lady Chapel, at which the Chapter of Lyons, and an enormous crowd of the faithful assisted, read aloud at the foot of the altar the act consecrating the city to our Lady of Fourvière. In accordance with the ancient custom, representatives from all the parishes attended, each offering a gold piece and a wax candle. In the evening a solemn blessing was pronounced on the city from the top of the holy hill. This act of consecration is repeated annually on the 8th September, and in the evening the Blessed Sacrament is carried outside the church, and raised in solemn Benediction over the city. Beneath an enormous crowd gathers on the quays, and at the moment when the appointed signal announces the raising of the Blessed Sacrament all prostrate themselves in adoration.

After twelve years absence, the cholera again appeared in France, and this time a few cases occurred in the military hospital. As before the people had recourse to Mary, who once more came to the assistance of her subjects. The

progress of the plague was stayed and no further cases occurred.

On the 8th December, 1852, the city of Lyons celebrated by general illuminations, on a scale of grandeur hitherto unprecedented, the placing of our Lady's statue in the new tower which had been built and which dominated all the buildings by which it was surrounded.

In 1870, danger and death once more threatened Lyons. The horrors of war were devastating the fair land of France. Three times had a regiment of the enemy received orders to march on Lyons, and three times did the foe pause and turn aside, as if some invisible hand had stayed their march. Then it was in the hour of the most imminent danger, that, as of old, the archbishop, the priests, and people gathered round the altar at Fourvière, and there bound themselves by solemn vow to erect a new sanctuary if the Most Immaculate Virgin would intercede to protect the city and diocese of Lyons from the hands of the enemy. The gracious Queen of Heaven accepted her children's vow. The invading armies were stayed at the very gates of the city which, as we have seen, was not once molested during the whole course of the war. The magnificent basilica which to-day dominates the city is a glorious proof of how nobly the people redeemed their vow. In all France there is no grander temple than that raised by the faithful of Lyons to the glory of God and to testify to all time their gratitude to God's Immaculate Mother for the protection so signally accorded to their city.

There is no shrine in France held in higher veneration than that of Fourvière. From all parts pilgrims turn their steps to this favoured spot. The sick, the sorrowful, weary wayfarers on the thorny high-road of life, fainting beneath their load; those who are starting forth on an untried career, filled with hope, all alike go to lay their griefs, their pains, their hopes and fears, at the feet of her who is the Sweet Mother of Mercy. And Mary is pleased by the wondrous favours she accords to manifest how pleasing to her is the homage which her children render to her at the ancient shrine of Fourvière.

E. LEAHY.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

RELIGION, says the Abbé de Broglie,¹ professes to answer the most momentous and the most anxious questions that can engage the attention of the human mind, and its answer, in one form or another, has been accepted and cherished by the human race. But your modern 'scientist,' as he calls himself, has little respect for the opinions of the human race. To be sure, he says, the human race believes in religion; but then the human race is wrong. All men are fools; all religion is a creed outworn, an hypothesis unnecessary for the understanding of the world, and hostile—nay, fatal—to all true progress. Yet this same omniscient individual reckoneth naught human as foreign to him; so he asks himself: What is religion, and how is it that it has such a hold upon human nature? What is the origin of this universal foolishness? How did man ever begin to believe in this unscientific superstition?

It is clear that a man who approaches the question in this frame of mind must be hopelessly astray in his solution of it. To start with, he has no idea of what religion really is; he is utterly unable to realise what it has been, what it has meant to all the noblest and wisest of men. Current definitions of religion, current accounts of its origin, falsely labelled scientific, make this abundantly plain to anyone; and one need not know much of the metaphysical lunacies of Germany, or the reckless theorising of French and English materialists, to find it out. At every turn we are confronted with the grossest misunderstandings and misrepresentations of obvious facts and principles; and a believer in any form of religion would fail to recognise his beliefs and practices in the strange travesties that are dubbed scientific interpretation of them. It is the old story of the straw man valiantly overthrown by his maker.

¹ *Problèmes et Conclusions de l'Histoire de Religion.*

The most popular theory among those 'thinkers' is that which is identified with the names of Herbert Spencer, Tylor, Huxley, Tiele, etc.; and it may be described, as the Abbé de Broglie describes it, under the title of Primitive Animism.

According to this view primitive man must have had a rather primitive outlook upon the world. Poor fellow, he could know no better; for his simian relatives had no school or university to send him to, and, indeed, he was not a promising scholar in any case. Yet withal was he a philosopher, and his first piece of philosophy was to look upon all things in nature as animated and having life, like himself. But what is life? To this problem our philosopher next applied himself, with no ordinary zeal and thirst for knowledge. Unlike his modern patrons he was much given to introspection. He observed that he slept and dreamt; in his slumbers he wandered into dreamland; he made the further brilliant discovery that men die, and that dead men do not breathe any more than they tell tales; perhaps, he saw a ghost or two, who may have enlightened him about the next life. Reasoning upon such *data* he concluded that in man there is a something else besides the body, an *alter ego*, a spirit, a shade, a ghost. But external nature, too, is full of life; therefore, quoth he, it is full of spirits as well. This view of the world is called Animism, and, according to Spencer, Tylor, etc., it was the first form of religion; and it is found, according to Huxley, Spencer, and others, as the only religion of the lowest savages of our day. If a wise man, a magician, a brave warrior, or a stout hunter died, his ghost would hold a high place among ghosts; such spirit would gain in reputation as years went by, they would become as gods and be worshipped as such by the primitive savage. After a while a hierarchy grew up among the gods, suggested, says Spencer, by social and political distinctions among men; and the process would go on, not without infinite scuffle and dust among the gods, such as we read of in Greek mythology, till, at last, the best god came out on top and gradually elbowed out all the others.

This theory seems to postulate the crudest form of Darwinism as its foundation ; and so far it stands condemned. Still it is not without resource ; for it is urged that evolution in some sense is an established fact all through nature and human history ; all things grow, improve, change for the better. Therefore, it is contended, even if the first man were no monkey's son, his religion could not have been anything but crude and primitive. To which it can be obviously replied with Mr. Jevons¹ that evolution and progress are not synonymous terms. Evolution in any hypothesis is the successive changing of an organism so as to suit varying environments. But before you can show that the change in the organism was for the better you must show that the surroundings varied in such a way as to demand such continual improvement. Improvement in relation to surroundings may be a falling off from an absolute standard of perfection. To apply this to the history of religion, it is plain that a learned body of theologians or scientists if they sojourned for a while in Zululand would have no chance against the native sorcerers and medicine men ; nor would their views prove the fittest to survive in Zulu schools of thought. Again, it is a simple fact of history that progress in any true sense of the word has always been the exception rather than the rule ; the progressive races are enormously outnumbered, even in our own times, by the conservative and retrograde. In what sense, therefore, can positive science teach that mankind is on the whole improving ? Is there accurate systematic proof of such improvement, or is it a mere assumption due to the self-complacency of comfortable scientists in their snug parlours, a figment of the scientific imagination contemplating an unproved theory in another narrow department of human knowledge ? How does it appear that all nature is growing to perfection and will ever grow till the scientific millenium is reached ? What about the final catastrophe to which all nature is hastening inexorably according to the teaching of an authoritative school of scientists ?

¹ *Introduction to History of Religion.*

Again, it is not true that the growth of religion towards perfection must keep pace with the advance of material or worldly civilization. Indeed it is hard to understand what Agnostic scientists mean at all when they speak of improvement in religion. Religion, according to them, is an error, a disease. Surely the progress of a disease in its own proper nature, with its own natural tendency, should not be called improvements in any sense. Surely the best improvement, or rather the only improvement, is to eliminate it utterly from the system it preys upon. On the other hand, if religion be regarded as a truth, a healthy growth that has its roots deep in human nature, there is nothing to show that its progress will be aided directly by any advances that may be made in other departments of human activity. Macaulay said that all the data of natural religion were as fully within the grasp of the men of Homer's time as of our own; hence it would follow that in old times natural religion would already have reached its full perfection, provided men paid sufficient attention to it. How far there can be development in natural religion is a further question; but the only clear examples of true religious development are the cases of Judaism and Christianity, which are on a totally different plane. And in this connection it is well to point out another of the question-begging fallacies of which agnostic writers are guilty. To show that religion is improved by science and by general worldly progress they point to the history of modern Europe; whereas the truth is simply the converse of this, for Christianity, as a matter of fact, is the cause, and not the effect, of modern civilization. Yet another paradox awaits the inquirer into those dim regions. Science, we are told, of its own nature tends to root out and destroy all religion; while on the other hand we are told that civilization, which is the work of science, is the sole cause of religious progress! The oracles of Exeter Hall will go on proclaiming that England is wealthy because England is Godly; but people who are not oracles will bear in mind the old story about Dives and Lazarus.

Still Huxley would say, a fact cannot be argued away; and it is a fact that races which are at the bottom of the

scale in general culture have likewise the lowest forms of religion. To which statement we reply, with Mr. Andrew Lang,¹ that it is itself a crude contradiction of known fact. The various indigenous tribes of Australia, the African Bushmans, and the inhabitants of Terra-del-Fuego are admitted by all to be in the lowest state of barbarism; yet among these very races some of the highest and purest religious notions can be found. Of course these savages are not without a ridiculous mythology any more than were the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans; still from this tangle of myth we can disengage the genuine belief in a primal eternal Being, who spoke to men in former times and gave them His law, and is still their Father and Friend, who is the author of all things and the invisible omniscient guardian of morality. Daromulum is the name for the Deity among the tribes of Australia, 'He watches the youths from the sky, is prompt to punish by disease or death breach of His ordinances.'² Mr. Lang learned his facts from men who observed them on the spot, like Palmer and Howitt; and he concludes thus his review of Australian religions':—'Many other authorities could be adduced for the religious sanction of morals in Australia. An all-knowing Being observes and rewards the conduct of men; He is named with reverence if named at all; His abode is the heavens; He is the maker and Lord of things; His lessons soften the heart.' The African Bushmans have a god Cagu of whom they say: 'Cagn made all things, and we pray to him thus: "O Cagn! O Cagn! are we not thy children? Do you not see us hunger? Give us food."'³ In Terra-del-Fuego they believe in 'a great man who is always roaming about the woods and mountains, who is certain of knowing every word and every action, who cannot be escaped, and who influences the world according to men's conduct.'⁴

Modern savages are put on a par with primitive man; and the statement is that as modern savages have the lowest form of religion, the same must be true in the case of his

¹ *Making of Religion.*

⁴ Orpen, *apud* Lang, *ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 193.

³ Fitzroy, *apud* Lang.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

prehistoric prototype. Huxley's assertion that the lowest savages are practically without religion cannot stand, as we have seen. On the other hand, at the very dawn of history, we find among all nations that have a history, religious notions as pure as those we have just been considering: this is abundantly proved by the Abbé de Broglie in reference to India, China, Egypt, Chaldea, Syria, Phœnicia, Greece, and Rome.¹ But the anthropologist view would tell us that such notions could not have been evolved so early.

One method of eluding the force of this argument is to say that, after all, we know nothing about the condition of primitive prehistoric man; that even modern savages are infinitely superior to him in all things. But if this consideration avails for one side it also avails for the other; if we cannot argue from modern Australians, the anthropologists have as small a right to argue from the godless Zulus. At all events, the clear lesson of known history is decidedly not what the anthropologists represent it to be, namely, a constant or even a moderately uniform growth from less perfect to more perfect forms of religion.²

Herbert Spencer would say that tribes, such as the Australians, who possess a comparatively high form of religion, and are at the same time at the very bottom of the scale of general culture, must have degenerated from a former civilization. Of course there is no proof, not the slightest particle of evidence of such degeneration; but let us grant it and see what is its significance as against the general theory of its authors. Here we have a tribe that fell from a high state of general culture without leaving any traces of their former greatness; and yet they still cling to a high form of religion. Similarly, is it not conceivable that primitive man had a high form of religion even though he have left no traces of all round material culture?

Another answer is that those low savages were evangelized by superior races, and so were saved from the necessity of native development. This, too, is a mere

¹ De Broglie, Legge, Le Page Renouf, etc. ² *Ibid.*

hypothesis invoked in support of a hypothesis. There is absolutely no evidence for it. The religious doctrines in question were handed down in ancient hymns, were imparted to the initiated tribesmen in solemn mysteries to which strangers find it extremely difficult to gain admission.¹ These savages, too, are shy, conservative, fiercely hostile to all foreign influences; and, above all, their languages have been unknown till our own day. Surely it does not seem likely that they were taught by foreigners.

An essential feature of the Animistic theory is this, that it supposes the Supreme Being to be always explicitly regarded as a spirit. Man, it is said, could never think of a Great Spirit unless he first have the idea of spirit in general; but all men regard God as the Supreme Spirit. Now this last assertion is not true.² The Supreme Being is not always regarded as a spirit. The Australians regard God as a magnified human being dwelling beyond the stars, the Fuegians believe in the great black man of the woods, the Melanesians believe in beings who never died, and who are not ghosts in any sense, etc., and it is important to note that such races also believe in ghosts, and indeed often pay them a certain religious worship. On the other hand they insist that God existed before death entered into the world, before there were any ghosts at all. Even when the Supreme Being is regarded as the ancestor of a tribe, the idea is much the same as the pure Theistic notion that God is the Father of all men, our Father in Heaven.

Thus there is no necessary connection in the savage mind between the idea of divinity and the idea of 'ghost' or 'spirit.' With regard to the process which the savage is supposed to have gone through in the formation of his notion of spirit, it is to be remarked that it was after all a metaphysical process of some difficulty; and it may be suggested that there are other processes quite as well within the reach of primitive faculties. I refer to certain rudimentary forms of the argument from Design, First Cause and Conscience which, according to theologians, are likely

¹ Lang, *Making of Religion*.

² *Ibid. passim.*

to occur to the average intelligence. These processes may or may not be valid; but they are natural and simple and in fact all mythologies and all divine names contain them in one form or another. This would be an intelligible account of the origin of religion; but it would represent Monotheism as primitive and also as having a real basis in reason and in human nature; and neither representation would please the agnostic.

But the essential question of the whole inquiry is: How did man get his idea of God? Before you can deify man or ghost or fetish, you must already have acquired this idea. 'Lao-tze is god.' 'Odin is god.' In those propositions the predicate has to be accounted for: how did the knowledge of God come to the Chinaman and the Teuton? The Animistic theory gives no satisfactory answer to this question. Ghosts, it is said, became gods, just as men became chiefs and kings. But there are races who believe in God and have no chief or king. The Australian aborigines, for example, carefully keep down all social and political distinctions and are thoroughgoing communists and democrats. Again the notion of king, chief, warrior, are not religious notions at all; they may help to illustrate and develop such notions already existing, but they cannot originate them. To every man who has ever had religion in the true sense religion has been a serious solemn thing, with a deep and a subtle hold upon all the fibres of his being, with a power to inspire, to console, to terrify. In all evolution there must be a *continuum*, a substratum that underlies all change. Now, what is the *continuum*, what is the common element between dread of spectres and religion? What is there in common between the Zulu pandemonium of greedy, hungry, immoral hobgoblins and the wise, mighty, kindly Father of the Australian tribes? By what conceivable process of development could a ghost become a god? This question is not answered and cannot be answered in the Animistic theory. That theory cannot account for the central and essential idea of all religion. It derives no support from the actual facts of past or contemporary history. Its propounders fail to grasp the

meaning of religious notions, beliefs, and practices. It has established no one truth that is inconsistent with the old-fashioned view that in the beginning man was taught of God. The burden of proof all along the line rests with the novelty and the novelty has proved unable to sustain it.

P. FORDE.

A NOVEL OF MODERN ITALY

WE have all heard of the rustic Englishman who came to London to see the Empire, the Roman Catholic Church, and the West End. It would be interesting to learn what impressions he received of Catholicism as the result of his descent on the great metropolis; but the fact that he included the Catholic Church among the few things really worth seeing proves that in some vague way he regarded it as one of the wonders of the world.

Among the many noteworthy tendencies manifested during the closing years of the nineteenth century perhaps no one was more unexpected in its development, or more far-reaching in its influence, than the interest displayed in everything that concerns the Catholic Church. It is not easy to trace the exact genesis of this feeling. Naturally the ever-widening extension of the Faith in this country has had something to do with it. Catholic churches and Catholic priests, monasteries of monks, friars, and nuns, have multiplied almost miraculously during the last twenty years. As an immediate result of this, old prejudices are shaken if not wholly demolished. I shall not soon forget the excitement caused among the inhabitants of a little English town by the arrival in their midst of a small community of nuns. The good people failed to understand how the sisters could dwell in anything but a sombre building surrounded by high walls and cut off in some hopeless way from the outer world. The idea of nuns walking about the town in their habit, and doing their shopping just like Mrs. Smith or

Miss Robinson, and equally alive to the urgency of obtaining full value for their money, literally dumbfounded them. What, however, was a nine days' wonder a few years ago, is now calmly accepted as one of the most natural things in the world. Needless to add the nuns are everywhere received with that deference and respect which even the humblest Englishman, be his faults what they may, entertains for everything of a religious character. Then, wherever a Catholic Church is established, even in remote country districts, the people like to attend the Sunday evening service and hear the Father preach. This must help to uproot a large amount of ignorance and bigotry.

Another thing we must bear in mind is the marked increase in the number of people who travel nowadays, especially on the continent, compared with the number of tourists that left our shores annually, say fifteen years ago. Travelling facilities have increased; the cost of transit has grown cheaper; the material prosperity of our people has gone up by leaps and bounds; money was never more plentiful; education is yearly spreading more and more, with the result that people grow anxious to see for themselves the beauties of other lands of which they have read and thought so much. It is quite a usual thing now to see a long train steaming out of Charing Cross station at 9 p.m. in the summer months packed with artisans on their way to Switzerland, or the Italian lake country, on a nine days' tour arranged for them by the London Polytechnic. Once on the continent your Anglican at once feels the attraction of the Catholic Church. I happen to know a professional man, an Anglican, who takes his month's holiday every year on the continent. At home this man would never dream of crossing the threshold of a Catholic church. Such a thing is not even to be thought of. What would the vicar, and the vicar's wife say? Yet this man no sooner sets foot on foreign soil than he makes it a point to attend as many Catholic services and functions as possible. In fact I may say that he knows the history of every Cathedral in France and Germany, and the peculiar features, whether of architecture or decoration, noticeable in each.

The writer of fiction who is ever on the watch for new and unexplored fields in which he may exercise his fancy is generally quick to notice any definite change in the public taste, and instantly sets about satisfying the latest fashionable craving. All roads, we are told, lead to Rome; and in or about Rome, Roman doctrine and practice, Catholic ideals, and types of Catholic character, have the minds of some of our leading writers of fiction been centred for some time past. In France we have men so dissimilar as Emile Zola and Huysmans both drawing their inspiration from the same source. In England the fascination of Rome is felt, not merely by Catholic writers of the stamp of Mrs. Craigie (John Oliver Hobbs), Dr. Barry, and Mr. Marion Crawford, but equally so by writers of such uneven quality as Robert Buchanan, George Moore, Marie Corelli, and Hall Caine. I question seriously if the wheel of fortune ever presented us with a more curious portent than George Moore as the narrator, and to some extent the apologist, of the problems of convent life.

Few contemporary writers of fiction have awakened a deeper interest in their handiwork than that very remarkable woman, Miss Marie Corelli. Some of her books, such as *Barabbas* and *The Sorrows of Satan*, not to mention *Thelma* and *Boy*, have in all probability been read and purchased more extensively than the combined works of any other three popular novelists of the day. Shop assistants, and other people dowered with a superabundance of false sentimentality, barmaids and nursery governesses, have long since pinned their faith to the products of Miss Corelli's genius. In fact the ordinary critic who reads her books dispassionately is frequently at a loss to account for her undoubted influence over such a large and varied *clientèle*. Like most other prominent novelists Miss Corelli has felt the attraction of Rome, and in her *Master Christian* she has put before the world her views as regards the Church, her pastors and her ministers, with a vehemence more easily imagined than described. It is evident that Miss Corelli had argued herself into the belief that the disturbances and divisions witnessed in the Anglican Church during the last

eighteen months pointed directly to a revival of the 'No Popery' cry. Hence we find one distinguished critic of her work declaring himself as follows: 'The "No Popery" cry is rising, and the *Master Christian* will float like a cork on its topmost crest.' Miss Corelli has evidently felt the influence of Rome as largely as most other writers, but she knows the feelings and the tastes of her admirers so thoroughly she must have felt that the easiest road to popularity lay in the adoption and cultivation of a 'shrewish vindictiveness' as regards the Church and her rulers. The references to the person of the Holy Father display an utter absence of anything approaching fine feeling or good breeding. She so brings it about that her heroine Angela paints a portrait of what she regards as a typical priest. The picture is labelled 'A Servant of Christ at the Madeleine, Paris.' Miss Corelli treats us to the following description of the subject represented:— 'Low, beetling brows; a sensual, cruel mouth, with a loosely projecting under lip; eyes that appeared to be furtively watching each other across the thin bridge of nose; a receding chin and a narrow cranium, combined with an expression which was hypocritically humble, yet sly.' This, mind you, is not the type of face which obtains in the case of a single individual. We are asked to believe that it is the face of an entire class; and, no doubt, two-thirds of Miss Corelli's admirers are fully convinced that such is the case. 'There is no question of choice [Angela is made to declare]. These faces are ordinary among our priests. At all the churches, Sunday after Sunday, I have looked for a good, a noble face in vain, for an even commonly honest face—in vain.' Such is Miss Corelli's typical priest. The example she sets before us of archiepiscopal brutishness is conceived in the same vein and tarred with the same sweeping-brush. She says:—'The smooth countenance, the little eyes, comfortably sunken in small rolls of fat; the smug, smiling lips, the gross neck and heavy jaw, and, above all, the perfectly self-satisfied and mock-pious air of the man.' By such overdone specimens of caricature did Miss Corelli endeavour to fan into some semblance of flame

the well-nigh defunct embers of No Popery in this country. The attempts, however, in this direction have proved a most ghastly failure. The entire press of the nation ridiculed the book, which had an enormous sale notwithstanding ; so numerous are the victims of hysteria and neurosis in our midst.

We can well understand the action of a hunter after notoriety of the type of Miss Marie Corelli in playing to the Protestant gallery in England ; but what are we to say of a journal of the standing of the *Saturday Review* when it seeks to emulate her achievements in a like direction ? Not many weeks ago this paper, when reviewing a very charming book by Dom Bede Camm, O.S.B., entitled *A Day in a Cloister*, permitted itself to give expression to the following sweeping and unsustainable charge against the monastic life of the present day :—‘ There is much evidence to show that a degraded animalism, not scandalously vicious, but dully gluttonous and material, is the atmosphere of much conventional life under modern conditions.’ Catholic readers of the *Saturday*, who look to its pages, and, as a rule, with appreciation, for a large-minded, equitable view of men and books and systems, must feel disgusted on reading such a revolting statement.

Among certain classes of our people Mr. Hall Caine is almost as prime a favourite as Miss Marie Corelli herself. I cannot say that I have read many of his works, although I have long been fulfilled of the desire to know something more of them. But since 1883, when he published his *Cobwebs of Criticism*, he has sent forth a long list of novels, rejoicing in such monochromatic titles as the *Bondsman*, the *Manxman*, the *Scapegoat*, and the *Christian*. Last year Mr. Caine spent a long holiday in Rome, with the result that he came under the spell of the Queen of Cities, and is now giving to the world the first instalments of his latest novel, the *Eternal City*. The scenes witnessed in Rome during the year of Jubilee are described by Mr. Caine with his customary grace and clearness. Baedeker has evidently been rarely out of his hands, if we are to judge by the amount of information he displays on a large range of topics. But

Mr. Caine never allows himself to forget that his readers are, for the most part, members of the various Protestant denominations. Thus, among the pilgrims who have come to Rome from all parts of Italy to pay their homage to the Supreme Pontiff he remarks upon their clerical guides. One is 'a simple priest, unkempt, unshaven, with shaggy beaver battered by the rain, and heavy shoes stained by the soil.' Another cleric is described for us as 'an old priest with the face of an old woman, but helpless looking and untidy, because he had no woman to take care of him.' Doubtless, Mr. Caine met with many such priests in his travels through Italy. What I blame him for is his feverish anxiety to put those types forward as generally representative of the Italian priesthood, not merely as exceptions. Again, in his quite fanciful description of the great procession from the Vatican to St. Peter's on the first day of the new century we encounter the following passages:—

And this dear old Padre with the mittens and rosary and the comfortable linsey-wolsey sort of face?

That's Father Pifferi, Confessor to the Pontifical household. He knows all the sins of the Pope.

Next come the representatives of the regular clergy, brown, white, and black, 'nearly all alike, fat, ungainly, flabby, puffy specimens of humanity.' Yet, I dare say, Mr. Hall Caine regards himself as an unbiassed, dispassionate, narrator of all that he has seen—in his fancy.

The supreme tribute to the influence and fascination of the Catholic Church is to be sought, however, not in the handiwork of Miss Marie Corelli or Mr. Hall Caine, but in that of Mrs. Humphry Ward, a writer who, when the history of English fiction during the closing quarter of the nineteenth century comes to be written, will be assigned a place far removed on an upward plane from the great majority of her contemporaries. Mrs. Ward writes as a thinker and a scholar. She is deadly in earnest; too much so, perhaps, for the ordinary shallow reader of fiction. Lacking a keen sense of humour, she more than compensates for this by her keen appreciation of all that is good and beautiful in nature and in art. She grips the ordinary

intelligent reader in her first chapter, and, willy nilly, carries him to the end of her story. In her latest book, *Eleanor*,¹ we probably see her at her best. The book, more especially to those who have lived and travelled in Italy, is altogether fascinating. I cannot remember any work that gave me greater pleasure from the purely literary point of view during the closing quarter of the year 1900, if you except *An Englishwoman's Love Letters*, and *All that was Possible*, two books replete with even the finest nuance of literary expression, and remarkable for a delicate play of fancy which render them irresistible to every man of letters.

Mrs. Ward bids us to the consideration of the Italy of our own day, the Italy which has grown so wonderfully during the last thirty years, but whose people are ground into the earth by an intolerable burthen of taxation, the Italy which 'sent seven thousand of her children to butchery in a wretched colony, because her hungry politicians must have glory to keep themselves in office,' the Italy which tolerates the imprisonment of the Head of the Church of her people, and condones the confiscation of his Temporalities. To this Italy, of many lights and shadows, Mrs. Ward dedicates her book.

To Italy the beloved and beautiful,
Instructress of our past,
Delight of our present,
Comrade of our future;—
The heart of an Englishwoman
Offers this book.

As Browning has it, 'Everyone soon or late comes round by Rome.' The chief interest of Mrs. Ward's book is centred in three characters. First, there is Edward Manisty, an English Liberal politician of high standing, but who has fallen out with the leaders of his party on the education question, a sort of disappointed Vice-President of the Council in fact. Leaving England in a fit of pique Manisty comes to Italy where he interests himself in the

¹ *Eleanor*, by Mrs. Humphry Ward. London: Smith, Elder & Co., Waterloo-place, 1900.

deadlock existing between the Italian Government and the Papacy. The man's historical sense is profoundly touched by the logical and consistent attitude of the Church ; and although an avowed agnostic, he resolves to write a book which he intends to be an elaborate defence of the claims and methods of the Catholic Church. In the composition of this work Manisty is assisted by his cousin, Eleanor Burgoyne, a widow of thirty, with a past full of sadness, the resultant of an unhappy marriage, which ended in a tragedy which involved the loss of her only child, a little boy, to whom she was passionately attached. Eleanor Burgoyne is a woman of rare charm of manner, refined and dignified, and though extremely delicate still possessed of a peculiar kind of beauty. 'A certain kind of grace—very rare, and very complex in its origin.'

The eyes [we read] were, indeed, beautiful ; so was the forehead, and the hair of a soft ashy brown folded and piled round it in a most skilful simplicity. It was a face of experience, a face of grief ; timid, yet with many strange capacities and suggestions both of vehemence and pride.

During the time that Manisty is engaged upon his book Eleanor acts as his secretary, and to some extent as his adviser and encourager. She is not a writer, but her judgment of literary work is sure and deliberate. A close intimacy has gradually sprung up between them as the book grew under their hands. The woman seems to take a new lease of life. Things and sights which possessed no interest for her a few months ago are now full of attraction. Manisty's mind is extremely well informed. He can converse eloquently, sometimes vehemently, on most subjects. The result is that these two from constant association come to regard one another as something more than cousins. The love, however, is all on the woman's side. Beyond a feeling of gratitude for her valuable help, and a real cousinly affection for Eleanor, Manisty has no stronger regard for her. It is probable, however, that his manner towards her may have conveyed more than this.

At the date the story opens Manisty's book is almost completed. He looks forward with a sort of exultation to

the sensation it will cause, more especially among his fellow-members of the Liberal Government in England, all active sympathisers with the makers of United Italy (so-called). He and Eleanor have been living with his aunt, a Miss Manisty, a timid, fussy old soul, for several months in an old villa, built high on the ridge of the Alban Hills.

Below it [we read] olive-grounds and vineyards, plough-lands and pine plantations sank, slope after slope, fold after fold, to the Campagna, and beyond the Campagna, along the whole shining line of the west, the sea met the sunset; while to the north, a dim and scattered whiteness rising from the plain, was Rome.

Rome seen from the villa through the midst of the gathering storm clouds, presented a most imposing spectacle.

Over Rome itself there was a strange massing and curving of the clouds. Between their blackness and the deep purple of the Campagna, rose the city—pale phantom—upholding one great dome, and one only, to the view of night and the world. Round and above and behind, beneath the long flat arch of the storm, glowed a furnace of scarlet light. The buildings of the city were faint specks within its fierce intensity, dimly visible through a sea of fire. St. Peter's alone, without visible foundation or support, had consistence, form, identity.

In this villa we come face to face with Manisty for the first time. The man repels one, notwithstanding all Mrs. Ward's attempts to make him acceptable. There is much in him of the churl, much of the cad, much conceit, much vanity and self-complacency. He is described for us as being of middle height, no longer in his first youth, with an extraordinarily handsome head, face, and shoulders: but with a somewhat irregular, stunted figure. He has black hair, grey eyes, and dark complexion, the nose is long, the mouth energetic. There is a sense of discord about the whole man which, however, imparted 'an effect of power—of personality—of something that claimed and held attention.'

A visitor is coming to the villa much to Manisty's disgust. This is Miss Lucy Foster, a young Puritan from Boston, whose friends in that cultured city had been particularly kind to Manisty, on the occasion of his tour

through the United States. The contrast between the studied simplicity of Lucy's style of dress, and the rich, finished, elegance of Eleanor's, is almost ludicrous when they first met. 'Oh! poor child—poor child!—what a frock!' was Eleanor's inward ejaculation. Manisty was to take the young American into dinner. 'Good heavens, why she is a perfect chess-board,' he thought to himself, looking askance at her dress, in a sudden and passionate dislike—'one could play draughts upon her, what has my aunt been about.' If Manisty is disgusted with the first appearance of Miss Foster, Eleanor, with her fine womanly intuition, discovers the real character of the young American, and her possibilities for loveliness when treated by the proper hands. They become the best of friends from the first. After dinner the Englishwoman shows the young American a charcoal sketch of the Holy Father. 'Isn't it clever. It is by one of your compatriots, an American artist in Rome. Isn't it wonderful, too, the way in which it shows you, not the Pope but the Papacy—not the man but the Church?' At Manisty's villa the chief figures in Roman society are wont to foregather. There are ambassadors, cardinals, clerics, members of the Guardia Nobile. Their conversation is a revelation to the American girl, who is positively scandalized at seeing Mrs. Burgoyne, nominally a Scotch Presbyterian, attending Mass regularly in the church at Marinata. 'She found herself living with two people for whom Catholicism was not, indeed, a personal faith, but a thing to be passionately admired and praised like art, or music, or poetry.' Manisty grows more and more interested in her. The puritanical bias of her views on Italy and the Papacy affords him endless opportunity for railery. With him and Eleanor she attends a grand function at St. Peter's, where she sees Leo XIII. for the first time.

The white figure, high above the crowd, sways from side to side: the hand upraised gives the Benediction. Fragile, spiritual as is the apparition, the sunbeam refines, subtilises, spiritualises it still more. It hovers like a dream above the vast multitudes—surely no living man!—but thought, history, faith, taking shape: the passion of many hearts revealed.

Speaking of this glorious ceremony afterwards to Lucy, Manisty tells her that the thing which renders such functions so tremendous is—

That there is no break between that man and Peter—or Linus, if you like, it comes to the same thing; that the bones, if not of Peter, at any rate of men who might have known Peter, are there mingled with the earth beneath his feet; that he stands there recognised by half the civilized world as Peter's successor; that five hundred, a thousand years hence, the vast probability is there will still be a Pope in St. Peter's to hand on the same traditions and make the same claims.

Just about the time Manisty's book in defence of the claims of the Holy See is ready for the printers, a friend of his, Mr. Vanbrugh Neal, comes to stay with him in the villa at Marinata. This man is described for us as a devout Anglican of a delicate and scrupulous type. His temper was academic, his life solitary; rhetoric left him unmoved, and violence of statement caused him to shiver. As might naturally be expected, Manisty asked him for his opinion of his recently finished work, and Neal advanced certain critical objections which affected both the facts and the arguments of one whole section of the book. This man had evidently gauged the inherent weaknesses in Manisty's character correctly. All his egotism notwithstanding, he was hopelessly dependent on the opinions of a few friends, of whom Vanbrugh Neal was one. Together the two men debated the points raised by Manisty's visitor—Neal always gentle and insinuating; Manisty violent, excited, obstinate, yet generally giving way with unexpected suddenness.

When Manisty denounced irresponsible science and free thought as the enemies of the State, which must live, and can only live by religion; when he asked with disdain, 'What reasonable man would nowadays weigh the membership of the Catholic Church against an opinion in geology or exegesis?' when he dwelt on the *casiness* of faith,—which had nothing whatever to do with knowledge, and had, therefore, no quarrel with knowledge; or upon the incomparable social power of religion—his friend grew restive.

Neal, however, was always ready to shatter an exuberance, to check an oratorical flow by some quick double-edged word

that would make Manisty trip and stammer, and showed how great is the gulf between a literary and a practical Christianity.

Smarting under the sting of his friend's arguments, Manisty hastily decides against publishing his book. All the labour and research of months have been spent in vain. Associating Eleanor in some vague way with his disappointment, he behaves towards her in such a way as to arouse in her a sudden tumult of passionate pride and misery. The woman has given this man her heart, and to add to the bitterness evoked by his coldness, she notices a growing fondness on his part for the American girl, Lucy Foster. Herein we have the making of a fine tragedy, and it must be said that Mrs. Ward employs each development of the situation with cleverness and freshness. Someone has said that women love most by whom they are most tried; and Whittier does not hesitate to say that :—

Woman wronged, can cherish hate
More deep and dark than manhood may.

Certainly in the case of Eleanor there is something vastly touching in the sincerity of her affection for Manisty.

The only portion of this remarkable book which lays Mrs. Ward open to the charge of having taken Protestant prejudice into account during its composition is her exploitation of the pathetic Father Benecke. Manisty defends the action of the Church in his regard, although he entertains the highest reverence for the character of Benecke himself. The average Protestant, however, will read into Mrs. Ward's criticism a still further example of the tyranny which the Vatican is supposed to exercise over intelligence and independence of thought. It is perfectly hopeless to try and explain the position of the Church as a divinely appointed teacher to those who are carried away by every untested theory and absurd hypothesis advanced by the *soi-disant* scientists of the present day.

Father Benecke is a native of Southern Germany, and is described as having filled the chair of theology in a university. At the age of sixty-five he published a philosophical work which brought him into conflict with the Church.

He is called upon to renounce his views and theories, and he submits himself to the voice of authority. So far so good. A cardinal, however, with whom he is acquainted, informs him that Leo XIII. has been greatly troubled in mind on his account, and suggests the writing of a private, filial letter, which he (the cardinal) may take to the Holy Father. Benecke at once falls in with this idea on condition that no one shall be permitted to see his letter save the Supreme Pontiff and the cardinal who carries it to him. We are given to understand that this condition is accepted. 'Now,' says Benecke to Manisty a few days after, 'this morning, there is my letter—the whole of it—in the *Osservatore Romano*! To-morrow—I came to tell you—I will withdraw it. I withdraw my submission.' Manisty's remarks to the priest are characteristic. He says: 'You have been abominably treated—no doubt of that. But have you counted the cost? Intellectually, I am all with you—strategically, all with them. They can't give way! the smallest breach lets in the flood, and then, chaos!' Benecke however, is obstinate, with the result that he pays the inevitable penalty. The man, as put before us by Mrs. Ward, is a marvellously attractive character. To the end she makes him speak and act as only a priest, I had almost said a saint, can speak and act. But Mrs. Ward does violence to our convictions, to our judgment, when she asks us to believe that a man of Benecke's intense spirituality (his temperament, says Mrs. Ward, was that of the ascetic and missionary religious), could ever have associated himself with such a contemptible and grossly material body as the German Old Catholics.

Meanwhile Manisty's infatuation for the American girl, Lucy Foster, grows stronger daily. The deepest well-springs of affection in the man's being are brought into action by this girl as the result of her almost miraculous escape from death at the hands of Manisty's mad sister who has been staying for a short while under his roof. This scene is one of the most wonderfully vivid and powerful in the whole book. Lucy, on her part, feels herself being gradually dominated by the man's personality. She cannot

understand, much less analyse, her feelings in his regard. Eleanor grasps the situation in a moment. She is not the one, however, to submit to defeat without a struggle. She may exclaim in all sincerity: *Que vivre est difficile, ô mon cœur fatigué!* but yet she contrives to bring home to Lucy the greatness of her love for Manisty.

‘It is not you [she explains to the young American] but fate. You have taken from me—or you are about to take from me—the last thing left to me on this earth! I have had one chance of happiness, and only one, in all my life, till now, and at last I have found another chance—and after seven weeks you—you—are dashing it from me!’

‘Mrs. Burgoyne,’ Lucy exclaims, ‘is it kind—is it *bearable*—that you should say these things to me? I have not deserved them. What right have you?’

‘What right?’ repeated Eleanor, in low tones—tones almost of astonishment. ‘The right of hunger—the right of poverty—the right of one pleading for a last possession! a last hope!’

The intense passion of the older woman bears down the younger who recognises now that Eleanor has been badly treated by Manisty, and that by right he is hers. What troubles us here, however, is to find any reasonable explanation of either Eleanor’s or Lucy’s infatuation for Manisty. Eleanor, notwithstanding her love for him, is fully alive to his defects of mind and character, which, I presume, she was prepared to bear with. ‘Alack!’ says Mrs. Ward, ‘What woman ever yet refused to love a man because he loved himself?’ As for Lucy there is something utterly repellant in the notion of a pretty young girl being fascinated by a middle-aged egotist of the type of Manisty. Mrs. Ward evidently wishes us to understand that the man’s personality was irresistibly forcible. But this is exactly what we never do feel, not even for a moment throughout her book. Probably the female mind sees things in a different light from that in which we regard them. ‘Woman,’ says an old playwright, ‘is a microcosm; and rightly to rule her requires as great talents as to govern a state.’ A high appreciation truly, and as far removed from the famous dictum of Archbishop Whately, who would have us believe that ‘Woman

is a creature without reason, who pokes the fire from the top.'

Anxious to put themselves outside the range of Manisty's influence Eleanor and Lucy, after much interchange of ideas, resolve to fly to a remote part of Italy leaving no address behind them. They take up their abode in a few wretched rooms in a portion of what had once been a Carmelite Convent situated on *Torre Amiata*, some miles beyond Orvieto. It is the hot season of June and July, and Eleanor, always delicate, gives evident signs of approaching utter collapse in spite of all her efforts to sustain her vitality.

In this part of her book Mrs. Wards treats her readers to some delightful descriptions of Italian life and scenery. The *contadini*, the *carabinieri*, the *padre parroco*, all pass before us in all their native charm and rusticity.

During their stay at Torre Amiata Eleanor and Lucy make the acquaintance of the Countess Guerrini, one of the most natural and convincing characters in the whole book. The Contessa is the local landowner. Her only son had lost his life during the disastrous Italian campaign in Erythrea. She is now living in the strictest seclusion with her daughter in their palazzo, trying to assuage her grief for the loss of her son by ministering daily to the wants of the poor in the district round about. During one of her visits to the Contessa Eleanor is introduced to Don Teodoro, the young *padre parroco* of the village church. He is described as a slim, engaging figure, with a boyish charm and spontaneity which seemed to be characteristic.

Eleanor watched him with admiration, noticing the subtle discernment of the Italian which showed through all his simplicity of manner. It was impossible to mistake, for instance, that he felt himself in a house of mourning. The movements of body and voice were all at first subdued and sympathetic. Yet the mourning had passed into a second stage, and ordinary topics might now be introduced. He glided into them with the most perfect tact.

For a woman of Mrs. Ward's extraordinary cleverness and knowledge of the views entertained by the various parties in the Italy of the present day, the Contessa and the

parroco make excellent puppets for the display of her acquaintance with the different sides of a situation singular in the annals of modern history. When condemning, during the course of conversation, the action of the King and Queen of Italy for being present at a lecture delivered by a Jew named Mazzoli in which he pleaded the need of a 'new religion' for the people of Italy, the young *parroco* insists that outside the Church there can be no true philosophy. At this the Contessa laughs and, turning upon him a flashing and formidable eye, says : -

'Let the Church add a little patriotism to her philosophy, Father; she will find it better appreciated.'

Don Teodoro straightened to the blow. 'I am a Roman, *Eccellenza*—you also, *scusi*!'

'I am an Italian, Father—you also. But you hate your country.'

Thereupon the Priest adds :—'I have nothing to do with the Italy of Venti Settembre. That Italy has three marks of distinction before Europe—by which you may know her.'

'And those——?' said the Countess, calm and challenging.

'Debt, *Eccellenza*! Hunger! Crimes of blood! *Sono il suo primato—l'unico*!'

'Ah!' said the Countess, flushing, 'there were none of those things in the old Papal States? Under the Bourbons? The Austrians?'

'*Eccellenza*, Jesus Christ and his Vicar come before the House of Savoy!'

'Ruin us, and see what you will gain!'

'*Eccellenza*, the Lord rules.'

'Well, well. Break the eggs—that's easy. But whether the omelet will be as the Jesuits please, that's another affair.'

And so ends an oft repeated battle in which each of the parties clings passionately to his own view.

The chief surprise in store for the two fugitives at Torre Amiata is the unexpected presence of Father Benecke. He is labouring under the censure of the Church, and even the children in this out of the way Italian village fly from him as if he were a plague. Eleanor comes upon him rather suddenly in the half ruined chapel attached to the old Carmelite Convent in a corner of which she and Lucy have taken up their abode.

'Madame,' says Benecke, 'you see a man dying of hunger

and thirst ! He cannot cheat himself with fine words. He starves.'

Eleanor expresses surprise, not quite grasping his meaning.

'For forty-two years,' he said, in a low, pathetic voice, 'have I received my Lord, day after day, without a break ; and now they have taken Him away, and I know not where they have laid Him.'

The man is filled with a sense of desolation. Eleanor realised his hunger of soul, as she remembers having heard of the nuns in some convent in Rome who frequently became ill with restlessness on Good Fridays, when Christ was absent from the tabernacle in their little chapel.

The evident sincerity of the man and the simplicity of his character appeal more and more strongly to Eleanor. The tension of mind under which she has laboured so long, united with the suffocating heat of the Italian midsummer, have exhausted from her all her slender stock of strength and activity. Feeling that her death cannot be far distant, she resolves to unburthen her soul to Benecke, who, as I have already said, speaks to her as only a saint could. In fact, we never seem to realise, so beautiful and convincing is Mrs. Ward's portrayal of the priestly character, that the man is at variance with the teaching authority of the Church. Eleanor explains to him the depth of her passion for Manisty, and the object she had in view in separating him from Lucy :—

'I had reason,' she says, 'to think that life had changed for me, after many years of unhappiness. I gave my whole, whole heart away. . . . I had done much to deserve his kindness ; he owed me a great deal. Not, I mean, for the miserable work I had done for him, but for the love, the thought by day and night, that I had given him. There was, of course, some one else, Father, some one younger and far more attractive than I. There was no affinity of nature and mind to go upon, or I thought so. It seemed to me all done in a moment by a beautiful face. I could not be expected to bear it, could I ? I resisted—successfully. I separated them. The girl who supplanted me was most tender, dear, and good. She pitied me, and I worked upon her pity. I took her away from my friend, and why should I not ? Why are we called on perpetually to give up, give up ? It seemed to me such a cruel, cold, unhuman creed. I knew my own life was broken---beyond mending—but I couldn't bear the unkindness ;

I couldn't forgive the injury ; I couldn't, couldn't. I took her away, and my power is still great enough, and will always be great enough, if I choose, to part these two from each other.'

'My child,' the priest makes answer, 'God has done you a great honour. There are very few of whom God condescends to ask as plainly, as generously, as He now asks of you. What does it matter whether God speaks to us amid the thorns or the flowers? But I do not remember that He ever spoke among the flowers, but often, often, among deserts and wildernesses. You say that you have renounced the expectation of happiness. What, then, do you desire? Merely the pain, the humiliation, of others. But is that an end that any man or woman may lawfully pursue, pagan or Christian? All selfish desire is sin—desire that defies God and wills the hurt of man. But you will cast it out. The travail is already begun in you that will form the Christ.'

'Father, creeds and dogmas mean nothing to me!' 'Perhaps,' he said calmly; 'does religion also mean nothing to you? Ask yourself whether in truth *Christ* means nothing to you—and Calvary nothing? Why is it that this divine figure is enshrined, if not in all our affections—at least, in all our imaginations? Why is it that at the heart of this modern world, with all its love of gold, its thirst for knowledge, its desire for pleasure, there still lives and burns this strange madness of sacrifice, this foolishness of the Cross? How has our world of lust and iron produced such a thing? How, except as the clue to the world's secret, is man to explain it to himself? Ah! my daughter, think what you will of the nature and dignity of the Crucified—but turn your eyes to the Cross. Trouble yourself with no creeds—I speak this to your weakness—but sink yourself in the story of the Passion and its work upon the world! Then bring it to bear upon your own case. There is in you a root of evil mind, an angry desire, a *cupido* which keeps you from God. Lay it down before the Crucified, and rejoice—rejoice!—that you have something to give to your God, before He gives you Himself.'

Benecke is resolved to strain every nerve to bring Eleanor to faith, to sacrifice, and to God. He and Manisty occasionally correspond, and in one of his letters he asks the Englishman to come and spend a few days with him. His invitation finds Manisty wearied after a long and profitless journey all over Italy in quest of the two ladies who are quietly living at Torre Amiata. He makes up his mind to come and see Benecke who has made no mention of the near presence of his long sought relative and friend. The inevitable result, of course, is that Manisty discovers their whereabouts; and as the book draws to a close we are

afforded a glimpse of Eleanor's great act of renunciation, and Lucy's growing affection for Manisty, a fact which jars upon our feelings most unpleasantly. Do what we may it is still hard to associate this clear-eyed American girl with a middle-aged egotist of the type of Manisty. Mrs. Ward herself seems at a loss to explain the situation, she says of Lucy:—

Did her love for him rest partly on a secret sense of vocation? a profound, inarticulate, divining of his vast, his illimitable need for such a one as she to love him?

Lucy may, perhaps, have found her true vocation. But from our knowledge of Manisty's character and disposition, his insufferable conceit and priggishness, one can safely harbour a misgiving as to its duration.

Eleanor, with all its drawbacks, will probably rank among the best of Mrs. Ward's novels. Like all her work it is well and carefully written; and although most of the characters are not over-convincing, and decidedly middle-aged, yet there are numerous other compensations for these drawbacks. The book will undoubtedly do much to fix the attention of the reading public on the existing relations between Church and State in Italy. When I say this I must not be taken as generally endorsing the majority of Mrs. Ward's conclusions. Far from it. But no matter how widely we may differ from her we cannot withhold a feeling of genuine admiration for the pains she has taken to study a situation fraught with difficulty to the non-Catholic mind. Again, the knowledge she displays of Italian character is perfectly marvellous. She seems perfectly acquainted with the conditions of life of the people of the country, and gives us some delightful descriptions of Italian scenery. Thus, towards the end of the book she makes Manisty say:—

'It is a marvellous country, this! What rivers—what fertility—what a climate! and the industry of the people. Catch a few English farmers and set them to do what the Italian peasant does, year in and year out, without a murmur! Look at the coast south of Naples. There is not a yard of it, scarcely, that hasn't been *made* by human hands. Look at the hill-towns; and think of the human toil that has gone to the making and maintaining of them since the world began.'

Manisty would fain bring all secularising folk, English secularists included, to Italy to study the results of the struggle between Church and State in that country.

'Just understand,' he says 'what it means to separate Church from State, to dig a gulf between the religious and the civil life. Here's a country where nobody can be at once a patriot and a good Christian—where the Catholics don't vote for Parliament, and the State Schools teach no religion—where the nation is divided into two vast camps, hating and thrusting at each other with every weapon they can tear from life.'

Still, he insists, there are forces in Italy that will re-make Church no less than State as the generations go by. His final judgment on the situation takes rather a paradoxical form. He says:—'The truth of the matter seems to be that Italy is Catholic, because she hasn't faith enough to make a heresy; and anti-clerical, because it is her destiny to be a nation.'

In another chapter of this deeply interesting book Mrs. Ward makes a Madame Variani say, when referring to Manisty,—

'Most Englishmen have two sides to their brain—while we Latins have only one. But Manisty is like a Latin—he has only one. He takes a whim, and then he must cut and carve the world to it. But the world is tough—*et ça ne marche pas*! We can't go to ruin to please him. Italy is not falling to pieces—not at all. Italy will win! Manisty takes the thing too tragically. He doesn't see the farce in it; we do. We Italians understand each other. We are half-acting all the time. The North will never understand the South.

With which declaration most thinking people will agree, especially if they have lived for a few years in Italy.

There is one quality, the utter absence of which must render the perusal of Mrs. Ward's books slightly distasteful to a number of readers, and that is her want of a sense of humour, the saving salt of which has carried many an indifferent book to success. Mrs. Ward is probably too serious; and as her writings are usually given over to the discussion of grave social or religious problems, the habit of eliminating anything of a frivolous or humorous nature has become fixed, much to the detriment of her novels.

There is, however, one spark of fun in *Eleanor* over which even the gravest must hold their sides. We are introduced at a garden party given by the English Ambassador in Rome, in the Villa Borghese, to a Doctor Jensen, one of the most learned men in the world. The paradox of the man's existence was that he cared nothing for his reputation as a *savant*. His one consuming desire was to be regarded as a 'sad dog'—a terrible man with the ladies. Introduced to Eleanor, he bowed low, smiling fatuously, with his hand on his heart. During the course of conversation he told her how that the other day he had gone back to the Hermitage Library at St. Petersburg, after a lapse of thirty years, to consult some rare books contained on its shelves. In a work which had not been disturbed since he last used it he found a leaf of paper on which he had written some words in pencil. They were 'my own darling.'

'And if I only knew now *rich* darling,' he said to Eleanor, slapping his knee. 'Vich darling!'

Truly a natural stroke this, and evidently true to life.

RICHARD A. O'GORMAN, O.S.A.

‘MAKE AN ACT OF CONTRITION’

WHOMAN has not heard this exhortation? What Catholic has not committed to memory and recited daily some form purporting to be an Act of Contrition? But what percentage of them do, in reality, make the act? We must await the answer until the day of general revelation. But, in the meantime, for ourselves, and for all whom our duties and responsibilities might reach, might it not be well to consider—1. The importance of the subject; 2. To see if our ideas on it are correct; 3. How in practice it may be attained? We treat the subject of Contrition, quite independently of the question, as to the sorrow necessary for sacramental absolution.

I.—1. For the readers of the I. E. RECORD no proof is needed that all are bound to make an Act of Charity during life; and for this, in the case of grievous sin, an Act of Contrition is required. That it is a matter of positive precept we know from Deuteronomy, and in the New Law we infer the same from the Sermon on the Mount.¹ He taught them, saying: ‘Be ye, therefore, perfect.’ He taught ‘the multitudes’ the obligation of being perfect. Therefore, not the Apostles only, or priests or religious, but the people generally; each according to their place in the world, must labour to perfect themselves.² Now this perfection is nothing more or less than charity. Such is the teaching of St. Alphonsus, quoting St. Francis de Sales, both doctors of the Church. The latter says: ‘Some make perfection consist in austerity, others in prayer . . .’ But they are all deceived; Perfection consists in loving God with our whole hearts; while St. Alphonsus makes it the one thing necessary, citing the words of inspiration: ‘Charity, which is the bond of perfection.’ To these testimonies we may add the pithy and well-known sentence of St. Augustine: ‘Love God, and do what you please.’

¹ Matt. v.

² Manning, *Eternal Priesthood*.

2. We may die suddenly, without the aids of sacraments, yet with time left for the Act of Contrition, if only we know how to make it. What this, with the desire of confession, will do for the soul, in sin or grace, a child can tell.

3. The certainty of being in the state of grace admits some fear of the contrary, and sometimes becomes more diluted still; and yet there is no distinct obligation to confess. Torturing fears rob the soul of peace, particularly if sacred functions are soon to be performed, which demand great purity of soul. Who, in such a state of things, could over-rate the Act of Contrition?

4. But if it is to the purpose every day and hour, much more at the last day and hour of life. St. Alphonsus holds it to be necessary. 'No security can be too great when eternity is at stake.'¹ We must be all tutiorists at that hour. Not only probabilities, and of the slenderest kind, should be counted with, but even possibilities. And possibilities there are with reference to matter and form of the sacraments, with reference to minister and recipient alike. Then, let the obligation be established or not, he would, in our opinion, be somewhat rash who would, at such a crisis, slight the teaching of our great moralist, saint, and doctor of the Church.

5. Nor is it idle to suppose that many a well-instructed Catholic might do for their Protestant neighbours, in dying, a work which to the priest would be impossible. They would not hear of priest or confession, but will receive the visits of lay Catholic neighbours. Well, let one such zealous and otherwise competent lay person, suppressing all mention of priest and sacrament, and of everything that might disturb the *bona fides*, suggest the motive of Contrition, and help him in making the Act, and in eliciting a desire to do all that God wills in the circumstances; and he will have performed an act of most needful charity. Whether, having gained so far the confidence of his friend, it might become a question of conditional baptism, we submit it to better judgment.

¹ *Imitation of Christ.*

II. Having considered the value of contrition, let us now see what in reality it is. And first, what it is not. Here the motive is everything; and the motive, it may be safely asserted, is not fear or hope or gratitude. These are good and prepare the way; but not one of them, nor all together, constitute the motive of the Act.¹ The motive is charity or the *amor Benevolentiae*. By charity we prefer God to all His creatures—things and persons—because by reason of His goodness He is lovable above all. And by Contrition we turn away from sin through the same motive. Charity being first in order, not of time—for there is no such order—it will be sufficient to consider its requirements as a motive to Contrition.

The charity of which there is question is love of God above all things for His own infinite perfections, and regarded as a friend to whom we wish well.² This is the common opinion, and we cannot, therefore, content ourselves with the opinion which advocates God's goodness to us as a sufficient motive of charity. And, following the line of safe opinions, we add that not one or more of the divine attributes is the motive sought, but all summed up in the word 'Bonitas,' which is the *Complexio omnium Attrib.*

The opinion, stating that a single attribute, *v.g.*, Justice, would be a sufficient motive should be qualified. It would not do to say 'I love . . . because He is infinitely just.' The motive should turn on the Divine Goodness, 'debet ferri in Deum ratione boni,'³—Divine justice showing Him to be good and amiable above all things. Yet even in this qualified sense it is but an opinion—St. Alphonsus and others holding the contrary.⁴

Does perfect charity, then, exclude every thought of self, of punishments and rewards, even of the happiness of enjoying the 'sovereign good'?

¹ Sum. 2, 2, q. 24, a. 2. *Timor introducit Charitatem, Fides Generat Spem, et Spes Charitatem.*

² Maz., *De Vert. inf.*, 1229, etc.

³ Maz., *De Vert. inf.*, n. 1240.

⁴ Tract. 6, n. 437.

So thought Fenelon, but the doctrine is condemned by the Church. No, the love God requires is a love of friendship, 'Amicitia,'¹ the bond of union being the beatific vision—*Vita aeterna*.² So far then from perfect charity shutting out hope for self, it requires it even. To disregard the promised gifts of a friend would be destructive of friendship; and the great God in His strong love for us condescends to be our friend. The God we love must be our God, so that if, *per impossibile*, it were otherwise—this is the teaching of St. Thomas—charity would be impossible.³ To love God aright we are then under the happy necessity of hoping to enjoy Him. Yet this latter must not enter into the motive of our love. St. Bernard puts it well: 'Non sine præmio diligitur Deus etsi absque præmii intuitu diligendus sit.' We love God for Himself; and in this love we find our own happiness, which certainly He wishes us to seek. It will then easily be seen that the perfection of charity is to be sought not in intensity of the feelings or even of the will, but solely in the motive, a preferring of God to all His creatures and among them to ourselves. Emotional feelings which belong to the inferior part of the soul are somewhat comforting; for, it is rather to be expected that the intensity of a will turning from sin and united to God would tell upon the senses and move to tenderness and tears. Yet this is but an accident, for there are many by nature austere and cold in whom these tender feelings are not easily engaged, yet they are men of good will, strongly attached to God, and faithful in the hour of trial. Nor are the emotional feelings absolutely reliable as proofs of supernatural, sorrowing love. Of themselves they are natural, and do not rise to a higher level, and may in nowise affect the will.⁴

III. *The Means; or, How to Attain to the Love of*

¹ 'Qui manet in Caritate in Deo manet et Deus in eo.'—1 John iv. 'Vos amici mei estis.'

² *Max., Disp.* 6, n. 1253, referring to the *Summa* 1, 2. q. 65, a. 5, etc. 2, 2, q. 23, a. 1.

³ 'Si Deus non esset hominis bonum, non esset ei ratio diligendi.'—2^a 2^{ae}. q. 26, a. 13. In such case we should 'admire but not love Him;' words of St. Francis de Sales from *The Love of God*.

⁴ See Scaram, *On Charity*, vol. iv.

Benevolence and Perfect Contrition.—The work is supernatural and therefore there is need of grace. And furthermore, our mind could not reach the motive of charity so as to influence the will without the infusion of the habit of charity. 'Charitas Deo diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis.'¹ Thus quotes St. Thomas, and continues:—

Deus secundum se est maxime cognoscibilis, non tamen a nobis propter defectum nostræ cognitionis, quæ dependet a rebus sensibilibus; item etiam Deus in se est maxime diligibilis in quantum est objectum beatitudinis, sed hoc modo non est maxime diligibilis a nobis propter inclinationem affectus nostri ad visibilia bona. Unde patet, quod ad Deum maxime hoc modo diligendum necesse est quod nostris cordibus caritas infundatur.²

Grace, then, is necessary, actual and sanctifying.³ And, as grace is given ordinarily in answer to prayer, hence the need of prayer in the first place.

In the second place, the faculties of the soul thus supernaturally aided must be engaged in the work. The understanding has to be convinced by a motive known by faith, and through the understanding the will has to be brought into action. Now, the motive we have seen is high, the highest possible, the Divine attributes; and can we think to reach it? Charity is commanded; and all are bound to make acts of charity frequently during life; therefore, it is at least possible. Nor can it be very difficult of attainment, since an Apostle⁴ has said, 'His commandments are not heavy.' Under the Old Law even the commandment (of love) was not far off, not⁵ beyond the sea nor above in heaven that one should call it impossible or hard. But, under the law of love, charity—its motive and itself—is made easier still; for a Divine Person has come down from

¹ Rom. v.

² 2^a. 2^{ae}. q. 24, a. 2.

³ If, happily, in grace already, the soul, by prayer and by eliciting the Act, can receive an increase; if not in grace, then, simultaneously with the Act of Contrition, sanctifying grace will be infused. We leave untouched the controversy as to whether sanctifying grace and the habit of charity are not one and the same thing.

⁴ John v. 32.

⁵ Deut. xxx.

heaven to make God visible¹ and palpable and lovable. Let us hear St. Cyril:—

We could not form an idea of God, pure and uncreated Spirit as He is, to worship Him; therefore, did He put on our flesh as a garment, that we might have an idea of Him, and that we might even see and hear Him and enjoy His society.¹

Such, too, the thought placed beautifully before us by the Church as one of the causes of the Nativity² in the Preface, '*Quia per Incarnati Verbi Mysterium,*' etc.—'Because by the Mystery of the Incarnate Word a new light from Thy brightness hath enlightened the eyes of our mind, that whilst we know God visibly (in the flesh) we may by Him be drawn to the love of things invisible (*i.e.*, the Divine attributes).' So it is, without any great effort of the imagination we come to God through the Man-God; for, by the Incarnation He has bridged over the abyss that lay between us and the thought of God. We are certain that He trod this earth and blessed it with His sacred feet; that He went in and out amongst men; that for men He suffered and He died; and that He still remains with us in the tabernacle.

Yet, all these facilities notwithstanding, the Act of Contrition is no easy matter for a certain class of sinners. There are those who 'drink iniquity like water;' who take no interest in God; never entertain a loving thought about Him, but would seem to say in defiance 'I have sinned and what evil hath befallen me': for such the difficulty remains and would seem all but insuperable. But God wills the salvation of every one of His human creatures, at all times and in all circumstances; He is a God of mercy who loves to pardon; and, according to a maxim in theology, *is never wanting in the necessities of His creatures*. Here is an urgent necessity: a sinner at the point of death and no sacrament available—let some intelligent lay person put before his mind the motive of Contrition, advancing, or

¹ 'He that seeth Me seeth the Father also.'—John xiv. 9.

² A Lapide, *On St. Luke*, ch. ii. v. 7.

³ *Ibid.*

rather, rising step by step, from the imperfect to the perfect; let him pray with him and for him, engaging the advocacy of the Refuge of Sinners, and trusting in the Precious Blood, and then hope that Contrition will be forthcoming.

We have said 'rising step by step.' Now, what are the steps by which not only the obdurate and ordinary sinner but also the fervent Christian may come to make the Act of Contrition?

1. As we have already seen, to pray for the grace—'*Diffusa est,*' etc. Grace, we may hope, will be given to expel sin, or, if happily grace abides already in the soul it will abide still more.

2. Place the motive before the mind to be carefully considered. But how? Go directly to meditate the Divine Attributes? The cleverest theologian should, we fear, confess to failure; and, in all humility, begin lower down.¹ Recall the teaching of St. Cyril, and the Preface of the Nativity. St. Thomas has written '*timor et spes ducunt ad caritatem per modum dispositionis.*'

To begin, therefore, with a less perfect motive, that of Fear; the fear of impending judgment, terrible, yet just! One might recall a time when he was certainly unprepared for that dread ordeal. Then let him say, 'What if I died then? What should have been my sentence? Where should be my soul at this moment, and for eternity?' Let him weigh each word of the sentence casting him away from the face of Jesus to the company of devils, and say 'Who has saved me from so dreadful a lot? The great mercy of God! He had but to withdraw His hand and I should instantly have fallen under the Eternal Curse. Oh, what a mercy! Thanks be to God! And the Mercy of God is God Himself.'

Or, recalling the Parable of the Prodigal, he will see that same Divine Mercy, which is God Himself, not only sparing the sinner, but searching for him, and rejoicing when He finds him. Then let him think 'I am that sinner and

¹ Consider the imperfection of our faculties wounded by sin, and our tendency to things sensible. 'God [says St. Thomas] is most lovable in Himself . . . but not so to us by reason of the inclination . . . to visible good things.'

worse ; and God has so dealt with me. Oh, the mercy of God, how amiable it shows Him ! How good is God !'

Or, again, selecting some stage or stages of the Passion, the Garden or the Pillar, the Protorium, the Way to Calvary, or Calvary itself ; and, using the questions recommended for meditations of this kind—Who ? What ? How ? Why ?—let him await the answer supplied by Faith, and dwell particularly on that to the question ' Why ? ' ' For us, men, and for our salvation. Yes, for me, even me, poor, unworthy, ungrateful creature ! What love, what goodness ! No one but a God is capable of such goodness ! And He is God, One with the Father and the Holy Ghost from eternity and to eternity, and He has prepared a place for me in Heaven, and wishes me to be united with Him, and to share His happiness for ever. All this the Church teaches me.'

Thus we see how the imperfect conducts to the perfect. But more easily still can this be effected through the motive of gratitude. We think favourably of and admire those who have been good to us in the past, and from whom we hope good things in the future ; and God has been both to us, by action and by promise, in a super-eminent degree ; so that, grace assisting, we pass easily from the imperfect to the perfect—to admire and love Him for His own goodness, to love Him above all things and persons, which is charity. It will then easily be seen that the two things—the pure, disinterested love of God, and the desire of our happiness in Him—instead of being opposed, are rather helpful to each other.¹

But though not taking as the motive any one attribute, but the '*Complexio omnium*,' etc., i.e., *Bonitas Divinia*, it would seem at least much to the purpose to bring out one or more before the mind that would call forth the best affections of the heart—say His Self-existence, Omnipotence, as seen in the visible world, the work of His hands, His Mercy and Beauty, the thought of which drew from St. Augustine

¹Leinkhul, vol. i, n. 316 and fol. ; and St. Thomas 2^a, 2^{ae}, q. 24, a. 9, sets down, as the highest degree of charity, an ardent desire to be united with God, and possess Him in Heaven.

that soul-stirring affection—‘Oh, Beauty, ever ancient, always new: too late have I known Thee, too late have I loved Thee! What are all earthly beauties compared with thee. They are but emanations from Thee, an unfailing source, undiminished, a boundless ocean of beauty and all perfections! Thou art the uncreated goodness, God *my God*, “Deus cordis mei, et pars mea Deus in æternum.”’¹

Should any one, in reciting the formula commonly employed for eliciting the Act, doubt his own sincerity, fearing that his words are but words, let him mark the difference between the love of creatures and the love of God. Creatures fall under the senses of the body, and in the love of them the senses as well as the will are engaged. The emotional feeling within, the tear from the eye, and the warm expressions of endearment are the ordinary accompaniments of profane love. Not so the love of God; we ought indeed to love with heart and soul and feelings, and with our whole being Him who is everything to us; yet looking to essentials, this love is seated in the will, and one can love strongly and well without any tenderness or emotion. And let him mark again the second part, ‘I firmly purpose,’ etc. Is he determined never, through fear of evils however great, or hope of the highest earthly happiness, to turn his back on that God, *his God*, whose goodness he has been considering; in other words never to offend Him wilfully by a mortal sin? This is the test; and if he can stand it he may rest content. Yet he must not apply too sharp a test in the form of a particular evil which, acting on the senses, might prove too much for his strength of will, and cause it to recoil. Would it not be tempting God to weigh against His friendship the delivery from torture or death, or the enjoyment of some great and lasting prosperity? Such trials of love God is not likely to send or permit to happen; they are imaginary, and in imaginary trials one must not hope for special supernatural assistance. We have said ‘never grievously to offend,’ etc. This is enough for the *amicitia* of charity; and he who can say it honestly is a

¹ Psalm lxxii,

true friend of God ; and His charity is perfect in *kind*. There is a higher, it is of those who purpose firmly against venial sin ; and a higher still, of those who purpose to live so united to God as to seek in all things His good pleasure.¹

With reference to the formula for the Act of Charity and Contrition, we would, with all deference and with diffidence in our own judgment, remark that, in all prayer-books and catechisms, the motive is not made to precede the Act. Thus runs the formula—‘ My God I love Thee above all things,’ then follows the motive ‘ because Thou art,’ etc. Is this as it should be ? The motive is set down to influence the Act ; and can this be if the words corresponding to it are completed before any mention of the motive ? Might not this much be said ? Either the Act is in every case complete when the first part of the formula has been recited, or it is not. In the first case it is needless to formulate the motive ; in the second case the Act should follow, that is, be repeated. There is a priority of time between motive and act, one an exercise of the understanding, the other of the will, the former influencing and the latter being influenced. If the motive is to be set down at all, why, let it have its natural place. With a saint, whose mind is ever occupied with the thought of God’s goodness, the motive is ever present, and acts are elicited a thousand times a day.

But with ordinarily good Christians the case is different ; though disposed to love God, and living habitually in His grace, their mind, distracted by many occupations, needs to be convinced that it may act upon the will, and hence the necessity of a motive indicated at least. No need, for such purpose, of any long process ; a prayerful raising of the soul with advertence to the motive as found in the formula, but in its proper place, followed by the Act, and the work is done. The mention alone of God’s goodness, and his claims upon our love, with the class in question, intelligent and good, recalls the teaching of faith and thus furnishes the motive. Hence, we would say, the importance of a formula following the natural order.

¹ Lemkhul, vol. i. n. 320.

For such as need conversion through Contrition the process should be more elaborate, as seen already. God of course could effect it all in the shortest time; but we should not expect miracles at His hands. Yet His mercy is like to a miracle—bearing with the sinner, inviting, and helping him to return to His embraces. He gives even to the hardened sinner, in the extremity we are contemplating, all the means of a true conversion; prayer, to which He attaches His Omnipotence—‘Whatsoever you shall ask . . . He will give . . .’ And His Word, of which He has said ‘Are not my words as a fire [yes, able to inflame the coldest heart] and as a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?’¹ Such strokes of this hammer are heard in these invitations:—‘If your sins be as scarlet they shall be made white as snow.’ ‘Come to me all you that labour and are burdened and I will refresh you.’ Such too the pitying remonstrances:—‘Oh that they would be wise and provide for their last end.’ ‘Oh ye sons of men, how long will you be dull of heart? Why do you love vanity and seek after lying?’ ‘Why will you die, Oh house of Israel?’ (Oh poor sinner! die in your sins?) What a power for the conversion of the most obdurate in the hands of a zealous priest, prayer and the Word of God, the Mother of Mercy invoked helping in the work? Powerful means and motives these to or towards Contrition, in the absence of the priest; for they show Divine Mercy so far above the capability and even the understanding of man. If with such means as these available, the rock will not be broken, the sinner will not be contrite;² if he dies in sin it is because he wills it!

Now, kind reader, if so far we are at agreement, it is an agreement as to the premises; and the conclusions will, we hope, present less difficulty. These conclusions will concern ourselves personally; then our functions in the pulpit; and lastly in the confessional, but particularly at the bed-side of the dying.

1. *Ourselves*.—It is a question of charity which should

¹ Jer. xxiii. 29.

² Derive the word from its Latin root *conterre*, *contritum*; and compare the heart broken with sorrow and the rock broken with the hammer, etc.

begin at home, though it should not end there ; a question that leads, and imperatively, to introspection. Our Lord came to cast fire upon the earth, and wishes that it should be enkindled and kept burning in the hearts of all. What other is this than the fire of Divine Love? should we not then seek some signs of its indwelling in our souls? We shall not seek for feelings—warm, or tender, or tearful—about God ; but should ask, what habitually are our thoughts and dispositions regarding Him? Do we regard Him as our Friend of friends whose interests we have at heart ; as our Father and the best of fathers whose paternal Heart we as children are afraid to sadden? How are we affected by the outrages offered at home and abroad to the Majesty of God? We know how the Psalmist was affected on the like occasions:—‘Vidi praevaricantes et tabescebam.’ ‘Opprobria exprobrantium tibi ceciderunt super me.’ He so espoused the cause of God that he felt those outrages and insults as though they were offered to himself. Again, what interest do we take in missionary enterprise, by which God’s kingdom is extended, and His name glorified on earth as it is in heaven? The love of God, we have seen, is a fire, and zeal is the flame thereof ; if, then, our zeal is not manifested in our works or prayers, is it not to be feared that the fire, whose tendency is to break out, has no place within us. St. Teresa, in her *Pater Noster*, has said what amounts to this:—We cannot be certain that we love God with the love of friendship, because we cannot confer favours on Him, whilst upon our neighbour we can. If, then, we are showing marks of friendship to the neighbour for God, that cost us something—and the more the better—the thought is reassuring, and would justify an appeal like St. Peter’s to the omniscience of our Lord, ‘Thou knowest that I love Thee.’ This should be sufficient for one’s peace of mind even at the dying hour ; and to seek a greater certainty would be to leave no room for hope, which must go hand in hand with charity. An example confirmatory of this in the writer’s memory may be given here. An ecclesiastic of great learning and virtue, Dr. A. F., in a dangerous illness was greatly troubled at the thought of judgment. But, added to the

ordinary succours of religion, he had at his bed-side a priest of practical piety and good sense, who said : ' Now if you had the choosing of your judge, and the whole world to select from, is there any one you would prefer to our Lord and Saviour.' He answered promptly in the negative and was comforted. The soul emptied of creatures, and truthfully professing the love of preference, may cast itself confidently and peacefully into the arms of its Judge. ' Love God, and do what you please.'¹ ' He that loves God with his whole heart fears neither death nor punishment, nor judgment nor hell ; because perfect love gives secure access to God.'²

2. *In the Pulpit*.—Now, if charity is the one thing necessary, it needs not saying that it should be often heard from our pulpits. If St. John at Ephesus kept on repeating his exhortations on the second precept of the law, the first should be heard in season and out of season, even to the point of remonstrance. If the preacher is called a man of one idea, and the objectors speak the truth, it is well ; for this idea, got well into the heads of his hearers, and kept there, is all-sufficient. But the preacher will not do his part by eulogising charity in words of eloquence ; he must tell his hearers what it is, and the steps leading to its attainment. But this would be didactical, and the people expect a *sermon*. The question is about pastoral preaching, and the pastoral sermon from which the didactical element is excluded is but as the 'sounding brass,' etc. It may, indeed, please a class of hearers who in a sermon, as in most other things, seek their pleasure rather than their profit. But the simple and the right-minded of every class, who would profit, are deprived of their spiritual food, with which the Church, by her councils, would supply them.³ And might not the apprehended dryness of such preaching (teaching rather) be relieved by a fervid peroration of, say, five minutes in a discourse of twenty-five ?

¹ St. Augustine.

² *Imitation of Christ*, Book I., ch 25.

³ Council of Trent, sess. xxiv. chap. 4, confirming and adapting to the present time canons under Paul III.

And if this manner of teaching is the thing needed for the adult congregation, much more for the congregation of little ones, in whom the Word is sure to fructify in fuller measure. Let the answers to the questions: 'What is charity?' 'Why should we love God above all things?' 'How are we to love?' etc., be drawn out by the priest, as catechist, in plain, intelligible language, suited to their capacity, and made interesting by examples, and God will be better known, and, therefore, better loved—'*Ignoti nulla cupido.*' Things visible, the attractions of the hour, will, unfortunately, often usurp the place of God in the souls of many; but, the duty of instruction suitably discharged, the supernatural will, in the main, keep the ascendant, and the way be prepared for turning to God in love, and in sorrow for offending him.

3. *In the Confessional, etc.*—Here, indeed, is the touchstone of the zealous priest. Having brought his penitent to break with sin, and with all affection to it, and to turn to God in the hope of pardon, as unquestionably he is bound to do, will he stop there, content with initial love, on the very threshold of Contrition? Theologians, even the most liberal, whose concern is, for the most part, to determine the minimum of disposition for the Sacraments, counsel us to look higher; and if it were for themselves a question of the last Sacraments, we venture to assert they would apply the counsel to themselves, and reduce it into action. It were, indeed, cold and perfunctory to be contented with the *beginning* of love when the further step to love itself can, as we have seen already, be made so easily.

But, suppose it is difficult, the difficulty cannot be evaded by the appointed dispenser of God's graces. To gain the love of men our Lord shrank not from suffering and the Cross; and through His Apostle we are exhorted to love God, since He first loved us. He came to cast fire upon this earth, and wishes it to be kindled in the hearts of all—no other than the fire of His love. To kindle up and spread this holy fire is a work most pleasing to every good Catholic, but for the priest it is simply a duty. This is a duty discharged in every work of the ministry zealously performed;

but particularly in the confessional ; and still more particularly on occasion of the last Sacraments. The penitent, suppliantly asking pardon through his priest, places his confidence and his soul in his hands. 'Father,' he says, 'I am a sinner, help me, pray for me, save my poor soul !' No priest can deny those helps without failing in duty to God, and to that soul now given to his hands, to do for him all that is needful. He will, before concluding the *process*, help his penitent to raise his attrition to the rank of contrition, and afterwards, suggesting briefly the motive, will make with him a fervent Act of Charity and Contrition. In case of the last Sacraments, he will make provision for the frequent repetition of these acts ; and, even with no other object, will repeat his visits. The physician does as much for his patient ; and, with an enemy awaiting his opportunity against that soul, it were like a betrayal to dispose of it at a single visit.

The question here being confined to the part Contrition has in reconciling the sinner, and justifying the just still more, we would suggest—seeing the importance of having the motive ready at hand, and lest anything important should be omitted—a prepared formula in outline for helping penitents. The intervals of such outline would, in using it, be filled up by the fervour of the moment. And not one but two or three formulas as the case might require ; for we must gauge the capacity and education (spiritual education) as well as the dispositions of the subject. With some the subsidiary motive of fear should be but sparingly employed, and only as leading to gratitude for preservation from well-merited punishment. Most will be touched by presenting of the Crucifix with accompanying explanation, *juxta captum* ; while ultimately all should be reminded of the Divinity of our Lord and His claims, as a Divine Person, to the best love and deepest sorrow of our heart. The subject thus prepared by prayer and consideration of the motive, let teacher and taught say conjointly the two-fold act, and a great work is done.

But all this is hard and trying, and in the case of a hardened sinner, who for years has been a stranger to the

supernatural, may be called a hopeless task. *Hard and trying*, yes; but *hopeless*, no. With God all things are possible; and He wishes the salvation of that hardened soul, and with that view has now placed it in your hands. Show him how to pray earnestly, confidently, perseveringly; pray for him and with him, and hope that his *sufficient* grace will soon be *efficacious*; and that, from *initial love* and attrition, he will rise to perfect love and contrition. The work is hard and trying, but the saving of a single soul is worth it all; much more, and immensely more, the making it a perfect Christian. Work for which opportunities are afforded a hundred times a day throughout this land of ours; and at which many a zealous priest is day by day 'spending himself and being spent.' Theirs is a silent work, and unnoticed by the worldly-minded. But if, instead of pointing heavenwards to men, and counselling resignation on earth, as did our Holy Father lately to the persecuted religious in France, they denounced the oppressor with no measured words, and counselled unlawful courses, their praise would be in the mouths of men. Now it is in heaven, where a crown is laid up for them with all who instruct many unto justice.

To conclude. We have considered the important place contrition should hold in the daily life of every Christian. Every Christian is bound to aspire to the perfection suited to his state; and charity is perfection for all states. But charity has its degrees—the lowest implying a sorrow for all mortal sin; the next a sorrow for sin of every kind and degree. Seeing then that all have sinned, and are sinning, he who would aspire to perfection must aspire to contrition as well. We have considered, too, some very urgent needs for contrition as the one solitary means of recovering grace after mortal sin. And, to prevent the error of taking a word or formula for the thing itself, we have considered its *nature*; and have seen it is a sorrow arising from the thought of God's goodness not excluding for ourselves (rather containing) the hope of enjoying Him. Thus hope and charity and contrition, and faith underlying all, work together for the good of those who will be saved.

Lastly, we have considered the *Means of Contrition*, first prayer, second meditation on the less perfect motives leading up to the supreme object, the love of God for His own infinite goodness. This love is not seated in the feelings, which are but accidents, but in the will preferring God to all His creatures, and adhering to him at any and at every cost, and hating sin because it offends Him. With nothing less than this should we be contented. Such a love, reduced to an act, is of Divine precept, binding frequently through life and at the end of life. Nothing else can content our souls, created with a longing for happiness to be found in God alone. Worldlings will freely confess they have not found happiness in their idol; the saints tell us they got a foretaste of it in loving God. They poured forth their souls in longings to enjoy Him :—‘What have I in Heaven or on earth but Thee.’ ‘When shall I come and appear before the face of the Lord!’ In such earnest longings they saw not the terrors of Divine justice, and so passed peacefully on to the full enjoyment. It was the fulfilment in them of God’s word :—‘Perfect charity casteth out fear’ And if we are wise we will in our measure be ever striving to do likewise.

R. F. L.

DOCUMENTS

RESOLUTION OF THE ARCHBISHOPS AND BISHOPS OF
IRELAND ON THE INADEQUATE PROVISION FOR THE
SPIRITUAL NEEDS OF CATHOLICS IN THE ROYAL
NAVY

At a meeting of the archbishops and bishops of Ireland, held at Maynooth, on 26th June, ultimo, the following resolution was unanimously adopted :—

We have frequently urged His Majesty's Government to make adequate provision for the spiritual needs of Catholic sailors in the Royal Navy, and, notwithstanding their repeated promises to do so, such adequate provision has not yet been made. We now deem it our duty to advise Catholic parents not to allow their children to join His Majesty's ships until suitable arrangements shall be made to minister to the spiritual wants of Catholic seamen in the Fleet.

(Signed),

✠ MICHAEL Cardinal LUGUE, <i>Chairman.</i>	} <i>Secretaries.</i>
✠ JOHN, Bishop of Clonfert,	
✠ RICHARD ALPHONSUS, Bishop of Waterford and Lismore,	

PROPER ERECTION OF THE STATIONS OF THE CROSS

CONGNIS SACERDOTUM A SS. CORDIE IESU¹

DE MODO NOVITER INVECTO ERIGENDI STATIONES VIAE CRUCIS

Procurator Generalis Cognis Sacerdotum SS. a Corde Iesu huic Sacrae Congni Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae exponit quod a plurimis annis in Gallia mos invaluerit erigendi stationes Viae Crucis cum crucibus ligneis supra quas, in conjunctione brachiorum tabellae depictae mysteria consueta repraesentantes applicantur; ita ut tantummodo extremitates brachiorum crucis appareant. Addendum est quod in ipso actu erectionis istarum stationum Viae Crucis, jam tabellae cucibus adhaerebant.

¹ Iterum proponitur hocce documentum, nonnullis mendis purgatum, et iam in praecedenti Fasc. p. 123 editum.

Cum hisce de erectionibus sic factis controversia exorta sit, ad omne dubium tollendum humillime quaerit orator :

Num erectiones stationum Viae Crucis de quibus supra, validae et licitae sustineri valeant?

Sacra vero Congregatio proposito dubio, audito unius ex Consultoribus voto, respondendum mandavit :

Affirmative prout exponitur : Verumtamen, cum juxta decreta (30 Jan. 1839; 23 Nov. 1878) Indulgentiae huius sacrosancti exercitii crucibus tantum sint adnexae, S. C. vehementer inculcat ut nihil innovetur, sed antiqua et ubique recepta praxis servetur, quae est ut cruces supra depictas tabulas integre conspicuae emineant.

Datum Romae ex Secria. ejusdem S. Cognis die 27 Martii, 1901.

¶ L. M. Card. PAROCCHI.

L. ✠ S.

FRANCISCUS SOGARO, Archiep. Amiden., *Secrius*.

THE ROSARY OF THE SISTERS OF CHARITY

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE INDULGENTIARUM

DECLARATUR FILIAS A CARITATE UTI POSSE AD RECITANDUM
ROSARIUM S. DOMINICI CORONIS S. BIRGITTAE, SEX DECADIBUS
CONSTANTIBUS

BEATISSIME PATER,

Veneziani Agostino Procuratore Generale *ad interim* della Congregazione della Missione di S. Vincenzo de' Paoli, prostrato al bacio del S. P. espone quanto segue :

V. S. con Breve speciale in data del 1 Dicembre, 1892, si degnava di accordare ai Preti della Missione la facoltà di benedire per le Figlie della Carità le corone coll'applicazione delle Indulgenze del SSmo. Rosario, ed alle stesse Figlie Carità il privilegio di conseguire queste indulgenze anche quando per motivi di carità non potessero recitare per intero il Rosario o lo dovessero interrompere. Ora essendo la corona delle Figlie della Carità, per tradizione che risale alle origini dell'Istituto, composta di sei decine come quella di S. Brigida, è sorto in alcuni Missionarii il dubbio se recitando con essa il Rosario, ne conseguano le Indulgenze.

Pertanto ad acquietare gli spiriti e ad evitare l'inconveniente di cambiar la corona tradizionale l'umile oratore supplica istantemente la S. V. a voler dichiarare che anche coll'uso di detta corona le Figlie della Carità possono conseguire le indulgenze del Rosario

Domenicano, uniformandosi esse nel recitarlo alle regole seguite dai fedeli si in quanto all'ordine ed alla meditazione dei misteri che in quanto al numero delle decadi.

Ex Secretaria S. Congregationis

Indulgentiis SS.que Reliq. praepositae, die 8 Maii 1900.

S. Congregatio, attento decreto in una *Urbis et Orbis* sub die 29 Februarii 1820, nec non attentis iis quae in Sylloge Indulgentiarum vulgo *Raccolta*, leguntur (pag. 10, edit. 1898), declarat, Sorores in casu uti posse ad recitandum Rosarium S. Dominici, coronis Sanctae Birgittae sex decadibus constantibus.

L. ✠ S.

Ios. M. COSELLI. *Substi.*

POPE LEO XIII. CONGRATULATES A FRENCH DOMINICAN

LEO XIII GRATULATUR P. FROGET DE LIBRO CONSCRIPTO CIRCA
INHABITATIONEM SPIRITUS S. IN ANIMIS JUSTIS

DILECTO FILIO BARTHOLOMAEO FROGET, SODALI DOMINICANO —
PICTAVIUM

LEO PP. XIII. .

Dilecte Fili, salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem. De ingenii doctrinaeque fructibus quos Nobis frequenter catholicorum exhibet pietas, si profecto solent multo accidere gratiores qui ad illustranda documenta Nostra utiliter spectent. Et peculiari quidem gratia dignus est liber quem abs te nuper accepimus; in quo ex disciplina Angelici Doctoris, divini Spiritus admirabilem in animis iustis inhabitationem dilucida copia exposuisti. Caput istud fidei catholicae, sane praestantissimum piaque consolationis abundans effectus, litteris Nos encyclicis *Divinum illud munus* sollertiae eorum valde commendavimus qui animis ad aeterna excolendis pro officio dant operam. Aequissimum nempe est tantarum rerum ignorance a populo christiano plane depelli; atque adeo id enixe efficiendum ut *altissimi donum* Dei unde complura manant et maxima beneficia, omnes religiose studeant et noscere et diligere et implorare. Cui assequendo proposito iam adiumentum non tenue ex libro tuo esse profectum, gratulamur tibi; eoque deinceps amplius profecturum esse speramus libentes et cupimus. Tuum porro obsequium erga auctoritatem Nostram tuumque in Nos more deditissimi filii animum collaudantes, paternae benevolentiae testem et munerum auspicem divinorum. Apostolicam benedictionem tibi peramanter impertimus.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum die XX Februarii anno MDCCCXI, Pontificatus Nostri Vicesimo quarto.

LEO PP. XIII.

POPE LEO XIII. AND HIS 'NOBLE GUARD'

SAECULARI RECURRENTE FAUSTITATE CREATIONIS NOBILIS COHORTIS,
'GUARDIA NOBILE,' LEO XIII COMMORATIVUM MNEMOSYNUM
INSTITUIT

DILECTIS FILIIS PROTECTORIBUS NOSTRI LATERIS
MERENTIBUS ET EMERITIS

LEO PP. XIII.

Dilecti Filii, salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem. Saecularis eventus faustitas, quae nobilem cohortem vestram hisce diebus laetitia merito perfundit, non ita cadit in rationem rerum vestrarum, ut Nos etiam quodammodo non attingat, et ad incundos animi sensus non commoveat. Respicientes enim Nos spatium praeteriti temporis, et memoria repetentes varia rerum eventa, quae huic Apostolicae Sedi Deo volente, vel secunda vel adversa acciderunt, animadvertimus vestros in munere decessores, quorum non pauci erant vobiscum cognatione et affinitate coniuncti, in assignata sibi a Pontifice statione digne permansisse. Enimvero unde vigesimo ineunte saeculo, cum nonnulli Quiritium Optimates quo obsequium studiumque suum difficillimis Ecclesiae temporibus Romano Pontifici testarentur, enixe, peterent a regnante Decessore Nostro Pio VII, ut se in numerum veterum excubiarum adsciscere vellet, et ille Pontifex libenter eorum optatis obsecundans in locum praetoriae Equitum turmae eos nobiles viros volens lubensque sufficeret, repente foeda illa tempestas coorta est, qua fortuna Apostolicae Sedis, mox ad pristinum decus et splendorem reditura, iacuit aliquandiu inclinata ac pene eversa. Id temporis, ut memoriae posterorum proditum est, novi Equites, licet in militia tyrones, illustre dederunt specimen fidelitatis et virtutis; maluerunt enim in Urbanam Arcem, quasi mancipia, detrudi, quam ab observantia desciscere, et fidem Pontifici semel datam violare. Cuius quidem laudis nemo vestrum est, dilecti filii, qui non sentiat quodammodo se esse participem, ideoque vos omnes saecularia istiusmodi solemnia, velut gentilitia sacra, laeti factitatis. Quae virtus et fides in posterioribus etiam rebus gestis et in recentioribus Ecclesiae acerbitatibus et luctibus luculenter apparuit, et Nos pro certo habemus fore ut unusquisque vestrum, si res postulet, eandem religionem Nobis eandem fidem servet, ac maiores vestri praestiterunt, et parvis virtutis edat exempla. Ad Nos quod attinet, Decessorum Nostrorum supra dicti Pii VII,

Leonis XII, Gregorii XVI et Pii IX, qui ordinem vestrum non paucis auxere iuribus et honoribus, vestigiis insistentes, volumus ut etiam per Nos aliqua vobis honorum fiat accessio. Quapropter ne memoria huius fausti eventus, ut assolet in rebus humanis, cito intereat, singulari mnemosyno vos omnes donandos censuimus, quod vobis de Petri Cathedra, de Nobis egregie semper meritis, paternam etiam benevolentiam Nostram cumulate testetur. Volumus igitur et Apostolica Nostra auctoritate decernimus, ut proprium conflatur ex argento numisma, cuius adversa pars Nostram imaginem referat dextrorsum respicientem, aversa duos habeat oleae et quercus ramos, quibus in mediis legatur titulus '*Leo XIII. P. M. Custodibus. Corporis. Nobilibus - Anno. C. - Ab. Eorum. Cohorte - A. Pio VII. Dec. Suo - Constituta.*' Peculiari huiusmodi honoris insigni, quod a taenia serica, alternis distincta lineis caeruleis et rubris, dependeat, decoretur pectus Protectorum omnium Nostri lateris, et eorum nimirum, qui hoc honorifico munere funguntur, et eorum, qui illo, dum sivit aetas, perfuncti sunt. Haec ultro concedimus non obstantibus contrariis quibuscumque.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum sub Anulo Piscatoris die XI Maii MDCCCXI. Pontificatus Nostri Anno Vicesimo quarto.

ALOIS CARD. MACCHI.

L. ✠ S.

**DECREE OF THE SACRED CONGREGATION OF RITES ON
THE BLESSING OF THE LILIES OF ST. ANTHONY OF
PADUA**

E SACRA CONGREGATIONE RITUUM

RITUS AC FORMULA BENEDICTIONIS LILIORUM IN HONOREM
S. ANTONII PATAVINI DIE 13 IUNII EIUS FESTO IMPERTIENDAE
IN ECCLESIIS ORDINIS MINORUM ¹

'Sacerdos indutus pluviali albo vel sine casula, cum ministris similiter indutis, stans in cornu Epistolae dicit in tono feriali':

V. Adjutorium nostrum in nomine Domini.

R. Qui fecit coelam et terram.

V. Dominus vobiscum.

R. Et cum spiritu tuo.

¹ Haec formula est inserenda in Appendice Ritualis Minorum. Vid p. 144 aliam formulam inserendam in Appendice Ritualis Romani. N. D.

OREMUS

Deus, a quo omne bonum sumit initium et semper ad potiora progrediens percipit incrementum : concede, quaesumus, supplicanti-
bus nobis ; ut quod ad laudem nominis tui inchoare aggredimur,
aeternae tuae sapientiae munere, perducatur ad terminum.
Per Christum Dominum nostrum.

R. Amen.

‘Hic celebrans incensum ponit in thuribulo, et Diaconus, dicto’ : Munda cor meum, ‘ac benedictione accepta, cantat Evangelium’ :

‡ Sequentia sancti Evangelii secundum Matthaeum (Matt. 6 c).

R. Gloria tibi, Domine.

In ille tempore : Dixit Jesus discipulis suis : Nemo potest duobus dominis servire : aut enim unum odio habebit, et alterum diligit ; aut unum sustinebit, et alterum contemnet. Non potestis Deo servire et mammonae. Ideo dico vobis, ne solliciti sitis animae vestrae quid induamini. Nonne anima plus est quam esca, et corpus plus quam vestimentum ? Respicite volatilia coeli, quoniam non serunt, neque metunt, neque congregant in horrea, et Pater vester coelestis pascit illa. Nonne vos magis plures estis illis ? Quis autem vestrum, cogitans, potest adjicere ad staturam suam cubitum unum ? Et de vestimento quid solliciti estis ? Considerate lilia agri, quomodo crescunt ; non laborant, neque metunt. Dico autem vobis quoniam nec Salomon in omni gloria sua coopertus est sicut unum ex istis. Si autem foenum agri, quod hodie est, et cras in clibanum mittitur, Deus sic vestit, quanto magis vos modicae fidei ? Nolite ergo solliciti esse dicentes : Quid manducabimus, aut quid bibemus, aut quo operiemur ? Haec enim omnia gentes inquirunt. Scit enim Pater vester, quia his omnibus indigetis. Quaerite ergo primum regnum Dei, et justitiam ejus, et haec omnia adjicientur vobis.

R. Laus tibi, Christe.

‘Finito Evangelio, celebrans a Diacono incensatur : deinde vertit se ad altare in eodem cornu Epistolae, ac dicit in tono feriali’ :

V. Justus germinabit sicut lilium.

R. Et florebit in aeternum ante Dominum.

V. Domine, exaudi orationem meam.

R. Et clamor meus ad te veniat.

V. Dominus vobiscum.

R. Et cum spiritu tuo.

OREMUS

Deus, Creator et Conservator generis humani sanctae puritatis amator, dator gratiae spiritualis et largitor aeternae salutis, bene~~x~~dictione tua sancta, bene~~x~~dic haec lilia, quae pro gratiis exsolvendis, in honorem sancti Antonii Confessoris tui, supplices hodie tibi praesentamus, et petimus benedici. Infunde illis, salutari signaculo sanctissimae ✠ Crucis, rorem coelestem. Tu benignissime, qui ea ad odoris suavitatem, depellendasque infirmitates, humano usui tribuisti; tali virtute reple et confirma, ut quibuscumque morbis adhibita, seu in domibus, locisque posita, vel cum devotione portata fuerint, intercedente eodem famulo tuo Antonio, fugent daemones continentiam salutarem inducant, languores avertant, tibi que servientibus pacem, et gratiam concilient. Per Christum Dominum nostrum.

R. Amen.

‘Posito incenso in thuribulo, Sacerdos aspergit lilia dicens’: Asperges me, ‘sine psalmo, et thurificat ter, nihil dicens; postea descendit ad infimum gradum altaris, et singulis genuflexis, cantores intonant Responsorium’:

Si quaeris miracula,
Mors, error, calamitas,
Daemon, lepra fugiunt,
Aegri surgunt sani.

Cedunt mare, vincula,
Membra resque perditas
Petunt et accipiunt
Juvenes et cani.

Pereunt pericula,
Cessat et necessitas:
Narrant hi qui sentiunt,
Dicunt Paduani.

Cedunt mare, vincula,
Membra resque perditas
Petunt et accipiunt
Juvenes et cani.

Gloria Patri, et Filio, et Spiritui sancto.

Cedunt mare, vincula,
Membra resque perditas
Petunt et accipiunt
Juvenes et cani.

V. Ora pro Nobis, beate Antoni.

R. Ut digni efficiamur promissionibus Christi.

OREMUS

Subveniat plebi tuae, quaesumus, Domini, praecelari Confessoris tui beati Antonii devota et iugis deprecatio : quae in praesenti nos tua gratia dignos efficiat, et in futuro gaudia mereatur aeterna. Per Christum Dominum nostrum.

R. Amen.

'Fit distributio liliorum iuxta morem ; ea finita, Sacerdos lavat manus el linteo abstergit, etc. Caeremonia finitur cum benedictione, quam Sacerdos populo impertitur cum reliquia S. Antonii.'

ORDINIS MINORUM

Rmus. Pater Fr. Petrus ab Arce Papae, Procurator Generalis Ordinis Minorum, Sanctissimo Domino nostro Leoni Papae XIII humillime exposuit, in quibusdam sui Ordinis Provinciis pium iamdudum invaluisse morem, ut quotannis, idibus Iuniis, qua die sancti Antonii Patavini solemnitas agitur, lilia in ipsiusmet honorem benedicenda offerantur. Nostra hac aetate, cum eiusdem sancti Confessoris cultus feliciter increverit, praesertim per effusae illius erga pauperes charitatis imitationem, tam pius eiusmodi usus de liliis benedicendis magis in dies adaugetur. Quo vero ad eam benedictionem impertiendam in cunctis, ubi libuerit, ecclesiis ad Franciscalem Minorum Ordinem ubique terrarum pertinentibus uniformitas habeatur, idem Rmus. Pater supremae Apostolicae Sedis approbationi ritus vigentis ac formulae schema demississime subiecit : quibus die festo S. Antonii legitime Fratres Minores in suis ecclesiis deinceps utantur.

Itaque exhibitum benedictionis ritum ac formulam, cum Emus. et Rmus. Dnus. Cardinalis Vincentius Vannutelli relator in Ordinario Sacrorum Rituum Coetu, ad Vaticanum subsignata die coadunato, ad iuris tramitem proposuerit ; Emi. et Rmi. Patres Sacris tuendis Ritibus praepositi, omnibus mature perpensis, auditoque R. P. D. Ioanne Baptista Lugari, S. Fidei Promotore, rescribendum censuerunt : 'Pro gratia et ad Emum. Ponentum cum Promotore Fidei.' Die 5 Februarii 1901.

Demum hisce omnibus Sanctissimo Domino Nostro Leoni Papae XIII per infrascriptum Cardinalem Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi Praefectum relatis ; Sanctitas Sua sententiam Sacri eiusdem Consilii ratam habens, ritum, ac formulam benedicendi lilia in honorem S. Antonii Patavini, prout huic praeiacent Decreto, benigne approbare dignata est indulsitque, ut eiusmodi

formulam, Rituali Ordinis Minorum inserendam, Fratres in posterum adhibere valeant in liliorum benedictione, quotannis die festo eiusdem sancti Confessoris impertienda. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque.

Die 26, iisdem mense et anno.

D. Card. FERRATA, *Praef.*

✠ D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., *Secret.*

NOTICES OF BOOKS

THE CATHOLIC CREED. By Very Rev. J. Procter, S.T.L.
Second Edition, revised. Art & Book Co. Price, 3s. 6d.

To the high praise which on all hands greeted the first edition of Father Procter's well-reasoned and well-written book, and to the words of warm commendation with which its many merits were appraised when noticed in the I.E. RECORD twelve months ago, we shall add nothing by way of criticism, but, by way of favour for a work that sets forth in simple eloquence and persuasiveness the beauty of Christian dogma, we would bespeak for the new revised edition an ampler measure of Catholic support and a readier circulation than even was accorded it on its first appearance.

MARY WARD: A Foundress of the Seventeenth Century.
By Mother M. Salome. Burns & Oates. Price, 5s.

It is pretty generally admitted, we think, that one of the most pressing needs of the Catholics of these countries is a healthy and interesting literature as specific against the frivolous, and but too often, vile and dangerous productions, which are daily issuing from a corrupt press. Mother Salome is cognisant of the fact, and besides honouring her country-woman, has done her part to meet the difficulty. And, in our opinion, she has done it well. Beginning at the cradle, she traces the fortunes of that long and active life in an unpretentious but attractive manner, and the side-lights thrown on the civil and religious history of that critical period, show us that there were in England people who had the faith, and who were prepared, in testimony thereto, to relinquish all man holds most dear. From the nature of the case, we should expect a life like this to contain a good deal of matter for which the ordinary reader would have no relish, but the authoress has exercised her tact in excluding everything of a technical character, especially where canon law or theology should play an active part. We, therefore, fully adopt the criticism of the Bishop of Newport who says, in his introduction:—"I cannot imagine any story more interesting, more touching, more

stimulating, to Catholic girls of the present day than that which is told in these pages of the noble way in which a daughter of England's old faith and ancient blood rose to meet the storm and danger of her times, and, whilst giving her whole heart to God, dedicated her life to her faith and her country.'

P. V. H.

LIFE OF THE VERY REV. FELIX DE ANDREIS, C.M. First Superior of the Congregation of the Mission in the United States. With an Introduction by the Right Rev. John J. Kain, Archbishop of St. Louis, Mo. St. Louis, Mo. : B. Herder.

THIS is a very interesting and a very edifying biography of one of the Catholic pioneers of the United States. We are told that it is compiled from sketches written by Mgr. Rosati, the first bishop of St. Louis, the colleague and successor of Father de Andreis. It is clear that the sketch is either a translation of the Italian notes of Mgr. Rosati by someone who has not a command of first class English nor the gift of adapting Italian ways of saying things to ours, or else that Mgr. Rosati's sketches were written in English before he had thoroughly mastered the language. The defects of style are well compensated for by the interesting and edifying contents of the book.

EXPOSITION OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. By a Seminary Professor. Part III.—Worship. Philadelphia: J. J. M'Vey. \$2.25.

WHETHER the wide range of the subject forbids it, or whatever else may be the source of the defect, one will not find amongst recent publications, many *exposés* of Catholic doctrine, that are at once well-knit and comprehensive, that fairly exhaust the theme and yet be of sustained interest throughout. They seem, inevitably, to group themselves either as eloquent apologies or as what are but transfigured catalogues of dogmas, with but a meagre number in the intervening stages. Books will appear, the materials fused into a connected whole, organised and thoughtful, stamped with the personality of the author; works to satisfy from the harmony of the parts and of the diction, yet sure to leave a vague unsatisfied feeling of want of definition of clearly marked

individualized treatment. Or they will come forth a sort of magnified guide book, mere lists of propositions, rigorously classified and sub-divided, clear indeed and solid in their teachings, sympathetic in their spirit, but smacking in their English dress of the dreariness of the musty tomes whence they seem to have been straightway transferred. The book under review belongs to the latter class, but is of a type superior to its fellows. There is not that weariness of spirit waiting on its perusal. It is the third and last part of a course of religious instruction prepared for the use of, and under the patronage of the De la Salle Brothers. Meaning by worship 'the sum of those means by which we are to honour God and sanctify ourselves,' it treats for 800 well-printed pages, by way of question and answer, of Grace, Prayer, Sacraments and the Liturgy. The doctrine therein set out is abundant, solid, and accurate; the positions as a rule clearly mapped out and qualified, expressed in precise terms in English of much purity, and the whole is leavened by a high Catholic spirit of deference to authority and of reverence. The setting of the parts is well-planned. Summaries and skilful analyses at the ends relieve the tedium of the chapters while giving them a unity and a system. Some defects there are amidst much good work; mere negative blemishes that seem but the necessary limits of an attempt to traverse at an even, plodding pace so vast a field. Some minor details are excessively developed, and that at the expense of root-doctrines, with a certain loss of proportion and a possible misleading of those who are unskilled in Theology, and who may measure the certainty and importance of a dogma by the volume of treatment accorded it. It seems also a waste of labour, and a snare for the unwary, to bring in the divisions and sub-divisions that in many matters theologians have devised for offensive and defensive purposes alone, seeing that in every instance the author has wisely shunned the battle-ground of domestic controversy. Exception might be taken to the absolute form in which a few sentences picked out at random, are worded. 'The end of all the commandments of God is to preserve sanctifying grace,' p. 49; 'Is the true faith requisite for the valid reception of the Sacraments? No, except for penance,' p. 177; 'The interpretive intention is sufficient for the valid reception of the holy Eucharist,' p. 176; 'Why is sufficient grace so called? . . . is so called because it does not realise the effect in view of which it is given,' p. 23. Notwithstanding these minor matters, the work well deserves the words of praise of the Bishop of

Maurinne: 'The catechist who is thoroughly acquainted with the doctrine contained in this course of religious instruction will give lessons that are sound and fruitful; his words will be that seed, which falls on good ground and produces fruit a hundred-fold.' Priests, also, who may like a well-Englished version of the theological dictates of their college days, would find the work useful.

THE SCALE OF PERFECTION. Written by Walter Hilton.
With an Essay on the Spiritual Life of Mediæval
England. By the Rev. J. B. Dalgairns, of the Oratory.
A New Edition. London: Art and Book Company.

THE *publishers* of this edition of the *Scale of Perfection* have not much to boast of beyond the mechanical skill displayed in the printing of the volume. There is nothing in the new edition to distinguish it from the previous one. It seems to be purely and simply a financial venture. It would, however, in our opinion, prove a more successful venture if the *publishers* had asked someone to edit the work—to give us some fuller account of Hilton himself than that which is to be got in the essay of Father Dalgairns, to correct the inaccuracies and modify the coarseness of what we may almost call the translation from the original.

Every nation has its own predilections, even in matters of devotion, at least in so far as the form is concerned. The substance is the same for all Catholics. Canon Hilton's work seems to us particularly suited to the people for whom it was written; but, unlike the *Imitation* and the *Introduction to a Devout Life*, it does not contain the note of universal suitability. It appeals to the best instincts of the English nature in language sometimes remarkably beautiful, at other times, as it would appear to us, not quite so happy. As a spiritual work, however, it has, with Father Augustine Baker's *Sancta Sophia*, its recognised place in the history of Ascetic Theology. It is well that it should be still available, although we think that modern Catholics will prefer to meditate in books of more recent origin.

J. B.

THE LIFE OF MOTHER MARY BAPTIST RUSSELL, SISTER OF MERCY. By her Brother, the Rev. M. Russell, S.J.
New York: The Apostleship of Prayer Press, 1901.

A VERY gifted member of a highly-gifted and distinguished family is presented to us in these pages. The glorious faith that has been, as it were, the guiding star of the Russell family in these countries, would have been imperfect if it had not sent some of its members to those regions in which earnest and energetic labourers are so much needed. The country that sends out missionaries is doubly rewarded; the family that sends them out is specially blessed. *Bonum est sui diffusivum*, and the best proof of a deep and ardent faith is the desire to spread it and strengthen it in lands where it is either unknown or not yet flourishing in the vineyard.

Mother Mary Baptist Russell was a strong and noble character. When once the sphere of her activity was marked out and recognized she cast no 'longing lingering look behind,' but pursued her way steadily and persistently until she had filled up a lifetime of good and great works. The narrative of Mother Baptist's life is simply and unaffectedly told, and the many sidelights the little work lets in on the aims and achievements of several of her relatives are full of interest. We sincerely hope that the Russell stock may prosper, and that the new generations may be worthy of the old ones. We could wish them nothing better.

J. F. H.

HYMNUS 'PANGE LINGUA,' XII. modulis diversis vocibus aequalibus concinendus comitante Organo (ad libitum) addito Hymno Sti Thomae Aquinatis 'Adoro te.'
Auctore P. Griesbacher. Opus 42. Ratisbon, 1900, Coppenrath. Score and two separate Voice Parts.

TWELVE settings of the Hymn '*Pange lingua*' and one of the '*Adore te*,' all for equal voices. Of the twelve settings of the '*Pange lingua*' two are for one part, and two for two parts with organ; three are for three parts, four for four parts, and one for five parts with organ *ad lib.* The five part composition may also be rendered in three parts. The '*Adoro te*' is for three parts, with a fourth part (Alto II.) and organ *ad lib.* We have no hesitation

in describing all the compositions as model settings, and hope that they will be frequently performed by choirs of nuns and similarly constituted choirs.

H. B.

PLAIN SERMONS. By the Rev. R. D. Browne. Second Edition. London: R. and T. Washbourne, 18, Paternoster-row.

A USEFUL collection of sermons on the 'Fundamental Truths of the Catholic Church,' a setting forth of thought and doctrine very direct, simple, practical, and, as far as possible, in the words of Sacred Scripture. This is the praise of the volume.

J. W. M.

MISSA IN HONOREM S. BENEDICTI, ad duas voces aequales concinendo organo. Composuit Herc-Kerle. Ratisbon, 1900. Coppenrath. Score and separate Voice Parts.

A two-part Mass of orthodox style. The melodies are natural and healthy. Contrapuntal devices are used moderately. We should not consider the composition as a work of the very highest merit. But as it is fairly easy, it can be well recommended.

H. B.

The Irish Ecclesiastical Record

A Monthly Journal, under Episcopal Sanction.

Thirty-fourth Year] SEPTEMBER, 1901. [Fourth Series
No. 405. Vol. X.

Value in Moral Theology and Political Economy.

Rev. T. Slater, S.J., St. Beuno's, North Wales.

The Relation of Ethics to Religion.

W. Vesey-Hague, M.A., Dublin.

The Moral Training of Children.

Rev. R. E. Fitzhenry, M.S.S., D.Ph., Enniscorthy.

Dr. Salmon's 'Infallibility.'

Very Rev. Dr. Murphy, V.F., Macroom.

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Rev. James P. Rushe, O.D.C., Dublin.

Documents.

Beatification and Canonization of the Blessed Emilie de Rodat. Does Omission of Penance Affect Validity of Dispensation? Does Wilful Omission of Penance Affect Validity of Dispensation? The Mass of 'Refugium Peccatorum' in Paschal Time.

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
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VALUE IN MORAL THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

THE price of a thing is the expression in money of its value. But what is value? What is it that makes a pair of boots sell for sixteen shillings in a certain place on a fixed day? The question is one of primary importance in the science of Political Economy. Jevons¹ quotes with approval the following words of Mill:—

Almost every speculation respecting the economical interests of a society thus constituted, implies some theory of value; the smallest error on that subject infects with corresponding error all our other conclusions; and anything vague or misty in our conception of it, creates confusion and uncertainty in everything else.

The theory of value is picturesquely said by a foreign writer to be the dragon which guards the entrance to economic science; while another declares that he who understands value, understands half of the difficulties of the science of Economics.² If the notion of value is fundamental in Economics, it is of great importance, to say the least, in Moral Theology, and particularly in questions concerning justice and contracts. It may be of interest to inquire what economists have to say on a subject which specially belongs to their province, and to compare it with the received doctrines of Moral Theology. According to a recent writer, economists have shown the teaching of

¹ *Theory of Political Economy*, p. 80.

² C. Antoine, S.J., *Economie Sociale*, p. 253.

theologians on the point to be chimerical and absurd : and as I propose to make the words of this writer the basis of my remarks, I will quote him at length :—

In modern times the form of economic doctrine has been affected by the fact that it has been so much discussed by men who were accustomed to deal with physical and mathematical problems, and who brought their habitual methods of reasoning to bear on the phenomena of supply and demand. In a similar fashion the economic doctrine of the thirteenth century in Christendom was affected, as far as its form was concerned, by the engrossing studies of the time ; economic problems were discussed by men who were habituated to the methods of metaphysics. In accordance with current modes of thought, they tried to determine an ideal standard which should be realised in particular transactions, and sought for a definite conception of a ' just price ; ' the practical inquiries then resolved themselves into means for discovering the just price of each particular thing. From the modern point of view this whole quest was chimerical : prices are always fluctuating, and must, from their very nature, fluctuate. According to the ' plenty or scarcity of the time ' there will be great differences in the quantities available, and, therefore, in the relative values of wheat, cloth, coal and commodities of every sort. We know, too, that the commodity used for money must vary in value from time to time, and that, therefore, there must be continual fluctuations not only in values but in prices as well. The attempt to determine an ideal price implies that there can and ought to be stability in relative values, and stability in the measure of values, which is absurd.

The mediæval doctrine and its application rested upon another assumption, which we have outlined. Value is not a quality which inheres in an object, so that it shall have the same worth for everybody ; it arises from the personal preferences and needs of different people, some of whom desire a given thing more and some less, some of whom want to use it in one way and some in another. Value is not objective—intrinsic in the object—but subjective, varying, with the desires and intentions of the possessors or would-be possessors ; and because it is thus subjective, there cannot be a definite ideal value, which every article ought to possess, and still less a just price as the measure of that ideal value.¹

According to Dr. Cunningham, therefore, the mediæval theory of a just price for everything, and the mediæval concept of value have been shown to be absurd and untenable by modern economic science. The schoolmen of the middle

¹ Dr. Cunningham, *Western Civilization in its Economic Aspects*, 1900 p. 78.

ages, habituated to the study of metaphysics, looked upon value as a quality intrinsic to the thing itself. To them it was something objective, definite, stable, and fixed; and so the measure of value, or price, was something stable and fixed also.

On the contrary, the doctrines of modern economic science have been formulated by men accustomed to deal with the physical and mathematical sciences. These men have brought their strictly scientific methods to bear on the economic problems of supply and demand. They have taught us that the mediæval quest after a just price for commodities was as chimerical as the quest after the San Grail. Taught by them we now know that prices are not stable and fixed, but are always fluctuating, and must of their very nature fluctuate. The plenty or scarcity of the time will affect the quantities of the available commodities, and so will affect the relative values. We now know that money itself, the measure of value, is subject to the same economic laws as other commodities, and that it fluctuates in value as they do. So that the attempt of the schoolmen to arrive at a just price for each particular thing involved the two absurdities of supposing that there can be stability in relative values, and stability in the value of money.

Let us see what the schoolmen really did teach about the just price of commodities. It is easy to state some absurd theory, ascribe it to the metaphysical scholastics of the middle ages, and then proceed to demonstrate its absurdity. It is a more scientific method of procedure first, as the scholastics were fond of doing, to make sure of the fact—*Primo, quæritur utrum sit*.

Molina, one of the great doctors on justice, will tell us what the common teaching of the schoolmen concerning the just price of commodities really was. Almost any other of a score of scholastic theologians would serve our purpose equally well, and I shall refer to one or two others in the course of my remarks, but in the main I propose to follow Molina. The difference between the date at which he lived and the thirteenth century, which Dr. Cunningham has specially in view, need not trouble us, for there was no

change of doctrine in the meantime ; Molina's teaching is merely that of St. Thomas somewhat amplified.

This scholastic doctor then is careful in the first place to say what the just price is not derived from. It is not, he says, to be measured by the excellence of things according to their own nature and intrinsic qualities, but according as they serve man's use and benefit. A mouse considered in its own nature is a more excellent thing than corn, but mice are worthless, while corn, which serves man's necessities, has its price.

However, he proceeds, the price of a thing does not depend merely upon its usefulness for supplying man's necessities, but it depends a very great deal upon the estimation which men commonly choose to have of it with reference to its use. Thus the just price of a gem, which is for ornament only, is greater than that of a large quantity of corn, wine, meat, cloth, and horses. And among the Japanese a piece of rusty iron or cracked pottery is of immense value on account of its antiquity ; while among us it is worth nothing at all. And mere ornaments of coloured glass have a far higher price among the Ethiopians than gold, which they exchange for them. Now all this is brought about solely by the common estimation in which things are held in the place where they are exchanged, so that such trafficking is not to be condemned, though the want of culture and the manners of such peoples are sometimes laughable.

So that the just price of a thing depends a great deal upon the common estimation of men in any place ; and when without fraud or any unfair dealing, a commodity is commonly sold at a certain price in any place, that may be considered the just price, as long as the circumstances which cause prices to vary remain unchanged. The Roman Civil Law ¹ and the common opinion of doctors agree on this point.

But it must be observed, adds Molina, that a great many circumstances alter the prices of commodities. Thus scarcity makes the just price rise, while plenty makes it fall ;

¹ L. *Prætia rerum*, Dig. ad legem Falcidiam.

the greater number of competing buyers at one time than at another, or their eagerness to buy, makes prices rise, on the other hand the fewness of buyers makes them fall; the greater demand at one time than at another, while the supply remains constant, as of horses in time of war, makes prices rise. The scarcity of money in any place makes the price of other things fall, while abundance of money makes the price of other commodities rise. For the less the supply of money in any place the greater its value, and thus many more other goods are bought with the same sum. The manner of sale, too, alters the price, as we see in sale by auction, or when a man is anxious to find buyers and seeks them, or in sale by retail.¹

The just price which we have been considering was called by some theologians, following Aristotle, the *natural* price; not, as Molina is careful to explain, because it did not depend largely on men's estimation, nor because it was not very inconstant and changeable, but to distinguish it from the *legal* price, which was settled for some commodities by law. Inasmuch as the natural, or *vulgar* price as it was also called, depended upon men's estimation, wants, and desires, which are very various, it could not be a quantity exactly determinate and precisely defined, it necessarily admitted of a certain latitude; and so theologians distinguished the highest, the lowest, and the middle price, and taught that justice would be done if the seller kept within those limits.²

All this, even in the light of modern economic doctrines, seems eminently practical and thoroughly in keeping with common sense; I fail to detect in it anything that savours of the 'metaphysical,' if that term is intended by Dr. Cunningham to mean unreal and unpractical. The whole point of the teaching of the theologians lies in this, that there is such a thing as a fair and reasonable price for commodities, in which English law and English juries agree with them, and that it is matter of justice to keep to

¹ Molina, *De Justitia*, tract ii., disp. 348.

² *Ibid.* disp. 347.

it in contracts. The scholastics certainly knew as well as the modern economist that prices are always fluctuating; they knew that the plenty or scarcity of the time has great influence on the relative values of commodities of every kind; they knew of what is now called the law of supply and demand; they even knew that money is exposed to constant variations in value, and that it would be absurd to look for stability either in relative values, or in the measure of values. In fact they knew all that Dr. Cunningham has taken for granted that they did not know.

From what has already been said, it is quite clear also, in spite of what Dr. Cunningham seems to imply, that the scholastics knew that 'value is not a quality which inheres in an object, so that it shall have the same worth for everybody.' Molina expressly states that it arises from the preferences and needs of different people, with their different desires and wants. As we shall presently see they unanimously denied that the seller can charge for any special individual advantage which may accrue to the buyer from the bargain; thus clearly supposing that social and individual value were two very different things. However, a difference between the scholastic doctrine on value and modern theories is touched upon, when Dr. Cunningham proceeds to say :—

Value is not objective—intrinsic in the object—but subjective, varying with the desires and intentions of the possessors or would-be possessors; and because it is thus subjective, there cannot be a definite ideal value, which every article ought to possess, and still less a just price as the measure of that ideal value.

According to modern theories then, value—exchange value is meant—is merely subjective, varying with the desires and intentions of the possessors or would-be possessors of a commodity; and so there is no definite value which a thing possesses, and no just price, for a just price is merely the just measure, the proper equivalent of value. A man may sell a horse for what he can get, he may exact whatever interest the borrower will give him for a loan, he may pay his workmen as little as necessity forces them to take for a

day's wage. There is no just price for commodities, justice is not violated by however unconscionable a bargain. Certainly these are conclusions of great importance, and if they had been proved to be true, we should have to modify some of the rules of Moral Theology. Catholic theologians of the middle ages, as well as their successors of to-day, are unanimous in teaching that there is such a thing as a just price for commodities, that justice can be violated by charging too much for what is sold, and that individual wants and tastes do not finally settle the just price. 'The estimation of one or two,' says Lugo,¹ 'does not suffice to raise the price, but the common estimation is required.' This doctrine is common to all theologians, and most are content to quote in proof of it the Roman Civil Law: 'The prices of things are not settled by the tastes or utility of individuals, but by those of the generality of people.'² The great authority of the Roman Law, that ever-living monument of written reason, was of itself considered sufficient to settle the question; but some went further in their inquiries as to the method of arriving at the just price. Scotus taught that to estimate the just price of his merchandise the merchant should reckon up all the expenses which he has incurred in buying, transporting, housing his goods, then add to them something for his labour and trouble, and something else to compensate for the risks he has run: what corresponds more or less to all these items, will be the just price, he says.³

In modern phrase the costs of production were the measure of value, according to Scotus. This opinion was commonly rejected by other theologians, who pointed out that if this were so, the merchant who had lost a portion of his goods might raise the price of the rest to compensate himself; which could not be admitted, for the price of goods is not measured by the profit or loss of the seller, but by the common estimation concerning their value in the place where they are sold, consideration being given to all the

¹ *De Justitia*, xxvi., n. 42.

² *L. Pretia rerum*, 63 Dig. ad legem Falcidiam.

³ Molina, disp. 348.

circumstances; besides *Res perit domino*, and it was not fair that the public should bear the private losses of the merchant.

The common estimation then is the cause of value and the measure of value, according to the scholastics; and if the formula be understood as they understood it, there seems no objection why 'the common estimation' should not still be used as a correct term for the cause and the measure of what economists call market prices. For certainly the market price of an article, whatever it may ultimately depend upon, is settled proximately by the common estimation of the value of the article in the particular market, at the time in question. Some of the most recent writers on Economics state this doctrine in terms as precise as those used by the scholastics. Thus Mr. J. A. Hobson¹ says:—

Now, just in proportion as exchange or market-value enters and displaces use-value, so does social determination of value displace individual determination. While value in use is strictly personal, value in exchange is distinctively social. A market, however crudely formed, is a social institution; the value of our farmer's produce is partly determined by the personal labour he has put into them, but partly by the needs and capacities of others, and not even by the needs and capacities of any definite individual, but by a great variety of needs and capacities expressed socially through the instrument of a market price, which is a highly elaborate result of bargaining, and does not represent the needs or the capacity of any single purchaser.

It would seem, then, that the difference of view between theologians and economists appears prominently and practically only with regard to non-market prices. The theologian teaches that justice requires that there should be an equivalence of social value between the price and the thing bought; (I say 'social value,' because, of course, each party to a contract hopes to gain in individual value in use, otherwise there would be no exchange;) that the just price is settled by the common estimation of the value of an article; that value is partly objective, inasmuch as it

¹ *The Social Problem*, 1901, p. 144.

supposes usefulness, capacity to be esteemed and desired, in the object, partly subjective, not, indeed, with reference merely to the wants and desires of the buyer and seller, but with reference to the common estimate of people at the particular time and place. However, theologians commonly allow the seller to charge for any special private loss of any sort which he may suffer from parting with his property, the *pretium affecti onis* as it is called; and so to this extent they concede that subjective and private wants and desires may be allowed to influence the terms of the contract. What they agree in rejecting is the view that the seller may exact a higher price on account of some private necessity of the buyer, for then he might sell dearer to the poor than to the rich, or on account of some special advantage accruing to the buyer from his purchase, for then he would sell what did not belong to him, and sin against justice.¹

On the other hand the economist considers that the value of an article and its price are settled by the consent of the parties to a bargain; no man would give 100 per cent. interest for money unless it were worth his while; the loan, therefore, is worth that price to him, and the lender does him no injustice in taking it.

This, of course, would be true if both parties to the contract were equally intelligent, free, and independent; a man, if he chooses, may give what he likes of his own for any commodity; if he gives a sovereign for a cup of tea at a bazaar, held for a charitable purpose, nobody will have anything but praise for his generosity. But usually when an unconscionable bargain is struck the parties are not on equal terms.

If a man promises 100 per cent. for a loan, when the current rate of interest on money is 3 per cent., or if a labourer undertakes to work for sixpence a day, when the common rate of wages is sixpence an hour, hard necessity alone, or perhaps ignorance, will have been the cause of his consent to such unfair terms. In such cases theology teaches that he who exacts such hard terms commits a sin

¹ St. Thomas II. ii. q. 77, a. 1.

against justice, and is bound to restitution ; but the theory of value, on which this theological doctrine rests, is, according to Dr. Cunningham, an 'assumption which we have outlived.'

The difference between theological and economic doctrines on this point may partially perhaps be explained by the difference of standpoint assumed by theologians and economists respectively. Theologians consider the question from an ethical point of view, they condemn whatever the Christian code of morals condemns ; on the other hand many economists at least treat the phenomena of political economy as they treat the phenomena of the physical sciences. The law of supply and demand is, for the purposes of the science, studied and reasoned upon with the help of mathematics as if it were as necessary and determinate as a law of astronomy ; most economists abstract from questions of morality. Thus Jevons wrote :—

I conceive that such a transaction must be settled upon other than economical grounds. The disposition and force of character of the parties, their comparative persistency, their adroitness and experience in business, or it may be a feeling of justice or of kindness really influences the decision. These are motives altogether extraneous to a theory of economy.¹

Perhaps Dr. Cunningham belongs to this class of economists, and perhaps he would not disagree with the theologians if he treated the matter from their point of view, for he writes :—

We feel that it is unfair for the economically strong to wring all he can out of the economically weak, or to trade on terms in which 'common estimation' is notoriously set aside. We have given up as impracticable many of the old attempts to put down hard bargains with a high hand : but modern moral feeling does not sensibly differ from that of mediæval times in the desire, if it were possible, to interfere with the action of any dealers who are able to enrich themselves through the necessities or the ignorance of others, and to gain at their expense. If we tried to find a test by which to discriminate hard bargains we could scarcely do better than adopt the mediæval phrase and say that hardship arises when a bargain is made without reference to 'common estimation.'²

¹ *The Theory of Political Economy*, p. 124.

² *Western Civilization*, p. 80.

This is admirable, but we hardly see how it can be reconciled with other passages of the same author. In other passages he seems to condemn the theological doctrine not only as out of place in economics, but as false in itself. He thus seems to agree with many other writers, the earliest of whom is said to be Hobbes, who rejected the hitherto received doctrine on commutative justice, and substituted an invention of his own. 'The value of all things contracted for,' he says, 'is measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore the just value is that which they be contented to give.'¹

This assertion Hobbes did not attempt to prove, nor has it been proved by any of his followers. The argument drawn from marginal values is no proof that the subjective and individual theory of value is in accordance with truth and justice; it merely formulates the fact that as a rule people will exchange commodities as long as it is worth their while to do so.

Economists are by no means agreed as to the nature of value, although all confess that it is a question of the greatest difficulty; some hold that it is purely subjective, depending upon the desires of each individual; others, that it is the same thing as private utility; others, that it is social utility; others, that it is the relation between two services exchanged; others, that the value of a commodity is the labour bestowed on it, and so forth. None of these theories is commonly accepted, and none of them is an improvement on the old doctrine that common estimation is the cause and measure of value. The merely subjective theory, which seems to be most in vogue, fails to furnish any reasonable ground for condemning transactions which all, economists included, admit to be wrong. It even furnishes some sort of justification for the iniquities of the swindler, the usurer, and the sweater. I cannot do better than conclude this article with the concise argument by which, in his *Encyclical on the Condition of Labour*,

¹ Hobbes, *Of Man*, p. 137.

Leo XIII. proves its falseness as applied to the price of labour.

We now approach a subject [says the Holy Father] of very great importance, and one on which, if extremes are to be avoided, right ideas are absolutely necessary. Wages, we are told, are fixed by free consent, and, therefore, the employer, when he pays what was agreed upon, has done his part, and is not called upon for anything further. The only way, it is said, in which injustice could happen would be if the master refused to pay the whole of the wages, or the workman would not complete the work undertaken.

This mode of reasoning is by no means convincing to a fair-minded man, for there are important considerations which it leaves out of view altogether. To labour is to exert oneself for the sake of procuring what is necessary for the purposes of life, and most of all for self-preservation. *In the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread.* Therefore a man's labour has two notes or characters. First of all, it is *personal*; for the exertion of individual power belongs to the individual who puts it forth, employing this power for that personal profit for which it was given. Secondly, man's labour is *necessary*; for without the results of labour a man cannot live, and self-conservation is a law of Nature which it is wrong to disobey. Now, if we were to consider labour merely so far as it is *personal*, doubtless it would be within the workman's right to accept any rate of wages whatever; for in the same way as he is free to work or not, so he is free to accept a small remuneration or even none at all. But this is a mere abstract supposition; the labour of the working man is not only his personal attribute, but it is *necessary*, and this makes all the difference. The preservation of life is the bounden duty of each and all, and to fail therein is a crime. It follows that each one has a right to procure what is required in order to live, and the poor can procure it in no other way than by work and wages.

Let it be granted, then, that, as a rule, workman and employer should make free agreements, and in particular should freely agree as to wages, nevertheless there is a dictate of Nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. If through necessity, or fear of a worse evil, the workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or a contractor will give him no better, he is the victim of force and injustice.

T. SLATER, S.J.

THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO RELIGION

DESPITE the fact, so unequivocally disclosed by recent ethnological investigations, that Religion arose, historically, quite independently of morality, and that, to a certain extent, the connection between them has always remained a precarious one, it nevertheless but seldom occurs to anyone nowadays (and least of all, I imagine, to a Catholic), to reflect on the distinction between the two, or to consider their relation to one another. I am not, of course, oblivious of the distinction, common enough in Catholic schools, between Ethics and Moral Theology; but, as will appear more fully in a moment, this distinction hardly corresponds to the one I have in mind just now, and to the elucidation of which the present paper will be devoted. There are doubtless many reasons for the current confusion of ideas—if that be not too strong a phrase—on the subject, and of these two occur to me as specially prominent. In the first place, the complete interpenetration of moral and religious ideas in our modern Catholic system seems largely responsible for the confusion to which I am referring. The morality of a Catholic is so much a part of his religion, and the natural ethical impulses are for him so inseparably associated with the dictates of a divine Lawgiver, that it is hardly possible for him to conceive of a morality which should rest upon any other basis than that of a divine ordinance. Nor is this confusion of altogether modern growth. We find it in the classical moralists of the Church, who always appear incapable of deciding whether man ought to be moral because morality is natural to him, or because it is God's will that he should. While, as moral philosophers, they accept to a man the Aristotelian doctrine that happiness is our being's end and aim, and feel that the notions of duty and obedience are foreign to purely ethical enquiries, at the same time, as theologians, they are constantly endeavouring to find a place for these very notions in their ethical system, with the result that

Scholastic Ethics presents at its inception an indissoluble contradiction.

A second source of the prevailing confusion may, perhaps, be found in the influence of Kant's ethics on all subsequent speculation concerning moral problems. Kant, as we all know, made morality to consist in submission to the Categorical Imperative of Duty, and further reckoned the so-called 'moral' argument as the sole valid demonstration—the word is sufficiently accurate for present purposes—of the existence of the divine Being, without whom morality is inexplicable. For him, therefore, as for most of those who came after him, the connection between morality and religion is the closest imaginable. Indeed, if duty be regarded as the essential element in all morality, it is not too much to say that morality thereupon becomes a mere department of Religion, since the notion of duty necessarily implies that of a supreme authoritative Lawgiver, and is meaningless apart from the admitted existence of such a transcendent Moral Governor.

It is scarcely necessary for me to point out that I am not here engaged in criticising the idea of duty, nor am I, of course, in the least disposed to question its validity or importance. What I wish to point out is that duty is a religious, and not an ethical, idea, and that its importation into the domain of pure Ethics rests on a mistake, and can only be productive of confusion of thought. In doing this I shall have gone as far as I believe to be necessary in clearing up the relation between Ethics and Religion. I should add that the views here put forward must be taken as provisional, since, naturally, I am far from thinking, that I have been entirely successful in solving the problem raised by the title of my paper. In setting down the results of some thinking on the subject, my chief aim is to throw out a few hints and suggestions on an important, though seemingly neglected topic, which, as I hope, some of my readers may be induced to take up for themselves and work out with greater fulness of detail and more fruitful results than I could presume to attempt.

To begin with, then, it is clearly necessary to fix upon the

precise sense in which the words ethics and religion are to be employed in the course of the ensuing discussions. By Ethics I understand the science, or better, the study of morality, and by morality I mean a right way of living. Religion it is more difficult to define in a single phrase, but no substantial objection can, I imagine, be taken to the description of it as the cultivation or worship of a supra-mundane power, with its attendant incidents of obligation and restriction.¹ The question then is: What is the relation between Morality and Religion as thus defined? I think it is best to commence by taking note of a remarkable and indeed fundamental difference between ancient and modern systems of Ethics. This difference lies in the fact that, whereas the idea of duty forms, as we have seen, an important element in most modern ethical systems, sometimes even entering into the very definition of Ethics, no corresponding notion can be discovered in the moral philosophies of Greece and Rome. Many post-Kantian writers in particular give prominence to the idea of duty in their definition of ethical science, and to such a degree has the mode of viewing the subject involved in this procedure influenced modern thought that scarcely anyone nowadays dreams of an Ethic which does not mark out clear and definite lines of conduct, and formulate commands which it seeks to enforce by the enumeration of various pains and penalties, attaching to disobedience thereto. In short, the notion most emphatically proclaimed by the general body of moralists at the present day is that of duty or obligation. Just the contrary was the case with the moralists of antiquity. Neither in Greek nor in Latin is there any word which exactly corresponds in meaning to the modern conception of duty. The ethical ideal was never, in fact, conceived by the ancients under the form of a law or commandment at all.

I am aware that expressions are sometimes to be met with which might seem at first sight to negative this assertion. Most of us, for example, have heard of the Socratic νόμοι

¹ See as to this the very interesting remarks of the late Professor Wallace, *Lectures and Essays*, pp. 52-59 (Oxford, 1898).

ἀγραφοί, innate or 'unwritten' laws. But one need be no great Grecian to know that the word νόμος, as thus employed, bears its ordinary signification of custom or settled institution. Similarly Aristotle, in his ethical writings, makes occasional use of the phrases δεῖ and δεόν, but always in a passing and cursory way, never pausing to analyse the underlying conception, which can hardly be said to have been present to his mind in any explicit or developed form. The modern notion of an ethical or categorical imperative—concerning which I shall have something to say in the sequel—is altogether wanting in ancient ethics. Ethical precepts are expressed by Greek and Roman moralists alike in the form of a hypothetical imperative, or, at most, of an 'optative.' The moralist of antiquity offers counsels to his disciples; he never imposes commands. The reason for this is, as it seems to me, that the older thinkers always kept to the purely rational or human point of view, or, in other words, they remained faithful to the conception of Ethics as a *philosophic* science. They never imported into ethical considerations ideas derived from Religion and Theology, and so their systems are wholly free from the initial confusion which so often mars the work of their successors. To my thinking, they were entirely right in their procedure, and if I must speak my whole mind, I believe that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle is to be found the basis and substance of the only completely consistent and satisfactory body of ethical doctrine, just as his logical treatises contains the basis of every subsequent logic, or the *Elements* of Euclid the foundations of all future geometry. Such is the thesis which I set out to establish; the remainder of my paper shall be devoted to its substantiation.

I will not attempt to disguise the apparently radical opposition between this view of Ethics as a science intrinsically independent of religious doctrines and that generally held by educated Catholics at the present day. I think, however, that when proper explanations have been made, the opposition in question in large measure disappears, or becomes at most a matter of method, though, no doubt,

none the less important on that account. We are all more or less familiar with the notion of the ethical end, or end of human action, and with the fact of the general agreement among moralists that this end is to be found in happiness, though, to be sure, in the interpretation given to the notion of happiness the widest possible differences have prevailed. I have little doubt that the best and most generally satisfactory conception of the nature and function of ethical science may be reached through the consideration of a typical doctrine of ethical eudaemonism, such as we meet with, for example, in the pages of Aristotle. It is impossible, indeed, to discuss at all adequately in this place the content of the notion 'happiness' or 'well-being,' or to determine in what the peculiar happiness of mankind consists. Nor, indeed, is it essential to my purpose to do so. I will, therefore, assume at once that the doctrine of eudaemonism is well founded, and that happiness of some sort is the end and aim of all distinctly human activity. I contend that on this assumption a complete and coherent system of Ethics may be worked out, and having established this point, I shall proceed to consider more closely the relation between Ethics (as thus conceived) and Religion.

Ethics, then, starts with the idea of an end, and the most important of the concepts with which the moralist operates will consequently be that of 'right' or 'reasonable' action. By right or reasonable, as applied to human actions, he will understand that quality of such actions which renders them conducive to, in harmony with, or, at least, not opposed to, the ultimate end. The main business of practical Ethics will be to discover, by means of an analysis of the notions involved in the very idea of ethical science, what acts are or are not right or reasonable. Viewed in their relation to the ultimate end, all reasonable actions will, of course, ultimately be in a sort 'felicific'—if I may use this convenient neologism—in fact, it is precisely because they tend, directly or indirectly, to produce happiness that they are declared to be reasonable. To determine what particular actions are right or wrong it will, of

course, be a matter of grave difficulty, except in the simplest cases. Doubtless to say that those actions are right which are conducive to the moral life of individuals is a statement which tampers with no facts, and involves no hypotheses. Still it is clearly of little value as a practical guide, and a logician might, perhaps, bring other serious charges against it. But let that pass. My present concern is not with the ethical standard—the *ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων*, as Aristotle calls it—but rather with the bare notions of ethical right and wrong themselves. Now, the essential problem of Ethics is, in my view, which is also, I suppose, in essence the view of Aristotle, the problem of happiness. I will not go the length of interpreting happiness, as does that great man, to mean exclusively the happiness attainable in this life, though I incline to believe that the partisans of an altogether transcendent morality have much to learn from a study of the *Nichomachean Ethics*. Certainly we can only determine the ends at which it is reasonable for men to aim by studying human nature in the concrete in relation to the conditions under which it has to develop. The main point, however, is that if it be the function of Ethics to teach men how to realise the sovereign good (which we have agreed to place in happiness of some kind), then there is no room for anything in the nature of command or obligation. The true ethical category is the right (= the reasonable), not the ought (= the obligatory). To tell a man that he 'ought' to cultivate such habits of action as will lead to his eventual well-being is to use language that, from the ethical standpoint, has no real meaning. Prove to him, if you will, that some actions are right, *i.e.*, are such as would naturally commend themselves to the good man, but leave him to perform them or not as he pleases, or you desert the region of Ethics altogether. The moralist, as I said before and cannot too often repeat, must proceed, if he is to remain true to his mission, by way of counsel and example, by pointing to an ideal in whom the attributes of the 'good' man are visibly expressed. The right, for him, is the reasonable, or what makes for a good way of living; and the wrong is the unreasonable, that which is out of harmony with the ends at which it is reasonable for the

individual, regard being had to his position and circumstances, to aim. To give a new turn to a well-worn phrase, we may say quite literally that 'sweet reasonableness' is the true note of ethical action. A similar thought was probably in the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas when he asserted that while the theologian regards sin as an offence against God, the moral philosopher sees in it merely a violation of right reason.¹ Virtue is the intelligent pursuit of the highest good, and the fundamental postulate of Ethics is that life, in the most extended meaning of the term, is itself good, itself the end, itself the good for man. Those acts or means are likewise good which conduce to this end. In particular, those actions are good which tend to the welfare of the whole of which the individual character or single man forms a part. Here a question obviously suggests itself to the practical moralist. It may be asked, in effect—and I believe the question takes us at once to the root of the matter—Why is good action to be pursued and evil action avoided? The answer is in reality simple enough, though, as will afterwards appear, it is an answer which affords none too great assistance in the stress and turmoil of concrete moral life. It is an answer which requires to be supplemented before it can well be proclaimed from the house-tops with perfect safety. In a sense, the moralist has no complete answer to the question as thus formulated, and he is apt to appear at a loss when closely pressed to give a reply. He stands in a position almost identical with that of an artist who should be questioned as to why he ought to aim at the highest of which he is capable in his art. To those who have no love or appreciation for art, no satisfactory reply could, perhaps, be given; and so, speaking, of course, from the strictly ethical standpoint, no complete answer can be given to the question, Why ought I be moral? There is really no 'ought' about the matter if the notion of oughtness be taken to involve that of any external constraint. I 'ought' to be moral because morality is reasonable, and as such commends itself to my rational nature. I suppose if we all of us could

¹ *Sum. Theol.* I, ii, q. lxxi. a vi, ad 5.

see the facts with sufficient clearness in their relations to one another, if we could trace out the consequences of our conduct, or rather if we could see in a moment's intuition all the consequences which a particular course of action involves, I suppose, I say, that if this ideal state of affairs existed upon the earth, immorality would become impossible. In this sense the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge, seems to be the expression of a genuine truth. In the dry light of reason, immoral action stands self-condemned, by the very terms of its definition. And that, after all, is the only reason for its avoidance which the moralist can give. If life be the good, it is surely reasonable to embrace such courses of action as make for a right way of living, and to shun their opposites as unreasonable. But if the moralist be further questioned as to why *reasonable* action is alone to be pursued, he has no alternative but to answer, 'If you wish to act unreasonably, remember you can only do so at the cost of doing violence to your own nature as man; but of course if you are such a fool as to be unaffected by this consequence, and if the "good for man" has really no attractions for you, I am afraid there is no more to be said.' Moral philosophy determines the nature of man's sovereign good, but it has no means of compelling the vulgar to strive after its realisation. This is what I mean by saying that Ethics has no completely satisfactory answer to the query referred to above. The moralist sketches an ideal which he puts before mankind, leaving them to conform their lives to it or not as they themselves think fit. He has no sanctions to propose as attaching to deviation from this ideal; at most he can but declare that the realisation of the ideal is itself ethically good. It may occur here to the thoughtful reader that all this amounts to saying that morality is a matter of taste, and that a preference for immoral conduct is, strictly speaking, no more to be condemned than a preference for bad art. But the cases are not really parallel. The ethical end imposes itself upon our reason in a manner that admits of no denial. We cannot refuse to recognise the fact that human well-being, whether in this or in a future life, is itself a good, and that the means thereto are worthy

objects of moral choice. We do not ourselves propose the end for our own peculiar satisfaction. It is given us in the nature of things, and its recognition is incumbent upon all who take account of the facts. That reason is the highest part of man, and that its dictates are pre-eminently worthy of our obedience, is itself a fact that brooks no contradiction. The business of Ethics, and its functions as a science, is just to make explicit this fact, and to deduce the consequences which flow from it. The moral philosopher is concerned to map out the course of right action—*ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*. No doubt this itself is, in Aristotle's phrase, a large order, and it is unquestionably a work of the highest practical importance. But the moralist has no way of enforcing the maxims which he proposes to our acceptance in the name of right reason. There is a place in an ethical system for the notions of fault and error, but none for that of 'sin,' in the precise and definite sense of the infraction of a (divine) law imposed from without. It follows that the hortatory function of the moralist is limited in the extreme. He is scarcely, if at all, concerned with the notions of merit and demerit. Even freedom and responsibility are terms with which he has nothing to do. For all these notions are only intelligible when explicitly referred to a Law emanating from a transcendent authority, and the notion of such a Law is a notion foreign to the ethical sphere, having in fact been imported into it, mistakenly, as I think, from the sphere of Religion.

This brings us to the second part of our discussion. The characteristic difference between ancient and modern Ethics lies, as pointed out above, in the recognition by the moderns of the idea of divine law as all important in the domain of morals. It might be urged, indeed, that the suggested antithesis between ancient and modern ethical thought does not hold good universally, but it is sufficiently accurate for the ends I have in view, and more convenient than that between Christian and pagan Ethics, which I had in mind at the beginning. For one thing, I have no desire to appeal to theological prejudice in a question of this kind, and moreover, while it is incontrovertible that the event of Christianity

definitely established and gave currency to the idea of a code of Ethics based upon divine commandments, it should not be forgotten that such a notion may be found, in a more or less explicit form, in very ancient times, and that it is present, at least in germ, in all primitive religions, including even that of the Greeks. In face of this opposition of ethical thought, two courses are open to us. We may, to begin with, assert—and this is what is commonly done—that ancient systems of Ethics are one and all maimed, inchoate, imperfect, and in particular altogether inferior to our own, which rests upon notions derived from Judæo-Christian tradition. Or again, we may ask ourselves whether this off-hand denunciation of ancient Ethics does not itself result from a confusion between the philosophical and the religious or theological points of view.

For myself I have no hesitation in adopting the latter alternative. I will never consent to deny the name of moralist to those high-souled men of antiquity, from Socrates to Marcus Aurelius, to whom we are indebted for so substantial a part of our boasted modern culture. Plato and Aristotle are none the less genuine moralists because they never entertained the conception of duty, and had no word in their rich ethical vocabulary to express it. The case is different with regard to Religion. To it the notions of Law and Obligation are essential—an integral part of its content. In the earliest types of religious thought, as in the latest and most developed, we meet with the concept of a Divine Will, conceived in a manner analogous to that of a human legislator or even a despot, in which all moral precepts have their roots, and from which they derive their constraining force. I am not disputing the identity in point of content of the ethical and religious codes. On the contrary, such identity, in the main, forms part of my own case, as the reader will discover before the close, should his patience hold out so long. The religious notions do not contradict, but supplement, the ethical. In truth, it is only through the mediation of religion that ethical precepts acquire a divine sanction and mandate; and it is not too much to say that, were it not

for the help of the theologian, the moralist's counsels would remain for ever ineffective with the great mass of mankind. One great function of the religious teaching of the Churches in all ages has, in fact, been the supply of extra-mundane motives stimulating men to the performance of duty. And nobody, of course, doubts that a large proportion (if not the whole) of what the Churches deemed 'duty' was also advocated by the moralists as 'right' in their acceptance of the term. By all means, then, let the preacher and the moralist make common cause. They both aim at making men better and happier than they are, and they are both substantially at one as to what constitutes goodness and happiness. But only confusion can result from their attempt to usurp one another's functions. Now, that duty and the ideas connected therewith are formally and essentially religious, as distinguished from ethical, ideas is apparent, I take it, the moment we reflect that, after all, it is only from the point of view of Religion, and especially of revealed Religion, that a principle of duty can be clearly understood and defined. The bare notion of obligation resting upon us as persons presupposes an Infinite Person, from whom we derive our being and all we possess, and who, in consequence, has a right of commanding us and disposing of us as he pleases. Without the establishment of quasi-contractual relations between Creator and creature there is, properly speaking, no 'duty' possible. Conscience, as ordinarily understood, points to a moral lawgiver above and beyond ourselves. It is *in us*, but not *of us*; it reveals, but does not enact, the law. And if we look to the so-called sanctions of morality, the religious character of the notions which pass current as ethical in the ordinary text books of Moral Science is still more luminously evident. In short, the positive morality of Christian countries of to-day is so much a purely religious affair that, were the hope of a future state of existence suddenly blasted, it would inevitably disappear. I will not dwell on the exclusive character of such a view as this, which must, I suppose, be patent to all who take the trouble to think out the matter for themselves, and the predominance of which is particularly regrettable just now when the continuous

spread of agnosticism tends to render the recognition of a non-religious ethic every day of more importance. But I cannot resist the conclusion that many of our so-called ethical principles are really religious principles at bottom. Take the case, for example, of the Natural Law—a concept which looms large in our Catholic handbooks of Ethics, and to the elucidation of which the chief part of their contents is frequently devoted. The notion of a Natural Law seems to me to be open to serious criticism from more than one side, but here I am only concerned to call attention to the fact that it is one which finds its true place not in a system of Ethics but in a system of Natural Theology. It imparts relations between God and man which are in no way necessary to the elaboration of a completely rounded and coherent body of ethical philosophy. On the other hand, it is of the very essence of Religion to impose binding obligations upon those who give it their adherence. To my mind, the key to the true relationship between Ethics and Religion lies just in this fact. What the moralist conceives of as the right, Religion enforces as the law. To be sure, I do not believe that there is any such thing possible as a complete system of Ethics constructed dogmatically in advance. 'Εσμεν ἐνεργεῖα, said Aristotle long ago. And so it is only by looking to concrete human experiences, by viewing real men in their various complex relations, individual, social, political, and most of all by living for ourselves the moral life, that we can determine the final truth in Ethics, or can reach the full and adequate comprehension of the good for man. 'In other words,' as a distinguished philosopher has expressed it, 'there can be no final truth in Ethics any more than in Physics, until the last man has had his experience and said his say.'

Still, none but a pessimist will deny that the contents of the ethical and the religious consciousness are for all practical purposes identical. It is, therefore, possible that the moralist when he utters his guesses as to the true nature

¹ William James, *The Will to Believe*, etc., p. 184 (New York, 1897).

of the good life may be, after all, like the children of whom the poet tells us,

Pious beyond the intention of their thought,
Devout above the meaning of their will.

At all events, it is certain that the idea of duty is, from the rational or philosophical standpoint, utterly inexplicable. The breakdown of Kant's Ethics is a convincing proof of this fact. The most salient defect in his moral system is unquestionably his failure to account for the idea of duty. In order to maintain his position, he would have had to shew that this eminently respectable notion did not come into existence through the action of psychological laws; and to vindicate its claim to be regarded as an original and independent category of reason, he would have had to prove at least that it had never been transferred by association from the religious sphere. The criticism which Schopenhauer passes upon the famous 'categorical imperative' is abundantly justified, viz., that it was a result of Kant's Protestant upbringing, and was in reality inspired by the Ten Commandments. To go to the root of the matter, it seems to me that the attempt to found goodness upon duty, to make morality submission to an absolute commandment, the result of a law 'shot out of a pistol' somewhere in the supra-mundane regions, necessarily involves a *ὑστερον πρότερον*, for surely it can never be good to obey a law *quâ* law. The moral value of obedience consists in the fact that what is commended is in itself good, and that to pursue the good is the part of a moral man. This is true even of obedience to the Natural Law. It is good to obey God's will because God's will is in itself good. The ethical category is primary and fundamental, and in this sense it may be said that all true Religion has its roots in ethical ground. No one, I think, has indicated the relation between Ethics and Religion more clearly or more correctly than Spinoza. He distinguishes between the ethics of obedience and philosophical Ethics. There is no opposition between the two; on the contrary, the ethics of obedience which bases all the rules of human conduct upon a Divine command is precisely the expression of the true rational Ethic, though in a form capable of being

apprehended by the multitude and easily picturable in imagination. Philosophy and Theology must be kept distinct and separate from one another. They are complementary but co-ordinate, each mistress in her own sphere, and no good result can come from their confusion.

The result of our discussion is now manifest. I have tried to shew that it is only by accident, through a natural confusion of ideas, that we are inclined nowadays to regard the current view of Ethics as founded upon the idea of obligation as the classical and traditional, as well as the only satisfactory, form of the science. Ethics must be completely separated from Theology, must be brought down from heaven and given its true place on earth among men. Ethics must hand over to Religion the concepts she has borrowed, and of which she has made an illegitimate use, and Religion on her side must recognise the independence and relative autonomy of Ethics. There is no cause for disagreement between the two, for while their principles are different, they endeavour to reach results substantially the same. Ethics must beware of minimising the real value and practical importance of the religious concepts of law, of duty, of reward and punishment. It is not the case that there are two moral codes existing side by side and having equal claims on our respect and admiration. It is the points of view rather than the results which are different. The moralist considers the principles of human conduct in and for themselves and with quite other objects from those of the theologian. He fixes his gaze upon the sovereign good for man as the goal of his researches and regards human actions solely as related to that end. The theologian, on the other hand, is concerned to induce mankind to submit themselves to the will of God, and for this purpose he is compelled to make use of appeals to our love, our fear, and indeed to call into activity every one of those springs of action upon which the moral life is dependent for its realisation with the vast majority of us. Had our wills never felt the fleshly screen, it is conceivable that the cold unimpassioned exhortations of the moralist might have sufficed to win men to goodness, which, as we know, is in the long run identical

with happiness. Poor weak humanity, however, stands in need of motives more powerful than the gentle allurements of reasonableness, 'sweet' indeed, but often powerless amid the clash and conflict of uncontrollable impulses. Hence Religion steps in to aid the cause of the good life, and those whom it cannot win over by a love that ranks among the purest and noblest of moral sentiments, it cows by fear into submission to the law of righteousness. To follow right for righteousness' sake were indeed true wisdom, but it is the wisdom rather of angels than of men. Yet after all, this need not greatly concern us, for in the knowledge that in acquiescing in God's own good pleasure we are at the same time working out our own end as men, we have the ground of a synthesis between Ethics and Religion which, while enjoining their mutual distinction, harmonises their ends by merging them in a unity higher than either.

W. VESEY HAGUE, M.A.

THE MORAL TRAINING OF CHILDREN

IGNORANCE is the source of many evils. An insufficient knowledge of the dogmatic teachings of our holy faith has wrought fearful havoc amongst the youth of our progressive age, entangling them in the network of the sophistical theories of modern scepticism, causing them first to doubt, then to question, and finally to deny the truths of religion—whose fundamental principles they have never learned. Ignorance of those essential truths, which by the moral law all Christians are bound to know and believe, has been the cause of the eternal ruin of many.

Affirmamus [says Pope Benedict XIV.] magnam eorum partem qui aeternis suppliciis damnantur, eam calamitatem perpetuo subire ob ignorantiam mysteriorum Fidei quae scire et credere necessario debent: multi enim laborant ignorantia crassa articulorum Fidei quos explicite scire et credere tenentur aequae Sacramentorum.

I do not intend to speak of either of these extremes of religious ignorance, although the subject I mean to treat of has an intimate connection with them. That subject is the deficiency of adequate moral training in the child, by which false ideas and erroneous consciences are formed in the minds of the young and allowed to remain, to the prejudice of that sweet and easy advancement in holiness which it should be our object to promote. Of this deficiency then, its causes and its lamentable consequences, I shall endeavour to speak, and afterwards I shall suggest what I think to be the most useful means whereby a truer perception of the moral principles of our faith may be engendered in the impressionable mind of the child.

I. That children, to a large extent in some places, to some degree at least in almost all places, are ignorant as to all the true nature of sin, its gravity, its specific difference, priests who have had any considerable experience in hearing their confessions must admit. Take, for instance, the

precept of prayer. Many theologians hold that this would not be mortally violated except by neglecting it for a whole year. Be this as it may, it is at all events the commonly received opinion that one does not commit a grievous sin by abstaining from prayer for about a month; and this, even though not one pious affection, one single act of religious worship, internal or external, was offered up during that space of time, which is almost an inconceivable hypothesis, especially in the case of the child. Practically then, for even a very ordinary Christian, the possibility of mortal sin is excluded as to the fulfilment of the precept of prayer; and who shall determine when precisely even a venial fault is committed? Now, as a general rule, what do children think of this? 'How many children,' says Father Cros, in his excellent treatise, *The Confessor after God's Own Heart*, 'pupils of small seminaries and ecclesiastical colleges, accuse themselves as of mortal sins of having ill-performed or neglected morning or night prayers for a few, or even one day.' The necessity of prayer may be deeply impressed upon the child's mind; the beauty of prayer—the union of our souls with our Heavenly Father—may be constantly proposed to the child; the efficacy of persevering, fervent prayer may be proved and illustrated; all this is right, all this is indispensable; but when a child counts himself guilty of mortal sin if he neglect his morning and night prayers for a day, or a week, or a fortnight, then there is a deficiency in his moral training.

Rarely do we meet with little boys and girls who have sufficient intelligence to gauge the degree of gravity to which their sins reach. With what a halting voice for instance, are we told sometimes that they have cursed! It has cost them no small effort to summon up courage to make the declaration. Their minds had been constantly filled with a horror of this wicked habit; they had been strictly warned to shun those companions who were addicted to it, and so they are sure, oh, always sure, that this anyhow is a grievous sin. And if, through cruel-to-be-kind curiosity, we ask them to repeat for us the 'curses' they have uttered, we often find it very hard to keep a serious countenance. And,

oh, what joy the children feel, when we in mercy tell them, if we do, of the small offence, if any, against God which their 'curses' usually contain. And so with many other of their common faults; taking the name of God in vain, for example, talking and laughing in the chapel, being wilfully distracted and inattentive at Holy Mass. For children to accuse themselves of these things is all right; for children to be imbued with a lively sense of the disrespect towards Jesus Christ of which they are guilty by voluntary acts of irreverence is most desirable; but to be persuaded that thereby they are committing mortal sin is a sad mistake and shows a lamentable deficiency in their moral training.

II. Now, in the second place, let us glance for a moment at the causes of this deficiency. These, I think, may be reduced to three. The first is a negative one, and is to be found in the child's own intellect and untrained mind. The second is in the early impressions of the child, whereby in its home and in school it is imbued with a hatred of all kinds of wrong-doing without any discrimination as to degree of gravity. The third cause arises from imperfect catechizing by those who do not understand aright the true nature of their all-important office, or are otherwise incompetent.

(1.) With regard to the first cause little need be said. As we have seen, children, if left to themselves, will form the most mistaken ideas regarding the nature and gravity of sin. As a rule they are thoughtless and giddy, incapable of serious reflection, utterly unable to determine whether it is to the right or to the left they are to turn. 'They resemble,' as a Protestant divine beautifully puts it, 'those pliant tendrils which are ready to attach themselves to any object whatever; to cling, to twine themselves in close embrace around some broken branch that lies rotting on the earth, as around the tree on whose strong and stately stem they might climb to the skies.'¹

They have little or no judgment, their reasoning powers

¹ Dr. Guthrie, *Early Piety*.

are very limited. This is true of them in almost every respect, but it is especially true in matters of conscience and morality. Here they are completely at sea, hopelessly incompetent to distinguish between small and great, between counsel and precept, and oftentimes, between right and wrong. And hence, with a confused notion of the malice of every species of wrong-doing, when confession day comes around, they will, with unhappy hearts, examine their consciences on every thing they can possibly think of, make all kinds of impracticable resolutions for the future, tell their 'sins,' and, after confession—all their trouble over—go back to their childish life the very same as ever.

(2.) The second cause of the child's erroneous conceptions are the early impressions of sin received from its parents and teachers.

As a general rule, when sins, whether of commission or omission are spoken of to the little ones, the strongest language is used. With regard to some special faults, parents and teachers must necessarily be very severe, they must never make light of them or pass them over, if they would prevent in time the formation of pernicious habits which eventually might develop into grievous crimes. The child is told how God is always looking at us, and how angry He is when we do anything that displeases Him. He is scolded, oftentimes punished with severity, when he is known to have transgressed—but no discrimination is taught him as to the degree of gravity his offences contain: the malice of evil-doing is being ever impressed upon him, but he knows of no distinction between small and great. What wonder then that the conception of sin in the child's mind regarding his common faults grows stronger and stronger, till finally he becomes convinced that many—if not all—of his defects are grievous offences. (Let it be clearly understood that I do not in any way mean to assert that parents are culpably responsible for the deficiency of their children's moral training; still less do I wish to censure or discourage the praiseworthy efforts of parents and teachers to inspire the child with a horror of sin, and a

love of virtue—except, perhaps, when their over zeal leads them to undue severity. My object is solely to state what I think to be a fact, namely, that the untrained mind of the child is apt to deduce erroneous conclusions from their persistent, well-intentioned admonitions in matters of moral precept.)

Let me give one example. Most children are severely chastised by their parents and teachers for the vice of lying. In the school, the child who is found guilty of this vice is publicly punished and humiliated, held up as almost the worst example of youthful perversity, and solemnly warned to be sure to tell the priest of their falsehood the next time they go to confession. Unfortunately, in dealing with children's faults, this is a common practice amongst certain classes of teachers, and one greatly to be condemned. And so, terribly impressed with the gravity of this offence, it naturally concludes, if left to its own unaided powers of discrimination, that it must surely be one of the 'big' sins.

Under this second cause of the child's deficiency in right moral perception, I may mention also the extensive and misleading catalogue of sins, to be found in many prayer-books, especially the older ones, on which the examination of conscience is to be made. Here small and great, necessary and useful, counsel and precept are placed before the child's untrained mind in one miscellaneous compendium of offences. I need not dwell on this relic of Jansenistic practice; everyone can see what a prolific source it is of error and confusion.

(3.) The third cause of the child's ignorance is imperfect catechizing by those who are not suited for nor sufficiently interested in this important duty. It is not every one who can be an efficient catechist. There are few who understand aright—I am speaking *principally* of lay-teachers—the true nature of catechetical instruction. Many, unfortunately, seem to think that anything is good enough for the children, and that it makes very little matter whether the doctrine they expound for them be sound and exact or the reverse. They do not understand that by their carelessness and want of precision they are sowing the seeds of error and doubt

and sometimes even of positive unbelief in the child's mind; for children unhesitatingly take whatever the catechist tells them on the authority of his word.

The catechist [says Father Potter in his admirable work, *The Pastor and his People*], who does not possess sufficient knowledge to enable him to discharge these duties (*i.e.*, of successful catechising) as he ought, will be certain to go lamentably astray in the matter of his teaching. He will teach heresy without knowing it. At one time he will put upon his people *obligations which God and His Church never imposed upon them*. At another he will teach them that they are not bound by the gravest laws. Thus, his inexact teaching; his false decisions, at one time too lax, and at another too severe, will in all probability be the cause of innumerable sins in his flock, *since it is thus that false consciences are formed*.

Of course it is evident that if the catechist himself has confused notions concerning the truths and precepts of religion, or but a superficial knowledge of his subject, he cannot fail to instil erroneous ideas in his pupils' minds. But even though he be well versed in moral science, it often happens through his want of tact, his lack of interest in his work, his deficiency in zeal or his inadequate conception of the sublimity of his office, that he will make haphazard statements eminently calculated to produce wrong impressions in the untrained minds of his young hearers.

These souls [says Mgr. Dupanloup] are young plants, tender flowers, often beaten down to earth by killing blasts and withered before their time. Well, to revive them, to lift their heads again towards heaven, you, in the catechism, pour upon them the pure water of doctrine, the sweet dew of grace; and with what charming eagerness they drink it! and how quickly and how entirely they are penetrated by it! . . . Ah! but you must thoroughly understand *not thick, muddy water* must you pour upon them, but *pure, fresh spring water*, the water of the living word.

Unfortunately—as who better than we priests know?—it is too often muddy water which is poured into the thirsty mind of the child by the unskilled teacher. Perhaps his own mind in a chaos of confusion; perhaps he uses language more unintelligible than the words of the text he would

explain. Clear, limpid streams of true, pure doctrine are not poured upon the thirsty weakly souls of the little ones, and so, false and mistaken notions are instilled into their minds; or at least, they are left in their own uncertain, childish views and convictions.

III. So much for the sources of deficiency in adequate moral training of the young. We now come to consider its undesirable consequences.

The child in whose mind erroneous opinions are formed and allowed to remain, will grow up either in thorough ignorance of true, sound principles, or, at least, with that deplorable confusion of ideas from which doubtful consciences—the copious sources of sin and misery—generally result. ‘What the boy does not learn, the man does not know.’

We have all experienced the strong force of early impressions and convictions. An idea takes possession of our mind; imperceptibly it grows stronger and stronger upon us, and in time it becomes a settled conviction, almost as strong as faith. We had not sufficient judgment to analyze it when we were children; we never think of analyzing it when we grow older: we have taken it on faith, and it has become part of our faith. And when, sometimes by accident, we come to see the error and absurdity of it we are amazed, and, perhaps, rather ashamed of our stupidity. I remember once a student, an advanced student in theology, telling me of the revelation it was to him, when one day in conversation with a companion his mind became suddenly illumed to the fact that to break the pledge was not a grievous sin! And every confessor knows, especially in the case of the rude and uneducated, how commonly this same erroneous notion regarding the ‘pledge’ prevails, and how many mortal sins, through this fatal ignorance, are committed. Surely this is a terrible effect of inadequate moral training. And what is true of the false notions concerning the ‘sin’ of breaking the pledge is equally true, unfortunately, in many other matters—in the matter of deferring, for instance, the penance received at confession; of neglecting daily prayers; of letting fall from their lips—even unintentionally—some

curse or indecent word. Adults, especially the ignorant and uncultivated, remain perfect children in matters of moral knowledge; the false notions they imbibe in childhood, if not eradicated, become for them certain convictions, and acting upon these, they are responsible for the guilt and sin into which, through their erroneous conscience, they are drawn. And it is an extremely difficult matter, at least amongst the class of persons I allude to, to obliterate these early impressions. 'If false and fatal maxims,' says Bossuet, 'are once permitted to enter the children's minds, the tyranny of habit becomes so invincible in them that there is no remedy which can cure the evil. To prevent it becoming incurable it must be anticipated.'

Or, again, even if a thoroughly false conscience in many matters be not always the outcome of deficiency in moral training, there generally results at least a doubtful conscience, a chaotic uncertainty. When children's school days are over, when they no longer attend the catechism class, if in their early years they are not made acquainted with the true, unvarnished principles of right and wrong, if they are allowed to remain in ignorance of every just criterion by which to form—to some degree at least—a sound judgment and a certain conscience; then it commonly happens that they grow up to manhood with the same rash and confused opinions. 'If teaching be inexact,' says Father Potter, 'and not strictly in conformity with the doctrine of the Church, the catechist will, in all probability, lay the foundation of a spirit of doubt and unbelief which will not fail to bring forth its unwholesome and poisonous fruit in due season.' And this is equally true when the defective training proceeds from the other causes. Their religious education is over. They hear sermons, of course, sometimes. But sermons are not calculated or intended to instruct in the elementary notions of moral knowledge, and so far from getting light in this respect from these vigorous denunciations of evil and eulogies of virtue, they are often only the more embarrassed and lead astray. And so they go on in their, at least, partial ignorance, beating the air with clouded and doubtful minds. They deliberately expose

themselves to the danger of committing sin; they have a kind of idea that such a thing is wrong, maybe very wrong, but they are not sure; they do not know how to put away the doubt, to form for themselves a safe and certain conscience—with undecided mind they commit the act. They will come to confession then, and they will ask us have they, by doing so and so, fallen into sin? as if objective and subjective were synonymous! What misery and evil then result from this deplorable state of uncertainty, this blunted form of conscience—all the effect of deficient moral training—everyone for himself can plainly see.

Another consequence of this deficiency is the paralyzing effect it has upon that sweet, generous, and easy piety which makes the practice of religion so attractive, especially to children. It causes their lives, which are generally so innocent in themselves, and which might and should be a free and loving service of their Heavenly Father, to be oftentimes miserable and unhappy. With false and mistaken ideas of sin in their minds, it is generally with a servile fear they strive to observe the law of God, and their obedience is not a willing one. They know not the beauty of virtue; piety is robbed of its charm. If children understood that by their little defects they were not at all separated from the love of God, not at all become objects of His hatred, deserving of terrible chastisements from a severe judge; but yet that they were indeed grieving the tender heart of a pitying Father, Who knows and compassionates their human frailty, Who is full of love and kindness and mercy; how much more generous, happy and enamoured of goodness would they be! On the contrary, how difficult it is for them to be attracted to piety and holiness, if they are persuaded that many of their common faults are grievous sins, by which they lose the favour and friendship of God and become objects of loathing in the sight of Heaven. They fall into those faults frequently, however they may regard them; and deeming themselves then defiled by mortal guilt, their hearts become sad and unhappy, they get discouraged, they think it all too hard, they think it almost impossible to persevere, and

oftentimes they give up trying. This may not be true in many cases, but it is undoubtedly true in some, especially when children have delicate or scrupulous consciences, and when they are endeavouring, as best they may, to lead good Christian lives. How much more conducive to holiness it would be if they knew the simple truth. Falling then into their slight transgressions, they would not be cast down. They would know that they could easily cause the light cloud that rose up between them and God's perfect love to disappear, by a little act of contrition, a little sorrowful prayer. They would know how to be always beginning again, as all of us must do. They would serve God with joy and filial devotion; their lives would be more innocent and happy, and they would thereby strengthen their souls for the trials and temptations of maturer age.

A child [as the author of *Moral Training* beautifully puts it] must take all things on faith, and if what he has been taught in childhood looks all the brighter and truer the older he grows, his character is founded and built on faith, for it has strengthened with his strength, and grown with his growth, giving him a simple upright soul, a strong clear intellect, and a brave trusting heart.

IV. I come now to consider the means (as far as regards the priest) by which the deficiency in the child's moral training may be, to some extent at least, prevented or remedied.

These means are: first, catechising by the priest himself, and secondly, a special attention to children's confessions.

Catechetical teaching comprises three things: the recitation of the words of the catechism, the explanation and instruction, and, above all, the moulding of the young soul into habits of virtue. It would be beyond the scope of the present article to dwell at length upon all three. I shall take up only that part of the work which may be effectively directed to the infusion of sound moral knowledge into the child's mind.

(1.) The priest himself should teach the catechism. 'Ad rectores animarum spectat per seipsos pascere gregis sui

agnos,' say the fathers of the Third Council of Baltimore.¹ It is unnecessary to speak of the importance which should be attached to this sublime duty. The children, as St. Augustine says, are the priest's 'germen pium, examen novellum, flos honoris et fructus laboris, gaudium et corona.' It is enough to remember that we priests are the fellow-workers and ministers of Him, Whose divine hands were laid with such infinite tenderness on the heads of the little ones Who is never so sweet and gentle and loving, as when He takes them to His heart and speaks to us of their interests. 'The priest,' Bishop Moriarity maintains, 'who would neglect every other instruction, and teach the catechism to the children of his parish, would have done a great deal. The priest who would discharge every other duty and neglect this, would have done nothing' Lay-teachers, even religious, although excellent assistants in the work of catechizing, are not fully competent to sow the seeds of spiritual knowledge. They are not theologians. They cannot be dogmatic in their teaching. The priest alone, by reason of his training, is qualified to explain and interpret authoritatively the precepts of the Christian doctrine; he alone is capable of implanting in the child's mind those clear, true notions which will enable it to form a fairly correct judgment in matters of morality. The Third Council of Baltimore lays this down expressly:—'*Præceptores sacerdotali caractere non insigniti, sive religiosi sive laici, magno equidem sunt adjumento in juvenum institutione, at munus verbum Dei docendi sibi proprium non habent.*'

With regard to the method to be adopted in teaching the words of the catechism, Dr. Stang makes the following suggestion:—'We would advise young priests to teach catechism synthetically, and not to use the analytical form; not making the children first learn the lesson *verbatim* and then explaining, but first explaining it and then looking for answers.' In the case of advanced pupils, and when the lessons are frequent and short, this method seems to be

¹ N. 217.² In lect. V. *Dom. in Alb.*

preferable. For when a portion is first carefully explained, and the children required to commit the words to memory for the next class-day, they will do so with a far greater degree of interest and intelligence. They will also remember the true sense and meaning of what they learn much more easily than if they had first committed the answers to memory and were afterwards instructed on the meaning of the text. A few words from the catechist will bring back and permanently fix in their minds the explanation they have heard.

For the catechetical instruction to be effectual in preventing the formation of confused and erroneous ideas, it must be clear and solid. It should also be made as interesting as possible.

(a.) It must be clear. Quintilian's precept is most appropriate: 'Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino non intelligere non possit, curandum.' The children should not only be able to understand, but we must so adapt our explanations to their capacity that it be impossible for them not to understand. To effect this, the instruction should be well divided, simple, and short. First, it should be well divided. The children must be told exactly what is going to be explained to them, the divisions of the subject and its connection with the last instruction. This will attract their attention and give them an intelligent interest in what they are about to hear. Without it the instruction will be wearisome and confusing, the children will be unable to follow it, and they will understand but little of what is said to them. If it be necessary to clearly announce the subject-matter and points of our sermons and instructions to grown people even, how much more indispensably so is it not in the case of the young and untrained? Secondly, the instruction must be simple. There must be no exaggeration, nothing forced or contradictory, no subtle reasoning.

The teacher's language [says Father Lambing in his *Sunday School Teachers' Manual*] should, to be perfect, combine the simplicity of the child with the accuracy of the finished scholar. It should be his constant study to simplify his language as far as possible, never employing a word the meaning of which is not familiar to the least talented member of his class.

The catechist should become a child amongst children. He must put himself in their place, descend to their level, adapt his mode of speech to theirs, and patiently repeat over and over again what he says to them. Otherwise his instructions, so far from enlightening the feeble intellect of the child, will, in all probability, be but a source of confusion and error. 'Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino non intelligere non possit, curandum.' In the third place, for the instruction to be clear, it must necessarily be short and concise.

Children [says Fleury] cannot take in several ideas at once, nor understand their relation one with another: they do not speak continuously for long, and their sentences are short. In speaking to them we ought to imitate them, speak in short sentences, and be brief and exact.

Their minds are compared to vases with narrow necks, into which, if we pour a liquid too abundantly, but little, if any, will enter; but if we gently pour it, drop by drop, with time and patience all of it goes in, and nothing is lost. It is the same with the child. The great maxim of St. Francis of Sales was, *To say little, and to say that little very well.* If the instruction be long the children will become weary and distracted. By nature they are restless, unable to concentrate their attention upon anything except for a short time, and by burdening their memory we often only break it down altogether.

(b.) Catechetical instruction must be solid and exact. I have alluded to the deplorable results of incorrect teaching when speaking of the causes of the child's ignorance, and I need not repeat what I have said. The catechism is an explanation of the word of God, and this alone should safeguard it from that disrespect which inexactness or disregard for truth in its teaching implies. Let the catechist denounce evil as strongly as he will; let him endeavour, by every means his piety may suggest, to instil a hatred of vice and a love of virtue into the child's mind; but at the same time let him take all possible care not to create a false conscience in his impressionable young hearers. That would be a lamentable result of his efforts. Consequently he should

not hesitate to let them know the truth; he should clearly instruct the children on the degree of gravity that accompanies the sins and defects against which he inveighs. The truth is the best. There are sufficient motives to urge against vice, and by which to induce a love of virtue without having recourse to exaggeration or 'salutary ignorance.' And if in individual cases the enlightened sin the most, the fault is their own, the principle is not thereby affected.

(c.) Finally instruction should be interesting and attractive. Children are most effectively taught through their natural desire of being pleased. 'If the catechism,' says Fenelon, 'be taught in a dry, cold, uninteresting style, naturally enough the children will pay little attention to it. They will be carried away by a thousand distractions.' The teacher should study how to vary the questions as much as possible, to break them up and dwell on their different parts, asking the children from time to time have they understood him so far. He should never put them a question which would be beyond their capacity; and when a more than ordinarily difficult one turns up, he should, without seeming to do so, insinuate the answer. In this way a lively interest will be created amongst the young learners, they will be agreeably surprised to find out that they are able to understand things so well and give intelligent answers, a healthy emulation will be excited amongst them, they will give their utmost attention, and the lesson will be got through with pleasure and profit. Examples, illustrations, and stories should be largely made use of. A good story is the most potent factor of all in making the instruction attractive. It helps the child, too, to understand the truths that are taught, it impresses them firmly on his mind, and fixes them in his memory as nothing else can. Mgr. Dupanloup recommends the catechist to propose little cases of consciences from time to time, give wrong solutions on purpose, and get himself corrected by the children. There is no doubt that such a practice would make his instruction very pleasant for them, and help much to develop their reasoning powers.

Catechetical instruction is a difficult work. Instruction

in any shape or form, to whatsoever class of listeners, is not easy. 'To make definitions,' says Père Lacordaire, 'is the most difficult of all mental exercises.' And the making of clear definitions enters largely into the work of instructing. The difficulty is increased when it is with children we are dealing. Hence the necessity for careful preparation; for, though it is certain that instruction, when it is clear and simple, will do much to brighten the dulllest intellect, it is only when we *know thoroughly* and *prepare diligently* what we teach that we can be clear or simple. The catechist who does not study and carefully prepare beforehand what he is going to say will not be successful. He will be neither clear, brief, nor exact; on the contrary, he will be obscure, prone to useless and wearisome repetitions, and often incorrect in his teaching. He will not know how to 'break the bread for the little ones'—the bread of knowledge, which should be meted out to them in tiny morsels, easily taken and retained, just as the mother dove crushes the grain of corn before giving it to her young. The Bishop of Orleans does not hesitate to confess that he spent sometimes two or three days, sometimes a whole week, of continuous work in preparation for certain difficult instructions. He maintains that four or five hours, at least, are to be devoted to this purpose, for he well knew that without due preparation the instruction 'runs a great risk of being vague, wordy, and wearisome.'

(2.) In the second place, the priest can do much to prevent the formation and growth of erroneous ideas by devoting special attention to the child's confession. As before, I do not mean to speak of this in all its details, but shall confine myself to its bearing upon the subject under consideration.

And first let us see what the confessor should avoid. He should avoid two things: severity and irascibility in the first place, and dwelling overmuch on slight defects in the second. With no class of penitents should harshness be used in the confessional; but in the case of children especial care must be taken, lest by an impatient or angry word their sensitive minds be overawed and their mouths closed. 'Cum pueris,' says St. Alphonsus, 'adhibere debet confessarius

*omnem caritatem et modos suaviores quantum fieri potest.*¹

And St. Francis of Sales:—

I am not callous enough to treat my dear children severely. Had there been anything better than kindness, Jesus Christ would have told us so; and yet He only gives us two lessons to learn of Him, meekness and humility of heart. Let him who is enamoured of severity begone from me, for I will have none of it.

The confessor who treats his child-penitent with severity, instead of guiding the young soul in the path of truth and holiness, will inevitably lead him sadly astray. Besides causing him to regard the sacrament of mercy as an ordeal from which he shrinks in fear, he will also oftentimes be instrumental in fostering in the child's impressionable mind the growth or continuance of those erroneous notions which it should be his object to eradicate. In the second place, the confessor should not dwell too much on small transgressions and imperfections. To do so would be productive of results similar, to a certain extent at least, to those just mentioned. If the child has been guilty of mortal sin, the confessor should, of course, animadvert strongly upon this. If he accuse himself of venial sins only, he may be seriously admonished with regard to the more dangerous and wilfully committed. But on his numerous trifling defects, the confessor, keeping in mind that the manifestation of venial faults is by no means requisite, should not too closely or lengthily cross-examine. If this be not observed the child will only be confused and made unhappy, harassed with scruples, and his attention withdrawn from correcting his more serious offences.

Having hinted at these defects, let us now see how the confessor should act in order to promote the formation of sound moral perceptions in his young penitents.

To obtain candid and satisfactory as well as short confessions, it is most advisable to make use of prudent interrogation. (In passing, I may remark that children are much more easily induced to tell certain kinds of sins in their first confessions than afterwards. By judicious interrogation we can get them then to disclose everything.

¹ *Praxis Confes.*

But if there be some matters which they find it hard to mention, and are not helped out of the difficulty, it often happens that in their subsequent confessions, no matter how they be questioned, they will not be able to overcome their repugnance to manifest their concealed sins. It is especially desirable, therefore, in the first confessions of the child, that a careful interrogation be employed.) Many children do not know how to tell their sins; they have not been properly instructed on the matter, and left to themselves they form the strangest notions. Some will tell us absolutely nothing; others will accuse themselves of almost all the sins they find in the prayer-book. Some are so sensitive and nervous that they find it well-nigh impossible to confess certain faults; others so rude or ingenuous that they will rush on to undesirable manifestation of details before we can stop them. The remedy for all this is prudent interrogation. From clear questions put to them they will learn best how to examine their consciences and to accuse themselves with accuracy, candour and modesty. They will be taught practically how to make their confessions. We know, too, that most children like to be interrogated; it takes the burden off their shoulders; they are far and away more satisfied than if left to themselves, no matter how well they may be prepared. To bring about these happy results is surely a sufficient recompense for the time and trouble it may cost the confessor.

With regard to the matters on which they are to be questioned, these, as I insinuated above, should not be trivial. The interrogation should be, for the most part, on serious offences. St. Alphonsus¹ finds fault with confessors who go into too much detail with the child.

Let them ask him [says the holy Doctor]—1st. Whether he has concealed any sin in a former confession. 2nd. Whether he has blasphemed against God and His saints. 3rd. Whether he has neglected to assist at Mass on Sundays or holidays of obligation. 4th. Whether he has struck his parents, disobeyed them, spoken injuriously of, or uttered imprecations against them. 5th. Whether he has been immodest. 6th. Whether he has injured his neighbour,

¹*Praxis Confes.*

or stolen anything from him. 7th. Whether he has spoken uncharitably of anyone. 8th. Whether he has eaten meat on the forbidden days ; satisfied the paschal duty.

How different is this examen from those found in the prayer-books to which I referred above ? Of course St. Alphonsus does not mean that this list is to be always strictly adhered to. He wrote for priests, and knew that they would use their judgment. Hence he omits to speak of the number of times the sins have been committed. But the saint clearly shows that superfluous questioning is to be avoided, and that the confessor's attention should be chiefly directed to the more grave faults of the child. By judicious interrogation of this kind he will inspire his young penitents with a horror of mortal sin and a fear of anything calculated to lead on to it ; he will prevent the formation or growth of erroneous ideas regarding the gravity of their sins, create in them a safe and certain conscience, and teach them to use their reasoning powers with discrimination.

Moreover the confessor should abstain from interrogating the child on the manner in which certain sins are committed. It is certain that '*circumstantiae aggravantes intra eandem speciem*' *per se* need not be manifested. In dealing with children, especially in delicate matters, this is of fullest application. Even though they are ready and willing to explain matters, they should be gently admonished not to do so and made to understand that it is unnecessary. This may afterwards save them from anxious doubts and scruples and even from sacrilegious silence ; for it not unfrequently happens with regard to certain sins that the circumstances are of much more difficult revelation than the sin itself.

And this brings me to the last suggestion I have to make. The confessor should, not merely by using these negative means, but also by positive instruction, enlighten the child's mind with regard to the gravity of his offences. If he believes that his penitent is persuaded that such or such a venial fault is a grievous sin (and he can form a fairly correct judgment on the matter from the manner in which the child confesses it, the degree of intelligence it is gifted

with, etc.), he should at once remove the false impression. Even though he only suspects such to be the case he ought to let the child know the strict truth. What is more, I will even say, that in some cases he would do well to find out from the child itself its conception of gravity regarding its common faults, in order, if necessary, to correct it. It may be objected that all this would make children's confessions too difficult and onerous for the confessor himself. I admit it is troublesome; but it is a labour of love, a work of the most tender charity to the little ones, and one, we may be sure, that is very dear to the Heart of Jesus—the children's own Friend. Moreover, when the child is a regular penitent of ours, the work once done is done for always; the joy he feels from the happy revelation is too great to allow him to forget what he has learned. When the child knows the truth, we can then speak on certain sins as strongly as we wish without danger of misconception; as I said before, there are sufficiently strong motives to advance without leaving him in doubt or ignorance. Finally, it should be the priest's aim to make goodness and piety attractive to the child by putting before him motives of love and gratitude rather than of fear in order to withdraw him from vice. His mind is very impressionable, his heart is very pure; and the present fear of displeasing and being ungrateful to his loving Redeemer is much more potent to fill his soul with a dislike for sin than any consideration of future far-off punishments could be.

In conclusion, I have pointed out the existence of deficiency of adequate moral perception in the minds of the young, the causes that produce it, the undesirable consequences that result from it, and I have suggested some means whereby it may be prevented or remedied. It will be admitted, I think, that there is a great deal of truth in what I have said, though perhaps in some things all will not entirely agree with me. Individuals may devote time and attention to the matter, but it is not often that it is made the subject of open discussion and express consideration. To make the lives of the little ones more bright and holy and happy has been my motive, and there are none so

fitted to do this as those for whom those thoughts are written down—the earthly ministers of Him who has said:—‘Qui susceperit unum parvulum talem in nomine meo, me suscipit.’

R. E. FITZHENRY, M.SS., D.Ph.

DR. SALMON'S 'INFALLIBILITY'

IV.

THERE is no denying that Dr. Salmon has shown very considerable cleverness in his attack on the Catholic Church. But it is cleverness very sadly misapplied. And as he is very far from being the most formidable of her assailants, he cannot expect to succeed where even *the gates of hell* are foredoomed to fail. His charge against the Church of new doctrines and new articles of faith, of change in doctrine, is, to the unthinking, or to those who have been taught to think wrongly, the most grave that could be made. And it is also one of the most groundless, and can be made only by one who does not know, or who knowingly misrepresents the office and character of the Church. With the Catholic Church, the true Church of Christ, new doctrines are a simple *impossibility*. She received from her Divine Founder the entire, full, complete deposit of faith. She has held it full and complete from the beginning; and she shall hold it unimpaired till the end of time. As St. Vincent of Lerins says: ‘She loses nothing that is hers; she adopts nothing that is not hers.’ What Dr. Salmon calls a ‘new doctrine’ is simply a statement of some truth that has been in her keeping from the beginning; and in taking that statement from the deposit of faith, and in teaching it to her children, the Church is protected from error by the Holy Ghost the Spirit of Truth, ‘Going therefore teach all nations . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.’ ‘The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost

whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind whatsoever I shall have said to you.' Here, then, is the Church's warrant to teach. Her premises are God's own revelation, infallibly true, fixed and definite from the first; and in her process of interpreting it, the Holy Ghost is her guide, and owing to His guidance she cannot betray her trust: she can neither mistake the extent of her commission, nor the meaning of any portion of it. And when therefore, under such guidance, she declares, that a certain doctrine is contained in the deposit of faith, is part of it, her declaration must be true, and therefore the doctrine is *not new*, but as old as the Christian Revelation.

This follows directly and immediately from the *Infallibility of the Church*; and the Catholic who accepts that doctrine, accepts all this as a matter of course. He knows that in believing what the Church teaches, he is believing what our Lord revealed to His Apostles, and what they committed to the Church from which he now accepts it. And he not only accepts the actual teaching of the Church, but he is prepared, and for the very same reason that he accepts what she now teaches, to accept also whatever she may in the future make known to him. Any increase of religious knowledge imparted to him by the Church is welcome to the Catholic, its truth and its antiquity are to him a foregone conclusion. He knows that it is part of that body of truth which he had already accepted unreservedly, and in its entirety—that it is a fuller meaning of some truth which he had already believed—that it now comes to him on the same authority on which all his faith rests; and by reason of that additional light and knowledge he accepts now explicitly what he had hitherto implicitly believed. This is no more than saying that a Catholic is a Catholic, that he really believes what he professes to believe; and for such a person new doctrines in the sense imputed by Dr. Salmon are impossible. By *new doctrines* Dr. Salmon means doctrines that were not revealed at all—false doctrines—and he gives as instances the *Immaculate Conception* and *Papal Infallibility*. But Catholics know that the Church defines nothing that

was not in her keeping from the beginning—nothing new—and the very fact of their definition is to the Catholic a proof that these doctrines formed a part of the original revelation; and later on Dr. Salmon shall be supplied with evidence of the unmistakable traces of these doctrines in Catholic tradition.

The mental attitude of Catholics Dr. Salmon does not realise at all, and hence it is that he makes such silly charges against us. He never loses an opportunity of saying hard things of the Oxford converts for their unpardonable sin of abandoning Protestantism in order to save their souls. He says of them:—

Perhaps those who then submitted to the Church of Rome scarcely realised all that was meant in their profession of faith in their new guide. They may have thought it meant no more than belief that everything the Church of Rome then taught was infallibly true. Events soon taught them that it meant besides that they must believe everything that that Church might afterwards teach, and her subsequent teaching put so great a strain on the faith of the new converts that in a few cases it was more than it could bear. (Page 19.)

And later on (page 62) he gives Mr. Capes as an instance of one who found the strain too great, though, according to Dr. Salmon's own version of the case, Mr. Capes left the Catholic Church because he refused to accept a doctrine which the Church taught at the very time he joined her. Now, if any of the converts alluded to came into the Church in the state of mind described by Dr. Salmon, they really were not Catholics at all. They had not accepted that which is the foundation of the whole Catholic system—the authority of the teaching Church, which involves belief in anything the Church may teach in the future as well as acceptance of what she actually teaches. And converts coming into the Church are well aware of this, for it is fully explained to them. The Catholic Church does not blindfold those who come to join her, notwithstanding Dr. Salmon's confident hypothesis. It is not to make up numbers that she receives converts. They must be instructed before they are received, and no priest could, without sin, knowingly

receive into the Church one so ill-instructed as Dr. Salmon supposes some of the converts to have been.

Dr. Salmon says of Mr. Mallock that 'he criticised other people's beliefs and disbeliefs so freely, that it was hard to know what he believed or did not believe himself' (page 60). These words are strictly applicable to Dr. Salmon himself. With the exception of a few vague references to what 'a prayer-full man,' may find in the Bible, he gives no clue to his own creed. He boasts of 'the strength of his conviction of the baselessness of the case made by the Romish advocates' (page 14); he is quite sure that all distinctive Catholic doctrines form 'no part of primitive Christianity.' But this is all negative, and all through his Lectures his teaching is of the same sort. Thus he tells us what he does not believe; but as to what he does believe, we are left totally in the dark. But such is his idea of faith, that it really does not matter much, whether the articles of his creed be few or many, for his *faith is purely human*. It is not the argument of things unseen; not the testimony 'greater than that of man;' not an assent in nothing wavering; not therefore the root and foundation of justification, but a merely human faith, probable, hesitating, doubtful, with no higher certainty than mere unaided human reason can give it. Dr. Salmon believes in the truths of Christianity (if he believes them at all) on exactly the same grounds, and with exactly the same certainty, as he believes in the career of Julius Cæsar. Tacitus and Suetonius give him the same certainty as St. Matthew and St. Luke. His own words are:—

That Jesus Christ lived more than eighteen centuries ago; that He died, rose again, and taught such and such doctrines, are things proved by the same kind of argument as that by which we know that Augustus was Emperor of Rome, and that there is such a country as China. Whether or not He founded a Church; whether He bestowed the gift of infallibility on it, and whether He fixed the seat of that infallibility at Rome, are things to be proved, if proved at all, by arguments which a logician would class as probable. (Page 63.) . . . We are certain, for instance, that there was such a man as Julius Cæsar. We may call ourselves certain about the principal events of his life; but when you go into details, and inquire, for instance, what knowledge he

had of Cataline's conspiracy, you soon come to questions, to which you can only give probable, or doubtful answers, and it is just the same as to the facts of Christianity. (Page 74.)

And for all this he had prepared his hearers by telling them (page 48) that 'it must be remembered that our belief *must* in the end rest on an act of our own judgment, and can never attain any higher certainty than whatever that may be able to give us;' (page 48). These sentiments are again and again repeated in Dr. Salmon's Lectures; and in them we have the key to the nature and value of his faith, as well as to the character of his declamation against the Catholic Church. He devotes a great part of his Third Lecture to the right of *private judgment*, or rather he *insists on the necessity of private judgment* (page 48). And here again he transcribes almost word for word, and without acknowledgment, Whately's *Cautions for the Times*. All through the lecture he is confounding *private judgment* with the legitimate exercise of reason, and he so represents Catholics as if they condemned all exercise of reason with reference to the truths of faith. Now, Dr. Salmon must be well aware that *private judgment* has a well-recognised meaning in theological controversy. It means the opinion of the individual as opposed to external authority; it means the right of the individual to determine for himself, and quite independently of all external control, what he is to believe or not to believe. But *private judgment* is not a synonym for reason, and in condemning it in its controversial sense, Catholics do not interfere in the slightest degree with the legitimate use of reason. Let us use our reason by all means. St. Paul reminds us of that duty. But in establishing His Church, and commissioning her to teach the nations, our Lord Himself condemned *private judgment* in its controversial sense, and the Catholic Church only repeats that condemnation. We must use our reason. A fool cannot make an act of faith. And this is really all that Dr. Salmon's declamation comes to.

But in his zeal to make a case against us the Doctor shows that he has himself no divine supernatural faith at all. 'Our belief,' he says, '*must* in the end rest on an act of our

own judgment, and can never attain any higher certainty than whatever that may be able to give us' (page 48). This statement is completely subversive of faith; it is an enunciation of rationalism, pure and simple. If Dr. Salmon's belief is to rest ultimately on his own judgment, then his faith is human, and Huxley, whose judgment was at least as reliable as Dr. Salmon's, had as good grounds for rejecting the Bible as Dr. Salmon has for accepting it. It is well that he has stated so clearly the fundamental principle of Protestantism—a principle which robs faith of its supernatural character, and which has given to Protestant countries as many creeds as there are individuals. If each one's faith is to rest ultimately on each one's judgment, we are not to be surprised at the harmony and unity that are a *note* of what Dr. Salmon calls his Church. Pope's lines are strictly true of it :—

'Tis with our judgments, as our watches, none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own.

It must be presumed that Dr. Salmon is contemplating that faith without which 'it is impossible to please God'—supernatural, divine faith—but he is completely astray as to its motive and nature. Supernatural divine faith does not rest ultimately 'on an act of our own judgment,' but on the authority of God revealing the truth we are to believe. We believe the Trinity, the Incarnation, Redemption, not because 'an act of our own judgment' shows them to be true, but because God has revealed them. Dr. Salmon confounds the *motive* of faith with the *motives of credibility*. For an act of faith we require a revelation and evidence of the fact of revelation. The motives of credibility are those reasons which satisfy us that the revelation is from God—that God has spoken. They are those which establish the divine origin of the Christian faith generally—miracles, prophecies, the wonderful propagation and preservation of the faith, its salutary effect on mankind, etc. All these supply us with a wide and legitimate field for the exercise of our reason, and within that field Catholics do exercise their reason, and according to their circumstances they are

bound to do so. These motives of credibility lead us to believe that a revelation has been made; they are a preliminary to faith, but they are not the motive of faith, or any part of that motive. They do not enter into the act of faith at all. Because of them we believe in the existence of the revelation, but the revelation itself we believe on the authority of God Whose word it is. And belief resting on any motive inferior to this would not be divine faith at all, and could not be the means of saving our souls. Dr. Salmon tells his students that faith is the outcome of their own judgment (and it is to be hoped that they are all profound thinkers), but St. Paul tells them: 'By grace you are saved, through faith, and this not of ourselves, for it is the gift of God.'¹ And the same saint said to the Thessalonians: 'When you had received of us, the word of the hearing of God, you received it not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God, Who worketh in you that have believed.'² According to St. Paul there is in faith something which we do not owe to our own talents or judgments, but which is God's gift directly. And in strict accordance with this doctrine of St. Paul, is the teaching of the Vatican Council. It says:—

But that faith which is the beginning of man's salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue, whereby enlightened, and aided by God's grace, we believe those things which He has revealed to be true, not because of the intrinsic truth of them, known from the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God revealing them.

And the Council pronounces an anathema against those who hold, as Dr. Salmon does, that for divine faith it is not necessary that the revelation should be believed on the authority of God revealing. With this supernatural divine faith illuminating and elevating the soul, what a sad contrast is presented by Dr. Salmon's bald rationalism—'the act of his own judgment.' And the saddest feature of the contrast is the spiritual blight and ruin which Dr. Salmon's theory involves. Supernatural faith is necessary for salvation, and the Doctor's

¹ Ephes. ii. 8.

² 1 Thes. ii. 13.

faith is not supernatural. It is purely human, and can have no more influence in saving souls than the latest theory on electricity. And as Dr. Salmon's faith is purely human, he is quite logical (though quite wrong), in saying that it can attain to no higher certainty than reason can give it; and that his belief in our Lord's life and teaching comes to him in the same way as his belief in the career of Augustus Cæsar—that it is merely a hesitating, doubting, assent, at best only a probability. The Doctor professes a profound knowledge of, and an intimate acquaintance with, Scripture; and yet nothing can be more clear and explicit than the Scriptural condemnation of his theory of faith. In texts almost innumerable faith is spoken of, not as the doubting, hesitating, probable opinion that he describes it, but as an assent to God's word full, firm, and unhesitating. 'If you shall have faith, and doubt not,' said our Lord to His disciples,' where He clearly describes doubt as incompatible with faith. 'Therefore, let all the house of Israel know *most certainly* that God hath made both Lord and Christ, this same Jesus whom you have crucified.'* 'For I am *certain* that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.'† 'For I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day.'‡ 'Ask in faith, nothing wavering,' says St. James.§ Nothing can be clearer then, than that *faith*, according to Scripture, is a firm, unhesitating, unwavering, assent to God's word. Those who hesitate are described as having 'little faith' or no faith. Faith and doubt are regarded as incompatible. And this is precisely the teaching of the Catholic Church. The Vatican Council, in the 3rd chapter *De Fide*, tells us that we are bound to give to God's revelation 'the full obedience of our intellects and of our wills.' And it further asserts that 'our faith rests on the most firm of all

* Matt. xxi. 21.

† Acts ii. 36.

‡ Rom. viii. 38, 39.

§ 2 Tim. i. 12.

§ 2 James i. 6.

foundations'—the authority of God brought home to us by His Church. When, therefore, Dr. Salmon told his students that 'our belief must in the end rest on an act of our own judgment,' and can have no higher authority, he is contradicting the express language of Scripture as well as the express teaching of the Catholic Church; and he is leading his students astray on the most vitally important of all subjects—the nature of saving faith. It is clear that he has no real conception of any supernatural element in faith; and hence it is that he seeks to ridicule the idea that there is any such, or that Catholics can have any certainty in matters of faith above what unaided reason can give.

I mean [he says] to say something about the theory of the supernatural gift of faith as laid down at the Vatican Council, merely remarking now that the theory of a supernatural endowment superseding in matters of religion the ordinary laws of reasoning, an endowment to question which involves deadly peril, deters Roman Catholics from all straightforward seeking for truth. (Pages 62, 63.)

And what he has to say is this :—'They are not naturally infallible, but God has made them so. It is by a supernatural gift of faith that they accept the Church's teaching, and have a divinely inspired certainty that they are in the right' (page 81). And he quotes the Vatican Council in proof of his statement, though there is nothing whatever in the Council that would give him the slightest countenance. We do not claim any gift, supernatural or otherwise, 'superseding in matters of religion the ordinary laws of reasoning.' These laws we respect and adhere to with far more consistency and persistency than Dr. Salmon shows in his own conduct. If misquotation and misrepresentation be in accordance with 'the ordinary laws of reasoning,' then Dr. Salmon is a profound logician! We do not claim to be infallible, either naturally, or supernaturally; we do not claim 'a divinely inspired certainty that we are in the right,' and the Vatican Council give no grounds whatever for those ridiculous statements. We have in the Church an infallible guide, and as long as we follow her guidance we are *certain* of the truth of our faith. But we are not infallible, for

through our own fault we may cease to follow the Church's guidance, and thus may fall away, and lose the faith. As long as we are loyal children of the Church we are certain of the truth of our faith, but that certainty does not come to us by inspiration. We do not then make the claims attributed to us by Dr. Salmon. But we do claim with the Vatican Council, and hold as of faith, that we cannot make a salutary act of faith without actual grace enlightening our intellects to see the truth and inclining our wills to embrace it. And this claim of ours is not new, as Dr. Salmon ought to know. Our Lord Himself says :—' No man can come to Me, except the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him.' ' By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is a gift of God.' Actual grace is necessary for all those acts that prepare us for justification, and especially necessary for the more arduous and difficult acts which are opposed to our own passions and prejudices, and Dr. Salmon must be very oblivious of early Church history if he venture to doubt this. To say nothing of other fathers the writings of St. Augustine against Semi-Pelagianism would supply him with abundant proofs of the necessity of illuminating and helping grace, and would show him also that only heretics questioned that necessity. The Second Council of Orange (A.D. 529) in its seventh canon says :—

If anyone asserts that by our natural powers we shall determine or embrace any good thing that pertains to eternal life, or that we shall assent, as we ought, to the salutary preaching of the Gospel without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, who gives to all sweetness in assenting and in believing the truth, that person is deceived by the heretical spirit, and does not understand the voice of God saying in the Gospel ' without Me you can do nothing, (John xv. 5), or that of the Apostle, ' not that we are able to think anything of ourselves, as from ourselves, but all our sufficiency is from God ' (2 Cor. iii. 5).

The sentiment reprobated in such forcible language in this canon is exactly Dr. Salmon's, and it did not occur to him when he ridiculed the statement of the Vatican Council as false and new, that that statement was taken word for

¹ John vi. 44.² Ephes. ii. 8.

word from the canon of the Council of Orange just mentioned. If the Doctor had given some time and thought to the study of the important and difficult subject on which he lectured so glibly, he would not have made such an exhibition of his levity and of his ignorance by ridiculing as false and new a doctrine which our Blessed Lord Himself revealed most explicitly, and which His Church has held and taught ever since her foundation. Cardinal Newman, so frequently misquoted by Dr. Salmon, puts this matter, with his wonted force and clearness, as follows :—

Faith is the gift of God, and not a mere act of our own, which we are free to exert when we will. It is quite distinct from an exercise of reason though it follows upon it. I may feel the force of the argument for the Divine origin of the Church. I may see that I ought to believe, and yet I may be unable to believe. . . . Faith is not a mere conviction in reason ; it is a firm assent ; it is a clear certainty, greater than any other certainty, and this is wrought in the mind by the grace of God, and by it alone. As then men may be convinced, and not act according to their conviction, so they may be convinced, and not believe according to their conviction. . . . In a word, the arguments for religion do not compel anyone to believe, just as arguments for good conduct do not compel anyone to obey. Obedience is the consequence of willing to obey, and faith is the consequence of willing to believe. We may see what is right, whether in matters of faith or obedience, of ourselves, but we cannot will what is right without the grace of God.¹

Instead of reading such extracts for his students, Dr. Salmon falls back on 'an act of his own judgment,' and with very unsatisfactory results. After his dissertation on private judgment he proceeds as follows, feeling apparently that the Catholic Church must go down before his assault :—

We have the choice whether we shall exercise our private judgment in one act or in a great many ; but exercise it in one way or another we must. We may apply our private judgment separately to the different questions in controversy—purgatory, transubstantiation, invocation of saints, and so forth—and come to our own conclusions on each, or we may apply our private judgment to the question whether the Church of Rome is infallible, etc. (Page 48.) . . . It is certain enough that what God revealed is true ; but, if it is not certain that He has revealed the

¹ *Discourses to Mixed Congregations*, Dis. XI., pp. 260, 261. Ed. 1862.

infallibility of the Roman Church, then we cannot have certain assurance of the truth of that doctrine, or of anything that is founded on it. (Pages 63, 64.)

Here again the Doctor is illogical and misleading. He will have to determine whether the *Church of Christ* is infallible and indefectible also; and since this is certain and has been proved, he will then have to exercise his judgment in determining which of the existing bodies is that *Church of Christ*. It must, at all events, profess the doctrine of infallibility, for that doctrine is revealed and true; but since only one of the competitors holds that doctrine, it follows that, if the Church of Christ be existing on earth at all, it must be that one which Dr. Salmon calls the Church of Rome. This is the logical way for Dr. Salmon to use his reason, and it will lead to conclusions very different from those of his lectures. It is a wide field, and a legitimate one, for the exercise of his judgment. But to apply it 'separately to purgatory, transubstantiation, and the invocation of saints' is to abuse it. Only the Church can speak with authority on such questions. These are doctrines that cannot be proved as it is proved that Augustus was Emperor of Rome or that there is such a country as China; and faith founded on such arguments will avail very little for Dr. Salmon in the day of his need. It was not faith founded on such arguments that gave St. Paul the certainty of which he speaks in his Epistle to the Romans;¹ it was not such faith that enabled St. Stephen to 'see the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing at the right hand of God';² it was not such faith that sustained St. Laurence on the gridiron, or that ever enabled anyone to 'take up his cross and follow' our Divine Lord. Such faith as Dr. Salmon contemplates can bring no real consolation in this life, and can inspire no hope for the life to come. Resting on an act of his own judgment, like his belief in the exploits of Cæsar or Napoleon Buonaparte, it does not go outside the sphere of mere reason; and hence it is that he seems to know nothing of the elevating, assuring, sustaining character of divine faith, and nothing of the effect of grace on the soul.

¹ viii. 38.

² Acts vii. 55.

Grace and the supernatural are to Dr. Salmon unintelligible terms. He cannot enter into the views of Catholics regarding them; he cannot understand the certainty, the peace of soul, the 'sweetness in believing,' which the gift of faith brings to Catholics. All this he caricatures, though he cannot comprehend it. By pandering to the prejudices of young men not overburdened with knowledge, he may secure an audience in his class-room and the character of champion of Protestantism, but he should not forget that these young men have souls to save, and that it is only divine faith can save them. His references to 'the prayerful man' and to the Bible as a safeguard against Romanism are vague platitudes. The *private judgment* which he extols used to be the Protestant substitute for Pope and Church; but 'modern criticism' has killed it, and all Dr. Salmon's art cannot bring it back to life. For the advocates of the Bible, interpreted by private judgment, the vital question *now* is: How much of the Bible is left for private judgment to interpret? And if Dr. Salmon had given his attention to this question, his time would have been more usefully as well as more charitably spent than it is in bearing false witness against us.

Dr. Salmon was able to give his students the welcome assurance that Catholics were so shattered by the logic of controversialists of his own class and calibre that new methods of defence had been recently resorted to, but, of course, with no prospect of success. The new defences are Newman's *Theory of Development*, and the theory contained in his *Grammar of Assent*. These were, he told them, specially designed to meet the exigencies of controversy, but have failed to do so. In his First Lecture Dr. Salmon warned his students not to identify the statements of particular divines with the official teaching of the Catholic Church, and yet he is doing just that himself all through his Lectures. The works named are represented by him as if they were the very foundation of the Catholic system, essential to its existence. That he should have introduced them into his argument at all, shows how confidently he relied on the intellectual character of his audience. For surely Cardinal Newman is not the

Catholic Church, and the Church has not adopted the works named, nor given any official sanction to either of them ; and therefore she is in no sense whatever responsible for them, and whether the theories and arguments of the works named be sound or unsound, the Church is in no way concerned. The *Grammar of Assent* is, as the very name implies, an attempt to explain the mental process by which men arrive at their beliefs. The greater part of the book has just as much interest for Protestants as for Catholics. Only one section of the fifth chapter has any special interest for Catholics, and even that section is merely explanatory, showing how the philosophical principles laid down in the previous chapter may be applied to dogmatic truths. The late Cardinal Cullen said of the *Grammar of Assent* that it was 'a hard nut to crack,' and Dr. Salmon does not seem to have seriously attempted the operation. And after all his declamation he is forced to admit that Catholics are in no sense concerned with the book. He says :—

When Newman's book first came out one could constantly see traces of its influences in Roman Catholic articles in magazines and reviews. Now it seems to have dropped very much out of sight, and the highest Roman Catholic authorities lay quite a different basis for their faith. (Page 78.)

The *basis* of Catholic faith has been laid down not by 'Roman Catholic authorities,' but by our Blessed Lord Himself, and considered, as an attempt to use the *Grammar of Assent*, as a weapon against that faith, the net result of Dr. Salmon's long lecture is—*nothing*. Let us see how he succeeds with the *Essay on Development*.

It is, he says, a theory devised to cover our retreat before the overwhelming force of Protestant logic. 'The Romish champions, beaten out of the open field, have shut themselves up in the fortress of infallibility' (page 46). But while retreating 'the first strategic movement towards the rear was the doctrine of development, which has seriously modified the old theory of tradition' (page 31). It must be owing to his propensity to misrepresent that he substitutes the absurd expression 'doctrine of development' for Newman's own words 'development of doctrine'; but he distinctly

states that it was an invention to meet a difficulty. 'The starting of this theory,' he says, 'exhibits plainly the total rout which the champions of the Romish Church experienced in the battle they attempted to fight on the field of history . . . it is, in short, an attempt to enable men beaten off the platform of history to hang on to it by the eyelids.' Though this extract would lead one to infer that the theory was not previously heard of he says, lower down, that the theory was not new, for it was maintained by Mochler and Perrone, and even a century earlier than their time.

But Newman's book had the effect of making it popular to an extent it had never been before, and of causing its general adoption by Romish advocates, who are now content to exchange tradition, which their predecessors had made the basis of their system, for this new foundation of development. (Page 31.) . . . When Newman's book appeared I looked with much curiosity to see whether the heads of the Church to which he was joining himself would accept the defence made by their new convert, the book having been written before he had joined them . . . it seemed a complete abandonment of the old traditional theory of the advocates of Rome.' (Page 33.)

Later on he says: 'This theory of development, so fashionable thirty years ago, has now dropped into the background' (page 41). And later on still, in his Seventh Lecture, he says the theory 'has now become fashionable' (page 113). What are we to think of this extraordinary theory, or the data given by Dr. Salmon? It is a new theory, and an old one, accepted by us and discarded; vital to us, and useless to us, and all, at the same time, according to this inimitable logician! Leaving to his juvenile controversialists the task of assimilating this mass of contradictions, it is quite sufficient to remind the Regius Professor that the Catholic Church is in no sense whatever responsible for the *Essay on Development*. It was written, as Dr. Salmon himself states, before its author became a Catholic; and if the Doctor had looked at the preface of the *Essay* he would have seen the following: 'His (the author's) first act on his conversion was to offer his work for revision to the proper authorities; but the offer was declined, on the ground that it was written and partly printed before he was a

Catholic' (Pref. p. x). This shows how little the Catholic Church is concerned with the theory or with the arguments of the *Essay*; and how grossly unfair, even to his own students, is the mass of misrepresentation piled up by Dr. Salmon, on the false assumption that the Church is concerned with it. The development of Christian doctrine is as old as Christianity itself. St. Peter's first sermon on the first Pentecost is an instance of it, and so too are the proofs and explanations of doctrine to be found in the New Testament, and in the early councils and early fathers, St. Vincent of Lerins propounded it as a formal theory. So far from supplanting tradition and the fathers, as Dr. Salmon says it does, it is an explanation of both; and if there be anything peculiar in Newman's theory, he is himself responsible as his own words testify. If Dr. Salmon had given as much of his time and talent to the earnest search for truth, as he devoted to the propagation of calumnies on the Catholic Church, it would have been all the better for himself, and for his students also.

Before passing from the subject of *Development*, it may be well to consider the value of any interesting discovery which Dr. Salmon has made in the history of the theory. He says: 'But more than a century before Dr. Newman's time the theory of Development had played its part in the Roman Catholic controversy, only then it was the Protestant combatant who brought that theory forward, and the Roman Catholic who repudiated it' (page 35). The allusion is to the controversy between Bossuet and the Calvinist Jurieu, and Dr. Salmon goes on to say:—

The theses of his [Bossuet's] book called the *History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches*, was that the doctrine of the true Church is always the same, whereas Protestants are at variance with each other, and with themselves. Bousset was replied to by a Calvinist minister named Jurieu. The line Jurieu took was to dispute the assertion that the doctrine of the true is always the same. He maintained the doctrine of development in its full extent, asserting that the truth of God was only known by instalments (*par parcelles*), that the theology of the fathers was imperfect and fluctuating, and that Christian theology has been constantly going on towards perfection. He illustrated his theory by examples of important doctrines, concerning which he alleged

the teaching of the early Church to have been defective or uncertain, of which it is enough here to quote that he declared that the mystery of the Trinity, though of the last importance, and essential to Christianity, remained as every one knows undeveloped (*informe*) down to the first Council of Nice, and even down to that of Constantinople. (Pages 35, 36.)

And Dr. Salmon adds that even 'the Jesuit Petavius had . . . made very similar assertions concerning the immaturity of the teaching of the early fathers' (page 36). And his conclusion is this: 'It seems then a very serious matter if the leading authorities of the Roman Church have now to own that in the main point at issue between Bossuet and Jurieu, the Calvinist minister was in the right, and their own champion in the wrong' (page 37). According to Dr. Salmon then Bossuet repudiated the development of doctrine in the sense in which Catholics now admit it, while Jurieu maintained in precisely the same sense as we now hold it; and moreover the learned Jesuit Petavius agreed with Jurieu. Neither of these statements has the slightest foundation in fact. Dr. Salmon says he has taken from Bossuet's *Premier Avertissement aux Protestans*. They are not taken from the *Premier Avertissement* for they are not contained in it; on the contrary it supplies conclusive evidence to contradict each of these statements. Bossuet addressing Protestants in the third section of the *Avertissement* says: 'What your minister regards as intolerable is, that I should dare to state that the faith does not change in the true Church, and that the truth coming from God was perfect from the first.' Now Bossuet immediately explains what he means by this statement, for he immediately quotes St. Vincent of Lerins in confirmation of it:—

The Church of Christ, the faithful guardian of the truths committed to her care, never changes anything in them; she takes nothing away; she adds nothing; she rejects nothing necessary; she takes up nothing superfluous. Her whole care is to explain those truths that were originally committed to her, to confirm those that have been sufficiently explained, to guard those that have been defined and confirmed, and to transmit to posterity in writings those things that she received from the fathers by tradition. (Sec. 4)

And having thus defined his own teaching Bossuet

lays down, in Sec. 5, that his proposition which the minister thought so strange is exactly that of St. Vincent of Lerins, and he adds: 'But it is not sufficient for that father to establish the same truth which I have laid down as a foundation, but he even establishes it by the very same principle, namely, that the truth coming from God was perfect from the first' (Sec. 5); and he then quotes St. Vincent as saying:—

I cannot sufficiently express my surprise, how men are so proud, so blind, so impious, so carried away by error, that not content with the rule of faith, once given to the faithful, and handed down from those who went before, they are every day looking for novelties, and are daily seeking to add, to change, or take away something from religion, as if it was not a heavenly truth, which once revealed is sufficient, but only a human institution, which can only come to perfection by continual changing, or more correctly, by every day finding out some defect (Sec. 5.)

And still quoting St. Vincent, Bossuet adds:—

But in order the better to understand the sentiments of St. Vincent we must look at his proof. And the proof of the unchangeable character of the doctrine is St. Paul's exhortation to Timothy: 'Oh, Timothy, guard the deposit'; that is, as he explains it, not what you have yourself discovered, but what has been entrusted to you, what you have received from others, and not at all what you might have invented yourself. (Sec. 5.)

From Bossuet's own words, therefore, in the *Avertissement*, relied on by Dr. Salmon, it is perfectly clear that his teaching as to the unchangeable character of Catholic faith, and the explanation of doctrines under the control and guidance of the teaching Church, is the same as Catholic theologians have always held and taught. It is the teaching given by St. Paul to his disciple Timothy, inculcated by St. Vincent in the beautiful language already quoted from him, and reiterated in St. Vincent's own words in the acts of the Vatican Council. Dr. Salmon professes to have read the *Avertissement*, and he gives in his own book the acts of the Vatican, and he does not see how they agree in this matter.

All looks yellow to the jaundiced eye.

The character given of Jurieu by his co-religionist and

contemporary Bayle, would not lead one to attach much importance to his views on theology, or indeed on any other subject. His views on *Development* Dr. Salmon professes to have taken from Bossuet's *Avertissement*, and Dr. Salmon's contention is, that our theory now was Jurieu's theory then, and that it seems a very serious matter if 'the leading authorities in the Roman Church have now to own that the Calvinist minister was in the right, and their own champion in the wrong' (page 37). Now, when we refer to the *Avertissement*, from which Dr. Salmon has taken his information, we find Jurieu's theory of *Development* described by Bossuet as follows: 'It may be alleged that the changes were only verbal in the terms, and that in reality the Church's belief was always the same. But this is not true . . . for the way in which we have seen that the ancients speak of the generation of the Son of God, and of His inequality with the Father, convey impressions very false and very different from ours.' (Sec. 6.) Again from Sec. 8 we learn that according to Jurieu the early Christians did not believe that the Person of the Son of God was *eternal*, and consequently did not believe that the Trinity was from eternity. Again in Sec. 9 we are told that according to Jurieu the early Christians did not believe that God was *immutable*. In Sec. 10 we are told that according to Jurieu the first Christians believed that the Divine Persons were not equal, and from Sec. 13 we learn that, according to Jurieu, the early Christians did not know the mystery of the Incarnation. It is needless to quote any further the blasphemies of this man. It is quite unnecessary to inquire whether Jurieu really held these blasphemies, though Bossuet convicts him out of his own mouth. Such at all events is the theory of Jurieu from the very text which Dr. Salmon professes to have quoted. According to Jurieu the early Christians were not only ignorant of true doctrines, but they held for at least three centuries doctrines that were blasphemous, and subversive of all true faith, and that from this mass of blasphemous error truth gradually (*par parcelles*) came forth. And with this text and proof before him Dr. Salmon does not hesitate to tell his students that

Jurieu's position then was the Catholic position now, and that 'in Newman's *Essay on Development* everything that had been said by Jurieu and by Petavius . . . is said again, and said more strongly' (page 37).

And what has Petavius done that he should be classed with such a person as Jurieu? Surely his character as one of the greatest scholars of his age, and one of the leading theologians of the great Jesuit Order, should have made even Dr. Salmon hesitate to link him with such an ignorant fanatic. But the most extraordinary feature of the charge against Petavius is that the very text on which the charge is grounded proves it to be utterly and entirely false—is simply a formal refutation of the charge. Again Dr. Salmon takes his information from the *Avertissement*, and the only reference to Petavius is in Sec. 28, in which Bossuet undertakes to prove 'that the passage of Petavius quoted by Jurieu, states the direct contradiction of what that minister attributes to him.' And Bossuet proves his assertion conclusively from the text of Petavius. There was question only of the doctrine of the Trinity, and Bossuet shows that according to Petavius all the fathers agree as to the mystery, though they sometimes differ as to the manner of explaining certain things connected with it. In the less important matters some few, very few, have erred. Some have spoken inaccurately but the great multitude of the fathers have been as accurate in their language as they were orthodox in their faith. This, according to Bossuet, is the teaching of Petavius, and anyone who consults Petavius himself will find Bossuet's statement quite correct. The text will be found in the preface to the second volume of Petavius' works, c. 1, n. 10 and 12 of Zachary's edition, Venice, 1757. Now, though Petavius directly contradicts Jurieu, Dr. Salmon declares that they agree, and by some clever mental process he finds that Newman agrees with both. In proof of this he says that 'Newman begins by owning the unserviceableness of St. Vincent's maxim "*quod semper*"' (page 37). Dr. Salmon himself has made the same admission at page 270. He adds that Newman 'confesses that is impossible by means of this maxim (unless indeed a very forced interpretation be

put on it) to establish the articles of Pope Pius' creed . . . impossible to show that these articles are any part of the faith of the Early Church' (page 37). Dr. Salmon is here fully availing himself of his 'advantage in addressing an audience all one way of thinking,' and thus he is lead again to attribute to Newman a statement that has no foundation in his text. Newman says nothing of what is attributed to him here. In speaking of St. Vincent's maxim, Newman says that an unfair interpretation is put on the maxim by Protestants in order to make a case against the Catholic Church, and that for this unfair interpretation Protestants themselves suffer.

It admits [Newman says] of being interpreted in one of two ways : if it be narrowed for the purpose of disproving the Catholicity of the creed of Pope Pius, it becomes also an objection to the Athanasian ; and if it be relaxed to admit the doctrines retained by the English Church, it no longer excludes certain doctrines of Rome which that Church denies. It cannot at once condemn St. Thomas and St. Bernard, and defend St. Athanasius and St. Gregory Nazianzen.¹

And Newman adds :-

Let it not be for a moment supposed that I impugn the orthodoxy of the early divines, or the cogency of their testimony among fair inquirers : but I am trying them by that *unfair* interpretation of Vincentius which is necessary in order to make him available against the Church of Rome.²

This is Cardinal Newman's real view as to the rule of St. Vincent of Lerins, very different from the view attributed to him by Dr. Salmon in his anxiety to make a case against the Catholic Church. And it is for this same object that Bossuet and Jurieu and Petavius are quoted by Dr. Salmon, to make them available against the Catholic Church. The attempt, however, is a miserable failure. In fact, no one can read the *Avertissement*, and read Dr. Salmon's paraphrase of it, without feeling—well, that the Doctor is a very imaginative person, that he has a rather clever way of manipulating his authorities, that he is a sort of mesmeriser who can make his media say precisely what he wants them

¹ *Essay on Development*, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

to say. His aim is, he says, not victory, but truth: but it must be admitted that he has a somewhat peculiar way of telling the truth. His manner of carrying on the 'Controversy with Rome' is in strict accordance with the time honoured traditions of Trinity College; and the College is, indeed, fortunate in securing the services of a regius professor who has such a profound knowledge of theology, and such a scrupulous regard for truth.

[To be continued.]

J. MURPHY.

THE TRIALS OF SOME IRISH MISSIONARIES

III.

THE facts contained in the present paper are similar to those already submitted to the reader in articles which appeared in the I. E. RECORD of May and June, 1899. They throw a still clearer light on the state of religion in Ireland for the greater part of the seventeenth century, serving, at the same time, to illustrate certain general assertions to which I was obliged to confine myself in my narrative of the Irish Discalced Carmelites. A series of MS. notes on various Chapters General of the Order,¹ written principally in Italian, furnish these facts, most of which seem to have been collected by one of the Irish fathers before the year 1650, with a view, no doubt, to the compilation of a history of 'St. Patrick's Province.' If we had nothing else to be grateful for, the notes now at our disposal add a number of new names to the sadly incomplete obituary of those Irish missionaries, whose further trials are, however, of quite an absorbing interest.

The name of Father Paul-Simon has frequently occurred in connection with the establishment of the Teresian Carmelites in Ireland. We are told that his great solicitude for the success of the Irish mission was due to the

¹ For the transcript of which I am indebted to Father Alphonsus, O.D.C., Ypres, and to the Rev. Benedict Zimmerman, O.D.C., London.

spirit of fervent zeal which he had noticed among the young students from this country preparing for the priesthood in the college of the Order at Louvain. One of the most promising of these future missionaries was Brother Matthew of the Immaculate Conception, a native of the County Galway, the son of Thomas Challoner and Catherine Ward. He had been professed at Brussels on the 10th of December, 1617; but just as he was giving evidence of very great talents it was discovered that he suffered from an infirmity which would prevent his ordination eventually. And the grievous trial of his life, borne with exemplary sweetness and patience, was to see his eager young companions leave for their native land, where they should be daily exposed to perils, privations, and hardships in the sacred cause of truth. Brother Matthew died at Louvain on the 17th of December, 1657, in the fifty-ninth year of his age, too humble, of course, so much as to dream that after several centuries Ireland would proudly number him among her zealous missionaries.

The need of financial resources was the principal hindrance to the immediate carrying out of the plan which Father Paul-Simon had proposed to the Superiors-General with regard to the Irish mission. But when he explained all that he had heard in Belgium concerning the charity and devotedness of the faithful of Ireland, and, above all, their pitiful longing for the consolations of religion, the other difficulties did not appear insurmountable; and special mention is made of the transport of joy with which Fathers Edward of the Kings, and Paul of St. Ubaldus, received the glad tidings of their having been chosen for those arduous duties likely to entail the sacrifice of their very lives. It was towards the end of the month of September, in the year 1625, that they reached the city of Dublin. Little had either of them thought, when visiting the various Carmelite monasteries which afforded them welcome hospitality on their tedious journey through Flanders, that a time would come when these houses should no longer exist, while the mission which they themselves were about to inaugurate at the risk of their lives should have developed into a most

flourishing Province of their Order. They may have seen and admired the picture of 'St. Teresa in Prayer,' which Rubens had recently painted for one of the Carmelite churches, and which, as it now hangs in the Art Gallery at Antwerp, cannot fail to remind those interested in the history of 'Carmel in Ireland' of what the Irish Teresian friars of the seventeenth century were willing to do and to suffer for the Faith.

We find that a Decree of the General Chapter of 1626 provided for the foundation of a college on the Continent for the education of both Irish and English subjects. This house was to have been under the immediate control of the Father General himself. However, the extraordinary success already attending the efforts of Fathers Edward and Paul, showed that so far as Ireland was concerned, the project might be deferred pending further developments. For in this same Chapter it transpired that the two religious had actually opened a little friary and chapel in Dublin, and now sought permission to enlarge the buildings, having received every encouragement from the Catholic citizens, and not being yet molested in any way by the authorities. Not alone were the fathers of the Chapter delighted to grant all the requests which had been made; but decided, moreover, on sending Father Columbanus of the Blessed Sacrament, Father Patrick of St. James, and Brother Fortunatus of St. Anne—a student who had completed his theological course, but was yet too young for ordination—to assist in the good work thus happily begun. Difficult as it was to communicate with Rome in those days, the Irish fathers kept their Superiors-General well informed of the progress of the mission; and later on a formal account of the mode of life led by that first little community of Discalced Carmelites in Ireland was forwarded for the approval and blessing of those who had the welfare of their brethren in this remote country very dearly at heart. Part of this edifying document is still extant; and somewhat lengthy allusion to it will well repay the trouble.

The chief object of Fathers Edward and Paul in coming to Dublin was merely to avail themselves of the toleration supposed to be enjoyed by Catholics under King Charles I. ;

their most sanguine hope being to rent a small house in the city where they could say Mass and recite the Divine Office before engaging in their missionary duties among the people. But no sooner had their arrival become known, than the faithful took it for granted that they might assist at the Holy Sacrifice in the room used by the friars as an oratory. This led in a very short time to the necessity of making that petition to the General Chapter. Having celebrated the Sacred Mysteries each morning, and fulfilled their obligations in choir, the fathers attended for hours at a time in the confessional, and frequently preached during the week as well as on Sundays and festivals; in fact, whenever a favourable opportunity offered to instruct and edify the people. Both Father Edward and Father Paul seem to have possessed a special talent for moving their audience to remorse and fervour, the latter priest often selecting as the subject of his discourse the Truths of Religion, which he explained briefly and convincingly, and in such wise that the faithful might see for themselves how easily the absurd errors of that age could be forcibly refuted. Moreover, a pious meditation—usually from the works of Lewis De Granada¹—was read for a number of people who visited the little church every day at noon, desiring to spend some time in mental prayer before the Blessed Sacrament. So much profit was derived from this excellent practice that the fathers are said to have positively worked wonders in the spiritual way, keeping always to the solid principles of mysticism laid down in the writings of St. Teresa, St. John of the Cross, and the Venerable John of Jesus Mary. As for their own advancement in virtue, the religious observed the rigid rule of their Order just as fervently as if they had no missionary labours on hand, knowing this to be the most efficacious means of arriving ultimately at perfection.

It was not long until that humble retreat became a favourite place of devotion in Dublin, being known among the Catholics as the Chapel of 'Our Lady, the Vanquisher of all Heresy,' because of the great zeal of the friars in

¹ Whose admirable treatise, entitled *A Memorial of a Christian Life*, was edited, in English, by Father L'Estrange, O.D.C., early in the last century.

proving the brown scapular to be a special shield given to protect the clients of the Blessed Virgin in time of danger. We are told that many pious young men—sons of some of the most influential citizens—applied for admission to the austere Order of Carmel; but just then there was very great difficulty experienced in sending postulants abroad for their noviceship and education. Still, in some instances, Fathers Edward and Paul did assume the risk even as early as the year 1626; and in the course of time two of those fervent aspirants became most successful missionaries in Ireland, and were well known as Father Angelus of St. Teresa and Father Joseph of St. Mary.

The fame of this poor friary in Cook-street at length attracted the notice of many of the leading Protestants of Dublin, who, visiting the place through curiosity, stood amazed at what they saw, and were deeply moved by the mortified lives of the religious, evidence of which appeared on every side. Among their more distinguished visitors, the friars received the Viceroy himself, who was equally impressed by the spirit and bearing of Fathers Edward and Paul; and on another occasion his secretary—Calisorth (?)—called unexpectedly when passing near the monastery, and asked to be allowed to accompany the religious to the refectory. Of course the favour was most willingly granted, and so profoundly edified and touched was that gentleman by his strange experience—the reading happened to be on the General Judgment—that he was unable to speak when leaving. He generously contributed to the fund for improvements in the church and friary, and sometime afterwards he sent a present of fine fish to the fathers in acknowledgment, he said, of their goodness to him on the day he had the privilege of being their guest. The Castle officials were not always so kindly disposed to the Carmelites of Cook-street, as I have elsewhere explained.¹

In the same narrative mention is made of the fervour of the novices received into the Order at Dublin. Not alone were they most diligent in the Regular Observance, and devoted to prayer and mortification—exercising themselves

¹ *Carmel in Ireland*, p. 49.

unceasingly in the presence of God and holy Obedience—but, from the very beginning, were eagerly looking forward to the time when in the discharge of their missionary duties they might happily be called upon (as some of them actually were) to lay down their lives for the Faith. The first of all—as we learn from another source—to take the brown habit of Carmel in his native land was a young man known in religion as Brother James of the Blessed Sacrament. He was member of an ancient and noble Irish family, his parents being exemplary Catholics and extremely careful in the education of their son, whose after-career so fully repaid their anxious love. Owing to the great inconvenience and risk of sending postulants abroad, the Discalced Carmelites of Dublin obtained permission to profess their own subjects as early as the year 1627, the date of Brother James's canonical reception. He was then in the twenty-first year of his age. During his noviceship he gave much edification to the other members of the community, by this time quite numerous; and, as a student, soon proved that he was gifted with extraordinary abilities. He became one of the professors in the Irish Province almost immediately after his ordination, and taught with great success until he was driven into exile by the Puritans. But his renown had already extended to the Continent; and he was at once appointed to teach both Philosophy and Theology in the college of the Order at Malta. Later on he was called to Rome to train the students at S. Maria della Vittoria in the art of Polemics: a position deemed of gravest responsibility at the time; but for which Father James of the Blessed Sacrament was well qualified in every respect. He died there in the year 1648 to the great regret of the entire Order; more especially, of course, to the sorrow of his brethren on the Irish mission.

From the Acts of the General Chapter, held during the month of May, 1629, we learn that the newly-elected Superior-General, Father Ferdinand of St. Mary, was deeply interested in all that concerned those under his jurisdiction in Ireland. Their zeal had produced much fruit by this time, not only among the faithful of Dublin, but

throughout the entire country. The various requests made to this Chapter by the Irish fathers were readily granted ; amongst other things, Father Edward of the Kings was most anxious for the foundation of another house, wherein those who had been recently professed could be educated for the priesthood. There were now twenty-five members in the community at Dublin, and all the exercises of the strict Observance—such as rising at midnight for the recital of the Divine Office—were carried out most fervently, the religious not availing themselves of the usual missionary dispensations. Particular mention was made of their zeal in the discharge of the duties of the sacred ministry, the younger friars eagerly waiting to emulate the edifying example of Fathers Edward and Paul. But as very few of them were yet priests, and since the labours of the mission continued to increase, when the General Chapter next assembled (A.D., 1632), it was decided to send the Irish fathers some further assistance 'to combat error'—particularly as Father Edward of the Kings had in the meantime died—by placing at their disposal the services of a young religious who had just completed his studies in Belgium. This was Father Malachy of Jesus, whose career was very eventful and of great profit to the Irish Church.

Father Malachy was a native of the county Louth, and was only in the forty-first year of his age at the time of his death, A.D., 1641. He had been educated in Flanders, because of the persecution against Catholics in Ireland, and in 1622 became a Discalced Carmelite. Pious and studious, he gave the utmost satisfaction both as a novice and as a collegian, and on coming to Dublin he made many converts, one of whom was the Protestant Dean of Kildare—the then President of Trinity College—a man of very great personal influence in Ireland. Naturally this excited the anger and jealousy of the heretics ; so that we are not surprised on finding Father Malachy's name in a list of Irish exiles, about which we shall soon have occasion to speak. Banishment proved martyrdom in his case, so terrible were the hardships the out-lawed friars had to endure before they were driven from the country.

A touching incident occurred at the General Chapter of the year 1635, which gives a still further insight into some of the minor trials our missionaries were called upon to bear. Two fathers from Ireland had undertaken the long and dangerous journey to Rome in order to assist at that Chapter as representatives of their province. They were Father Antony of St. Mary, the Vicar-Provincial, and Father Onufrius of St. Angelus,¹ who acted as Procurator of the mission. Their presence there implied not only the desire to forward the interests of the Irish communities in every way, but chiefly to testify to their filial obedience to the Superior-General of the Order. Father Onufrius, who was born at St. Omer in the year 1600, had held responsible positions in various monasteries in Belgium and France, and had been intimately connected with the Irish mission for a very long time, seemed most fitted for the duty imposed upon him, as he had recently concluded the canonical visitation in Ireland. However, on presenting their 'letters patent' to the Chapter (a formality most strictly insisted upon by the Constitutions), it was found that the other Irish fathers had omitted to sign these important documents for their representatives; and, consequently, neither Father Antony nor Father Onufrius could assist at the various sessions, for the Superiors-General were unable to remedy the omission, although all knew that it happened through inadvertence. Even an effort was made to admit at least one of the fathers in virtue of a Decree of the Sacred Congregation (Propaganda), A.D. 1663, which required one or two religious from each mission to attend the General Chapter every six years. But both Father Antony and Father Onufrius earnestly requested that the affairs of the entire Order should not be delayed on their account; and it is pleasant to write of the result: the several petitions of the Irish fathers were granted unanimously, and special reference was made to the edifying submission and humility of their Vicar-Provincial and of the Procurator of the mission. The foundation of the new friaries was formally confirmed,

¹ Intended for 'Father Onufrius of St. James,' evidently.

Father Onuphrius himself, who appears to have been affiliated to the Irish Province for the time being, was elected first prior of the Discalced Carmelite Monastery at Athboy. Father Fortunatus of St. Anne was appointed superior of the house recently established at Kinsale, pending the election of a prior and sub-prior (as the Constitutions prescribe) after the community had been duly formed there. All that had been already done regarding the novitiate in Dublin and the college at Drogheda was likewise cordially approved of by this Chapter; and as two young priests—Father Cyril of St. Joseph, and Father Christopher of St. Matthew—had lately finished their studies in Rome, it was thought advisable to send them back to Ireland immediately, where they would be of so much assistance, seeing how fervent their lives had been during their college course. The Irish fathers were deeply grateful for this and for the many other favours which they had received; but, above all, for the paternal interest in the welfare of their Province thus manifested by their Superiors-General.

Father Onuphrius again represented the Teresian Carmelites of Ireland in the General Chapter of 1638. Marvellous as had been the progress of the mission during the past twelve years, we learn that the religious lived in a state of constant suspense, so uncertain was the toleration shown to Irish Roman Catholics. Hence, although the petition forwarded by the Teresian Carmelites, for the canonical erection of the monasteries of their Order in this country into a province, was readily granted, the Chapter suggested that the Decree should not be executed until such time as the attitude of the King's enemies had become less threatening; their power at that particular time being very great. Still the Irish fathers, being allowed to act on their own discretion in this matter, did not hesitate to elect their first Provincial and his assistants, now formally placing the new province under the patronage of St. Patrick. As the English mission was then in urgent need of priests, the General—Father Philip of St. James—decided on sending Father John Baptist of Carmel (an Englishman who had become a Discalced Carmelite in Ireland) to administer to the spiritual wants of the faithful

there ; and from the year 1639, the Catholics of Warwickshire and Somerset, especially, derived great profit from the zeal of this religious, who in the course of his missionary career was called upon to suffer much in the cause of truth.

The next Général Chapter of the Order was held in the year 1641, at which the recently elected Irish Provincial, Father Patrick of St. James, and his companions, Fathers Malachy of Jesus and Simon of St. Teresa, assisted as representatives of the Teresian Carmelites of Ireland. The Decree relating to the establishment of St. Patrick's Province was now confirmed ; nevertheless, Father Patrick was anxious that there should be a novitiate for Irish subjects opened somewhere on the Continent ; so that thenceforth the young religious might be professed in security. Such was the existing state of affairs in Ireland that a persecution seemed daily imminent ; and for this reason the matter before the Chapter was considered all the more pressing ; although from the very beginning, as we have seen, the Irish Fathers themselves felt assured that, sooner or later, the project so frequently proposed would admit of no alternative. It was suggested that the Carmelite monastery at La Rochelle would suit this purpose admirably, in the almost certain event of its being restored to the Order by King Louis XIII. —to the joy of that monarch's Catholic subjects, if to the indignation of the Huguenot rebels. Father Patrick's request was ably supported by the Superior of the newly-established Province of Aquitaine, who said that deliberation could hardly be necessary on what concerned so intimately the salvation of many souls ; and which must needs redound greatly to the glory of God. It was rather a privilege for them to have an opportunity of co-operating in any way in a work so holy, for which their brethren in Ireland were prepared not only to strive zealously, but to lay down their lives. The petition was granted most willingly ; but when the Irish fathers should secure possession of that monastery at La Rochelle, it was to serve both as a Novitiate and a House of Studies, with a community not exceeding forty professed religious.

The fathers assembled in the General Chapter of 1641

were, moreover, much edified by the success of the members of the Order in Ireland, notwithstanding the many difficulties and trials attending their missionary labours. A thrilling narrative of what he himself had witnessed while at Ardee was furnished by Father Columbanus of St. Michael. He had been sent thither, when only a deacon, to accompany Father Victor of St. Michael, whom Father Simon, the Vicar-Provincial, had directed to prepare the ruins of the old Carmelite monastery there for a community of the Teresian friars, (A.D. 1639). Father Victor was still a student in Rome in the year 1634; and to Father Columbanus we are indebted for some of the most important documents relating to the history of St. Patrick's Province which, at present, are happily extant. Neither was the knowledge of the success of the Irish Discalced Carmelites at this epoch confined to the Order solely. We are informed that the Sacred Congregation signified approval of their zeal by granting them various favours, particularly the privilege of founding monasteries even when the ordinances of the Apostolic Constitutions, with regard to the number of religious in each community, could not be observed. This important concession was sanctioned by Pope Urban VIII. on the 10th of June, 1641. On the 18th of May that same year another Decree, in favour of the Irish Discalced Carmelites, and bearing the signature of Cardinal Barberini, was forwarded to the Archbishop of Armagh, to whose most special consideration these religious were commended lest they should be interfered with in any way in the exercise of the sacred ministry. It appears that the Teresian friars met with much trouble the preceding year (A.D. 1640) while establishing their claim to certain monasteries, a matter to which we shall have occasion to allude again in the course of our narrative. However, their own trials could not hinder them, apparently, offering a practical proof of sympathy to their brethren then struggling on the English mission. Father Joseph of St. Mary (Rev. Nicholas Rider), born in Dublin, of English parents, about the year 1600,

¹ Written 'Michael of St. Victor' in another document.

was one of the most promising members of the Irish Province; still, from a reference made in the General Chapter of 1641, we find that Father Patrick of St. James gladly sent him over to the aid of the Discalced Carmelites in England, an action highly approved of by the Superiors-General, who could well appreciate the generosity of the sacrifice which the Irish religious had thus made. The hopes placed in Father Joseph's spirit of missionary zeal were more than realized before the close of his long and eventful career in the year 1682. Besides the fervent discharge of the duties of the sacred ministry, he taught a number of young men the classics, and prepared them to study for the priesthood on the Continent, where most of them were afterwards ordained. He himself accompanied George Halley to the novitiate in Dublin, waiting to see him clothed in the brown habit and receive what proved for him the auspicious name of Angelus in religion, and which is now included in the list of our Irish confessors of the Faith.

IV.

A General Chapter of the Discalced Carmelites was held in Rome in the year 1644. Father John of the Mother of God—the Irish Provincial, mentioned as a most distinguished missionary—was present, and had a sad tale to tell of the sufferings and privations of the members of the Order in Ireland. The fathers of the Chapter might have expected some such narrative, for Father Innocent of St. Vincent, appointed to make the general visitation there, and also in England, in 1642, had already furnished evidence of the appalling condition of the Catholics in both countries, and of the trials of the priests who, at every hazard, persevered in affording them the strengthening consolations of their Faith. It was only in the residence of the Spanish ambassador that Father Innocent himself could meet the Teresian friars of the English mission, few in number, but full of zeal. On that occasion he believed the duty of his office to consist in merely encouraging the religious and exhorting them to still greater constancy, which he clearly foresaw must soon needs be heroic to meet more cruel

phases of the persecution already perhaps at hand. The Roman Catholics were everywhere detested by the heretics, who regarded them as traitors, and treated them accordingly. He was told that the most trying grievance which the faithful had to complain of regarded the many serious obstacles in the way of educating their children. As for the clergy they administered the Sacraments in constant danger of their lives; and could only venture forth from their hiding-places during the night, always fearful lest they should be discovered in the houses of the Catholics, to receive them being a felony in the eyes of the law. Still, Father Innocent assures us, that he found the persecution raging even more fiercely in Ireland, where several of the Discalced Carmelites had been recently slain; others were then in prison; many had been forced into exile; the remainder being dispersed throughout the country—to the very great profit of the suffering people, who were wonderfully encouraged by seeing those confessors fearlessly waging an unremitting war against the errors of their persecutors. In fact by the year 1643 all the monasteries of the Irish Province had been seized and plundered by the heretics; however, a few friaries were subsequently recovered by the religious, as already explained.

At the request of the Chapter, Father John of the Mother of God briefly stated the facts of the martyrdom of the three Teresian friars whom the Puritans had put to death; and he promised to forward to Rome, as soon as possible, an official document containing such formal evidence as might be used in the eventual beatification of these confessors. There is no doubt that that document was actually sent from Ireland; but, unhappily, it seems to have been either lost on the way, or to have fallen into the hands of those who did not then realise its importance. Were it now forthcoming, much might be done towards having the names of Father Thomas Aquinas, Brother Angelus, and Brother Peter raised to our Altars. The recent beatification of two Discalced Carmelites who were martyred in Sumatra about the same time—the Blessed Denis of the Nativity and Redemptus of the Cross—gives us reason to

hope that the cause of their Irish brethren will yet reach a like happy issue. And it is reassuring to find that we are referred for the authentic account of the martyrdom of the three Irish confessors to the narrative of Father Philip of the Blessed Trinity; a contemporary writer of great authority, to whom we are also indebted for the record of the sufferings and death of the Blessed Denis of the Nativity and Redemptus of the Cross.

Father John of the Mother of God was himself a victim of the Puritan fury, as we learn from a list of the names of Discalced Carmelites banished from Ireland in the year 1641. His companions in exile were Fathers Columbanus of St. Michael, Paul of St. Ubaldus, Fortunatus of St. Anne, and Paul Simon of Jesus Mary. They found a refuge and hospitality in the various monasteries of the Order in Flanders. But Fathers Angelus-Joseph, Laurence of St. Thomas, John of the Cross, Edward of the Kings (a namesake of the first President of the Irish mission); a choir-brother whose name is not mentioned, a lay brother, called Stephen, and another priest named Angelus, sought an asylum in France. Fathers Laurence, Nicholas, and Cyril escaped to Lombardy; Fathers Thomas of Jesus, Patrick of St. James, Bernard, and Malachy to Malta; Father Patrick to Cologne, and Father Angelus of the Holy Ghost to Piedmont. Some of these religious—Father Malachy of Jesus, among others—as we have seen, did not long survive the hardships they had been exposed to preceding their exile; but most of them succeeded in returning to Ireland very soon. It is easy to understand what dangers must have been encountered by Father John of the Mother of God, in order to be present at the General Chapter of 1644. He was shipwrecked on his way home, and lost whatever he had with him, amongst other things, the *Honoraria* for a number of Masses which were to have been said by the Teresian missionaries in Ireland. But when the matter had been represented to the Sacred Congregation, it was declared that all obligations should be fulfilled by certain anniversary Masses, as this was the only means in the power of the religious—owing to their own

circumstances and to the state of the country—to satisfy so urgent a claim of justice.

It is a remarkable coincidence that the very next reference to the Irish Province in the notes before us concerns the great interest taken by the Archbishop of Fermo—Monsignor John Baptist Rinuccini—in the affairs of the Discalced Carmelites of Ireland during his memorable mission to this country as Papal Nuncio. Father John of the Mother of God was the religious represented by certain writers as being bitterly hostile to Rinuccini at the very time that prelate was exercising his influence in Rome in favour of the members of St. Patrick's Province. And this, we are happy to say, confirms the opinion expressed by ourselves when dealing with the question at length in another place.¹ In an important document, written in Kilkenny on the 16th of January, 1646, the Nuncio confirms the Teresian community at Loughrea in possession of the old Carmelite abbey there, Father James Brisbane,² one of the Definitors Provincial, being their representative. The zeal of those religious is spoken of in terms of highest praise, the Catholic population of Loughrea—then about fourteen hundred as the Nuncio had been informed—deriving the greatest spiritual benefit from the fervour of the friars in the exercise of the sacred ministry. Various cogent reasons are given for the cause having been decided on behalf of the Teresian Carmelites; and this had been done in virtue of Rinuccini's authority as Papal Nuncio. But for the further reassurance of those religious he secured the Pope's own sanction to the Decree which he himself had issued in their favour.

In order to avoid capture by the heretics, the Irish Provincial and the father deputed to assist with him at the General Chapter of the year 1647 took different routes to Rome. The Provincial succeeded in arriving in time for the sessions, but the Chapter was already over when the other Irish father reached the Eternal City.

¹ *Carmel in Ireland*, pp. 64, 65, where, by the way, the title 'Cardinal' has been prefixed to the Nuncio's name, having been inadvertently transcribed from an original Italian MS. document.

² Father James of St. Dymna, probably.

Father Columbanus of St. Michael—who was then staying in the college at Rome—furnished a list of the members of the Order in Ireland at the time of his own exile. Some of these names have not hitherto occurred in our narrative, and are given, most likely, as well as Father Columbanus could remember in order of the seniority of the religious by profession:—Fathers Patrick, Columbanus, Paul, Antony, Angelus-Joseph, Cherubinus,¹ John of the Mother of God, Laurence-Matthew, Laurence (whose family name was Plunket), Fortunatus, Cyril, Alexius-Mary, Gregory, Hilary, James, Andrew, John of the Cross, Patrick of St. Brigid, Casimir, James of St. Dymrna, Dominic, Francis, Agapitus, Michael, and Columbanus—known in the world as the Rev. Arthur Merlyn. The students of the Irish Province were then—Brothers Paul, John of the Mother of God, Simeon, Thomas of the Nativity, Laurence, Bernard, Edward, and Dominic—some of whom had been received and professed since the departure of Father Columbanus from Ireland. There were nine lay-brothers:—Albert, Stephen, Francis, Honestus, Nicholas, Luke, Bernard, Peter, and Antony. The friaries of the Province were, according to Father Columbanus:—Dublin, Ardee, Drogheda, Athboy, Kinsale, Galway, Limerick, Kilkenny and Loughrea. Probably this was, likewise, the order of the foundation of these monasteries.

Although the Catholics of Ireland—both priests and people—were suffering a dreadful persecution in 1650, we find that the Irish Provincial and his two companions assisted at the General Chapter held that same year. But the fathers of St. Patrick's Province were hopeful of a brighter future, so much so, that they now asked permission to make some new foundations as soon as ever their present trials had ceased. However, far from being able to carry out so sanguine a project within the next three years, the Irish Teresian Carmelites saw the barbarous Puritans in absolute power from end to end of the country, and in the subsequent General Chapter (A.D. 1653) there was even a

¹ Of St. Gabriel—one of the Definitors Provincial, who wrote the life of Father Thomas Aquinas (alluded to above, p. 272) in 'elegant Latin.'

question raised as to the expediency of declaring the Province of St. Patrick dissolved. Having expressed their deep sympathy for their brethren still struggling on in the Irish mission, the fathers of the Chapter finally decided to wait the issue of present events.

The death of one of the Discalced Carmelites occurred in Ireland on the 2nd of August, 1653; and a few incidents in his career will show what the Irish missionaries of that period were called upon to endure. His name is mentioned in the list already quoted—Father Casimir of St. Cyril. The brief obituary notice was contained in a letter written to Father Isidore by another Irish father, Paul-Simon of Jesus Mary, who had escaped to Belgium; and it was from Tournay that he wrote on the 30th of March, 1654. Father Casimir had remained in Ireland from the very beginning of the troublous times, attending to the spiritual wants of the faithful in such parts of the country as were entirely in the hands of the Puritans. He was thrice brutally beaten by the heretics for having dared to exercise the functions of the priesthood, and on six different occasions he was seized and cast into prison because of his zeal in preaching the Catholic faith. At length he died of the plague, contracted while administering the Sacraments to those stricken down by that awful malady. And we may well believe that his fate befell many of his brethren in religion, whose names occur among those preserved for us by Father Columbanus.

Another document of much interest and importance supplies us with the names of the Teresian friars engaged in the labours of the Irish mission during the year 1659. Father Agapitus of the Holy Ghost was Vicar-Provincial at the time, the other priests being—Fathers Paul of St. Ubaldus, Laurence of St. Thomas Aquinas, Stephen of St. Ubaldus, Columbanus of St. Dymrna, Kieran of St. Patrick, Hilary of St. Augustine, John of the Mother of God, Columba of St. Michael, Angelus-Joseph of the Immaculate Conception, Thomas of Jesus, James of St. Dymrna, and Father Cyril of St. Joseph, probably the religious who had a famous controversy, in the year 1662, with Father Peter Walsh, O.S.F., author of the *Irish Remonstrance*. Fathers John of

the Mother of God and Stephen of St. Ubaldus were in Dublin at the same time, and no doubt Father Cyril was bravely supported by them in his fearless action. In alluding to this matter in a letter to his Superior-General, Father Cyril deeply deplored the condition of Catholics in Ireland at that epoch. The priests were still subjected to a harassing persecution, for, if they declined to sign the *Remonstrance*, they were either driven into exile or thrown into prison, as the author of that *Loyal Formulary* took care to explain to Father Cyril on his refusing to comply with so shameless a request at the conclusion of the celebrated conference. According to Father Cyril the six religious who then formed the Teresian community in Dublin exercised their missionary duties secretly among the faithful of the city, but with marvellous success. They received many converts into the Church; indeed, he assures us, so zealous were the Irish clergy, both secular and regular, that within two or three years the Catholic population of Dublin increased to fully twelve thousand, whereas at the 'Restoration' the faithful could hardly have been a sixth of that number. The priests were equally diligent in other parts of the country; but the Teresian missionaries used to complain that the reason why many more conversions had not been made was the difficulty of getting the heretics so much as to speak to a Roman Catholic.

The Discalced Carmelites of the Irish mission seem to have been most anxious to secure a novitiate of their own on the continent about the year 1665; but just then circumstances prevented them from getting possession of the monastery at La Rochelle; and when at last that house was given over to them, it is doubtful whether they were in a position to devote it to the purposes which they had so long in view. In any case they obtained permission to open a novitiate at Aix-la-Chapelle in the year 1677; but no further mention is made of this foundation. Of course the difficulties of sending postulants abroad at this period must have been extremely great; still we are told that the mission was comparatively always well supplied with priests: Father Bede Travers — one of the most zealous of the English

missionaries—informing us that between the years 1669 and 1670 there were at least twelve members of the Order in Ireland.

It may be taken as a proof of the rigorous trials to which the Irish missionaries were being subjected in 1680, when we find that the Procurator of the Teresian Carmelites could not assist at the General Chapter assembled at Bologna that year. The father deputed to attend the Chapter of 1683 did reach Rome in time; but he had suffered so severely during the journey that he was unable to be present at the sessions. It is said that King Louis XIV. of France tried to influence the decisions of this Chapter for political purposes; but, of course, his efforts were of no avail.

With the terror of the Oates' Plot still hanging over the land, the mere suspicion of being a priest was deemed more than a sufficient cause for arrest and examination before the notorious perjurer himself, or before any of his agents. Yet while this persecution was at its very fiercest, Father Charles of St. John, accompanied by Father Lucian Travers, came over to Ireland to make the canonical visitation; just as if the province was in a most flourishing condition, and the country in a state of the profoundest peace. Father Lucian—like his step-brother, Father Bede Travers—had himself a very distinguished career on the English mission. One incident in his life has endeared his memory for ever to Irish Catholics. He it was, together with another Discalced Carmelite, named Father Gaspar of the Annunciation, who had the privilege of assisting the venerable Oliver Plunket on the scaffold, and reverently placing the heroic confessor's head and limbs in a chest immediately after the execution. This act of piety on Father Lucian's part gave great consolation to the horror-stricken faithful, who dreaded lest the sacred relics should be left any time exposed or otherwise wantonly profaned (A.D. 1681). A little later on, A.D. 1686, we find an Irish Discalced Carmelite—known in religion as Father Augustine—who had been sub-prior at Ancona, received permission to return to his native land to devote himself to the duties of the mission. He accompanied Father Bede Travers, who was returning to England at that time.

Although they often suffered from hunger during their perilous journey over the Alps until they at length arrived in Cologne, they would not avail themselves of any of the dispensations allowed by their Rule. They were compelled to use a disguise, and we are told that instead of the beads at his side, Father Augustine now wore a sword!

Finally, we have a list of the Teresian fathers in Ireland in the earlier half of the eighteenth century. The names are already included among 'The Obits' of the Province; but we may insert them here again, following the order in which they occur in the document before us.¹ Thus we are informed that when Father Patrick of St. John Baptist—who had been sent over by the General of the Order, Father John Bernard (A.D. 1725)—was Vicar-Provincial, the following religious were engaged in the labours of the mission either in the friary at Wormwood-gate, Dublin, or at the Abbey, Loughrea:—Fathers Paul of the Cross (Kenny), Nicholas Coleman, Joseph-Renatus (Rev. Ralph Kilkenny), Robert Fitzgerald, Felix of St. John Baptist (Rev. Patrick Dodd), Marcellus Cullen, Francis of the Blessed Sacrament (Coleman), Urban of Jesus Mary (Rev. Matthew Barnwall), Angelus Antony of the Immaculate Conception (Rev. John McDonagh), Sylvester Mary of St. John Baptist (Tumulty),² Joseph Francis, Stephen of Jesus (Rev. John Lawless), Patrick of St. John the Evangelist, whose secular name was Hart. An Englishman called Father Onuphrius of St. Teresa (Rev. Edward Aisley) had died in Dublin in the year 1711. With exception of Fathers Paul Kenny and Nicholas Coleman—uncle of Fathers Columbanus and Nicholas Coleman, who were brothers—these priests were all under forty years of age at the time the list was drawn up; several of them having been but recently ordained; while there were nine other young religious destined for the Irish mission, still pursuing their studies on the continent. This list had been submitted by Father John of the Cross, who was himself about to return to this country when he

¹ *Carmel in Ireland*, pp. 232, 233.

² Several of these names are written somewhat differently in the Obituary—also translated from the original MS.

died. It is a truly sad sign of those times that he had to warn his Superiors not to use the title 'Father' or 'Reverend' when writing to the members of the Order in Ireland.

Indeed, the nineteenth century was well advanced before the trials of the Irish Discalced Carmelites, in the discharge of their missionary duties, had ceased. In a letter, dated the 25th of June, 1803, written by Father John Francis of St. Brigid, to one of the Superiors-General at Rome, we see that owing to the disturbed state of the country it was quite impossible to admit postulants to the Order in Ireland. Two of the Irish students were then in Lisbon and three in Spain, and there were now some aspirants whom the fathers would gladly send to Italy—very difficult though it then was to communicate with Rome, because of the wars on the continent. Father John Francis mentioned various other troubles which the religious had to strive against, but, like the Irish Teresian missionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who never appear to have been at all despondent—no matter what privations and sufferings they had to endure—he was hopeful for the future, and spoke in glowing terms of the grand new church which was being built by the members of the Dublin community. It was to be the largest and most beautiful sacred edifice in all Ireland. Not so very many years ago, men who are still in their prime of life, might have rightly thought this same church of St. Teresa's, Clarendon-street, but a humble structure, only too painfully reminding the devout worshippers there of the trials and struggles of the Irish clergy during the terrible penal days.

JAMES P. RUSHE, O.D.C.

DOCUMENTS

BEATIFICATION AND CANONIZATION OF THE BLESSED
EMILIE DE RODAT

RUTHENEN.—DECRETUM

BEATIFICATIONIS ET CANONIZATIONIS VEN. SERVÆ DEI MARIAE
GUILIELMAE AEMILIAE DE RODAT FUNDATRICES CONGREGATIONIS
SORORUM A S. FAMILIA

SUPER DUBIO

‘Ad constet de virtutibus Theologicalibus Fide, Spe, Caritate in Deum et proximum, nec non de Cardinalibus Prudentia, Iustitia, Fortitudine ac Temperantia earumque adnexis in gradu heroico in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.’

Singulari Dei providentis consilio factum est, ut per hos dies quibus apud ipsas gentes, quae humanitatis cultu atque etiam catholico gloriantur nomine, nequicquam reclamantibus bonis omnibus, benemerentissimis Familiis religiosis acre bellum infertur, publice per Apostolicam Sedem honori et memoriae prospiciatur eorum qui ex iisdem Familiis vitae sanctitate atque insigni meritorum laude admirabiles extiterunt.

Hos inter merito accensenda est virgo illa fortissima de christiana puellarum institutione deque omni fere humanae vitae conditione optime merita Maria Guilelma Aemilia De Rodat Instituti Sororum a S. Familia Mater legifera cui ad honores Beatorum Coelitum paratur ascensus.

Ortum habuit in pago Druelle in Gallia prope civitatem Rodez ex honestis piisque parentibus, Infantula in oppidum Ginals ducta sedulae aviae curis ita respondit, ut uberior ex tenera illa aetate fructus desiderari non posset. In pietatem prona ac divini amoris aestu succensa, a mundi illecebris aliena, patientia et lenitate excellens etsi fervidiorem indolem sortita, in egenos benefica, magnam de se expectationem excitavit praeclaris animi dotibus ac virtutum praestantia. Nacta occasionem anni sacri MDCCCIV innoxium corpus mira austeritate coercuit. Christianae propagandae fidei cupidissima, ac mire studiosa divinae gloriae, salutisque communis, ad futurum caritatis ministerium viam quo dammodo stravisse visa est adscitis sibi sociis puellis aliquot, quibuscum de Deo ac coelestibus rebus crebro diuque colloqueretur,

Annos nata decem et octo monasterium ingressa est cui nomen a matre Saint-Cyr, ubi munus diligentissime obivit Fidei rudimenta tradendi puellis, easque ad sacrum convivium rite disponendi. Eam domum annos undecim incoluit licet interrupte, quod in pluribus Sororum aliarum aedibus frustra religiosam vitam periclitata est. Ad pristinam denique sedem reversa et aegrotis curandis destinata, de nova constituenda Familia puellis egenis erudiendis alendisque cogitavit. Consilio in rem deducto, alterum brevi aperuit ludum nobilioribus puellis instituendis. Mox agerorum curae et eorum solatio qui eustodia detinerentur; sorores alias addixit nulla claustris lege obstrictas; item aedes condidit pro infantibus, domosque recipiendis foeminis quas a via lata et spatiosa ad arctam salutis semitam christiana caritate traducebat. Haec autem institutio multiplex qua Ven. Dei Famula nullum ferme caritatis genus omisit, celeriter per omnes Galliae provincias propagata est.

Ita per labores, sollicitudines, aerumnas plurimas Dei gloriae et proximorum saluti quum optime consulisset, fractis tandem corporis viribus, pretiosam in conspectu Domini mortem obiit decimo tertio calendas Octobris an. MDCCCLII.

Aucta post obitum fama sanctitatis quam in omni sibi vita comparaverat, praesertim ob prodigia quae ipsius invocatione a Deo acta ferebantur; de eius vita rebusque gestis rite instituta est inquisitio, servatis omnibus quae in huiusmodi Causis ex Apostolicis Constitutionibus sunt praemittenda, de eiusdem virtutibus initum examen ab hac S. Congregatione.

Triplex itaque hac de re habita est disceptatio. Prima sexto idus Maii anno MDCCXCVIII penes Rmum. Cardinalem Lucidum Mariam Parocchi Episcopum Portuensem et S. Rufinae Causae Relatorem; altera in Aedibus Vaticanis octavo calendas sextiles anni insequentis; tertia in conventu generali ibidem habito quarto calendas Martii volventis anni coram SSmo. Domino Nostro LEONE PAPA XIII; in quo ab eodem Rmo. Cardinali proposito dubio: 'An constet de virtutibus theologalibus Fide, Spe, Caritate in Deum et proximum, nec non de cardinalibus Prudentia, Iustitia, Temperantia, Fortitudine iisque adnexis in gradu heroico Ven. Servae Dei Mariae Guilelmae Aemiliae De Rodat in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.' Rmi. Cardinales et Patres Consultores singuli suffragia tulerunt. Sanctissimus autem Dominus Noster mentem suam aperire distulit, admonuitque ut in re tanti momenti divinum lumen instantius exposceretur.

Hodierno vero die Dominica infra octavam D. N. Iesu ad coelos ascendentis, divinae maiestatis Hostia devotissime immolata, ad nobiliorem Vaticanæ Aedis aulam accedens Rmos. Cardinales accersivit Dominicum Ferrata S. RR. Congregationi Præfectum et Lucidum Mariam Parocchi Causæ Relatorem, una cum R. P. Io. Baptista Lugari Sanctæ Fidei Promotore et me infrascripto a secretis, iisque adstantibus solemniter et rite edixit: 'Constare de virtutibus theologalibus Fide, Spe, Caritate in Deum et proximum, nec non de cardinalibus Prudentia, Iustitia, Temperantia, Fortitudine iisque adnexis Ven. Servæ Dei Mariæ Guillelmæ Aemiliæ De Rodat in gradu heroico in casu et ed effectum de quo agitur.'

Hoc autem Decretum publici iuris fieri et in acta SS. RR. Congregationis referri mandavit decimo quarto calendas Iunias anno MDCCCXI.

DOMINICUS Card. FERRATA, *S.R.C. Præfectus*.

L. ✠ S.

DIOMEDES PANICI, Archiep. Laodicens., *Secretarius*.

DOES OMISSION OF PENANCE AFFECT VALIDITY OF DISPENSATION?

OMISSIO POENITENTIAE IMPOSITAE PRO DISPENSATIONIBUS MATR.
NON SECUM FERT DISPENSATIONIS INVALIDITATEM

BEATISSIMO PADRE,

Il Vicario Gen. dell' Archid. di Cosenza supplica, perche nelle dispense matr. per causa di peccato, non s' imponga penitenza alcuna, per la ragione che si mette in pericolo la validità dell' esecuzione, massime quando trattasi di penitenza grave e diuturna. Ha prove che la penitenza si accetta fintamente: e poi certamente non si pratica. Sarebbe bene che per la penitenza se la vegga il Confessore, e che nella concessione delle dispense non se ne parlasse affatto.

Sacra Poenitentiaria ad praemissa rescribit: Poenitentias in executione dispensationum matrimonialium omnino imponendas esse, sed omissum earundem adimplementum secum non ferre dispensationis invaliditatem. Et notet orator in imponendis poenitentiis, quae non specificantur, ab executore rationem habendam esse conditionis aetatis, virium aliarumque qualitatum personarum, quibus dispensatio impertitur.

Datum Romae in S. Poenitentiaria, 14 Septembris, 1891.

R. Card. MONACO, *P.M.*

R. CELLI, *S. P. Substit.*

**DOES WILFUL OMISSION OF PENANCE AFFECT VALIDITY
OF DISPENSATION?**

OMISSIO POENITENTIAE PRO DISPENSATIONIBUS MATR. NON SECUM
FERT DISPENSATIONIS INVALIDITATEM, ETIAM QUANDO POENI-
TENTIA SUSCEPTA FUERIT SINE ANIMO ILLAM ADIMPLENDI.

BEATISSIMO PADRE,

Nelle dispense di occulto impedimento gli autori provati insegnano che, se il Confessore, per colpevole negligenza, non impone la penitenza, gravemente pecca, ma secondo la quasi comune sentenza, la dispensa si segue validamente: *non vero si poenitens, gravem suscipiendo poenitentiam, intentionem eam implendi non habeat*. Insegnano che pur valida sarà la dispensa se la confessione sarà nulla e sacrilega, o anche se non si riceva assoluzione. Sicchè non dalla invalidità della confessione, e dall'inadempimento posteriore della penitenza, ma dall'intenzione di non adempirla i predetti Teologi fan derivare l'invalidità della dispensa. Di tali finzioni ne avvengono continuamente, cioè di accettare la penitenza senza intenzione di adempirla. Per questo si mandò la prima supplica, senza di questo motivo quella supplica sarebbe stata per lo meno inopportuna.

Sacra Poenitentiaria Dilecto in Christo Vicario G.li scriventi super praemissis respondet: Clausulae praescribenti impositionem poenitentiae censeri satisfactum etiamsi ficto animo ab iis suscipiatur qui dispensantur.

Datum Romae in S. Poenitentiaria, 12 Novembris, 1891.

R. Card. MONACO, *P.M.*

A. Can. MARTINI, *S.P. Secr.*

THE MASS OF 'REFUGIUM PECCATORUM' IN PASCHAL TIME

EX S. CONGREGATIONE RITUUM.

ROMANA. DUBII; DUBIUM QUOAD MISSAM SUB TITULO 'REFUGIUM
PECCATORUM' QUATENUS HOC FESTUM TRANSFERATUR AD TEMPUS
PASCHALE

Dominica prima Iulii alicubi festum Deiparae celebratur sub titulo 'Refugium peccatorum' cum officio et Missa de Comuni, prima tantum Oratione, quae propria est, excepta. Quod profecto nulla difficultate laborat, cum de parte aestiva agitur. Sed vero accidit aliquando, ut dictum festum transferri debeat ad tempus paschale, et dubium eo in casu oritur super lectionibus III

Nocturni in officio recitandis. Namque Evangelium huiusce Missae de Communi, tempore paschali, est Stabant iuxta Crucem : in Breviario autem deest Homilia praefato Evangelio respondens. Hinc quaeritur : Quomodo est agendum in casu eiusmodi festi translati ad tempus paschale ?

Et S. R. C., referente subscripto Secretario, audita sententia Commissionis Liturgicae ac reliquis mature perpensis, rescribendum censuit : In casu adhibeatur Missa B. M. V. de tempore paschali a Pascha ad Pentecosten, retento Evangelio *Loquente Iesu*, de Missa B. M. V. a Pentecoste ad Adventum : cui Evangelio respondet Homilia III Nocturni officii proprii B. M. V. sub titulo 'Refugium peccatorum.' Atque ita rescripsit servarique mandavit.

Die 3 Septembris 1900.

C. Card. ALOISI-MASELLA, *Pro-Dat. S.R.C. l'ro-Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

DIOMEDES PANICI, *S.R.C. Secretarius.*

NOTICES OF BOOKS

A MEDIEVAL HERO OF CARMEL. Being an Historical Sketch of the Life and Times of St. Peter Thomas, Carmelite Bishop and Martyr and Patriarch of Constantinople. By the Rev. P. T. Burke, O.D.C. Dublin: Sealy, Bryers, & Walker. M. H. Gill & Son.

To all Carmelites and their very numerous friends and followers, and to many also outside that favoured circle, Father Burke's new volume cannot fail to be welcome. It is a memoir of one of the most remarkable men of his age, a learned man and a holy man, a scholar, a saint, and a martyr. These are characteristics that might be sufficient to recommend him to Irish readers. But the times in which he lived and the part he played in those times lend an interest to his career which is not always to be found even in the life of a saint.

'The fourteenth century,' writes his biographer, 'as is well known, was a period of great importance. The spirit of true Christian chivalry was dying. Attempts were still being made to revive the crusades; but the arms which European princes had used in defence of Christianity against the infidels were now wielded in mutual quarrels. The bond of union between the Churches of the East and West was once more broken. The ravages of the black plague all but depopulated Europe. The Papacy had suffered from the internal dissensions of the Italian princes, and the Popes sought security under the protection of the French crown. The great centres of learning, the universities, still continued to exercise much influence, and any student of the history of the time cannot well overlook their origin and development. Now with all these St. Peter Thomas was connected. He spent many years at the great Paris university, and was founder of the Theological Faculty in the University of Bologna. He lived in Avignon during the residence of the Popes in that city. He laboured in bringing help and consolation to those who suffered from the 'black plague.' He was sent by the Sovereign Pontiffs on various legations to Italian princes. On two occasions he went as Apostolic Legate to the East to labour for the reunion of the Greeks with the Church of Rome,

and finally his death was due to his efforts in leading a new crusade against the Turks.'

It is natural that the fame of the saints and martyrs should be in all the Churches, and no more striking illustration of the fact could be found than that the labours of this French scholar and martyr of the fourteenth century should be commemorated away here in Ireland at the beginning of the twentieth.

J. F. H.

SERMONS. By the Most Rev. Dr. Moriarty, late Bishop of Kerry. Edited by the Most Rev. Dr. Coffey, Bishop of Ardfert and Aghadoe. 2 vols. Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son. 1901. 12s.

We have only just received these two fine volumes, and in the time at our disposal cannot do more than notify their appearance and commend them to the earnest attention of our readers. Books of sermons we have in abundance, but it is not every day we meet with a series of sermons specially suited to the needs of Irish priests, and dealing in a masterly fashion with subjects that are of burning, practical interest in this country. It is not, therefore, the priests of Kerry alone, to whom the work is appropriately dedicated, but the priests of all Ireland and Irish priests all over the world who must feel deeply indebted to the learned and distinguished Bishop of Kerry for having so carefully and piously collected the sermons of his illustrious predecessor and given them to the public in these two fine volumes.

One of the best books that has issued from the Irish Catholic press in our days is the volume of Dr. Moriarty's 'Allocutions and Addresses' which Dr. Coffey published some years ago. That work gave an insight into the character of their author, and enabled his countrymen to view his life and labours in the perspective of history and in something like the unity of its purpose. They had heard his name for many a day, and had read many of his pronouncements separately in the newspapers. But these connected documents revealed to them, in some measure at least, the life-springs of his activity, his strong faith, his simple and unaffected piety, his vast learning, his practical knowledge of Holy Scripture, and his wonderful power of applying it in the happiest way to the themes with which he had to deal, a power which reminds us of Bourdaloue and Massillon, and sometimes even of the great Bossuet himself. All these things made Irishmen proud

of the great successor of St. Brendan, and made him rank in their esteem high amongst the great churchmen which this little island has given to the world. Assuredly, the impression made by the 'Allocutions' will be not only confirmed, but strengthened and enhanced by the 'Sermons.'

Beginning with the 'Address to the Soldiers of the Kerry Militia,' on St. Patrick's Day, 1855, what could be more appropriate or in what book of sermons could an Irish priest who has anything to do with soldiers find help and inspiration more suited to his purpose? Many of the 'Sermons,' moreover, recall some special and historic celebration, such as 'The Consecration of Kilkenny Cathedral,' 'The Laying of the Foundation Stone of Maynooth College Chapel,' 'The Dedication of Longford Cathedral,' 'Sermon at the Synod of Maynooth, 1875,' 'Opening of St. Patrick's Church, Mayo Bridge,' 'Opening of the Dominican Church, Tralee.' There are panegyrics not only of some of the great saints of the Church like St. Francis of Assisi, St. Dominic, St. Paul of the Cross, St. Vincent de Paul, St. Alphonsus Liguori, St. Laurence O'Toole, but also of some of the notable Irish churchmen of the day, such as Dr. Egan of Kerry, Dr. Blake of Dromore, Dean McEnnery of Tralee. But perhaps most useful to the busy priest, will prove the sermons on such subjects as 'Charity to the Poor,' on 'Scandal,' 'Lust,' 'Anger,' 'Avarice,' 'Gluttony,' 'Penance,' 'Sin and its Punishment,' and on some of the principal devotions, such as the sermons on the 'Quarant'Ore,' 'St. Joseph,' 'St. Patrick's Day,' 'Dedication of the Churches of Ireland,' 'All Saints' Day.'

Taking all things into account we can offer our unqualified congratulations to the Bishop of Kerry, on the good work that he has accomplished. We feel that no words of ours are needed to commend what he has done, and we only express the hope that the two volumes he has given us, may soon find a place in every priest's library, and in every student's library as well. Colleges and schools might go further, to seek for premiums for their 'laureati,' without being rewarded for their enterprise with better value. In literature, as in many other things, it is enough for a book to appear in Ireland to be neglected by Irishmen.

As there seems to be a revival of Irish industries of every kind, may we not hope that Irish Catholic literature may get something like fair play from Irish Catholics.

J. F. H.

"*Ut Christiani sitis et Romani sitis.*" "As you are children of Christ, so be you children of Rome."
Ex Dictis S. Patricii, in Libro Armacano, fol. 9.

The Irish Ecclesiastical Record

A Monthly Journal, under Episcopal Sanction.

Thirty-fourth Year
No. 406.

OCTOBER, 1901.

[Fourth Series
Vol. X.]

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
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
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AGNOSTICISM A GENERAL SKETCH

THERE are certain great questions which have ever forced themselves in upon the mind of man. So profound are they that they cause him deep concern.

He may not dismiss them even if he would, for their import is momentous; and ever and anon with new persistence they call for some solution. Has he an immortal soul? Whence has he come? Whither will he go? Is there an unseen world of spirit? Is there a God on whom he depends and to whom his allegiance is due? These are the great problems which are at once the reason and the root of all Science and of all Religion. Examination of them has given rise to many a system, has made and unmade many a creed. In the various departments of Physical Science, the facts of the visible world of sense have been examined and analysed with much care. In the domain of Psychology, man's own inner nature, the constitution of his wondrous faculties of thought and feeling, have been minutely and diligently explored. Even his perceptions of truth, that world of relations which his mind creates and perceives—the world of Metaphysics, of Mental Philosophy proper—has been thoroughly investigated, and forced to yield up its secrets to the man of thought. And all this goes on and will go on to serve the one great purpose: to help man to solve the

puzzle of his past, present, and future; to bring him, if so be, to the bottom of things where no one can ask the further reason why.

This is the work of the philosopher, but while he dreams the world worships; for, at all periods of the world's history, the masses of men generally have accepted some solution or other that pleased and satisfied them, and have expressed their belief in such explanation by some form of religious worship which embodied the popular creed. Thus natural religion shows itself to be the supreme Philosophy of Ultimate Causality: the recognition and worship of the First Cause by man. Now, it is an undeniable fact of history that human reason, as embodied in the overwhelming majority of the race, has been Theistic, has recognised a Supreme Being or Beings, a God or Gods, and has worshipped accordingly. Equally undeniable is it that men have almost as universally believed in a revelation or revelations made by the Deity to man: that they have not rested in natural religion merely, but risen to the supernatural. Thus has reason ever dictated the reasonableness of faith. In the very universality of Theism—and of Christianity among civilized nations—we have an *a priori* presumption in favour of their truth. If the universal sentiment of humanity be, at all, a guide to truth, its testimony is surely worth weighing in the matter of natural religion which springs so directly from the constitution of man.

Reason points to faith in much that concerns this great mystery of the Ultimate Cause. And why should it not? Does it not tell us that assent to the unseen on trustworthy authority is an absolutely indispensable condition for the maintenance of social life? I was never in Rome, but I believe firmly there is such a place. I never saw Julius Cæsar, yet I believe that he lived and waged the Gallic war; and the agnostic does not call me credulous therefor. Though I never saw Christ, I believe that He preached the Sermon on the Mount, and drove the herd of swine, with their demons, into the lake of Genesareth; and forthwith the agnostic grows indignant because I cannot see as clearly

as he does that the evidence in the latter case is worthless, and because I do not believe him when he tells me that it is so. Now, to deny revelation is the sure way to deny natural religion soon afterwards. To deny that God has spoken is a preliminary to denying that He exists. So thought Cardinal Newman, and he passed through the fire of tribulation, of doubt and misgiving, if ever man did. And no wonder it should be so; for neither truth is there such mathematical evidence forthcoming as will force assent. But to refuse assent to the fact of revelation, for want of such or similar direct evidence, is surely the height of unreason. Beyond the testimony of the senses, beyond internal evidence of objective truth, there are other criteria of certitude, other motives that call for assent. Authority is one which bears the hall-mark of reason, when its credentials are duly tested and admitted. Every day of our lives authority must satisfy us in accepting a thousand and one things which we may never hope to explore for ourselves. And reason tells us it is just.

But it is the more fundamental question of the existence of God, and the consequent value and validity of what is called natural religion, that exercises men's minds most nowadays. Believers in the existence of a Supreme Being, distinct from this universe, may be conceived to have arrived at this belief in either of two ways. It may be due to what Mr. Herbert Spencer depreciates as the mere accident of birth, but what we would rather designate as the wonderful divine favour of being brought up from infancy in the faith, as the vast majority of believers are; or it may be that an unbelieving adult comes to believe in God by the due and proper exercise of his thinking and reasoning faculties. In this latter case the reasonableness of consequent faith is manifest. In the former it is just as great even if not so manifest. When the child of tender years is asked the question: 'Who made the world?' and promptly answers 'God,' does he act one whit less reasonably than the learned agnostic philosopher, who reverently tells his questioner that he, for one, does not know. Ask the little boy further, how does he know,

At once the answer: 'My parents told me so; and I see no reason to doubt their word.' And if, at any time afterwards, he does see reasons to doubt, he is free as a Catholic—nay bound, if his doubts persist—to face them boldly and to settle them by finding further and firmer reasons for the faith that is in him. His enquiry may indeed fail to reveal to him the ultimate why and wherefore of what he believes, but he is not so foolish as to abandon his belief then and there on that account. He knows from his experience of a thousand and one happenings of every-day life that proofs of the existence of a fact are one thing, proofs of its how and why and wherefore quite another thing, and that the former are very frequently forthcoming without the latter. When, for example, he sees a tiny snowdrop bloom in the early spring-time, he is absolutely certain that it is blooming there; that is, if he be a man of common sense and not a philosopher of a certain school. But ask him how and why it blooms there, and you soon bring him face to face with a problem which the most eminent scientists are giving up in despair: that mysterious enigma, the constitution of a simple living cell.

The believer, then, of the ordinary type, has been reared up to his beliefs. He assented to the existence of God and the fact of revelation on the authority of his fellow-man in the first instance. Later on, perhaps, he accepted those same truths on the authority of the Church when its infallibility had been brought home to him by intrinsic evidence or by the weight of human authority. Having once firmly grasped these preliminary truths he has next received, fully and without reserve, the contents of the divine revelation, on the authority of God revealing. This assent of faith is at the same time so reasonable and so firm that rarely, if ever, during life is he troubled with doubts about the dogmas he has thus embraced. If the ordinary believer seeks at all for direct proofs of God's existence, he is satisfied, and not unreasonably, with considerations arising from the physical argument, or the universal persuasion of mankind—considerations which may not appear convincing to the critical mind of the trained and enquiring unbeliever.

The internal compactness and completeness of the whole Catholic system, the wonderful harmony of all its parts, its never-failing power to satisfy all the cravings of the human heart, to respond to the very noblest aspirations of man's higher nature, all this and much more that might be spoken in its praise, not only stamp it as divine before the world, but also safeguard those who know it from within, while they test its validity and explore its worth with all that exactness and severity which its strength and its pretensions confidently challenge. But while we, Catholics, can feel so contented in the consciousness of our blessed inheritance of truth, we must not forget that outside the fold there is no such peaceful calm. Unrest, uncertainty and turmoil everywhere prevail. With this reflection we may pass to the subject we propose to consider at some length—that wide world of religious doubt and philosophic speculation which is covered by the comprehensive title of 'Agnosticism.'

There are positive unbelievers : those who say they have fully convinced themselves that there is no God. Under one form or other of atheism their number is legion. With them or their doctrines we have nothing to do. The question of their sincerity would form a sad, but withal interesting subject for not a little study. An inquirer might suppose a number of young Englishmen born of educated, unbelieving parents, brought up as atheists, educated at some Free-thought university, breathing an intellectual atmosphere laden with doubt and uncertainty, and agitated by anxious religious and philosophic inquiry, enjoying the privilege of intercourse with the greatest intellects of their time, coming into contact with almost every form of religious creed, examining and analysing all beliefs and systems from their own infidel standpoint. Taking this crowd of humanity as his proper study, our inquirer might ask himself how long possibly or probably would its individual members remain in the *bonâ fide* inculpable conviction that there is no God—how long might each without offending say :

I take possession of man's mind and deed,
I care not what the sects may brawl.
I sit as God, holding no form of creed,
But contemplating all.

It would be wrong to judge of individuals. Even about the class it would be nearly useless to speculate. Whether they could or not it is not very likely that they would remain long in the smug conviction that God is nothing but a word. In all human probability they would soon begin to doubt and suspect, to question old convictions, to examine new reasons; and after a short time if they were honest with themselves, their answer to the question: 'Who is God?' would be a long, painful pause. So it is with multitudes in English-speaking countries of to-day. Tossed about with every wind of doctrine, in the clouds and darkness of the night, they seek laboriously—let us hope not often in vain—for the kindly light of truth. No wonder they are anxious and disturbed, for see what is at stake. No mere abstract theory but a great momentous fact. One that will not be settled by any mere formalism but by the full play of all nature's powers and by an honest and vigorous fidelity to the dictates of conscience and of truth. No wonder they call for our sympathy and help, those weak but honest wayfarers, who tread the perilous path perhaps from the utter darkness of positive atheism to the full light of God's truth in His own Catholic Church.

Those earnest toilers, however, are but a handful of lowly ones. Abroad stalks the demon of human pride, deceiving the doubtful, waylaying the wavering, whispering in the name of Modern Science, Rationalism, and Free-thought, that 'It is man's privilege to doubt'; even assuming the shape of an angel of light—that spirit of false humility which permeates modern, up-to-date Agnosticism—to seduce the weak and the unwary, and lead them away from the path of truth. It is about this latter-day enemy of God and His Church that we wish to speak. We can hope merely to touch on many of its phases in those pages, for it is a hydra-headed thing, and from all the various sciences it draws many votaries, consciously or unconsciously, under its blighting influence.

The growth of Agnosticism in the world of English thought is only the gradual and logical development of the erroneous principles of Locke and Hume and Berkeley,

under the influence of that spirit of independent thought and private judgment, implanted and fostered in England by the Reformation. The briefest backward glance, to show how such a school of thought has worked itself out, will make this manifest.

Seeing that Agnosticism claims to be in perfect accord with human reason, to be, in fact, nothing more than a vigorously perfect use of that faculty, it may be well to state at once that Catholics can and do proclaim themselves agnostics in that meaning of the term. Anyone who withholds his assent to a proposition in which he has no sufficient motives for believing, is so far forth an agnostic. He does not know whether such and such is true. He may have a suspicion or an opinion one way or the other, but until he sees more reason for an intellectual assent to either side he suspends his judgment. Now it is an interesting fact that the man who is responsible for the term 'Agnostic,' and who has stood sponsor for the system, has always maintained that he never attached any other signification to the word—which he invented for describing to the world his own mental state in matters philosophical—than the very orthodox and laudable one which we have just indicated. Professor Huxley is generally taken as a fair exponent of the agnostic position. That is, in so far as it is a definite position, defended on the same principles by representative writers of any note, for it is an undeniable fact that in the world of English Philosophy scarcely any writer of great ability can be relied on as speaking in behalf of any school and not for himself alone. Speaking for himself at any rate, in his *Essays on Christian Tradition*, Professor Huxley explains his position in the following terms:—

Agnosticism is not properly described as a 'negative creed,' nor indeed as a creed of any kind, except in so far as it expresses absolute faith in the validity of a formula which is as much ethical as intellectual. . . . That it is wrong for a man to say that he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce *evidence which logically justifies* that certainty. . . . That which Agnostics deny and repudiate is the contrary doctrine that there are propositions which men ought to believe without

logically satisfactory evidence; and that reprobation ought to attach to the profession of disbelief in such *inadequately supported* propositions.¹

Now, this is a clear exposition of Agnosticism in its negative sense, as a philosophic method, an attitude of mind to be assumed by man in his search after truth. As such no one can quarrel with it. If an agnostic is only a man who candidly confesses that there are a great many things he does not know, who asserts there are many truths which the human mind has not yet discovered, who refuses to believe without sufficient reason, then indeed are we all agnostics, or ought to be. But if it be easy to coin a word it is not always so easy to dictate its meaning to the public. They will have their own way, and whatever Professor Huxley may have wished the word to mean, it is universally taken nowadays not only for that exact method of thought outlined by its inventor, but also for a certain definite creed which is the outcome, not indeed of the use but rather of the abuse of that method. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe Agnosticism as a denial of all traditional creed, and a scientific contention that many things which men have heretofore supposed that they knew about the world beyond sense and behind phenomena, about the world of substance and of spirit, about the origin and Final Cause of all things, are not only really unknown, but, of their own nature, absolutely and forever unknowable to man.

The abuse of reason which has led to such extraordinary conclusions, is widespread and universal. It is sadly interesting to observe how men of undoubted genius, like Huxley and Spencer and Tyndall and Arnold, at the very time they raised their voices in complaint and protest to warn their generation against that narrow-minded and onesided attitude towards truth which they looked upon as the bane religion had brought upon their age—how they themselves were completely led astray by the self-same narrow-minded spirit; for that spirit springs also from a science that will not know God. While Herbert Spencer

¹ Page 310. The italics are our own.

arraigns religion for usurping a groundless authority over men's minds, he himself would have us sweep away that Philosophy which is the condensed wisdom of the human race, and that Religion which has ever been its civilizer, to replace them by a vast speculative system of physics, built on an unproven if not unprovable hypothesis! While Professor Huxley smiles at the childish credulity that embraces Christianity in its fulness, he would have us measure all truth by his own pet biological standards! And so it is with the rest. Few men, if any, can hope to be proficient in all departments of knowledge; and is a man to reject everything not proved by himself? We have already touched on the unreasonableness of such a disposition; and yet it would seem as if each of our modern agnostics wished to measure all the attainable truth in the universe by the criteria of some one special department or other in which he himself happens to be an expert. It would, of course, be too evidently ridiculous to demand, in matters of religion, the sort of evidence that is forthcoming in Euclid's Elements, and we do not allege that they go so far. But we do maintain—and any impartial student of their teachings will maintain—that it is their decided tendency. Add to this their prejudice against Christianity—a prejudice which unconsciously, but quite unerringly, warps their reasoning processes—and a sufficient reason for their far-away wanderings will be abundantly manifest.

In their loud condemnation of the principle of authority do those men forget that even the conclusions of natural science are accepted to-day by the millions, not on the evidence of demonstration, but on the authority of those eminent men of science who form its *Ecclesia Docens*? This is a fact often lost sight of nowadays; and one of its wholesome applications is this: that popular Agnosticism is simply a system of blind credulity towards the *dicta* of our agnostic scientists upon all topics under the sun. Can this be the consummation devoutly wished for by the apostles of Agnosticism? They are accused of entertaining such an ambition. If they do, their contempt for authority is an extremely awkward characteristic of their school. If, for

instance, some disciple were to say to his master: '*Ne sutor ultra crepidam*,' would it be very becoming for the master to urge his authority on the point in dispute?

Of the Agnostic tendency of English thought a full and sufficient reason will be found in the various influences which have made themselves felt in English systems of philosophy during the past three hundred years. Perhaps the deepest and most fundamental of those influences will be found to have existed so far back as the sixteenth century. The Reformation taught men to discount the value of authority and to attach supreme importance to private judgment. Very soon was the English mind deeply leavened with the tendency to unduly enphasize the worth of immediate and direct evidence in all departments of knowledge, sacred and profane, and at the same time to depreciate and minimize the claims of external authority; to make too much of the natural sciences where assent is based upon evidence that is mathematical or nearly so—evidence that necessitates assent—and to throw into disrepute the free intellectual beliefs of religion which are based upon authority and upon evidence of a less clear, exact, and cogent character. Such was the spirit of the century just past. Writing in the I. E. RECORD of May, 1891, a writer well says about it:—

The world, it would seem, has passed its term of childhood and reached its years of reason. Faith and credulity and superstition have gone their way. We are wiser than our fathers; we ask for proof, not authority. Such are the professions of the day. Whether the claim to this superiority is warranted by facts is another matter.

With a people subject to such influences, and entertaining such ideas, a method like Huxley's, insisting on the right of reason to get scientific evidence for all its assents, was likely to prove a dangerous instrument. And it did prove a fatal one: for people can conveniently forget that Religion does not call for mathematical evidence, and that the truths of Philosophy do not require geometrical proof. Indeed it was, humanly speaking, inevitable from the beginning that men with small sympathy for Christianity

in its Catholic fulness, professing no respect for authority, assuming such an exacting, and, indeed, unreasonable attitude towards the nature of the motives which ought to command intellectual assent, should gradually make complete shipwreck of the faith, and find themselves lost in a wilderness of despairing doubt and scepticism. A just retribution for the Rationalism that pretends to know all things is the Agnosticism which declares that it can know nothing : and it is a retribution which has overtaken many. 'The hopeless teaching that we can know nothing is the natural outcome of the arrogant claim to know all.'¹ Of course if these men had clung steadfastly to the dictates of right reason it would have brought them safely back to the true position which gives authority its due and rightful value in the search for truth. Reason's task it is to scrutinize the credentials of authority and estimate its worth accordingly. But is the agnostic position reasonable which seems to deny, in fact if not in teaching, that authority has any credentials at all worth scrutinizing?

Those very men who have ever pretended to a better, stricter, and more scientific use of reason than the credulous and superstitious Catholic have left all over their elegant and voluminous writings inconsistencies so numerous, and contradictions so apparent, to the impartial reader, that he is forced to carry away with him the conviction that consciously or unconsciously they have been acting the part of special pleaders for a weak and doubtful cause. Our best-known modern agnostics are mostly natural scientists, yet it is notorious how unscientific they can be and often are, outside the domain of science, when they take up the baton in the field of polemics against Christianity, or when they wish to attract attention to some pet theory of their own. We say this in no spirit of carping criticism, but because from experience we know it to be true. Numerous illustrations we could give were it to our purpose and would space permit. Their writings abound in contradictions because they do not teach the truth. Their great fault consists in

¹ I. E. RECORD, May, 1891, p. 402, 'Office of Reason in Theology.' W. H. Kent, O.S.C.

that narrowmindedness whereby they apply to all sorts of truths the very exact standards which the exact natural sciences demand. Prejudice prompts them unconsciously to apply their criteria now exactly and now loosely so as invariably to arrive at foregone conclusions, to believe what they wish, and to reject the traditional faith that is so distasteful to them. They can easily bring themselves to see absolutely no virtue in the time-honoured proofs of the existence of God, and yet they can convince themselves that 'beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time,' life sprang somehow or other from dead matter, while all attainable evidence points the other way!

It may seem strange that men who profess to be so exact and careful in their reasoning should stray so far from the truth. Yet, after all, it is not surprising. For the attractiveness of that right of private judgment, and the seductive charm of a system that promised emancipation of the intellect from the thralldom of authority, that promised individual independence and freedom of thought, all this, and a false psychology as well, soon brought about a state of confusion where the wish was always father to the thought, where reason itself was dethroned to make room for sense, where thought was confounded with sensation, and consciousness with imagination, where all was turmoil and contention, because the right order of things had been upturned and reason degraded by those very men who professed that they sought to emancipate and ennoble it. A system of psychology which gravely erred about the nature of the human faculties themselves, a system whose very foundations were rotten, is largely responsible for fostering that proud Reformation spirit and compassing the results which we deplore around us to-day. The unsoundness of the English Church by Law Established, its inability to bear the scrutiny of great minds, its want of any compact, harmonious and definite dogmatic system, its gradual disintegration, the tumult and conflict of the sects into which it has broken up, the consequent extreme difficulty experienced by its members in determining where any fragments of truth lay scattered, all these influences would, indeed, of themselves have certainly given to English

thought a tendency towards scepticism and infidelity. Consequently when they are found to have been exerted on people who were simultaneously the victims of an unsound and pernicious philosophic system, we need not wonder that England is growing more and more agnostic every day.

We have been touching on some of the causes which we deem responsible for Agnosticism. Its natural parents, however, seem to have been the progress of the physical sciences under the inductive method, and the setting up of a false philosophy of experimentalism in the rightful place of Metaphysics. Of course in its negative aspect—taken merely as a philosophy of scepticism—Agnosticism is as old as Epicurus. But of the modern English article the first manifestations are discernible in Locke's doctrine of phenomenalism. The first advocate of the philosophy of experience, the first to deny that what underlies phenomena—real substance—is at all knowable, the first, therefore, to aim a dangerous blow at Metaphysics, which is simply the science of real essences, Locke may be justly regarded as the father of English Agnosticism. The experience of sense can reach only phenomena; the inward essences of things lie beyond its sphere. But all our knowledge is only sense experience, and hence, we can know nothing whatsoever about substance. Thus did Locke sweep away the whole world of first principles and universal truth. He misunderstood a formula used by the schoolmen: 'Nothing is found in the intellect which was not first in the sense.' He would have all knowledge begin in experience and end there. The scholastics would have it begin but certainly not end there. 'We have no knowledge except what we derive from experience,' taught Locke. Except what the intellect draws from sensations experienced—yes; except what we gain by merely comparing the sensations themselves—no. Here then was opened the yawning chasm which has separated Catholic Philosophy from Agnosticism and Materialism, and every other form of that system which denies to man those nobler faculties of intellect and will that distinguish him from the brute. Here did English philosophers commence that fatal error of misinterpreting

the process and the product of their own thought—of belittling and degrading the very faculties by which they thought and reasoned. For them there was no cognoscitive power in man above sense. In their eyes the spiritual, thinking faculty, the universal idea, and its objective prototype, the real substance, were so many 'make-believes,' worthy of the 'dark ages,' and of those 'schoolmen,' who were so fond of pretending to much knowledge of things that men do not and cannot know! The advance of the natural sciences and the advent of the Evolution Philosophy fostered this lower view of human nature and its powers. The Philosophy of the Schools was deemed beneath contempt, and of course it was neither studied nor understood by those Englishmen who despised it most. But error cannot live and thrive on error; and in every age and in every school the truth will assert itself and live. The testimony of consciousness was found in the long run to have been as well and as faithfully analysed by the mediæval schoolmen as by any philosophers of our modern schools; but these latter are loath to acknowledge and bow to the conclusions of the Catholic scholastics of a few centuries ago. Ever and anon the great fundamental and undeniable fact of the universal concept presents itself for explanation. It is a strange inhabitant of the human mind, that; it is a mysterious product of human thought, that mental image which mirrors forth to consciousness not this individual or that or the other, but something which is similar in all individuals of the class—not Peter or Paul or John, but 'man' that is common to the three of them. What is the nature and origin of that mental image? The question is at the very root of all Philosophy. It is not our direct purpose here to vindicate the Catholic answer to it, nor expressly to examine in detail any modern views concerning it. We do think, however, that, in spite of any light the theory of association of experiences may throw upon it, and notwithstanding all that evolutionists may talk about *a priori* forms of thought which may be the result of experiences stored up in the nervous systems of our ancestors and transmitted to us by heredity,—the universal idea stands forth as a fact which

defies explanation on any other grounds than by recognising in it the product of a spiritual faculty, altogether above and superior to matter and sense. The modern agnostic, however, does not relish such an admission. Sooner than admit the plain explanation contained in Catholic philosophy, he rather denies that our knowledge of supra-sensible things is knowledge at all. He turns away and indulges in fantastic and unintelligible theories about the great root-fact of consciousness. He sits down and writes whole books for metaphysicians, to prove that neither he nor they know anything at all of what they are talking so much about.

But while they appear so unreasonable in their contention that we can know nothing whatsoever about substance or cause or necessity, let it not be thought that we Catholics err in the opposite extreme—that we pretend to know all or a great deal about those metaphysical entities. By no means. While we vindicate for human reason the power of gaining a real and certain knowledge of substance and cause, we are deeply sensible of the narrow limits that bound this knowledge and of the vast tracts of mystery by which it is surrounded. Even if substance is not the imaginary chimeræ of our agnostics, but the true object of perception, we are, none the less, far from knowing all about it; and there are many substances and causes quite beyond our ken. Our claim is much more modest, and yet is it truly great. For we claim to know *something* about those things, and we thereby advocate the existence of an interior faculty which transcends sensation, and which uses the products of sense in order to bring into view the vast empire of necessary truth. We maintain further that the human intellect, using as instrument the principle of causality, can take those purified spiritual concepts which it has drawn from the products of sense, and can mould them into an irrefragable argument for the existence of a First Cause of all things, Personal, Intelligent, and distinct from this Universe which is the work of His hands. Does the man deceive himself who uses his faculties so? If he trust his senses which tell him of surrounding phenomena, why should he pay no heed to that inner voice which speaks of

things hidden from sense and leads him onwards and upwards to the world of the unseen? Has he not as much or as little right to reject the intuitions of intellect as the perceptions of sense? Has he not just as intimate a consciousness of universal ideas as of sense perceptions, or are those mental pictures of 'cause,' 'substance,' 'life,' 'spirit,' to be accounted for by mere sense faculties without the aid of a spiritual faculty which we call intellect or mind? If he reject the conscious products of intellect as unreliable why should he accept without question the evidence of sense? If he be consistent he will go behind the evidence of sense as well as the first principles of reason; and once there he has put an end to all possibility of science or philosophy of any kind whatsoever.

Fortunately, or, perhaps, unfortunately, such thorough and consistent scepticism is not common. The materialist who denies the claims of reason admits those of sense; while the idealist who chooses to doubt the objective reality of phenomena does not extend his scepticism to the world of mind. Continental Philosophy, following in the wake of Descartes, became gradually more and more subjective and idealist in its tendencies until, under the influence of Kant and Fichte and Hegel, sprang up that famous German school whose disciples 'found themselves straying farther and farther from the path of truth, until at last they sank into the unintelligible doctrine of the Great Nothing.'¹ English Philosophy on the contrary, dominated by the influence of Locke, has clung, more or less persistently, to the materialist position. But in trying to prop up error by error it has gone through many strange vicissitudes. It was illogical and self-destructive at the outset, and after the lapse of three centuries is no less so to-day. Locke was inconsistent in admitting the existence of real substance, for sense does not tell us whether it exists or not. Berkeley was logical enough to doubt it, and to admit certainty only of present sensations. Hume pushed his master's empiricism to the denial of spiritual

¹ I. E. RECORD, May, 1882, p. 287, 'Philosophy of Tennyson.'

substance, advocating the doctrine of pure phenomenalism. This, of course, was a step unwarranted by his principles. He could, indeed, have denied that sense tells us anything about substance, whether material or spiritual. He could also have borne testimony to the existence, in his own mind, of the *idea of substance*, though that fact of consciousness would be to him inexplicable. But as to the objective existence of substance to correspond with that idea in his mind, he had no more right to deny than to affirm it. Furthermore, might it not have occurred to him that sensation, being really nothing but the modification of subjective sense organs, gave no certainty of anything existing outside the organs themselves? Well, at least, of the subjective sensations themselves he could be certain, for did not consciousness vividly testify to their reality? Very well. But consciousness just as vividly testifies to the reality of universal ideas in the mind: and if I choose to believe that the modification of my sense organs are produced by objective phenomena, have I not the same right and the same obligation to believe that my universal ideas are produced by objective substances? It is ever thus with those who rebel against the dictates of right reason, and refuse to trust their natural faculties and their primary intuitions of truth. Question the validity of any first principle, and you are soon forced to doubt the very testimony of consciousness itself. A writer who has given much thought to this whole subject very justly insists 'that the philosophy of Locke, faithfully adhered to, first results in scepticism, then develops into materialism, and finally ends in idealistic agnosticism and mental paralysis.'¹ Sooner than plunge into such a quagmire, English philosophers generally prefer to shirk the logic that would inexorably land them there. Often, no doubt, they oscillate and waver dangerously near the brink of the abyss, as, for example, Professor Huxley does when he airily writes the following:—

For any demonstration to the contrary, the collection of perceptions which make up our consciousness may be only

¹ I. E. REEVE, vol. viii., p. 387.

phantasmagoriae generated by the Ego, unfolding its successive scenes on the background of the abyss of nothingness.¹

Such a tit-bit of wisdom—worthy of the most mystic German idealist—is but the logical outcome of a scepticism that rejects first principles and questions the trustworthiness of man's natural faculties.

Indeed, in a certain sense it is to be regretted, as we have already hinted, that English philosophers do not care to test their theories by pushing them to their ultimate conclusions. They would then have a chance of seeing their unsoundness, for, to use the forcible language of a certain writer, the consequences of their principles are simply 'appalling.'

Science is deprived of objective validity. For all science deals with the universal; but the objective counterpart of the universal is essence. The latter in so far as it is known being merely an abstract idea, it follows that all science is reduced to a knowledge of our mental states, or to Empirical Psychology. Religion which involves the recognition of a personal God, and of certain definite relations in which we stand to Him, is essentially blind superstition. For whether God exists or not, and whether, if He does exist He concerns Himself about human affairs, or is not rather an Epicurian deity . . . man should act according to his reason, and take no heed of matters that his reason declares to be unknown and unknowable.²

And another writer already referred to sums up the results of the system in those pregnant words³ :—

Thus [he says] in the light of Locke's philosophy, the whole fabric of physical science disappears, and we ourselves are left with so many bundles of sensations face to face with nothing. Thus, too, our great physicists who know everything, and outside whose ranks no one else knows anything, those very sapient guides cry out at last that we are all equally ignorant, forasmuch as there is nothing to be known by anyone, and that the most perfect dreamer is the most learned man. What a sublime philosophy!

But the philosophy of empiricism was encouraged by the vast strides made in recent years in the domain of the

¹ I. E. RECORD, December, 1892, 'The Spirit of Modern Science,' by Rev. T. E. Judge.

² *Ibid.*

³ I. E. RECORD, vol. viii., 1887.

physical sciences. Here, indeed, experience, observation, induction, achieved wonderful results. Then they began to be applied to the subject matter of pure mental philosophy. And the men who thus applied them seem to have forgotten that those very criteria rest ultimately on the metaphysical principles which they would fain deny or ignore. It was when men sought to dethrone the principles of 'causality' and 'nature's uniformity,' and to set up 'experience' in the place of 'metaphysics' that the confusion and doubt and Agnosticism began in earnest.¹ Our knowledge is limited to sense experience, said Locke. Who ever saw or felt causation or causality, asked Hume. Succession in time and space we know, but cause—what is cause? A thing no one ever heard or touched—a figment of the imagination! Away then with causality, the basis of all *a posteriori* reasoning, the condition of all proof for the existence of God! Yes, experience is indeed a solid basis on which to build a philosophical system, given the requisite instruments, intellect as well as sense—admitting the universal idea and the necessary truth as the grand achievement of the higher faculty, as sensation is of the lower. But once deny those transformers of sense experience, and try to build on experience alone, and you pull down with the left hand what you built up with the right. Yes, on the road to knowledge, experience is a safe guide as far as it goes, but it is not the only guide: indeed it goes only a very little way.

It tells us what has been, it says nothing of what must be. Now, it is on necessary truths—on musts—that all science is founded; hence the philosophers of the English school, though priding themselves on their devotion to science, set out on principles which, if consistently followed, would reduce us to the level of long-memored brutes.²

This is a conclusion which, one should think, philosophers would shrink from. Not so, however, for it tallies admirably with the modern theory of Evolution. Professor Huxley, for instance, an admiring disciple of Hume, pushes the

¹ See I. E. RECORD, August, 1884, 'Dr. Ward's Philosophy of Theism,' p. 484, *sqq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 479.

latter's scepticism so far as to assert that what we call laws of physical nature are nothing more than conjectures, more or less safe or hazardous, of what will take place in the order of nature—conjectures based on our multiplied experiences of what has taken place in the past. The idea of physical necessity of any sort—of what he calls the iron law of must—he consistently scouts as an unauthorized intruder into the domain of science.¹

A few pages back we referred to some of the attempts made by the empirical school to explain away the universal idea and the necessary truth, and so patch up the self-destructive philosophy of pure experience.

All those attempts have, of course, been futile. Many of them are ingenious and elaborate, and not a few have a peculiar interest in connection with our present subject. The Association theory, identified with John Stuart Mill, has been often examined and found wanting, notably by Dr. Ward in his *Philosophy of Theism*. Mill tries to rob all truth of its necessity, to show that such an element does not belong to the objective order, but is only attached on to our perceptions by the activity of our own minds. Constant and oft-recurring similar sensations, following one another in some particular set of circumstances, foster in us a strong inclination to believe what may not at all be true—that they will and must occur in the same order in similar circumstances in the future.² This consideration he develops at great length with a view to explaining away those primary analytical truths which are the first principles of all knowledge, and the immediate objects of our intellectual intuitions. The logical results of such a system would be universal scepticism, pure and simple. We draw attention to it here merely in illustration of a truth on which we must ever strongly insist: that, to deny any one primary truth cuts from under one's feet all ground for accepting the remaining truths of that important class. By denying to man's mind a God-given power to see those primary truths immediately and intuitively, by the light of objective

¹ *Ibid.* I. E. RECORD, vol. viii., p. 496 (1887).

² *Ibid.* vol. viii., pp. 306, 424.

evidence shining in upon it, just as man's eyes see the landscape in the shining noonday sun, the philosopher has gone the sure way of denying their natural power to memory also and even to consciousness itself.¹

In recent years English Philosophy has undergone another interesting development which so bears upon our subject as to call for at least a passing notice. The idealistic philosophy of Kant and the German schools, to which we referred above as being the very antithesis of empiricism, has been making its influence deeply felt in the world of English thought. The blend of the two erroneous extremes might, in other circumstances, have augured well for the cause of the golden mean. But the extremes met, unfortunately, in the minds of men who would think of anything sooner than of entertaining the remotest idea of examining the moderate realism of the schoolmen, to see, if mayhap, the truth might lie there after all. And so two wrongs have not produced a right.

They have, however, produced some curious and very disheartening anomalies in the literature of later-day English Philosophy, especially when they are seen engrafted on to the great native growth of the Evolution theory. We have a good example of this state of things in Professor Huxley when he puts on the cloak of Kantian subjectivism to teach the world what it is to understand by faith for all future time: a sort of feeling or consciousness by which 'men constantly feel certain about things for which they strongly hope, but have no evidence in the legal or logical sense of the word. . . . Who can or shall forbid man' to believe thus? 'But,' he continues, '*let him not delude himself with the notion that his faith is evidence of the objective reality of that in which he trusts.*'² Here, certainly, Kant and Hume speak through their disciple, while he gently insinuates the desired impression that Christian faith is an unreasonable superstition as it stands. He thinks, further on, that this same faith in Christ, as the 'ideal of

¹ I. E. RECORD, vol. v., p. 481; vol. viii., p. 422.

² The italics are our own.

manhood,' is likely to be replaced by something better when found incompatible with our knowledge !

Thus does he quietly prepare the way for Herbert Spencer and his grand modern cult of the Unknowable ; for Matthew Arnold's strange new Deity, revealed to a wondering world as 'the eternal not-ourselves that makes for righteousness.' By such writing does he try to turn men's minds and sympathies in the direction of modern agnostic science, with the new idols that are its gods and the nature-worship by which it attempts to supplant religion. Huxley was an adept in the art of throwing discredit on Christianity and on Christ its God. It is interesting to see how, in the sceptical and over-exacting spirit of Hume, he applied to the Bible the tests of the natural sciences ; how he demanded for its authenticity an almost mathematical evidence, with the effect of rejecting as unreliable the sacred books for which he sometimes professed such reverence. Supernatural Religion he set aside as altogether out of court because unscientific. Natural Religion he undertook to 'bring into line' with the requirements of 'modern science'—that is of Evolution. He got the article ready-made from his friend Herbert Spencer and he has worked might and main to popularise it. According to this new Gospel we are to learn that the only form of religion in concord with the 'teachings' of 'Science'—dictated in fact and forced upon us by 'Science'—is the cult of the Unknowable ; and so there arises a new aspect of Modern Scientific Agnosticism, when we regard it and proceed to consider it as the religion taught by Evolution to Mankind.

P. COFFEY.

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND USE OF THE SCAPULARS

ONE of the most striking proofs of the strong bond of union existing between the various members of the Roman Catholic Church, is perhaps the origin of the now common devotion of the scapular. From its very beginning it bore the impress of a deep-seated Christian love, and a desire to extend to the whole Catholic community the privileges of the few. For the scapulars now common among the laity were, we are told, from the very outset nothing less than the scapulars worn by the different religious orders, and reduced to smaller dimensions for the convenience of the faithful.¹ This being so, we practically receive the habit of the various orders, and by wearing it we conform in a certain sense to the object and spirit of the order whose special dress it forms. These scapulars are approved of by the Holy See and carry with them many indulgences, partial as well as plenary, both in life and at the hour of death. This should be an incentive for all to follow St. Alphonsus' example: 'For my own part,' he tell us, 'I have been careful to receive all these scapulars.'²

Of the many kinds of scapulars the four principal and most ancient ones are: the scapular of the 'Holy Trinity,' that of the Seven Dolours of our Lady, that of 'Mount Carmel,' and the scapular of our Lady of Mercy. There are two scapulars of later origin, viz.: that of the 'Immaculate Conception' and the 'Passion.' Those of still more recent date are the scapular of 'St. Michael' (20th April, 1882), of 'St. Joseph' (15th April 1893), of our Lady of 'Good Counsel' (21st December, 1893). In addition to these we have the approved scapular of the Sacred Heart. It used to be a badge rather than a scapular, being a picture of the Sacred Heart on white woollen material and worn on the breast. It is now conferred with blessing and enrolment

¹ Decr. Auth. No. 423.

² *Glories of Mary.*

but has no special confraternity.¹ According to a custom, approved of by the Holy See, some of these scapulars may be joined together; thus we get four or five, viz. : that of the Holy Trinity, that of the Seven Dolours, that of the Immaculate Conception, and that of the Passion of our Lord combined. To these the scapular of Mount Carmel is sometimes attached.

We shall deal briefly with the following points :—

(i.) The matter, form, and colour of scapulars. (ii.) The blessing of, and the enrolment in the scapulars in general. (iii.) The blessing of and enrolment in the four scapulars combined. (iv.) The Sabbatine privilege of the scapular of Mount Carmel.

I. The Form, Material and Colour of the Scapulars.—Scapulars, as they are worn by the faithful, consist of two pieces of woollen cloth, united to each other by two bands or strings. We must follow the directions with regard to the form of these pieces of cloth. It has been settled by an answer of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgence, August 18th, 1868, which requires that the scapulars should be *oblong* or *square*, in accordance with the custom hitherto observed in making them, and should not be changed into an oval, round, or polygonal shape: ‘*Hucusque generalis viguit usus conficiendi scapularia formae oblongae, vel saltem quadratae. . . . Quæritur itaque utrum alia forma præter oblongam vel quadratam obstet validitati scapularis?*’ S.C.I. resp. *Nihil esse innovandum*, 18th August, 1868.’

As those two pieces of cloth form the essential part of the scapular, the two strings or pieces of tape are necessary only, in so far as they admit of the scapular being worn in the proper manner; the restrictions therefore with regard to the colour and material have only reference to the pieces of cloth. The two bands, with the exception of the strings of the scapular of the Passion, may be made of any material or colour. The material for the scapulars must be real and pure wool. Cotton or similar material is not allowed: ‘*Ratio est quia parva scapularia alia non sunt, quam*

¹ Cf. Mucchegiani, *Collectio Indulg.* n. 882, *seq.*; approved 4th April, 1901.

scapularia variis ordinibus religiosis propria, pro majori fidelium commoditate ad parvam formam redacta.’¹ ‘Unde sicut illa ex lanea textura proprie dicta non vero raticulata aut subcoacta conficiuntur ita et haec simili modo confici debent.’² And this material must be *woven* or *real cloth*, so that if it be merely woollen thread worked by the needle in the form of a scapular, it must be regarded as not satisfying the requirements of the Sacred Congregation: ‘Utrum vox pannus, panniculus, ab auctoribus communiter usurpata usui debeat in sensu stricto, i.e. de sola lanea textura proprie dicta? Resp. Affirmative, 18th August 1868; 6th March, 1895.’ It is, however, allowable to adorn scapulars with embroidered figures or symbols commemorative of our Lord’s Passion in gold, or silk of any colour, but it is *essential* that the necessary colour of the scapular should predominate: ‘dummodo ornamenta talia sint ut color praescriptus praevaleat.’³ The meaning of these words is clear from an answer given by the Consultor:

Non videri obstare ornamenta, si haec sint accessoria et scapularia per ea non immutentur. Oportet tamen ornamenta esse exigua, ita ut prima fronte cognosci possit quale scapulare sit. Si enim istis ornamentis magna scapularium pars obtegeretur, cum non amplius scapulare dignoscatur, de ipsa validitate esset dubitandum.⁴

From this, however, we must not conclude that a scapular, having one side covered either by an embroidered, or stitched, or printed picture of our Lady, as is often the case with the scapular of Mount Carmel, would be against the regulations. The Sacred Congregation has plainly spoken in a decree of June 18th, 1898: ‘Hinc non valent scapularia, quae quamvis ex lana confecta, ita ex utroque latere cooperiuntur, ut pannus penitus aut quasi penitus non appareat.’ In fact the only thing to bear in mind is that what is special to each scapular, should not be hidden from view. For example the side of the scapular of the Holy

¹ Decr. Auth. No. 423.

² Haine, *Theol. Mor.*

³ 18th August, 1868.

⁴ *Acta S. Sedis* vol. iv., page 102.

Trinity, on which the red and blue cross is worked, must not be covered by another picture.¹ From this last decree² it would not be quite correct to infer that scapulars, when made in strict conformity with the prescribed regulations as to the colour, form, and material, allow of no covering in order to prevent them from getting soiled. That the Sacred Congregation does not object to this manner of wearing the scapulars, Beringer proves in the *Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift*, 1899, page 213. Provided, therefore, the covering remains (separated from the scapulars) and covers them in such a manner that they may be used or removed at will, the prescription of the Sacred Congregation would appear in no way violated and the wearer would not be deprived of the corresponding indulgences.

The Colour.—The various scapulars have different colours. For the four scapulars, which are usually combined together, the following regulations are laid down:—

The scapular of the Most Holy Trinity must be made of *white* cloth, with a small cross of woollen material worked in the centre, the portion representing the length being red, that of the cross-piece being blue. Usually we find this cross on both pieces of cloth composing the scapular, but it is in the strictest sense sufficient if it be placed on that part which is worn on the breast. Still, to be quite sure, it is best to have the cross on both parts of the scapular, and not to depart from this custom.

The scapular of the Seven Dolours of our Lady is to be made of *black* cloth.

The scapular of our Lady of Mount Carmel ought to be *tan* colour, but brown or its variations, and even black will do.³ It is, however, advisable, in order to distinguish this scapular from that of the Seven Dolours, especially if we combine four or five scapulars together, to use brown as being the most suitable colour. Occasionally we find on one side of this scapular a representation of our Blessed Lady; but this is not necessary: 'Imago B.V. quae ponitur

¹ Cf. *Coll. Ind.* . . . a Patr. Mocchegiani, n. 825.

² June 18th, 1898.

³ Decr. Auth. No. 278.

ordinarie super unius oris partem non est necessaria sed est tantum pius et laudabilis usus.' (Instruction which is added to the faculty.)

The colour of the scapular of the Immaculate Conception is *sky blue*, and this colour is, according to an answer of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, August 22nd, 1842, absolutely necessary; but the representation of our Lady with the Child Jesus in her arms is not required: 'Quae panno vel sagulo (sic Summ. Auth.) conjungi solet Mariae Virginis imago ornamenti loco habenda est, ut Christi fidelium pietas magis magisque excitetur.'

The requirements of the scapular of the Passion are, that it should be *red*, that its two bands should be of woollen material of the same colour, that its two pieces should have, one a representation of our Crucified Redeemer, the other a representation of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary.

When a scapular, which has been used in the blessing and conferring, or if the one which we at present wear is not in accordance with the above-mentioned regulations we cannot, notwithstanding our *bonâ fides*, gain the indulgences which have been granted to it.

But to remedy this, the Very Rev. Provincial of the Capuchins in Pennsylvania has obtained from the Holy See an indult rectifying the reception of the various scapulars in the case of those who have received them invalidly.

Tr. P. Hayacinthus quum saepe invalide fiant receptiones ad scapularia, humillime supplicat, ut Sanctitas vestra omnes receptiones invalidas ad sodalitatem vel Unionem Scapularis cujuscumque, bona tamen fide peractas sanare dignetur. Resp. Ssmus. Dominus Leo XIII. benigne concedere dignatus est ut adscripti cum aliquo defectu ut in precibus, ab hinc indulgentias singulis Scapularibus proprias lucrari valeant. 20 Jul. 1884.¹

All those, therefore, who before the 20th of July, 1884, have invalidly received one or more scapulars, and have been enrolled in the confraternity of those scapulars, can

¹ *Tablet*, December 6, 1884.

gain the attached indulgences, without a renewed valid enrolment.

It would, however, be imprudent to stretch the meaning of this rescript so far as to conclude that in the case, where the scapular itself, which we have received, was invalid as to the form, colour, etc., that in such a case it would not be necessary to change this scapular for a valid one.

II. *The Blessing and Enrolment.*—Having made sure that the material of our scapular is perfectly in accordance with the requirements, the next condition to gain the indulgence is, that it should be blessed and given with the prescribed formula by a priest, who has the power to do so; moreover, the names of the recipients should be inscribed in the register of the Confraternity (if one exists).

No blessing of, or enrolment in, a scapular can validly be performed except by a priest, who has the necessary faculty.¹ The granting of this faculty for any particular scapular belongs directly to the superior of the order to which the scapular belongs, and is usually not given directly by the Holy See.

In making use of the faculty, we must *strictly adhere* to the tenor of the same. We cannot go beyond the limits of time and place, without invalidating the blessing and enrolment; when, therefore, those places, where there is a monastery of the order, are excluded in the faculty given us, we cannot validly bless or bestow the scapulars there.² A convent of nuns of the same order would obviously not interfere with the faculty. However, a compliance with the condition 'de consensu,' or 'licentia ordinarii' (should this be expressed), is also required for the validity.³

A priest who has received the faculty to bless and enrol in one or more of the scapulars, is not therefore *per se* empowered to change any of the obligations of the members of the sodality, 'nisi expresse enuntietur in Rescripto Concessionis pro benedictione et impositione scapularium,' although at present this permission is usually granted with

¹ Rescr. Auth. No. 444.

² Decr. Auth. No. 326.

³ Decr. Auth. No. 438, ad 2m in fine.

the faculty to give a blessing with plenary indulgence *in articulo mortis*.

One who has received the faculty to give the scapular to others, is also authorised to give it to himself, provided his faculty extends to the class to which he himself belongs. 'Sacerdos sibimet imponere potest scapulare, qui habet facultatem; indiscriminatim minime vero taxative.'¹ Thus a priest can give himself the scapular, when he has that faculty for the faithful in general, for the diocese or parish to which he belongs, but not if his faculty is given solely for some particular purpose, say a convent of nuns.²

The scapulars must not only be blessed, but also be conferred by the *same priest*. This is evident from a decree³ in which the Sacred Congregation concludes that the indulgences cannot be gained by the faithful, 'qui pro ingressu in societatem habitum benedictum de manu sacerdotis auctoritatem habentis non receperunt,' and this is confirmed by a later decision of the Holy See:⁴ 'Ceterum in impositionibus in futurum peragendis ab eodem sacerdote scapularia imponantur, a quo ipsa scapularia benedicuntur.' But these decrees apply only to the *first* and *original* reception, so that after having once validly received the scapular we can always change it for a new one, even though not blessed, without losing our right to the indulgences.

An exception was formerly made for the scapular of the Blessed Trinity, every one of which, before being worn, had always to be blessed, but by a recent rescript of the Sacred Congregation⁵ his Holiness Pope Leo XIII. has abrogated this special precept, so that the same rules hold good now for the scapular of the Blessed Trinity.

When many present themselves to be enrolled, it is not necessary that a different scapular should be used for each person. The same scapular can be used for the valid

¹ 7th March, 1840.

² Decr. Auth. No. 280. Decr. dd. 16 Julii, 1887.

³ 18th September, 1862.

⁴ Decr. Auth. No. 430.

⁵ 24th August, 1895.

enrolment of any number of persons ; but in this case the first scapular, which every one afterwards takes for himself, must have been blessed.¹ And Beringer, commenting on this,² says that the blessing of scapulars need not always take place in the presence of those who are going to be enrolled. If, for example, in conferring scapulars on a great number of people some scapulars are left over, we can make use of these for the enrolment of others without reblessing them, and so we could give the scapular previously blessed in the above-mentioned way to a sick person, employing a short form for the imposition. It is not necessary when conferring the scapular to suspend it round the neck of the recipient, it is sufficient if it be put on one shoulder.

However, the *prescribed* formula must be adhered to in the blessing and conferring. A single sign of the cross over the scapulars without employing the set form of words and the blessing with holy water, whilst having only an intention to admit into the sodality those who desire to be so enrolled, will not be sufficient.³ In this decree is stated (ad 1^m) 'Benedictio et impositio danda est juxta formulam praescriptam, ad normam decreti 18 Augusti, 1868.' The question and answer here referred to are:—

(2^a) Utrum hujusmodi formula usurpari solita in actu impositionis scapularium essentialis sit, ut, etc. . . . an vero absque indulgentiarum dispendio possit omitti praesertim in morbis aliove urgenti casu? Resp. (ad 2^m) Tam ad primam quam ad secundam partem proferenda esse verba, quae sunt substantialia ad formam decreti hujus Sacrae Congregationis diei 24 Augusti, 1844: quod sic sonat: An rata sit fidelium adscriptio confraternitati B.M.V. de Monte Carmelo, quae fit a sacerdotibus quidem facultatem habentibus, non servata tamen forma in Rituali et Breviario Ord. Carmelitarum descripta? S. C. respondit: Affirmative dummodo sacerdotes facultatem habentes non deficiant in substantialibus, neque in benedictione, et impositione habitus, ac in receptione ad confraternitatem.

According to the answer ad 3^m Decr. 27 April, 1887, the declaration 'de servandis substantialibus,' although expressly

¹ Decr. Auth. No. 421, ad 2.

² 11 Theil iii., Abschnitt, 158.

³ Vide Decr., 27th April, 1887. *Nouvelle Revue Théol.*, tom. xix. 365.

given with regard to the scapular of Mount Carmel may be applied in the same way to other scapulars.

It seems, therefore, that although the use of the prescribed formula is necessary, not everything therein expressed is required for a valid blessing and enrolment, but only the essential parts, viz., those which express the blessing, the conferring and the enrolment (where necessary into the confraternity. We can now apply this general rule to the particular formulas for the five following scapulars.

The short formula for the scapular of Mount Carmel, approved of by the Sacred Congregation of Rites, 24th July, 1888 (which therefore can always be used), contains nothing that is not essential, nothing therefore can be left out. Viz., 'accipe (accipite) hunc habitum benedictum.' In the formula for the scapular of the Most Holy Trinity the prayer 'Omnipotens sempiterne Deus,' and 'Deus qui per Sanctos,' etc., can be left out without touching the essential part.

In that of the scapular of our Lady of the Seven Dolours, the first part seems to be merely an introduction ('omnipotens sempiterne Deus').

The formulæ for the scapulars of the Immaculate Conception and that of the Passion, seem to be essential in all their parts. Probably the last part 'En Ego' with what follows, as having reference to enrolment in a confraternity, could be left out as these scapulars require no enrolment in a confraternity (*vide* Beringer). But, when there is no reason for omitting, it is better to use the whole prescribed formula.

In conferring a particular scapular on a number of persons at the same time, the blessing is pronounced only once over all the scapulars together, according to the prescribed formula, but in the plural number (in numero plurali). This will also suffice for the formula of the 'imposition' and 'admission' into the sodality.¹

The Sacred Congregation was asked: 'Utrum liceat sacerdoti in impositione scapularium ab ecclesia approbatorum omnibus rite peractis dicere semel numero plurali formulam: Accipite fratres vel sorores, etc., imponendo successive et sine interruptione scapulare

¹ Decr., 18th April, 1891.

omnibus praesentibus vel potius formula numero singulari pro singulis sit repetenda?' Respondit S.C.I. (18th April, 1891). Affirmative quoad primam partem: negative quoad secundam, uti decretum est in una valentinensi die 5 Febr., 1841, ad dub 4.¹

This decision holds good for all the scapulars approved of by the Holy See. The conferring of the scapular, according to the last answer of the Sacred Congregation, takes place after the form has been pronounced, and the priest holds the scapulars in his hand whilst he pronounces the same. 'Formulam in casu dicendam esse immediate antequam scapularia imponi incipiantur, eaque sacerdote in manibus tenente.'²

When there is a confraternity in connection with a particular scapular, the very fact of receiving that scapular makes the recipient at the same time a member of the said confraternity. The faculty to admit into the sodality is *per se* included in the power to confer the scapular. It is, however, strictly necessary in order to gain the indulgences, that the names of those who receive the scapular should be inserted in the register.³

The insertion in the register of these names, without a special concession to the contrary, is obligatory in the case of the scapulars of the Holy Trinity, the Seven Dolours and of our Lady of Mount Carmel (27th April, 1887); but not for the scapular of the Immaculate Conception, or that of the Passion, because these scapulars have no sodality attached to them.

With regard to this enrolment the Sacred Congregation of Indulgence declares: 'Sacerdos debet penes se habere privatum regestrum, ut quam primum commode poterit, transmittat nomina receptorum ad superiores respectivae confraternitatis vicinioris' (26th January, 1871). Too strict an interpretation, however, should not be placed on the word *vicinioris*, since it has merely been adopted to facilitate the enrolment of members. 'Cum liberum sit ea transmittere moderatori cujuslibet confraternitatis.'⁴ The associates can

¹ *Ap. N. R. T.*, xxiii., 520, *seq.*

² *Ap. R. T. Franc.*, iii., 539, *seq.*

³ Decr. 16th July, 1887, and 17th July, 1891.

⁴ S.C.I., June, 1898.

gain the attached indulgences and privileges from the day on which their names are inscribed in the register. The blessing and enrolment can take place everywhere, not only in churches and chapels, but also in private houses ; and all can be enrolled, even those who have not yet attained 'the use of reason.'

Besides the blessing of the scapular and the enrolment, with the insertion of our names in the register, it is necessary, if we wish to gain the indulgences, to wear them in the prescribed manner ; that is to say, care must be taken to have one part of the scapular on the breast, the other at the back, between the shoulder-blades ; both parts suspended from the shoulders by means of the main bands ; but they need not be worn next the skin. Neither is it allowable to have both parts together, either on the breast or between the shoulder-blades ;¹ nor is it permissible to fasten or attach them to any article of clothing, much less, of course, to carry them in the pocket.

The scapular must always be worn, both day and night ; and an omission to wear the scapular during any length of time, say a whole week, would cause us to lose our claims to the privileges for at least that time. Further, we must wear all the scapulars in which we have been enrolled. The fact that there may be two scapulars instituted in honour of the same saint, as, for example, those in honour of our Lady of Mount Carmel and the Immaculate Conception ; or have the same colour, as is the case in the scapular of Mount Carmel and that of the Third Order of St. Francis, would make no exception to this rule.² We have only to resume the wearing of the scapular which was left off for some time in order to regain the indulgences. A new blessing and enrolment would be necessary only if the scapulars were discarded with the intention of wearing them no more. 'Cum animo illi valedicendi, sive illa voluntas fuerit implicita deponendo scapulare ex contemptu, sive fuerit explicita, directe eidem vel ejusdem sodalitati renuntiando.'³

¹ Decr. Auth. No. 279.

² 10 Jan. 1886. *Ap. N. R. T.* xviii. 608.

³ Haine, iv. 312.

III. *The Blessing and Conferring of the Combined Scapulars*.—The faculty to bless and confer four scapulars, combined, with a short formula, was originally granted to the Redemptorist Fathers, to be used especially during their missions.¹ Later on the Holy See extended this faculty to other priests,² to be used even on ordinary occasions (*extra tempus missionum*).

The faculty, however, to bless and confer the scapular of Mount Carmel, combined with others, has been abrogated by Rome, and this scapular must, for the sake of greater honour and devotion (*honoris et devotionis causa*) be blessed and conferred apart from others.³ This decree, however, seems to speak only of the blessing and enrolment. There is, therefore, no restriction *as to wearing* it combined with others.⁴ It must be remembered that though these scapulars can be joined together it must be done in such a way that they really remain separate, one from another.

Mens est, ut sacerdotes qui utuntur indulto apostolico indicendi Christi fideles quinque scapularibus, non benedicant scapularia nisi ea sint distincta, id est vere quinque scapularia sive totidem sive duobus tantum funiculis unita, ita ut cujuslibet scapularis pars una ab humeris, alia vero a pectore pendeat, non vero unum tantum scapulare, in quo assuantur diversi coloris panniculi.⁵

So that it will not now do to unite these scapulars together in such a way that only their edges remain visible, as was formerly done. We satisfy all the requirements under this head, however, if the different scapulars are joined together by means of short pieces of tape, an inch or two in length, to a main band, which goes over the shoulders. It would also suffice if the edges alone of each scapular were connected with the main strings; and Beringer would even allow us in addition to stitch them together a little towards the centre, but so that at least at three corners they remain separated. Beringer tells us, too, that the two outside

¹ Pius IX., September 14, 1857.

² Leo XIII., 27th April, 1886.

³ Decr. Ord. Carm. 27th April, 1887.

⁴ Constat. ex Decr., S.C.I., 11 Martii, 1897.

⁵ Decr. Monasteriensis dd. 27 Aprilis, 1887.

scapulars should be those of the Holy Trinity and the red scapular of the Passion, and that they should be arranged so that the two prescribed pictures of the last, the red and blue cross of the first, remain visible. Finally, it must be remembered that in case the scapular of the Passion is among those, that are thus joined together, the two strings must *be of red woollen material*, and that when we unite several scapulars together, if we depart from the manner of joining just laid down, the blessing and imposition of scapulars would become in consequence invalid, and we would not gain the indulgences which the wearing of these scapulars carry with them, even though our enrolment was valid.

In order to be allowed to bless and confer four scapulars together—(1) A special faculty from the Holy See is indispensable ;¹ (2) We must obtain from the various superiors faculties for the respective scapulars of their order.² The blessing and imposition *without* the special permission of the Holy See, but with the sanction of the superiors of the respective orders, would be valid according to what has been said above, *non defecit in substantialibus*, because all the essentials are contained in the short form ; but it would be illicit, as the usual form is prescribed without the special permission of the Holy See.³ On the other hand, provided only with the special faculty from the Holy See, without being duly authorised by the superiors of the various orders to confer their scapulars, any attempt to bless and enrol in them would be considered invalid on the part of the priest thus limited in faculties, because, according to the above-mentioned decree, 12th September, 1883, the essential permission is wanting. The Holy See, when granting the faculty to use the short form, *always* presupposes that permission has been obtained from the superiors of the different orders for whose scapulars we require faculties ; except where in this special faculty of the

¹ Decr. Mon., 27th April, 1887.

² S.C.I., 12th September, 1883.

³ Cf. Decr. dd. 12th September, 1883, ad 3^m Rescr. Auth. No. 444. *N. R. T.* xix. 364-390.

Holy See the permission itself (viz., to confer the scapulars) is given *expressis verbis*. This would be the case with the faculties of the Congregatione de Propaganda Fide. The words are: 'Facultas benedicendi et imponendi quinque scapularia ac utendi quoad quatuor ex illis unica forma.'

The faculty granted by the Holy See to give the four scapulars, using only the short form, can be used not only when the four scapulars are actually given together, but can also be made use of, where only two or three are conferred, with the omission of the words which have only reference to those scapulars which are left out.

As appears from an Indult of S.C.I. (20th June, 1894), the Holy See has graciously approved of all admissions to the confraternity of our Lady of Mount Carmel up to the 20th of June, whatever may be the defects under which they labour.¹ According to a recent Rescript of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, dated July 3, 1901, the Holy Father has been graciously pleased to condone forgotten or neglected registration of members of the confraternity up to the date mentioned. Enrolments which have taken place after that date must again be notified to a Carmelite monastery.²

IV. The Sabbatine Privilege of the Scapular of our Lady of Mount Carmel.—By this privilege is usually understood the speedy deliverance from Purgatory of the souls of those who have faithfully worn this scapular through life. Our Lady herself, according to a tradition, made this promise in favour of the members of the Order and those associated with them in an apparition said to have been vouchsafed to Pope John XXII. This Pope, it is said, made known and confirmed this privilege by the Bull *Sanctissimo uti Calmine* (March 3rd, 1322), according to which our Blessed Lady speaks as follows:—'Et a die, quo isti recedunt ab hoc sæculo et properato gradu accelerant ad purgatorium, ego mater descendam Sabbato post eorum obitum et quos in purgatorio invenero, liberabo et ad Montem Sanctum vitæ æternæ perducam.' Many other

¹ *Ap. N. R. T.* xxvi. 482.

² *Tablet*, Sept. 14, 1901.

Popes (viz., Clement VII., Paul III., Pius V., Gregory XIII., Clement X., Innocentius XI., etc.), have defended and explained this privilege. The following decree of the Inquisition of date January 20th, 1613, given by Paul V., lays down the conditions for participation in this privilege :—

Patribus Carmelitanis permittitur praedicare: quod populus Christianus possit pie credere de adjutorio animarum Fratrum Sodalitatis B.M.V. De Monto Carm. videlicet B.V. animas Fratrum et Confratrum in caritate decedentium, qui in vita habitum gestaverint, et castitatem pro suo statu coluerint, officiumque parvum recitaverint, vel si recitare nesciverint, ecclesiae jejunia observaverint et feria quarta et Sabbato carnibus abstinerint, nisi ubi in iis diebus Nativ. Dom. festum inciderit, suis intercessionibus continuis suisque suffragiis et meritis, et speciali protectione post eorum transitum, praecipue in die Sabbati (qui dies ab Ecclesia eidem B.V. dicatus est) adjuturam.

It follows from this decree that three conditions are therefore required, viz.:—(1) After having validly received the scapular and being admitted into the confraternity, we must wear a proper scapular and in the usual way; (2) That we observe the holy virtue of chastity according to our state of life; (3) And say the Little Office of our Blessed Lady. In the case of those who cannot read, in addition to the days of fasting appointed by the Church, Wednesdays and Saturdays, unless Christmas should happen to fall on one of these days, should be observed as days of abstinence. Of these conditions the two first apply to every one and admit of no exception. The second condition prescribes the practice of the angelic virtue, viz., the observance of chastity in the single state, of fidelity in the married. In this respect, however, should one fail, he would not forfeit his claims to these privileges, but may regain his right to the promise by a good confession. It is, however, quite evident, that our Blessed Lady would be more disposed to deliver a member of Carmel from Purgatory the greater the faithfulness to the practice of this virtue.¹

The third condition, viz., that one who can read should say the Little Office of our Blessed Lady every day, means

¹ Ulrich Tresor. spirituel.

that the Nocturn proper to the day, together with the *Lauds* and the other hours of the same office, should be recited in Latin, according to the Roman Breviary. 'Nisi quis habeat proprium ritum a S. Sede approbatum.'¹ Those who are bound to say the Divine Office, or those who recite the Office of our Lady according to rule, satisfy thereby this obligation. Those who can read are not at liberty to substitute at will the second part of this condition²; whilst the obligation of fasting and abstinence (exclusive of eggs, milk, butter, and cheese on Wednesdays and Saturdays) on the above-mentioned days is merely imposed to afford an opportunity of enjoying the same privileges to those who are unable to read.³ It should be borne in mind, too, that the terms of the other condition cannot be said to be carried out, if use is made of a dispensation, such as that granted by the Bull *Cruciatae*,⁴ or the ordinary episcopal Lenten dispensation; except in the case where a lawful commutation has been obtained.⁵

Another good work can be substituted by a priest, who has this special faculty, when one is unable for some reason or another (*ob justam causam*) to say the Little Office or observe the fast and abstinence on the prescribed days. But although this commutation is not necessarily connected with the permission to bless, etc., the scapular of Mount Carmel, still at present it is usually given with the first faculty. In the use of this concession we must follow its tenor strictly. If, for example, it appear from the wording, that it is limited to a confessor, as is often the case, it would seem that a priest, who is not in possession of the faculties

¹ Decr. Auth. No. 419 S.C.I., 18th August, 1868.

² Decr. dd. 3rd Dec., 1892.

³ Decr. dd. 3rd Dec., 1892, ad 2^m et 3^m. *N. R. T.* xxv. 260.

⁴ Julius II., 1509.

⁵ From this answer (Decr. dd. 3rd Dec., 1892, ad 3^m) it seems to appear that what has been stated as to the use of a dispensation applies not only to the abstinence on Wednesdays and Saturdays, but also to the days of fasting appointed by the Church: 'in quacumque feria iv. vel in vigiliis aliisque diebus prohibitis.' P. Petrus Mocceghiani is apparently of the same opinion, *Coll. Ind.*, n. 1,934: 'Quapropter dici posse videtur Ecclesiam, dum iustis de causis a propriis legibus dispensat vel earum rigorem aliquando temperat, nolle in præfatis conditionibus, quæ a Deipara virgine in sodalium favorem referuntur appositæ, ullam modificationem inducere, sed eas velle integras permanere.'

to hear confessions, could not make use of it, though commutation, according to St. Liguori, can take place outside the confessional. 'Quando datur potestas commutandi opera praescripta in alia, id non necessario fit in confessione, et a confessore, qui audit confitentem: sed potest fieri extra, et ab alio idoneo.'¹

Still a second privilege in connection with this scapular has been granted by our Blessed Lady. In an earlier apparition, according to another tradition, the Blessed Virgin appeared to St. Simon Stock, General of the Carmelites, at a time of trial for the Order. Giving him a scapular she added these words, 'This will be a privilege for you and for all Carmelites, no one dying in this scapular will suffer eternal burning.'

We cannot dismiss this subject without referring to the innumerable indulgences attached to the Blue Scapular of the Immaculate Conception. Of these the two following deserve mention.

By the first of these all the associates, who recite six 'Our Fathers,' six 'Hail Mary's,' and six times 'Glory be to the Father,' in honour of the Most Blessed Trinity, in honour of the Immaculate Conception, and for the usual intentions of the Church, can gain all the indulgences granted to those, who visit the seven Basilicas of Rome, the Church of Portiuncula at Assisi, the Church of St. James of Compostella, and the Holy Land of Jerusalem, and that not only once but *each time*—*toties quoties*—without restriction as to the place where, or mode in which they pray, *i.e.*, kneeling or not kneeling:² 'Servato tamen decreto S.C.I. diei 7 Mart., 1678, approbato Inn. XI. cujus initium Delatae Saepius.' No other prayers are required. Nor is it necessary to go to Confession or Holy Communion in order to gain these indulgences, which are equally applicable to the souls in Purgatory.³ Still though confession is not prescribed, nevertheless the state of grace is necessary in order to gain the indulgences, if applied to the person himself, and in all probability if applied to the souls in Purgatory.⁴

¹ Lib. vi., Tract iv., n. 15.

² S.C.I., 18th September, 1862.

³ S.C.I., 14th April, 1856.

⁴ Lehmkühl, ii. 561.

It is stated 'Servato tamen decreto S.C.I. diei 7 Mart., 1678,' according to which Innocent XI. declares: 'Semel autem dumtaxat in die plenariam indulgentiam in certos dies ecclesiam visitantibus concessam, vel aliud pium opus peragentibus, *lucrifieri*.' It seems that this could only be applied and verified in the case of those indulgences, which are plenary and granted for the living: 'Nam qui pro defunctis acquirit indulgentiam, remissionis poenarum temporalium lucrum non facit, sed eam in alios transfert.'¹ The authentic² summary fully confirms this assertion of 'Mendener.'³ 'Juxta memoratum decretum indulgentia plenaria *pro vivis* concessa in diem certum, ecclesiam locumve visitantibus, non acquiritur nisi semel in die.' Accordingly it would seem to follow that all these indulgences, not only the partial but also the plenary, granted to those who visit those places, can be gained each time *toties quoties* at least *pro defunctis*. Moreover, since the decree of Innocent XI. granting the plenary indulgence *for certain days*, it would appear that all the indulgences, with the exception of those which are granted only to those who visit the Basilicas at Rome and Compostella *on certain specified days*, can be gained many times on the same day by the members of the sodality of the Blue Scapular for themselves or for the souls in Purgatory.⁴ The second privilege applies to a deceased member. It consists in granting by a special favour a plenary indulgence to the altar on which Holy Mass is offered up for his soul; whensoever and wheresoever it be offered.⁵

The devout wearing of the scapular is for every Catholic, if he chooses, a source of abundant grace, and we can ill afford to cast aside what has been approved of by the Church; for whilst securing our souls against many dangerous assaults in life, it will form the distinguishing mark of all true clients of Mary in the heavenly home, whither we are all fast

¹ Lehmkuhl.

² S.C.I., 26th August, 1882.

³ Decr. Auth. No. 374 et Rescripta Auth. Summar 57, scil. pag. 577 in nota.

⁴ Vide *N. T. R.* xxiv. 414-422; *item* Lehmkuhl, II, n. 561.

⁵ 'Altare privilegiatum.' Cf. Summ. Ind. a S.C.I., 26th August, 1882, approbatum.

speeding. But on the other hand, we must take care not to put unerring trust in the scapulars, nor look to them as infallible means of grace, so as to imagine, as some have done, that no matter how remiss we may be in our duty to God, Holy Church, and our neighbour, they will certainly work out our salvation in the end.

For true is the saying 'As you live so shall you die,' and many examples, alas, testify to its terrible significance. Still, to a truly contrite and determined soul, Mary has never failed: much less can we expect her to forsake in life and in death, those who in an especial manner have consecrated themselves to her and generously and faithfully donned her true livery 'the scapular.'

L. OOSTERLAAN.

IS ROME NECESSARILY THE SEAT OF THE PAPACY?

PROGRESS is a law and a necessity, and it involves changes which we welcome, but which would have filled our forefathers with alarm. It can hardly be disputed that the progress of civilization is from East to West, from the Old to the New World; some would even go so far as to say that the New World is more Catholic-minded than the Old. Is it conceivable that coming centuries will see such a radical change of ideas as is involved in New York becoming the throne of the Fisherman? We are moved to ask this question because it was put to the writer in its crudest and most startling form not very long ago. The interlocutor was a Protestant, and he somewhat bluntly asked: 'By-the-bye, you are Roman Catholic priest; is it true that the next Pope is to be an American Jesuit, and that he will remove the Curia to New York?'

Here was a collocation of ideas enough to stagger the senses of orthodox or conservative folk. Of course we scouted the notion and attempted to explain that the election to the Papal chair was never a foregone conclusion, that it was an affair in which we devoutly believed that the Holy Spirit had a more than usual share, and we added other remarks to the same effect. Our interrogator smiled as though he knew better, perhaps he still expects to greet the successor of the Fisherman clad in modern garb, with the genuine American ring, and dating his bulls from Neo Eboracum!

Yet it must be conceded that such a change, startling as it is, is not inconceivable. We may not always be blessed with Pontiffs of the stamp of Leo XIII.; without a recurrence of the dark periods of the Papacy, we may yet have Pontiffs whose ken is not so far-reaching, whose sympathies are not so all-embracing as we could desire; it may well be that the New World, through no fault of its own, finds itself out of touch with the Spiritual Head of Christendom.

Modern views may in time so predominate that the larger number of the members of the Sacred College may hail from America, there may spring up a feeling that an 'up-to-date' Pope, in other words an American Pope, would be an advantage. All this is possible, but is it possible that the Holy See should be removed from Rome to New York? that the successor of St. Peter should no longer be Bishop of Rome but Bishop of New York?

The question really depends for its answer upon another much disputed point. By what right is the Bishop of Rome the successor of St. Peter? Was it merely because St. Peter's sagacity led him to choose Rome for his see as being the future mistress of the world? or are we to say that he was divinely led to do so? We certainly have no New Testament authority for claiming a Divine command to St. Peter on the subject, nor even a Divine ratification of his choice. And yet if we concede that it was merely a choice based on human perspicacity, on what grounds can we deny the possibility of New York becoming the see of Peter's successor?

This was a question which naturally attracted a good deal of attention during the Papal residence at Avignon. The Roman people clamoured for the return of the Popes, and they urged the prescriptive rights of their city. Yet many of these Pontiffs would have been glad to be able to call Avignon the Papal see had it been possible. The truth is that they never seemed to conceive of such a change as possible. The idea that Rome was divinely, and therefore inalienably, chosen as the see of the Fisherman and his successors, appears repeatedly in Papal documents. Thus Pope St. Gelasius, Ep. xi. ad Anastasium, says:—'We must agree with the prelate of that see [Rome] since even the Divinity itself wished him to have pre-eminence over all priests.' Again, Nicolas I., Ep. viii. ad Michaelem Imperatorem, declares that 'the privileges of this see are perpetual, they are divinely rooted and planted, they may be assailed, transferred they cannot be.' Boniface VIII. says:—'The inscrutable depth of Divine Providence has placed the Roman Church over all Churches by an unchangeable

arrangement.'¹ While the Vatican Council says:—'We declare that the Roman Church, by the Lord's enactment, holds the primacy of ordinary power over all others.'² The reigning Pontiff, too, goes still further when he says:—'Not without a special inspiration from God did Blessed Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, direct his steps to that metropolis of the idolatrous world.'³

Similarly Innocent III. declares that it was a Divine revelation which led St. Peter to transfer his see from Antioch to Rome.⁴ The beautiful and well-known tradition referred to by St. Ambrose—*Sermo contra Auxentium*—might give us a hint as to the occasion of this revelation. He tells us that Christ met St. Peter fleeing from Rome, the Apostle asked Him: 'Lord, whither goest Thou?' '*Venio iterum crucifigi*,' came the answer; and the Apostle, understanding the Master's meaning, straightway returned to Rome. It is evident that if this were the occasion it would indicate that the revelation came as a Divine ratification of St. Peter's own original choice.

The sentiment is thus everywhere the same, but the grounds assigned for it vary. Gelasius, Boniface VIII., and Nicolas I. simply declare that it was a Divine act; Innocent III. says that it was not due to St. Peter's initiative, but that he was led by a Divine revelation to remove from Antioch; while the tradition given us by St. Ambrose might imply that the choice was Peter's, ratified by the Divine admonition he received to go back to Rome and die. Hence theologians differ much when discussing the question of the alienability of the primacy of the Church from the Roman bishopric. Dominic Soto, O.P. (died 1560), maintains that the choice was merely St. Peter's, and that Rome's rights are thus purely human in origin; but he adds, as though to avoid unpleasant consequences, that when once the union between the bishopric of Rome and the headship of the Church had been effected, it acquired a

¹ Bull, *Sacrosanctae Romanae*.

² Constit. Dogm. : *Pastor aeternus*, cap. iii.

³ Litt. ad Em. Card. Rampolla, 15 Junii, 1887.

⁴ Ep. lib. ii., 2.º.

Divine right. John of St. Thomas, O.P., declares that this union is probably of Divine origin, but not certainly so; while Cardinal Cajetan, O.P. (1469-1534), seemingly following out St. Ambrose's hint, maintains that the reason why the Bishop of Rome succeeds to the headship of the Church is 'the appropriation of the Roman Church to the Pontificate of Peter, ratified both by the death of Peter [in Rome] and by Christ's command.'

Still, when all is said, we have not got beyond the realm of tradition and opinion. Have we any grounds *a priori*, as well as *a posteriori*, for maintaining that, if the world were to last ten thousand years longer, it would still see the successor of the Fisherman enthroned at Rome? John of St. Thomas, after discussing the origin of the union between the bishopric of Rome and the headship of the Christian world, says that this union is so complete as to be inseparable; i.e., it would be impossible to witness the sight of a bishop ruling in Rome while the head of some other see was head of the universal Church. He excepts one case—the destruction of Rome itself. 'Apart from such a contingency,' he says, 'I think that no cause could arise which could justify, or even render valid, such a separation.' He makes this exception because he thinks it probable that Rome will be destroyed at the advent of Antichrist.

If we were asked which was the most important of the notes of the Church we might, of course, answer that none was more important than the other, or that each assumed an overwhelming importance according to divers points of view. There is a point of view from which Apostolicity is the most important note—namely, as the guarantee of the Church's oneness with Christ. It constitutes, as scholastics would say, the *informing* principle welding the rest together. When, however, we come to examine the note of Apostolicity we find that it is composed of two factors, one of which may be in its turn regarded as the informing principle of the other. Apostolicity may be defined as 'a property of the Church, by which, *through legitimate, public, and uninterrupted succession of pastors from the Apostles*, she continues in identity of doctrine, sacraments, and

government.' The words italicised represent the informing principle, the guarantee for identity of doctrine. Now, if Rome were destroyed, so that the Head of the Church could no longer have his see there, it is hard to see how the uninterrupted succession of pastors from the Apostles could be fairly called 'public.' Doubtless, for contemporaries, the reason of the break in the material part of the note of Apostolicity would be clear enough, but in the lapse of years what heartburning would ensue upon this question. It is true that this does not constitute an absolute bar to the destruction of Rome and the consequent removal of Peter's See, but we feel that it would cause a difficulty regarding the note of Apostolicity which would seem to be alien to the ordinary ways of God's Providence.

When we reflect upon the vicissitudes through which Rome has passed, when we recall the low ebb to which it has sunk, and that not merely morally but physically, it is hard to shut our eyes to the clear designs of Providence, which willed that the City of the Seven Hills should be called and should be 'The Eternal City.'

One day, perhaps, a son of America's soil will fill Peter's Chair, but we think it impossible that a successor of St. Peter will ever set up his see on America's soil.

HUGH POPE, O.P.

ADOLPH KOLPING

THE subject of this article is one of the most interesting personalities that Germany has produced during the past century.

It was somewhere about the year 1810 that Adolph Kolping was born at Kerpen, near Cologne, where he passed the earlier years of his life. His parents were of the peasant class, and so steeped in poverty that with every desire to educate their son, they were completely unable to provide the means necessary for that object, so the lad became apprenticed to a shoemaker, much to his own disgust, and the grief of his father and mother.

But with Adolph duty always took a prominent position, so he served his time diligently during his apprenticeship, on the completion of which he went, according to the custom of his class, on a wandering tour from town to town gaining experience and expanding his mind.

In those days the apprentices were accustomed to live with their masters, and as a rule they were none too well treated, their food was coarse and frequently insufficient, while beyond instruction in their particular handicraft they were totally neglected, for there was no one who interested himself in their spiritual welfare or their moral progress. Their deplorable position appealed very strongly indeed to the sympathies of young Kolping, and he devoted much of his time to studying deeply the condition of things and striving to discover some scheme of amelioration for it, nor was his labour in vain.

Not very long afterwards came the crisis of his life, when his dreams of ambition and philanthropy became for the first time possible of realization, for some generous friends found for him the requisite funds to enable him to enter on a systematic course of study, which he pursued assiduously under the greatest difficulties, and by making the greatest sacrifices. At length he was admitted to the

priesthood, was duly ordained, and appointed a curate, a position which he held for a very brief period at Elberfeldt, where he still continued to take an absorbing interest in the welfare of the working-classes, and on a quite small scale to organize a plan for the improvement of their social status.

But it was in Cologne, to which city he was subsequently transferred, that his life-work really commenced to bear fruit. Here he started his scheme of reformation modestly enough with twelve young men, and so successful was his initial effort that his gigantic plan of elevating the artizan class in every possible respect rapidly developed itself. He worked to the attainment of this object with untiring energy, ever striving to arouse in the breasts of the mechanics a feeling of respect for themselves and to foster in their hearts a sense of pardonable pride in their labours.

Of course Kolping needed many helpers, but, fortunately for the success of his self-imposed mission, he possessed in perfection the happy knack of discovering the proper men required for the purpose, and whenever he came across any such, possessed of the necessary qualifications, they were immediately enlisted in the good cause. One of the earliest of these was the present Cardinal Gruscha, the Archbishop of Vienna.

From very small beginnings the organization has developed to an enormous extent, the tiny acorn has grown into a sturdy oak, having its roots in Germany, whilst its branches spread all over the civilized world. At the present day there is not a single town of any importance in the Fatherland which does not boast of its club for the working-man, whilst Paris, London, New York, New Orleans, Alexandria, Rome, Jerusalem, and other cities too numerous to specify, are also similarly provided; in all there are now more than eight hundred branches in existence.

From time immemorial, from away far back in the mediæval ages, it has been the custom for every apprentice who has completed his time of servitude at his trade to have what is termed his 'Wanderschaft' tour from town to town lasting, at the least, for twelve months, during which period

he earns his subsistence at his craft as he journeys from place to place. Prior to the establishment of the *Gesellen Verein*, or Association of Workmen, this prelude to the real business of life was pursued under many disadvantages. • How different at the present time when the association can boast of a membership of close on a quarter of a million, whilst since its foundation several millions of artisans have enjoyed the privileges of these club-houses. No matter where the traveller finds himself, all that it is necessary for him to do in order to participate in all the advantages which his enrolment confers is to produce his certificate, when he is immediately welcomed into an hospitable home, where he is surrounded by friends of his own nationality, is supplied with food, and provided with sleeping accommodation at the most moderate charges. For instance, a really excellent dinner is served at the London branch for ninepence!

Nor are these material advantages the only ones obtainable, for the higher aspirations of humanity are also catered for, and mental pabulum, in the form of instruction in science and art, is given, whilst literature and amusements are furnished on a lavish scale. Thus, on Sunday evenings music, glee-singing, lectures, dancing and private theatricals combine to make the evening one of wholesome recreation and intellectual enjoyment, during which the members smoke their pipes or cigars and imbibe the light lager beer of their homeland. Spirits in any form are not permitted on the premises. All these, together with many other advantages, such as the use of a swimming bath, a gymnasium, and a well-stocked library, plentifully supplied with current periodical literature, are procurable by the members for the extremely moderate subscription of one shilling per month.

A priest invariably holds the position of president, an office which is certainly no sinecure as, in addition to the religious services he conducts, he gives lectures, imparts instruction, preserves order, joins in all the schemes for recreation, and is responsible for the homogeneous working of the whole concern. Under him there exists a committee,

elected by the members, any of whom who marry are forthwith ejected, although, as a general rule, they become honorary members, and enjoy all the privileges. They have the right of admission to all the meetings on the same footing as an ordinary member, but cannot vote, although their advice is at all times treated with respectful consideration.

Active members who may die are buried at the cost of the association, whilst all other members who are in the neighbourhood at the time are expected to attend the funeral.

In connection with every branch there is a sick club which provides doctors and medicine free of charge, and which further pays over a weekly sum of money, varying according to the circumstances of each particular case, to any member who from illness becomes incapacitated for work.

One very pleasing feature of the social gatherings is the frequent presence at them of old members, accompanied by their wives and children, who are always cordially welcomed by their younger brethren of the Gesellen Verein.

In proof, if any such were needed, of the importance of this institution let it be stated that the German Emperor takes a very great interest in its progress, fully realizing the illimitable power for good which such an association exercises over the rising generation, and he views the scheme as a gigantic breakwater opposed to the encroaching waves of socialism, anarchy, and infidelity.

Were half the power that fills the world with terror,
Were half the wealth lavished on camps and courts,
Given to redeem the human mind from error,
There were no need for arsenals or forts !

Before the death of Father Kolping, which occurred in the year 1856, he had the supreme gratification of witnessing the wonderful development which his great work had attained, whilst, in recognition of his remarkable services to humanity, he was, as a special honour and privilege,

accorded burial inside his own church at Cologne; and to the present time it remains a very pretty custom that every Geselle who passes through that city pays a pilgrimage to the tomb of the founder of the Gesellen Verein.

C. H. MOUNTAGUE-CLARKE.

LACORDAIRE

ONE of Cardinal Newman's biographers tells us of the magnetic personality of the great convert, and certainly, on happier expression could be found to describe the extraordinary power of fascination which some men seem to possess. I remember feeling the influence of the same power with reference to the first Napoleon and some of the celebrated characters who figured in the first French revolution. More recently in Irish history there arose a constellation of interesting and talented young men who possess the same power. I refer to the party of Young Irelanders who surrounded Thomas Davis. Literature concerning these magnetic personalities will make a deep impression on the mind, especially in the case of plastic and enthusiastic natures. The ardent enthusiast who is carried away by the glory of Napoleon and his satellites will be so captivated by his subject that he will appreciate no other kind of greatness. Literary eminence, civic virtue, the splendour of the saints will sink into insignificance by the side of such martial glory, and there will arise in his mind the desire to imitate the hero of his choice. In like manner the Irish youth of seventeen who follows with rapt interest the history of the Young Irelanders, will feel that patriotism is the grandest of all virtues, and will sigh for, and dream of a life devoted as he will think to the pure and noble ideals for which Davis and his ardent friends toiled. The old saying—'the insect takes the colour of the leaf it feeds upon'—is never so applicable as in the case of this kind of literature, and hence it is most important that with

impressionable dispositions, magnetic personalities of the right description should be put before them. The young idolater will then bow the knee to the true hero and will be impelled to devote his life towards the pursuit of really noble ideals. Instead of Napoleon give him St. Ignatius ; instead of Davis give him Newman, and his life may be elevated to an altogether higher plane.

The lives of the saints made St. Ignatius a saint, and no doubt there have been many, very many called away from the world to a life of religion by the perusal of St. Ignatius' own life. Almost in our own day, we have the plainest evidence of the influence Cardinal Newman's career has had in drawing so many into the Catholic Church. Fascinating characters have been produced by the Church at all times. I have referred to St. Ignatius, and in our day to Cardinal Newman. I will call the reader's attention to a third, who was a contemporary of Newman—Lacordaire—and I venture to assert that notwithstanding the great beauty of Newman's character, many will find themselves more captivated by that of Lacordaire. For my own part, I will say that in the history of the Church, if we except the great Hildebrand and St. Augustine, I find no nobler, no more interesting, no more chivalrous personality than the great Frenchman. Lacordaire is not a saint, that is, he will never find a place in the calendar, but nevertheless, his life is more inspiring, more admirably suggestive, as it is more interesting than the lives of many saints. A saint is one in whom the natural is shadowed by and lost in the supernatural, but Lacordaire, though a man of exalted piety, appears in all the freshness of his natural character. We see him falling into errors, we see in him many of those frailties which are so rarely to be met with in those who have attained heroic sanctity ; but these little shortcomings only make him stand out before us more vividly. They only bring out into bolder relief that nobility of character, that elevation of mind, that grandeur of soul, so far removed from anything mean or petty, that heroic resolve which marked him off from the men of his generation. We see in him especially one of the most interesting examples of the

action of the Church on the individual character. The Church found him, to use his own words, 'the child of an age which scarcely knows what obedience is, one for whom 'independence had been his couch and his guide,' and she sweetly broke down that rebellious spirit leaving him still the bold originality and the fearless disposition in which he had been nurtured. She found him, to use the language of Montalembert, like one of those 'barbarians who swooped down on the Roman Empire, the terror of her obedient children,' and she smoothed his roughness, tamed his wild nature, and without interfering with the grand features of his natural character, ingrafted into it the spirit of Christianity. It is the blending of two natures, so to speak, that makes Lacordaire so interesting. He was an infidel who gloried in independence, and the use of reason. He was made a Christian, taught to believe reason must not be his sole guide, but much more especially the revelation of God. Is his old character gone? Not in the least. He still prides himself in the exercise of reason. Reason and revelation he feels must never be opposed to each other; the right use of reason is therefore the use of the noblest faculty God has given to man. His spirit of independence made him a votary of human liberty. The Church taught him the docility and humility of the Christian religion. Is he no longer an advocate of liberty? Not in the least. He now preaches a higher and nobler liberty, and proclaims the Church the liberator of the world of nations as well as of individuals. Boldness, originality, independence he possessed before his conversion; the same characteristics he possessed after his conversion, only that into all of them was ingrafted, as I said, the true Christian spirit, the spirit of docility to the Church, of submission to all her authoritative decrees. He was the barbarian softened, elevated, spiritualised; the connecting link between the untamed children of the forests and the humble Christians of the civilized world.

What is the history of this great man? We cannot go through his life in detail, though it is a life strangely simple and uneventful, consisting of a few abrupt decisive changes,

followed by long periods of an unchequered nature. We shall confine ourselves to the most salient points. Born the son of a village doctor, brought up by a pious Christian mother, he early in youth lost his faith, becoming a prey to the infidel spirit of his times. Loss of faith was his only sin. His morals were ever pure. As he says before turning to God, he was a slave to human glory and nothing else. And yet, though never a victim of low passion, he could say, 'I am sated without having purchased satiety by experience.' The purity of his life amid the corruption of Paris is an evidence of the elevation of his nature, whilst his appreciation of the world's enjoyments, without ever experiencing them, show the eager-like penetration of his soul. He embraced the profession of the law, and was already a lawyer at the time of his conversion. Like all the changes of his life that seems to have been the work of a moment. As he wandered along the streets one day, the light broke in on his soul and he determined to be not only a good Christian, but also he made up his mind to give up the world and become a priest. Entering St. Sulpice, he spent the usual preparatory course there, remarkable only for the profound queries he would from time to time propose to his professors. From his letters we know how much in earnest he was to acquire the true priestly spirit. Writing to a friend he says, 'I wish to put off this natural life and consecrate myself to the service of Him who can never be either jealous, ungrateful, or base.'

His public life commenced in 1830 with his connection with the celebrated paper *L'Avenir*. De Lammenais, who was at that time regarded as the great luminary of the Modern Church, who had been caressed by the Pope and styled by an admiring generation the 'Last of the Fathers,' was the originator of the famous journal. A few other priests and laymen co-operated, but soon three stood forth prominently from the rest. These were De Lammenais, Lacordaire, and the youth of twenty, Count de Montalembert. De Lammenais was the great master to whom the others looked up, but Montalembert tells us of Lacordaire that though he revered De Lammenais, he was by no

means his pupil, and secondly that very soon the great writer was equalled, if not eclipsed, by his young follower.

We have an interesting portrait of Lacordaire as he was in 1830 from the pen of Montalembert. The two friends, both in the bloom of youth, met in the office of *L'Avenir*, and each was charmed with the other. 'I love him as if he were a plebeian,' writes Lacordaire.

I saw them both, De Lammenais and Lacordaire, for the first time [says Montalembert]; dazzled and mastered by the one I felt myself more gently and naturally drawn towards the other. He appeared to me bewitching and terrible, the type of enthusiasm in the cause of good. I saw in him a chosen one, predestined to all that youth most adores and covets—genius and glory. On the morrow of our first meeting he took me to hear his Mass, and we already loved each other as people are wont to love in the pure and generous outpourings of youth.

Lacordaire was then twenty-eight, and from his friend's portrait we can see that his intellectual and moral gifts were accompanied by all the outward graces of person. We are told of his 'tall slight frame, with its lofty elegance, subdued by a modesty noticeable through his whole person,' of his 'fine features and beautifully chiselled forehead,' of the 'royal set of the head,' so expressive of his noble character, of his 'dark flashing eye,' which bespoke treasures of anger and tenderness, and seemed to be ever on the lookout for enemies to overthrow and hearts to conquer and win; of his voice in which firmness and sweetness were combined and which could assume so well that 'despairing ring,' which his biographer years after his death could not remember without an inward shudder. It is little wonder that Montalembert would speak of such a man as predestined to genius and glory, for surely few were more richly dowered with those gifts which must shine forth among men and win their admiration. Moral graces, intellectual graces, and physical graces were all combined in this young man.

Needless to say that a journal supported by such men as De Lammenais, Lacordaire and Montalembert at once became celebrated. Few publications of its kind surpassed, perhaps equalled it in ability. It grew to be a power in the land—but a power of doubtful utility in the cause of religion.

To much fearless championing of the cause of the Church it joined extreme and at times extravagant opinions no less hostile to the government than annoying to the ecclesiastical authorities. In consequence of his fiery articles Lacordaire was often summoned before the civil tribunal, and there astonished his judges by the different rôles in which he appeared before them. Sometimes coming forth as a priest to answer an accusation; sometimes donning the lawyer's gown and defending himself with that noble eloquence which he even then began to manifest. These were times when priests were a proscribed class, when infidels crowded the courts to gloat over the discomfiture of some clerical delinquent. Yet, at times, they could not withhold their admiration for Lacordaire. 'Ministers of a foreign power' was the taunt levelled by a crown lawyer one day at Lacordaire and his brother priests. 'We are the ministers of one,' exclaimed Lacordaire, who is a 'foreigner nowhere—of God.' The hostile audience burst into a thunder of applause. 'Your name, young priest,' they cried, 'you are a fine fellow.' The rough trials which Lacordaire then encountered were a splendid training for his future work. They gave him nerve and courage and self-confidence. 'I am convinced,' he says after them, 'that the Roman Senate would not unnerve me.'

Having attacked, in language of extraordinary vehemence, the crown for appointing three bishops in virtue of the Concordat, he was prosecuted, and with him De Lammenais. He acted as his own counsel, and defended himself with great intrepidity. So far from abating the vigour of his denunciation he did not hesitate to call the members of the government 'oppressors.' 'You do not bind my hands,' he says, 'but you shackle my thought, you do not allow me to teach—me, to whom it was said *docete*. The seal of your laws is on my lips; when will it be broken? I consequently call you oppressors, and I dread bishops from your hands.' He was acquitted, and was hailed by his young friend Montalembert as the orator of the future. On another occasion he was forced to appear before a more important tribunal. This time his fellow delinquent was not De Lammenais but

Montalembert, and the latter being a peer of France, could be judged only by the House of Peers. As the case for both was one and the same, Lacordaire was obliged to defend himself before the same august assembly. He again acted as his own counsel, and so delighted his audience by his lofty eloquence and the tactful manner in which he accommodated himself to his new surroundings, that he left behind him an impression that long survived in the memory of his hearers. Many years afterwards, when Montalembert took his seat among his judges, he heard them speak with delight of the young priest who fascinated them by his enchanting eloquence. Montalembert himself must not have impressed them less. 'Your occupation?' queried the official. 'School-master and Peer of France' was the reply.

I have said that the brilliant pages of *L'Avenir* not only incurred the hostility of the government, but likewise awakened the suspicion of the ecclesiastical authorities. Lacordaire afterwards admitted the reason for these suspicions, and spoke with regret not only of the extravagant opinions put forward at times but also of the 'absolute logic' with which they were supported 'the logic which loses if it does not dishonour every cause.' Hence with the celebrity which *L'Avenir* brought Lacordaire it brought him also the reputation of a rash young enthusiast, whose mind was revolving dangerous ideas and whose pen might at any time give those ideas a most powerful influence for evil. He was therefore rendered a suspect, and we may say now with good reason. We know that one of the famous three, the greatest at that time, the oldest, the one whose judgment was most matured, afterwards fell away hopelessly from the Church. Why may not Lacordaire experience the same sad fate? He seemed more an enthusiast, more the prey to an exuberant imagination, more the victim of his ideas than De Lammenais. If his theories happened to clash with revealed truth, who could tell what youthful pride and an unbalanced judgment would lead to? Lacordaire was indeed cruelly wronged in these suspicions, but he was not, as I said, the object of rash judgments. As subsequent events showed there never was a soul so little in danger of lapsing

from orthodoxy as Lacordaire's. His outward deportment, his lofty carriage, and fearless speech, strangely concealed a soul fully grounded in humility. 'I would rather,' he says, 'throw myself into the sea with a millstone around my neck, than entertain hopes, ideas, or support even good works outside the Church'; and referring to De Lammenais' fall, he writes:—'He has blasphemed Rome in her misfortune: it is the crime of Ham, the crime which has, next to Deicide, been visited with the most palpable and lasting punishment. Woe to him who troubles the Church.' The man who uttered such language could not become a heretic, for heresy is always the offspring of pride, and pride was never uppermost in the mind of Lacordaire. On the contrary he possessed, as I said, that humility, that spirit of docility to the Church, which is always the sure guarantee of the Divine illumination. To use his own incomparable language: 'The light breaks in on him who submits as on one who opens his eyes.' Submission was his safety.

As yet, however, there was no need of submission. The doctrines of *L'Avenir* were only criticised and suspected. But matters were soon brought to a crisis. Lacordaire suggested that the points in doubt should be at once submitted to the judgment of the Holy See. In company with De Lammenais and Montalembert he set out for Rome. When he arrived he saw at once the true state of affairs. They were received kindly, but in such a way as to leave no doubt that Rome shared in the suspicions of the French authorities. De Lammenais chafed with pride. A long time elapsed before the doubtful doctrines came under examination. The spirit of rebellion was growing in De Lammenais; he was already communicating with the secret enemies of the Holy See. Lacordaire, on the other hand, was undergoing quite an opposite process. Forgetting the disputes of *L'Avenir* or, at least, prepared to submit on every point to the Holy See, he wandered about the churches and sacred sites of Rome, his heart glowing with a holy enthusiasm, his imagination filled with the glories of the past, and the loftiest and purest ambition—if ambition we may call it—kindling in his breast. He was

not to trouble the Holy See. As Montalembert says:— 'During his residence at Rome a great peace and light had arisen in his soul.' He saw in the past, which the memorials of Rome brought to his recollection, glories in comparison with which all the political and social triumphs of the present were as nothing. He saw the folly of allowing himself to be tossed about in the 'whirlwind of politics.' He saw the true position of the Church, the divinely appointed guardian and teacher of the world. He saw the magnificent and, at the same time, arduous task of the Holy See; he saw its difficulties, its world-wide duties, its never-ending troubles. He sympathised with it and determined that never would he trouble it. Henceforth would he withdraw himself from the turmoil of contentious questions, and essay to imitate those grand and obedient and sainted heroes who adorned the Church at all times and all places 'from the sands of Thebaid to the extremities of Ireland, from the fragrant isles of Provence to the cold plains of Poland and Russia.' Henceforth he would seek to follow in the footsteps of the 'patriarchs of those numerous families which had filled deserts, forests, camps, even to the chair of St. Peter, with their heroic virtues.' A great light had, indeed, arisen within his soul, just as the gathering darkness was falling on the soul of his master. Montalembert calls our attention to the marked difference between the two priests in their attitude towards the Holy See:—

The 'Last of the Fathers,' the renowned and eloquent doctor the aged priest, crowned with the admiration of the Catholic world for the last twenty years was struggling against his duty as a Catholic and a priest. The faith of the Catholic priest had in the other immediately dispelled all the fumes of pride, had vanquished all the seductions, all the waywardness of talent, all the intoxication of conflict. The youth understood all, the man of genius wanted to ignore everything. Prudence, clear-sightedness, dignity, and good faith were all on the side of the disciple.

And he goes on to tell us of the 'solemn and pathetic warnings' addressed by the disciple to the cherished master. 'I see him,' he says, 'wandering the live-long day among ruined monuments, stopping as though lost in admiration at all the sublime sites which Rome offers, then

returning at evening to our common home to inculcate on De Lammenais' reserve, resignation, and submission.' It is little wonder that many years later the sight of Lacordaire in the white Dominican habit would elicit from the fallen priest that acknowledgment so full of remorse and apparent regret—'that man weighs on me like a mountain.' At last when warnings and appeals were in vain Lacordaire abruptly quitted Rome, leaving his two companions behind. He endeavoured to rescue Montalembert from his dangerous associate, but in vain. Though he wrote in the most earnest manner, though he warned him that if De Lammenais carried out his plan 'there is no language sad enough to tell what will happen.' Montalembert would not as yet be delivered from that fatal fascination which De Lammenais seemed to possess.

Lacordaire's words of warning with reference to De Lammenais were prophetic. The latter was about to carry out his plan, and reduce himself to a state too sad to be described. Without awaiting the decision of the Holy See he left Rome with the intention of continuing *L'Avenir*. Lacordaire in the meantime had gone to Germany, and there the three friends were thrown together once more. There, too, the decree of the Holy See condemning their doctrines overtook them. They instantly submitted; Lacordaire and Montalembert sincerely, De Lammenais only apparently, as subsequent events clearly showed. 'There are defeats,' said Lacordaire, quoting from Montaigne, 'more glorious than victories.'

De Lammenais set out for his home amid the solitudes of Brittany, followed by a group of ardent disciples. Lacordaire, who was delighted at his submission, and thought it sincere, soon rejoined him. He was sincerely attached to him, whom he regarded as his master. To be the disciple of De Lammenais would be the greatest happiness of his life; but alas! soon the pure, humble soul of Lacordaire saw that his place no longer could be by the side of the loved guide. In Rome a great light had arisen in his soul. Amid the woods of Brittany, where his heart was ever raised to God by the beauties of nature which surrounded

him, it was made clear to him that he must sever his connection with De Lammenais. The separation was acutely painful. De Lammenais had at once dazzled his intellect and won his heart. He was distracted by the 'agonies of conscience battling against genius.' But at last conscience triumphed, and he left for ever the great and unfortunate man whom he loved so much and clung to with too lasting a fidelity. Before leaving he penned a beautiful letter to De Lammenais, and in it, as in a mirror, we see the grand loving nature of Lacordaire, so capable of the deepest attachment. From it, too, we can gather some idea of the really great qualities of De Lammenais, who could inspire a soul such as Lacordaire's with such sentiments as he gives expression to:—

You will never know but in heaven the sufferings I have undergone for the last year from the simple fear of giving you pain. In all my doubts, in all my perplexities, I have had you alone in view, and however bitter may one day be my existence, nothing will ever equal the grief which I feel on the present occasion. Wherever I may be you will ever have proofs of my respect and attachment for you which I shall ever cherish, and I beg of you to accept the expression of them from a broken heart.

What a noble and affectionate heart here unbosoms itself? Thrice happy indeed should we deem De Lammenais in such a disciple. Yet Montalembert tells us that De Lammenais never loved Lacordaire. We ought not to wonder at this, for Lacordaire was a perpetual thorn in his side, a constant check on his ever rising pride, a never-ceasing warning to him to bow down his rebellious nature; Lacordaire was to him what the priest is to the libertine, who is determined to give himself to the indulgence of his passions, and his company, sweet as it otherwise might be, was only growing more and more hateful. In reading of the relations between the two great men we are forced to give our tenderest sympathy to Lacordaire, and to lament that for a moment he should be enslaved by the proud and sullen nature of De Lammenais, who, with all his genius, was a most unamiable character. Hear how the loving disciple must speak of him:—

When we were together [writes Lacordaire] and I fancied I

discovered in him resignation, sentiments devoid of pride and passion, I cannot express what I felt. But these moments were few, indeed, and all that I can call to mind is stamped with a character of wilfulness and blindness such as dries up pity.

Lacordaire's departure was followed by that of most of the little group who surrounded De Lammenais in his solitary Breton home. Montalembert was the last left, and he clung to the great man with an extraordinary tenacity. Lacordaire resolved to do all in his power to save his young friend. He sent him letter after letter in which he appealed, exhorted, advised, argued. De Lammenais sought to counteract his efforts, so that often the same post would bring to Montalembert letters from his two friends. Lacordaire, however, was the more earnest in his endeavours. When correspondence failed he set out in search of his friend and found him, to quote Montalembert's own words, 'at the tomb of St. Elizabeth.' At first his advances were met with coldness; Montalembert was offended at the abrupt and public secession of Lacordaire, but at length he gave way, not, however, till he had made the generous heart of his true friend bleed. Soon after De Lammenais openly left the Church, and published the notorious work, *Paroles d'un Croyant*. Lacordaire felt himself bound to reply, and did so in a work of great brilliancy.

My conscience is at ease [he wrote], it breathes at last. No thought of ambition or pride was ever for an instant the spring of my conduct on that occasion. My policy consisted solely in my honest submission. If everything turned out as I foresaw, I only foresaw it by setting aside my own opinion.

To repeat his words he triumphed simply because 'the light breaks in on him who submits as on one who opens his eyes.' Speaking of the fallen man he says: 'May we all forgive each other the errors of our youth, and pray together for him who caused them by the superabundance of an imagination too lovely to be deplored.'

Here one chapter, and that the stormiest, perhaps, of the life of Lacordaire, closes. Years of enthusiasm, of hope, of struggle, of agony, had ended in sorrow and failure: notoriety rather than fame was the harvest which he

reaped. He wished for ever to leave the scene of his labours and commence life anew in a strange land ; he was about to accept the position of Vicar-General in the diocese of New York. This was not to be, however. His life was not to go on from failure to oblivion. The past, sad as seemed its memories and results, was to be the foundation of his future success ; the past was to be in a sense essential to that success. The Archbishop of Paris kindly offered him the position he held as chaplain to one of the Parisian convents before his connection with De Lammenais. He accepted it, and lived for three years in study and retirement. For a moment we see him coming forth with the charity of the true priest to take his place by the side of the plague-stricken people during the great cholera outbreak of 1831. The hostility to the clergy which then prevailed rendered it necessary for him to disguise himself in civilian's dress. As he moved about among the patients one day a poor man, whose wife was stricken by the disease, mistaking him for one of the attendants, went up to him, and asked him in a whisper, if it was possible to call a priest. 'I am one,' replied Lacordaire, and he bent down and ministered to the dying woman.

These three years in Paris were the happiest of his life. Here he displayed a new and unexpected feature of his character—his love of solitude. He loved his new and solitary life, he clung to it. Not even for a chair in the University of Louvain, not even for the position of editor of the *Univers*, both of which were offered to him, would he part with it. His mother came to live with him and brighten his lonely life, and when she died he found another, who more than took her place, the celebrated Madame Swetchine, who will ever be associated with the name of Lacordaire. Introduced to her soon after his secession from De Lammenais, he found in her all the love of a mother, and the prudence of an enlightened guide. 'Her soul was to mine,' he says, 'what the shore is to the plank shattered by the waves. I never met anyone in whom such breadth and boldness of thought were allied to such firm faith.' She, on her part, found in Lacordaire her chosen

son, with whose sorrows she sympathised, whose anxieties she shared, and whose triumphs afforded her the most exquisite pleasure of her life. For twenty-five years, this noble Russian lady, who had abandoned her country and her religion for the true faith, and whose house was the home of all that was brilliant in the Catholic circles of Paris, was the dearest of all Lacordaire's friends.

So enchanted was Lacordaire with the pleasures of solitude, that there was danger he would never allow himself to be induced away from them. He prayed and studied and thought during those three years, and he was happy. If he was admirable in the young enthusiasm with which he embarked in what he thought was the cause of the Church and liberty, he is more admirable now in the life truly humble and holy, which he lived in this obscure street where he dwell. 'I see him,' says Montalembert, 'growing daily in calmness and recollection, in prayer, study, charity, solitude, in a grave, simple, unnoticed life truly hidden in God. That is the spot where he matured his genius, and whence darted that eagle, whose flight has so far outdone that of all his rivals.' No language could be more earnest than that in which he speaks of the happiness of his new life. 'Happy the man who is born and dies under the same roof,' and not content with the seclusion of Paris, he sighs for some obscure country parish where he could live 'the world forgetting by the world forgot.' 'I wish,' he writes:—

To bury myself in the depths of the country, to live only for a small flock, and to seek my joy in God and the fields. People will see clearly whether I am an ambitious man. Farewell, great labours, farewell renown, and great men. I have learnt the vanity of all this, and my only desire is to lead a good and obscure life. Some day when Montalembert shall have grown grey in the midst of ingratitude and celebrity, he will come and contemplate on my brow the remains of a youth passed together. We will shed tears together by the presbytery hearth; he will do me justice before we both die.

And he continues:—

Born in ordinary times I shall go my way through the world among the things which do not live in the memory of man. I shall endeavour to be good, simple, pious, looking forward to the

future with disinterested confidence, since I shall not see it, labouring for those who perhaps will see it, and not murmuring against Providence, who might without injustice heap more evils on a life so devoid of merit.

'Fame is as the shadow fleeing from him who pursues it, and pursuing him who flees from it,' the proverb tells us. When Lacordaire was writing thus he was on the eve of his triumph, he who sighed for the woods and the fields, and an unknown life was about to blaze forth into glory and celebrity, which, as long as the Catholic Church lasts, 'will live in the memory of man.' Hitherto Lacordaire, though conscious of his ability as a speaker, never dreamt that he possessed the special powers of eloquence, which he afterwards manifested. During those three years of retirement in Paris he indeed speaks of his desire to preach, but, strange to say, on the first occasion, when he did really make an effort to succeed he utterly failed. Montalembert was among the audience, and when the sermon was over, he said to a friend who accompanied him, 'he is a talented man, but will never make a preacher.' Lacordaire himself was of the same opinion. 'I have nothing,' he says, 'that goes to make up a preacher in the full force of the word.' Still he went on preaching, not in the public churches, but to the students of the College Stanislaus. Here he found himself more in his element so to speak. After the first month he found the audience increasing considerably, 'it is a growing plant,' he writes. His original manner, and the novelty of the subjects, which he introduced, seemed to have found an appreciative audience. Yet this very originality and novelty rendered him suspected: He was accused of never mentioning the name of Jesus Christ in his conferences. To use his own words he was looked on as a 'hair-brained republican, an incorrigible offender, and a thousand other delicate things of the same sort.' At last suspicion became so strong that he was compelled to suspend his conferences altogether. Submission was painful, but again he conquered himself. It was his last trial. Providence was now to reward him for his many submissions. Ozanam was among those who had heard the

conferences at the College Stanislaus. He felt that these were the very subjects suited to the needs of the present generation, and that Lacordaire was the preacher, and the only preacher, who could reach the heart of the infidel generation. The old subjects and the old manner had lost its power; and the orthodox method of preaching had sadly left the Parisian churches empty. At the head of a body of students Ozanam sought the Archbishop, and petitioned him to appoint Lacordaire to the pulpit of Nôtre Dame for the approaching Lent. The Archbishop consented, though with reluctance. Lacordaire's first appearance in the pulpit, which he has made famous, was memorable. Ozanam and his companions surrounded the pulpit. There sat Madame Swetchine, trembling with anxiety as to the fate of her chosen son. The Archbishop was also present. Lacordaire ascended the pulpit, surveyed his audience, which even on the first occasion was large, trembled for a moment, heaved his chest, burst forth into a torrent of enchanting eloquence, and had his audience rapt in breathless interest at his feet. The delight of Ozanam and the Archbishop was unbounded, while Madame Swetchine felt the triumph as if it were her own. The success of the first conference was but the prelude to what was to follow. Time after time did the immense crowd fill every corner of the great cathedral, and listen with rapt attention to language such as they never heard before. Infidels came and were lost in wonderment, and many who were led thither by curiosity knelt before the altar to shed tears of heartfelt repentance. Everything about the preacher was captivating—his appearance, his manner, his voice, his delivery, but, above all, the novelty of his subjects. He met the infidel on his own ground. He brought the light of reason to bear on the truths of faith, and showed in glowing colours the glorious harmony between religion and reason. His eloquence was matchless. Poetry, passion, and profound learning were all combined in that 'impetuous crystal stream, surging and irresistible as an Alpine torrent.'

Ah! [writes Montalembert] I confidently call around that great and cherished memory all those whom I once saw swelling those

serried ranks, quivering with emotion around the pulpit of Nôtre Dame. Let them speak and tell all the blameless happiness, the holy fire, the invincible trust, the Christian loftiness they once owed to the empire of that voice for ever hushed! Where is the man from among his former hearers who would to-day enter sad and solitary the silent precincts of Nôtre Dame, stop before that pulpit, for ever widowed of its most illustrious occupant, without hearing within him the echo of that peerless voice, without seeing with the eyes of his youth those spacious aisles again filled with that moved and quivering crowd slaking their thirst at the swelling fountains of enthusiasm and faith.

It is little wonder that at the close of that incomparable series of conferences the Archbishop arose and publicly hailed the great preacher as the new prophet. He had triumphed. 'Every man,' to use his own words, 'has his day if only he will wait.' He did wait, and was rewarded. De Lammenais' was fallen, powerless, fast sinking into oblivion, and the humble disciple who knew how to trample on pride was now at the zenith of the purest fame, his name spoken of with love by millions the world over.

In reading these Nôtre Dame conferences we hardly know what to admire in them most. Now, in their written form, without the advantages of that splendid delivery of which Lacordaire was a master, we are forced to say they are the grandest of their kind ever written. But what will be our astonishment when we learn that those masterpieces of human eloquence, no less remarkable for their beauty of imagery, their close sequence of ideas, than for their profundity of thought, were *extempore* discourses. Lacordaire never wrote his sermons, and the written form in which they now are is due to the reporter who sat by the pulpit. Surely we can say there never was a speaker who surpassed, perhaps equalled, Lacordaire in this peculiar line. Among preachers Montalembert finds his superior in Bossuet alone, but it is difficult to see how an apt comparison can be instituted between him and Bossuet, the style and subjects of the two great orators being altogether so different. I have little hesitation in saying that the reader will find among the many great preachers whom the Church has produced none so original and distinctive, none so creative, none so

brilliant and profound at the same time, none whose works will be read with such absorbing interest. Lacordaire was the father of a new species of eloquence ; he owned no predecessor for his master, and hence it is idle to compare him to the great monarchs of the pulpit in times past. But though imitating none, none has been so endlessly and servilely copied. Even Cardinal Newman did not think it beneath him to draw inspiration from the pages of Lacordaire. Newman's allusions to Napoleon are but feeble echoes of Lacordaire's brilliant references to the great Emperor—references which Montalembert says made of 'Napoleon and his pretended conversion one of the most odious and repulsive commonplaces of the Christian pulpit.' In France so much did the new style find favour that the great churches throughout the land had each its Lacordaire, and so stale and flat did the attempts to reproduce the inimitable eloquence of the great man become, that Montalembert sighed for the old *prône* of the modest country parish priest on the Catechism or the Ten Commandments. Lacordaire was among preachers what Napoleon was among generals—but enough ! let us get a glimpse of his style of eloquence, and let us bear in mind first that these noble periods were all 'extempore' utterances, and, secondly, that Lacordaire suffers considerably from translation. Speaking of the longing after an indefinite something which fills our minds in early youth :—

Scarcely do we count eighteen summers when we languish with desires whose object is neither the flesh, nor love, nor glory, nor anything that has shape or name. Wandering in the silence of solitude, or in the splendid thoroughfares of great cities, the young man feels oppressed with yearnings that have no name ; he flies the realities of life as a prison in which his heart is stifled, and he seeks in everything that is uncertain and vague—in the evening cloud, in the breeze of autumn, in the falling leaves of the woods, an impression which fills while it tortures him. But it is in vain the clouds fleet by, the winds are hushed, the leaves fade and wither without telling him why he suffers, without sating his soul any more than the tears of a mother or the tender affection of a sister. Oh, soul, would the Prophet exclaim, why art thou troubled—why art thou sad ? Trust in God. It is in fact God ! it is the Infinite which is at work in our hearts of twenty years,

touched by Christ, but which have unwittingly strayed from Him, and in which the Divine Unction no longer producing its supernatural effect, still wake up the storms it was destined to calm. Even in old age we receive some of these shocks of bygone days—some of those melancholy daydreams which the ancients looked upon as the portion of genius, and which gave rise to the saying, '*Non est magnum ingenium sine melancholia.*' The soul faltering betimes returns in pain within herself; she betakes herself to the days of her youth to seek for tears, and no longer able to weep as of old, she lives for a moment on the painful but sweet memory of those tears.

Of the frailty of human love, he says :—

And supposing we did obtain it during life, what remains of it after death? Granted that the prayer of our friend follows us beyond the tomb, a pious memory whispers our name, but in a moment Heaven and Earth have gone a step forward, oblivion descends, silence covers us, from no quarter is ever again wafted across our tomb the ethereal breath of love. It is gone, for ever gone, and such is the history of man's love.

As he grew older his eloquence became richer and more brilliant, if possible. 'The splendour of his eloquence,' writes Madame Swetchine, 'is ever on the rise, and its beauty is incomparable. Never was talent seen ripening under more brilliant conditions, which seem to belong exclusively to youth.' Let me quote a passage, one of many equally brilliant, from one of his later speeches :—

M. de Châteaubriand, bending under the weight of glory and years, was one day on the solitary banks of the Lido, at the extremity of the Venetian lagoons. The heavens, the sea, the air, the islet shores, the horizon of Italy, all appeared such as the poet had been wont to admire them of old. It was the same Venice, with her cupolas, rising up out of the water; the same lion of St. Mark, with its famous inscription: 'Peace to thee, Mark, my Evangelist;' it was the same splendour, dimmed by defeat and servitude, but borrowing from the very ruins an imperishable charm; it was, in fine, the same spectacle, the same noise, the same silence. The East and West united in one glorious spot at the foot of the Alps, lighted up by all the memories of Greece and Rome. Still the old man became pensive and sad; he could not believe that this was Venice, the Venice of his youth, which had so moved him; and, understanding that it was himself alone who was no longer the same, he whispered to the sea breeze, which sighed to him in vain, this melancholy complaint: 'The wind which blows upon a hoary head blows from no happy shore.'

It is almost painful to quote from these glorious pages, quotations being so sadly insufficient to convey an adequate idea of the matchless splendour of the great preacher. Let it suffice to say that he who reads one page of Lacordaire will feel impelled to read another and another, with ever-increasing interest; and when he has read them all he will feel that so much deep philosophy, so much profound theology, so much keen discernment, so much splendid imagery, so much noble passion, so much sustained brilliancy, have never yet been found in the pages of any one pulpit orator.

These Nôtre Dame conferences raised Lacordaire to a unique position among the French clergy; and not in France alone did they make him famous, but they drew the eyes of Christendom towards him, and all recognised in him the preacher of the age. The time was when his heart thirsted for fame; now he had gained what he so ardently desired. Was he satisfied? Even that he still retained the ambition of his earlier days, his nature could not find content in the hollowness of human glory; but now he had risen far above all worldly dreams. Fame had lost its attraction in his eyes. His desire now was to lead a quiet and simple life. Hence we find him descending from the pulpit of Nôtre Dame, and fleeing into the solitude of a religious order. Not that such a change occurred, however, without a struggle. The dying embers of his early ambition were still smouldering within, and as a consequence he felt the separation from the world bitter, very bitter. 'The sacrifice,' he says, 'was a terrible one.' But terrible as it was, he resolutely made it, and never after had reason to regret it. Entering the Dominican Order, he remained for years hidden in the obscurity of a Dominican monastery, acquiring the spirit of his new life, growing in sanctity and knowledge, especially imbibing from the works of St. Thomas that profound theology which he was afterwards to make a new theme for his eloquence. When these years were over he appeared a second time in the pulpit of Nôtre Dame, and, clothed in the white Dominican habit, delivered a series of conferences more brilliant, if possible, than the first. The

crowds were even greater than on the former occasion ; and, though he appeared in a proscribed dress, such was his popularity that the authorities dared not interfere with him. Religious orders were at that time illegal in France. Lacordaire, by his overpowering eloquence, repealed, as it were, the obnoxious legislation. His appearance as a Dominican in the pulpit of Nôtre Dame was but a prelude to the introduction of the Dominicans once more into France. Eight houses started up around him in various parts of the country, and the prestige of his name conspired much to secure for them immunity from the interference of the law. The introduction of the Dominicans into France he regarded as the great object of his life. This great work accomplished, he was prepared to sing '*Nunc dimitte servum huim Domine.*' Henceforth he devoted himself chiefly to the consolidation of his work. His voice, however, was heard frequently in Paris and in the provinces, always with unimpaired splendour. At Toulouse especially he surpassed himself. Other literary labours, too, he performed, amongst them being an elaborate life of St. Dominic. Thus he preached and wrote and laboured till the accession of Napoleon III., when he retired altogether from the pulpit into the solitude of Sorèze, and there devoted himself for the remainder of his life to the education of youth. Only once do we find him in public again, and that occasion was when the French Academy appointed him one of its members. It was before the Academy he delivered his last swanlike public speech.

Calmly, happily, full of labours, of merit, of fame, he went down gloriously, like the setting sun. His inner life corresponded with the splendour of his outer. He was a great religious, a true disciple of St. Dominic. Living in an age of luxury and waning faith, when the old principles of mortification had fallen into desuetude, he had the spirit of the olden times. His life was one of the most rigorous austerity—nay, it is thought that his penances shortened his life. At the age of sixty-four this great and good man ended his days in the bosom of that family which he had gathered around him. He was famous during life,

but his death will add to his fame. As ages roll by his name will become more revered and honoured, his mighty genius will be more and more appreciated, and a hundred years hence it is not improbable that men will look back to him as the greatest preacher of all time.

JOHN MURPHY.

Notes and Queries

LITURGY

THE IRISH PRIVILEGE OF ANTICIPATION OF MATINS AND LAUDS

REV. DEAR SIR,—1. Was it custom or a Papal grant that gave rise to the practice in Ireland of commencing Matins, etc., for next day, at 2 p.m., at all seasons of the year?

2. Is the privilege restricted to those in Holy Orders, or does it extend to those in minors and to mere clerics who, by reason of solemn religious vows, are bound to the divine office? I have heard it stated for certain that solemnly-professed religious who are not subdeacons do not enjoy this Irish privilege, and *a fortiori* the same would hold good in the case of nuns, supposing that there are any such in Ireland bound to the Breviary.

3. Is this privilege of anticipating confined to the recitation of Matins, etc., *in private*, or can it be used also *in choro*?

4. Is this privilege purely territorial, so that the clergy lose it on leaving the Irish shore, and incoming *peregrini* may avail of it while here? Or is it in any sense personal, so that the Irish clergy may use it abroad?

5. What if an Irish priest is permanently adopted, say in England, or on a temporary mission, or on vacation there?

6. Is Putzer correct in stating (*Comment. in Facult. Apost.*, p. 307, ed. iv.) that the privilege, similar to ours, given by the Holy See to each of the American bishops personally, with power ‘*eandem facultatem ecclesiasticis viris sive saecularibus sive regularibus communicandi*,’ is *per modum dispensationis*, and is on that account available outside the diocese? Is it not rather thus available because of the obvious reason that the privilege is a personal one, being communicated to each subdeacon at his ordination in the seminary, and again to each priest in the printed list of diocesan faculties?

All these queries, of course, suppose that it is not safe in conscience to follow the opinion of many theologians, who

contend that Matins, etc., may be commenced *ubique terrarum* at 2 p.m. of the previous day.—Yours, etc., D. A. D

The ordinary Liturgists give us no help to answer these questions, which regard a local custom. But we have had the assistance of learned Theologians.

Our correspondent's queries do not require us to say anything about the general question of anticipation at 2 p.m., nor of the existence of the privilege in Ireland. This is admitted even by the ecclesiastic who holds 'that it is not safe in conscience to follow the opinion of many Theologians, who contend that Matins, etc., may be commenced *ubique terrarum* at 2 p.m. of the previous day.'

1. It is custom and not an express Papal grant that gives rise to the privilege. We have failed to discover even a reference to such Papal grant as would account for the general practice. If it ever existed, it is likely that there would be some trace of it, which would be known to those whom we have consulted.

2. We can see no ground for distinction except between those to whom common estimation grants the benefit of the custom and those to whom it does not. We consulted the representatives of the various Religious Orders in Ireland, and we find that some think that their Orders have not the custom even for those who are in Holy Orders. Whether the fact that they have not made use of the custom is a proof that they have not a right to it, we cannot decide. But we have no doubt that all others, who are bound to the Breviary, enjoy it.

3. Our view of the custom is that it did not mean to interfere with the regular hours of recitation *in choro*. Even those theologians who hold that Matins may be commenced always and everywhere at this hour, seem to confine the privilege to the private recitation. For instance, Ballerini, in his *Opus Theologicum Morale*, vol. iv., p. 301, writes: 'Quaestio heic occurrit circa horam idoneam recitando privatim Matutino.'

4. It is purely territorial in the sense that the 'clergy lose it on leaving the Irish shore,' etc. It is personal only

in the sense that they enjoy it throughout Ireland. '*Privilegium contra legem*,' says Lehmkuhl (vol. i., p. 139), '*odiosum esse censetur*;' and p. 140: '*Privilegium odiosum personale est strictae omnino interpretationis*.' Now it is not at all clear that there is a custom established by the Irish clergy of commencing Matins, etc., at 2 p.m. abroad. No doubt Matins may be said at this hour by the ecclesiastic, who holds the opinion of the many theologians who contend that Matins, etc., may be commenced *ubique terrarum* at 2 p.m.—not in virtue of his Irish privilege but of his theological conviction.

5. The Irish privilege ceasing, the priest must guide himself by the general principles of the treatise *De Legibus*, i.e., he must observe the common law, unless there be some new privilege to which he is entitled.

6. Putzer's dispensation and our correspondent's privilege *contra legem* differ only in name. Dispensation is the better term.

Evidently Putzer conceives the American concession to be personal in the widest sense. We presume that he knows from the American Bishops that this is the *mens legislatoris* who gave the positive grant. We are not so certain on this point about the custom, the source from which we derive our privilege; in this the Irish and American privileges are dissimilar.

P. O'LEARY.

CORRESPONDENCE

TERMINATION OF THE PRAYER 'FIDELIUM' ON ALL SOULS' DAY

REV. DEAR SIR,—Kindly allow me to direct attention to an inaccuracy, the result of some oversight, on page 56 of the new edition of the *Ordo Exsequiarum* which I brought out last year.

The Prayer *Fidelium*, at Lauds on All Souls' Day, is there incorrectly printed with the short ending, *Qui vivis et regnas in saecula saeculorum*. As it is the Prayer of the Office of the day, it should of course have the longer ending, *Qui vivis et regnas cum Deo Patre, etc.* This is expressly directed in the rubric of the Breviary.

On page 110, in connection with the rite of Absolution on All Souls' Day, the Prayer *Fidelium* is quite correctly printed with the short ending. An answer of the Sacred Congregation of Rites in reference to the ending of this Prayer at the Absolution, even on All Souls' Day, is quoted on page 103, footnote 3.

The inaccuracy on page 56, which somehow had escaped notice even during a most careful revision of the final proofs, forcibly attracted my attention the very first time that I used the book at a Requiem Office, on All Souls' Day last year. I thought it better to reserve this notice of it for the October number of the RECORD, in order to secure, as far as possible, that the correction should be before the minds of those using the book at Vespers on the 1st, or at Lauds on the 2nd of the coming November.

I remain,

Rev. and Dear Sir,

Your faithful servant,

✠ WILLIAM J. WALSH,

Archbishop of Dublin.

18th September, 1901.

DOCUMENTS

PERMISSION FOR MASS ON BOARD SHIP

VICEN. DUBIA OBLATA SACRAE RITUUM CONGREGATIONI A CAPPELLANO SOCIETATIS NAVIGATIONIS

Hodiernus Magister Caeremoniarum Dioecesis Vicensis in Hispania, rogatus a Cappellano maiore cuiusdam societatis navigationis, de consensu Rmi. sui Episcopi, a Sacrorum Rituum Congregatione sequentium Dubiorum solutionem humillime exposulavit, nimirum :

I. Utrum Episcopi possint sacerdotibus suae Dioecesis facultatem concedere, ut navigantes Missam in altari in navi erecto celebrare valeant ?

II. Utrum hanc ipsam facultatem tribuere possint omnibus sacerdotibus Episcopi, in quorum Dioecesi adsint portus maris ?

III. Utrum missionarii apostolici, vi huius tituli, valeant in navi celebrare, absque licentia Sedis Apostolicae ?

IV. Utrum. sacerdotes, qui privilegio fruuntur celebrandi ubique, valeant, vi huius privilegii in navi celebrare absque speciali Indulto Apostolico ?

V. Utrum Cappellae navium aut altaria in ipsis navibus erecta pro sacro litando debeant considerari ut Oratoria privata vel publica.

VI. Utrum in praedictis altaribus valeant celebrari Missae de Requite concessae per Decretum 3903 *Aucto*, diei 8 Iunii 1896 ad II, et 3944 *Romana*, diei 12 Ianuarii 1877 ?

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisito voto Commissionis Liturgicae omnibusque rite perpensis, rescribendum censuit :

Ad I, II, III et IV. Negative.

Ad V. *Si Cappella locum fixum habeat in navi, uti publica pro navigantibus habenda est ; secus neque publica est, neque privata, sed habetur uti altare portatile.*

Ad VI. Affirmative.

Atque ita rescripsit, die 4 Martii 1901.

DOMINICUS Card. FERRATA, S.R.C. Praefectus.

L. ✠ S.

DIOMEDES PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen., Secretarius.

MASS TO BE SAID AT DEDICATION OF A CHURCH

UTINEN. DUBIA QUOAD DEDICATIONEM ECCLESIAE SI OCCURBAT VEL CONCURRAT CUM FESTO TITULARI IPSIUS ECCLESIAE, ET FESTUM TITULARE EST TRANSFIGURATIO DOMINI VEL SS. REDEMPTORIS

In redigendis Calendariis particularium Ecclesiarum, sequentia exorta sunt dubia, quorum solutionem hodiernus redactor Calendarii Archidioeceseos Utinensis, de consensu Rmi. sui Ordinarii, a Sacra Rituum Congregatione humiliter expetivit, nimirum :

I. Quando Dedicatio propriae Ecclesiae occurrit vel concurrat cum festo titulari ipsius Ecclesiae, et Festum Titulare est Transfiguratio Domini vel SS. Redemptor, in occurso vel concursu quodnam est praefendum ?

II. In concursu diei octavae Dedicacionis propriae Ecclesiae cum Festis Transfigurationis Domini, vel Dedicacionis Basilicarum SS. Salvatoris et Ss. Apostolorum Petri et Pauli Almae Urbis, quomodo ordinandae sunt Vesperae ?

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, audito voto Commissionis Liturgicae, reque mature perpensa, respondendum censuit :

Ad I. Quum enuntiatus titulus sit Festum Domini, in occurso Festum Titulare praefendum est Dedicacioni : in concursu Vesperae dividantur.

Ad II. Dies octava Dedicacionis Ecclesiae propriae non cedit iuxta Rubricas, nisi duplici secundae classis.

Atque ita rescipsit, die 4 Martii 1901.

DOMINICUS Card. FERRATA, *S.R.C. Praefectus*.

L. ✠ S.

DIOMEDES PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen. S.R.C. Secretarius*.

SOLUTION OF DOUBTS RELATING TO THE CALENDAR

DECRETUM. DUBIA PROPOSITA RESOLVENDA A QUIBUSDAM CALENDARIORUM REDACTORIBUS

A quibusdam Calendariorum redactoribus Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi sequentia Dubia pro opportuna solutione, reverenter proposita fuerunt, nimirum :

I. Utrum circa orationes pro Ecclesia et pro Papa id retinendum sit ut, si altera vi Rubricae, altera ex praecepto

Ordinarii praescribatur, utraque, prouti de more, in Missa dici debeat?

II. Num *Pater, Ave et Credo* post chorale Officium stantes vel genuflexi recitare debeant chorales, uti stantes vel genuflexi recitare tenentur finalem Antiphonam?

III. Quando alicubi celebratur Anniversarium Dedicationis omnium Ecclesiarum, huiusmodi festum est ne secundarium pro illis Ecclesiis, quae consecratae non sunt?

IV. An dies octava alicuius festi habentis Octavam Corporis Christi, ubi haec Octava non est privilegiata ad instar Epiphaniae, sed ita ut quaevis duplicia classica, sive occurrentia sive translata admittat, celebranda sit per integrum Officium, vel per solam commemorationem?

V. In Festo Expectationis Partus B. M. V. quod incidit in Feriam VI quatuor temporum, cantandae ne sunt duae Missae in Ecclesiis Cathedralibus et Collegiatis, videlicet una de Festo et altera de Feria, etsi quandam identitatem habeant, vel tantum canenda est Missa de Festo?

VI. Iuxta Rubricas speciales Breviarii et Missalis Romani Festum Annuntiationis B. M. V., transferendum quoad chorum tantum in Feriam II post Dominicam in Albis tanquam in sedem propriam, non cedit nisi Festo primario eiusdem ritus occurrenti, quo in casu in sequentem diem similiter non impeditum transferri debet; quaeritur: In hoc postremo casu, concurrente Festo primario duplici primae classis, celebrato dicta Feria II, cum Festo Annuntiationis B. M. V. recolendo Feria III immediate sequenti, de quo Festo erunt dicendae Vesperae? Et regula quae traditur pro enunciato casu applicanda ne erit aliis casibus similibus ex. gr. in concurrentia Festi primarii duplici primae classis cum Festo S. Ioseph, Sponsi B. M. V., translato iuxta Rubricas in sequentem diem 20 Martii, vel in Feriam IV post Dominicam in Albis?

VII. Concurrente die octava Dedicationis propriae Ecclesiae duplici min. cum Festo Dedicationis Basilicarum SS. Apostolorum Petri et Pauli dupl. mai. quomodo ordinandae erunt Vesperae?

VIII. Quando Commemoratio omnium SS. S. R. E. Summorum Pontificum occurrit Dominica infra Octavam Omnium Sanctorum, eadem *Postcommunio* habetur pro Missa de Festo et pro dicta Octava: in casu unde sumenda erit *Postcommunio* pro Octava?

IX. In primis Vesperis Festi duplicis primae classis Commemoratio diei Octavae Dedicationis propriae Ecclesiae, cuius Officium mane persolutum fuit, faciendane est vel omittenda?

X. Privilegium translationis quo iuxta Rubricas gaudent Festa primaria SS. Ecclesiae Doctorum ritus dupl. min. si impedita fuerint, extendine debet ad eorum Festa secundaria eiusdem ritus.

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio ad relationem infrascripti Secretarii, audito voto Commissionis Liturgicae, omnibusque mature perpensis, rescribendum censuit:

Ad I., II. et III. Affirmative.

Ad IV. Negative ad primam partem: Affirmative ad secundam.¹

Quoad utramque quaestionem. Ad VI. Vesperae fiant de Festo digniori cum commemoratione Festi dignitate inferioris.

¹ Videlicet: Si dies octava alicuius festi habentis octavam incidat in aliam octavam, quae ita sit privilegiata, ut sola duplicia classica admittat, celebrari non potest per integrum officium, sed per solam commemorationem. Haec est regula generalis certo tenenda post relatum Decretum, quod rationi liturgicae, praeterquamquod quaestionem inter peritos ex auctoritate dirimit, sapienter innititur. Et sane quando aliqua octava sic privilegiata conceditur, ut sola duplicia classica admittat, esto etiam quod non solum sint occurrentia, verum etiam translata, nullum certe aliud festum admittere potest, sed debet excludere, quod inferioris est ritus. Excludet ergo eiusmodi sic privilegiata octava semiduplicia, duplicia minora, etiam Doctoris Ecclesiae, ac duplicia maiora. Quare ergo excludere non debet etiam octavam diem, nisi aliquo et haec privilegio fruatur? Etenim dies octava est per se dup. minus; atqui dupl. minus, infra octavam tali modo privilegiatam occurrens, celebrari per integrum officium nequit, ergo neque talis octava dies poterit celebrari.

Equidem quaecumque dies octava privilegio gaudet, ut in occursum praevaleat duplici cuicumque minori atque etiam maiori, sed duplici II classis praevalere nunquam potest. Ergo dies octava quaecumque duplici quocumque II classis, ut de duplici I cl. taceamus, semper erit inferior. Consequenter, peculiari quoque admissio privilegio, vi cuius dies octava duplicibus minoribus et maioribus in occursum praevaleret, nunquam praevalere poterit, imo neque aequiparari duplici II classis. Atqui in hypothesi sola duplicia II classis admittuntur, ergo admitti non potest dies octava, quae duplici II cl. ne aequiparari quidem potest, sed eo est inferior.

Hic autem animadvertendum est, non esse instituendam comparisonem inter ritum octavae privilegiatae et ritum diei octavae in illam incidentis; quia, haec instituta comparatione, non solum dies octava celebranda esset infra quaecumque aliam privilegiatam, sed etiam quodcumque duplex, et plura etiam ad minus semiduplicia. Dies namque infra octavam quaecumque, generatim loquendo, semiduplicis sunt ritus, imo et secundarii qualitate gaudent; ergo infra eam de quocumque duplici agendum esset, et etiam de semiduplici saltem primario. Sed comparatione instituta inter ritum et ritum, tunc privilegio, quo octava citata est, valeamus oportet; quo admissio, iam quaestionis confinia excedimus. Privilegium enim in eo consistit, ut de semiduplici infra octavam privilegiatam fieri possit, aliis exclusis festis etiam superioris ritus; ut proinde comparatio inter ritum diei infra octavam privilegiatam et ritum diei octavae

Ad VII. Vesperae erunt de die octava cum comm. de sequenti.

Ad VIII. In casu *Postcommunio* desumatur ex Missa Vigiliae Omnium Sanctorum

Ad IX Affirmative ad primam partem, Negative ad secundam.¹

Ad X. Negative.

Atque ita rescripsit, die 4 Martii 1901.

DOMINICUS Card. FERRATA, *S.R.C. Praefectus*.

L. ✕ S.

DIOMEDES PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicens., Secretarius*.

locum habere nequeat. Ita ex. gr. dies infra octavam Epiphaniae sunt ritus semiduplicis, excludunt tamen omnia duplicia occurrentia, nisi sint I classis. Frustra ergo in quaestionem adducerentur momenta superioritatis ritus in festis occurrentibus, quippe quae, etsi potiora sint, excluduntur nihilominus ob privilegiam octavae. Consequenter de semiduplici infra octavam semper erit agendum, nisi aliquod duplex I cl. occurrat, contra quodcumque aliud festum duplex occurrens. Iam quaeri potest, si ex hypothesi, quae comprobari vi Rubricarum nequit, ante festum Epiphaniae occurreret festum duplex cum octava, eiusque octava dies incideret infra octavam sic privilegiatam Epiphaniae, de hac die octava celebrari ne posset officium? Minime gentium, quia dies octava non est duplex I classis. A pari, si dies octava occurrat infra octavam Corporis Christi sic privilegiatam ut sola duplicia I et II cl. admittat: videlicet, de ea die octava fieri nequibit officium, quia dies octava neque dup. I, neque II classis est, quamvis II cl. magis quam I appropinquet.

Quae tamen dicta sint generaliter, cum ceterum S. R. C. quando has octavas privilegiatas indulget, ut plurimum innuit, praeter festa generaliter excludenda, ea particulariter, quae celebrari praecipit. Ita Decretum in *Asculana* n. 2611 (4576) indulget octavas ita privilegiatas SS. Corporis Christi et Assumptionis Deiparae, ut fieri tantum infra illas possit de duplicibus I et II classis, infra octavam vero Assumptionis excipit etiam octavam diem S. Laurentii, de qua vult ut officium fiat. Equidem cl. Gardellini in relativa adnotatione, docet hanc esse veluti regulam generalem, quod tamen nequaquam ostendit, et contrarium praesenti Decreto asseritur.

Similiter Decretum 2688 (4680) indulget festum SS. Trinitatis cum octava privilegiata, ita ut duplicia omnia pariter excludat, nisi I aut II cl. fuerint; vult nihilominus ut de aliqua die octava festi octavam habentis, integrum celebretur officium. Hanc quoque dispositionem particularem teneas; agitur enim de Indulto, quod tantum concedit, quantum legislator vult. Sed generalem regulam solum Decretum praesens exhibet, uti ex toto contextu patet; adeo ut, quando aliqua octava privilegiata a S. R. C. ita conceditur, ut de solis fieri possit duplicibus classicis, dies aliqua octava, quae infra illam potest incidere, per integrum officium celebrari non possit, sed tantum per commemorationem. Hae de ratione soluta ac demonstrata, seu ex ratione liturgica seu ex auctoritate, quaestio in Ephemeridibus, cuius solutionem prudenter distulimus, pro mense Aprili proposita.

¹ Hinc in Decreto 3624 ad VII. responsionis *Negative* sufficit *Affirmative*; et Rubrica, quae ibi servanda dicitur, est quae prostat post Tabellum Concurrentiae, num. 2.

THE VALIDITY OF CERTAIN MARRIAGES

EX S. CONGR. S. R. U. INQUISITIONIS

DUBIA DE INTERPRETATIONE DECRETI S. OFFICII DIEI 5 IUNII 1889
 QUOAD CAUSAS MATRIMONIALES EVIDENTIS NULLITATIS

BEATISSIME PATER,

Ad pedes Sanctitatis Vestrae humiliter provolutus Officialis Curiae N., nomine et consensu sui Archiepiscopi reverenter exponit quae sequuntur :

Decreto Generali Sanctae Romanae et Universalis Inquisitionis diei 9 Junii 1889 statutum est quasdam causas matrimoniales, quando nullitas est evidens, posse dirimi una sententia imminutis solemnitatibus et absque appellatione officio.

Inter quos casus adest etiam clandestinitas quoad locos ubi Tridentinum decretum '*Tametsi*' observatur. Quod semper intellexit haec Curia Archiepiscopalis hoc sensu quod nempe una sufficit sententia de plano quoties evidens defectus adest in observantia formae Tridentinae, ut si v.g. unus tantum testis adesset, aut si matrimonium contractum fuisset coram solo ministro acatholico, etc. Quum autem forma Tridentina plene observata fuit et quaestio movetur tantum de qualitate proprii parochi, etiamsi evidens appareat defectus domicilii aut quasi-domicilii item et delegationis, semper solemnitates omnes observantur et fit appellatio ex officio.

Sed et alii casus occurrunt, nec ita infrequenter, eorum nempe qui in fraudem potius legis civilis ne parentum consensum obtinere teneantur, pergunt in Angliam vel in alios locos ubi Tridentinum decretum non est promulgatum, et post paucos dies statim reversuri, ibi matrimonium contrahunt vel coram Officiali Civili 'registrar,' vel coram ministello acatholico, vel tandem coram ministro catholico, adstante 'registrar,' nulla habita delegatione proprii Ordinarii vel parochi delegatione. Hisce enim in casibus fere semper evidentissima apparet nullitas, praesertim cum contractus fit coram ministro acatholico, nunquam enim delegatio, etiamsi data fuisset, daretur ad contrahendum coram huiusmodi ministello.

Hisce stantibus, humiliter quaeritur :

I. Quoad matrimonia quae in Galliis, seu in locis ubi, promulgatum est decretum '*Tametsi*,' contrahuntur coram parochi et duobus testibus, num liceat appellationem ex officio omittere, quum ex actis evidenter concludi potest parochum non fuisse

proprium et nullam delegationem datam fuisse ab Ordinario vel parocho proprio alterutrius contrahentium?

II. Quoad matrimonia quae a catholicis, domicilium retinentibus in loco ubi decretum '*Tametsi*' observatur, contrahuntur in loco ubi idem decretum non viget, quin ibi acquisierint domicilium vel quasi-domicilium, num solemnitates processus matrimonialis stricte servandae sint quando evidenter constat eos contraxisse in fraudem legis et praesertim in fraudem legis civilis?

III. Num saltem habito processu cum requisitis solemnitatibus, dataque nullitatis evidentialia, Defensor matrimonii possit abstinere ab appellatione ex officio?

IV. Tandem num sufficiat processus summarius, et omitti possit appellatio, quoties matrimonium contractum est coram ministello acatholico vel coram uno magistratu civili?

Et Deus etc.

Feria IV, die 27 Martii 1901

In Congregatione Generali S. R. et U. Inquisitionis ab EEmis. ac RRmis. DD. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus habita, propositis suprascriptis dubiis, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, EE. ac RR. Patres respondendum mandarunt:

'Provisum per Decretum S. R. et U. Inquisitionis 5 Iunii 1889, quod intelligendum est tantum de causis, in quibus certo et evidenter constet de impedimentis, de quibus agitur, quae certitudo si desit, a defensore vinculi matrimonialis ad secundam instantiam procedendum erit.'¹

¹ En decretum de quo agitur: 'In Congregatione Generali habita feria IV die 5 Iunii 1889, Emi. ac Rmi. DD. Cardinales in rebus fidei et morum Inquisitionis Generales decreverunt:

'Quando agitur de impedimento disparitatis cultus et evidenter constat unam partem esse baptizatum; et alteram non fuisse baptizatum; quando agitur de impedimento ligaminis et certo constat primum coniugum esse legitimum, et adhuc vivere; quando denique agitur de consanguinitate aut affinitate ex copula licita, aut etiam de cognitione spirituali vel de impedimento clandestinitatis in locis ubi Decretum Tridentinum '*Tametsi*' publicatum est, vel uti tale diu observatur, dummodo ex certo et authentico documento, vel in huius defectu ex certis argumentis evidenter constet de existentia huiusmodi impedimentorum, super quibus Ecclesiae auctoritate dispensatum non fuerit; hisce in casibus, praetermissis solemnitatibus in Constitutione Apostolica *Dei Misericordiae* requisitis, matrimonium poterit ab Ordinariis declarari nullum, cum interventu tamen Defensoris vinculi matrimonialis, quin opus sit secunda sententia.

Eodem Feria ac die

'SSmus. D. N. D. Leo PP. XIII decretum Emorum. PP. approbavit et confirmavit.

'I. Can. MANCINI, S. R. et U. Inquisit. Notarius.'

NOTICES OF BOOKS

CHURCH MUSIC SERIES. No. 1. *Gregorian Mass for Solemn Feasts (Missa in Festis Solemnibus) with Pange lingua and Litany of the Saints for Forty Hours' Adoration, in Staff and Sol-fa Notation especially suitable for School and Confraternity Church Choirs.* Edited by a Catholic Priest. Dublin: Browne and Nolan, Ltd. London: Catholic Truth Society, 1901.

THE reform of Church music in these countries has been considerably impeded by the want of practical editions of suitable music. Although the annual output of Church music on the Continent is something enormous, so that it would appear as if every possible want were supplied, still the special conditions of our choirs are such as to demand special editions suited for them. To supply this want 'a Catholic Priest' has undertaken a Church Music Series, the first number of which we have under review. It contains Gregorian melodies suited for, and required by, most choirs, the 'Mass for Solemn Feasts' including the *Asperges*, as well as the *Pange lingua* and the Litany of the Saints, with the subsequent prayers as used at the Forty Hours' Adoration; The special feature of the publication is the combination of the Tonic-sol-fa and the Gregorian Staff notations, the object being, as set forth in an admirably written preface, to give the notation that is best understood in most of our schools, and at the same time to accustom our singers gradually to the Gregorian notation.

In transcribing the melodies into Tonic-sol-fa notation the editor has abstained from expressing the various forms of the Gregorian notes, and of this we fully approve. For although it appears that the original editors of the Medicean Gradual wanted the three forms of notes to express different durations of sound, it is now almost universally agreed that all through the middle ages these forms did not express duration, and the idea is getting more and more accepted that even for the Medicean version of Gregorian Chant a method of rendering which does not treat the notes as indicating different length is preferable. Did not Dr. Haberl, one of the editors of the 'Ratisbon' Gradual, which originally was an exact reprint of the

Medicaea, speak recently of 'the superstition that the *longa* meant a long tone'?

In the Litany of the Saints the method of 'pointing' the various invocations is indicated by different type for the syllables on which the inflections take place. Of the rules followed in this pointing we fully approve. The psalm *Deus in adjutorium* is similarly treated. The last versicle *Et fidelium* would, we think, have been given better in a lower pitch. There is certainly a rule that the *Fidelium* at the end of Vespers should be sung *submissa voce*, and the same would seem, by analogy, to hold for the versicle alluded to. A fall of a fifth, to *f*, might be the most suitable arrangement.

The printing of the Gregorian notation is not up to the standard of the best modern work of this kind. Sometimes, moreover, neums are printed in a scattered manner, which does not look well. But when we get twenty-six pages for a penny, we must not grumble at a slight want of elegance.

We sincerely hope that the little book will meet with a very large demand, and that further numbers of the series will appear soon.

H. B.

THE IRISH COLLEGE IN PARIS (1578-1901). With a brief Account of the other Irish Colleges in France—Bordeaux, Toulouse, etc. By the Rev. P. Boyle, C.M., Rector of the College.

LET it be said at once that this is a very interesting book, if only for the eighteen documents which are printed in the appendix. The author dates the foundation of the Irish College in Paris from the arrival in that city of the Rev. John Lee and six Irish students, who took up residence, in 1578, in the Collège Montaigne, one of the colleges of the Paris University. It is not stated when exactly the Irish students, who came to seek in France that education which was denied them at home, became a distinct college; but there is clear evidence that there was in Paris, in 1621, an Irish 'seminary of at least twenty-four priests and students, supported formerly at the expense of the great L'Escapier, and now aided by the benevolence of his widow and of other persons who fear and love God, and under the wise government of a truly worthy man, the Rev. John Ley.' In 1623 this seminary was legally recognised as a college of the University of Paris, and Document 3 of

the appendix contains the 'Rules of the Irish Seminary, Paris, A.D. 1826.' Those rules obliged the inmates to rise at 4.30 a.m., and to assemble at 5 a.m. for meditation—'Hora quinta matutina præcise, et hora octava vespertina omnes accedant ad preces communes quæ divisæ sunt in mentalem et actuaalem. Norma vero qua mentalis peragi debeat, a Praefecto Statuatur Praefectusque in hoc genere orationis rationem quævat a Seminaristis.' One of those rules obliged the students to master the French language, and to speak only Latin or French within the college. There is not much known about the site or internal history of the college during the first period of its existence (1578-1677). There is, however, ample evidence that it formed a live part of the great Paris University. 'Several Irishmen held chairs in the University colleges.' In 1652 a M'Namara was Professor of Philosophy in the College of Cardinal Lemoine, an O'Moloy Professor of Philosophy in the College of Beauvais, and a Poer Professor of Philosophy in the College of Liseux. It was in the room of the latter that the Irish students met, in 1651, to protest against the spread of Jansenism in the University. They made figure enough to attract even the attention of the poets of the day. Rulhière, in a humorous poem, *Sur les Disputes*, places them in the front rank of the school disputants :—

'Vanez-y, venez voir, comme sur un théâtre
Une dispute en règle, un choc opiniâtre.

Deo moines échauffés vrai fléau des docteurs
De pauvres Hibernois, complaisants disputeurs
Qui fuyant leur pays pour les saintes promesses
Viennent vivre à Paris d'arguments et de Messes.'

The allusion in this last line to living on Masses had special relevancy, for most of the Irish students were first ordained priests, and afterwards educated, this arrangement enabling them to defray in part the expenses of their education out of their '*honoraria*' for Masses.

In 1677 the Irish students got possession of a deserted Italian college, called the Lombard College, which was founded in A.D. 1333, and endowed for the support of eleven poor Italian students. This soon became the centre of the Irish colony. After 1685 it contained two communities, one of priests and the other of clerics. The priests were governed by four provisors, one from each of the four Irish provinces; while the clerics were

under a prefect of studies. It would seem that the arrangement did not always work smoothly, and it was doubtless a change for the better when the clerics removed, in 1769, to new premises.

'The Rev. Laurence Kelly, the energetic prefect of the clerics, having obtained a royal permission, purchased a house and plot of ground in the Rue du Cheval Vert, now Rue des Irlandais, at a cost of 47,000 francs, and caused to be erected the buildings which form the actual Irish College.'

From this date until the Revolution the two Irish Colleges—the Lombard College for priests and the new college which became the present Irish College—carried on their work in peace and success. The second chapter of Father Boyle's book deals with the history of the Irish student colony in Paris from 1577 to the Revolution, and is full of interesting details—details of the studies, discipline, and domestic life of the students, of their relations with the University and the ecclesiastical authorities, and of their relations with the mother country and the French Government.

It is with regret that we leave this period during which the Irish students breathed the atmosphere of the Paris University, to pass on to the days when the Irish College entered on its career as an isolated seminary. It was the influence of university education that gave us the list of distinguished names referred to in those pages—that gave us those 'Jesuits of the secular clergy' whom Lecky in his *Ireland in the Eighteenth Century* has characterised as 'mild, amiable, cultivated, learned, polite, uniting the meek spirit of the Christian pastor to the winning gentleness of the man of the world.'

In the early days of the Revolution the property of British subjects was respected, and so the Lombard College became a safe retreat for the French clergy, 'until the fearful days of *La Terreur*.' The sister college was during this time the scene of some stirring episodes. Here is one of the most picturesque:—

'It is stated that on one occasion the mob attempted to force their way into the College. A student named M'Canna (more probably M'Kenna) kept them at bay holding a pistol in hand. . . . He addressed the crowd, and said that the Irish had come to France relying on French hospitality. . . . The crowd listened, and at last withdrew, saying *C'est un grand bon diable*.'

When war was declared with England after the King's execution, the property of both Colleges was confiscated, and their

history for a time sinks into night. They emerge about 1804 united to the English and Scotch Colleges, and possessed of whatever remained of all the other Irish Colleges in France. In 1814 it was separated from the English and Scotch Colleges, and remained the sole heir of the Irish Colleges of Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nantes, Poitiers, Douai, and Lille, not one of which survived the Revolution. The whole estimated loss of Irish ecclesiastical property in France amounted to about two and a half million of francs.

In chapter IV the author deals with the College as reorganised after the Revolution.

‘We learn from the evidence of Dr. O’Higgins before the Royal Commission at Maynooth in 1826 that the Irish College students at that period numbered nearly sixty; that they had their classes in the College and no longer attended the University as was the custom before the Revolution, that the studies were solid and the discipline of the house most regular.’

The relations of the College with the English Government as detailed in this chapter are of a curious character. The College authorities presented in 1816 to the French Government a claim for indemnity for the enormous losses sustained during the Revolution. The French Government, in discharge of its obligations, placed a bulk sum (producing an annual interest of three million francs) at the disposal of England, ‘leaving to that Power the duty of examining and adjudicating on the claims of her own subjects.’ The English tribunal to which the matter was referred refused, and has since repeatedly refused, to indemnify the Irish Colleges on the ground that ‘although their members were British subjects . . . their end and object were directly opposed to British law.’

‘Meanwhile the College continued its educational work. Many of the students . . . became distinguished. . . . In 1835 B. Fitzpatrick, afterwards Lord Abbot of Mount Melleray, matriculated. In 1836 Lawrence Gilloly, and in 1839 Thomas Croke entered the Irish College as students.’

The working of the College was handed over in 1858 to the Vincentian Fathers on account of ‘certain disciplinary difficulties’ which are not stated, but which have certainly disappeared, for it is recognised that in the hands of the sons of St. Vincent de Paul this historic institution has done excellent service in supplying the Irish Church with learned and zealous priests. Among the many obligations which the Vincentian Fathers have placed Ireland

under, not the least is one of gratitude for the present compilation, which is a solid and scholarly contribution to Irish Church history, and will preserve from oblivion many documents, facts, and incidents illustrating the faith of our fathers, the sufferings and triumphs of Irish students abroad, the generosity of France and the tyranny of England.

After reading the interesting chapter on the other Irish Colleges in France, one must regret that the author was unable to unearth any information about the Irish seminaries at Rouen and Bourges.

T. P. G.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL SCHOOL READER FOR
THIRD AND FOURTH STANDARDS. School and College
Series. Edited by Rev. T. A. Finlay, M.A., F.R.U.I.
Dublin : Eblana Press.

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Each part contains eighty-four pages. The book is well bound and illustrated, and is sold to pupils of National Schools for fivepence.

THE BIBLE AND RATIONALISM. By the Rev. John Klein.
In four volumes. New York, etc.: Herder.

FATHER KLEIN is already favourably known by his *Christian Anthropology* and *Ecclesiastical Dictionary*. By his countrymen in the United States he is regarded as one of the most prolific writers on subjects of interest to all Catholics at the present day. A work from his pen, *Answers to Difficulties of the Bible*, and which appeared some years ago, has been recast and enlarged, as he tells us, and is now republished under the title, *The Bible and Rationalism*. In its expanded form it consists of four goodly volumes, and may be regarded practically as a new work. It is designed to supply English readers with a reply to those objections which at the present day are so frequently made against the truth of certain books of Scriptures.

Fortunately for ourselves, we never hear in Ireland anything disrespectful to the inspired Book; but it is not so in the United States and in some other English-speaking countries. There the need of defending the Bible against the attacks of unbelievers is not an uncommon experience. But while in France, Germany, and Spain several apologists—such as Moigno, Motais, Guibert, Meignan, Vigouroux, Braun, and Gonzalez—have deserved well of their countrymen, in English-speaking lands very little has yet been done by an orthodox pen. There have been, of course, occasionally articles in the reviews, but scarcely a book worth mentioning.

It is true that Father Klein writes in a popular fashion. His work is not intended for professed students of Scripture or Oriental languages or textual criticism; on the contrary, *The Bible and Rationalism* is addressed to all those who take an intelligent interest in some of the Biblical questions of the day, but are nevertheless unable, of themselves, to solve certain difficulties that are made much of by rationalists. The author appears to have kept in mind only the wants and wishes of the general reader, who is satisfied with getting a notion of the nature and contents of each book of the Old and New Testament, of the objections that have from time to time been raised against them by unbelievers, and of the answers to those objections.

As we have said, the work does not presuppose on the part of its readers either knowledge of physical sciences or of historical principles, or acquaintance with Oriental languages or with the

ever-changing phases of 'higher criticism.' Nevertheless the zealous author has set himself a task of no ordinary difficulty. This is evident from the mere statement of the fact that *The Bible and Rationalism* contains a special introduction to nearly all the seventy-two books of Scripture, and a refutation of objections made against them. As Father Klein's exposition covers such a wide field, his readers have no right to expect a minute or detailed examination of the subjects he treats.

Of the four volumes into which his work is divided, two are devoted to an explanation and defence of the Pentateuch. Vol. I., besides giving a summary of the events mentioned in Genesis and Exodus, treats of the monotheism of the Hebrews, and also of their Levitical priesthood, sacrifices, and feasts. In Vol. IV., which, though, for some unexplained reason, is numbered as the concluding one, nevertheless is in reality the introductory portion of the entire work, there are two 'Preliminary Chapters' on geology and geogony respectively, into which a great deal, taken from reliable sources, has been compressed. These are followed by chapters on 'The Mosaic Cosmogony,' 'The Hexameron' (in which the period theory is advocated'), and five chapters containing an explanation and examination of evolution, as originally put forward by Darwin, and as systematized in Hæckel's theory of

¹ The author thus describes his position :—

'For us, we adopt the theory of the *epochal days*, which continues to regard Chapter I. of Genesis as historical, but in understanding it in the following manner, and in being careful not to exaggerate the concordistic accounts between the Biblical cosmogony and geology :—

"'The six days of creation,'" says H. Rensch (*Bibel und Natur*) "in particular does not imply that there has [*sic*] been numerically six geological epochs. God reveals to us the division of the creation into seven periods only because of the analogy which He wished to establish between the divine week of the creation and the week here below. . . . The essential is that the number *seven* is preserved. Certainly we have to admit that the seventh day of the creation is not a day like ours. . . . The important point in this question is the idea of the week and that of day."

'There has been a development, an ascending progress, in the divine work. At first the Creator produced the elements of matter, as is stated in the first verse. The elements afterward [*sic*], by their diverse combinations, formed the inorganic and mineral matters; then successively appeared the plants and animals, and finally man.

'Genesis, not being a scientific treatise, sketches only in great traits the cosmogony; it does not enter into details. Consequently, all the attempts which have for end to bring into accord the particular points of the geological discoveries with the sacred account are purely conjectural. The natural sciences show, in the production of the beings, the same ascending gradation as Genesis. This is sufficient for us to affirm that there is accord between them, as was done by a *savant* of acknowledged competence and great wisdom, M. Barrande.'

Monism. The volume concludes with a review of some of the chief questions in Pentateuchal exegesis. Chapter X. deals with some of the problems regarding the state of primitive man and the antiquity of the human race; Chapter XI. treats of the unity of mankind; Chapter XII. of the Noachian deluge; and Chapter XIII. of Biblical chronology. Volume II. contains, in its first section, a *resumé* of objections put forward by rationalists against Josue, Kings, and some other of the historical books. The second and third sections respectively treat of the sapiental and the prophetic books. Among the minor prophets, Osee, Jonas, and Zacharias are the only ones of whom mention is made, because Father Klein says the others do not furnish material for any objection on the part of rationalists. The subject of Vol. III. is the New Testament, the difficulties in the Gospels and their solution occupying about half of it. Father Klein devotes his eighth chapter to the 'Miracles of the Gospels.' The Epistles and the Apocalypse are finally reached, and some objections to their veracity are briefly disposed of.

It would, of course, be impossible to confine within the limits of a reasonably-sized book, even the bare enumeration of *all* the faults that unbelievers say they find in Scripture. They are innumerable. All that a writer of an apologetic work can do is to give *samples*, and to show their worthlessness. He may be thoroughly acquainted with the interpretation of some books of Scripture, but as regards that of others he must be content to rely more or less on the authority of others, competent scholars in their own department. Men who have devoted all their time to the study of the Evangelists or of St. Paul cannot be conversant with the difficulties of Paralipomenon. Such is the case of those who write at first hand. It is equally true of those who endeavour to communicate in popular form the results attained by the pioneers of exegesis. The writers of whom we speak may acquire a fair general knowledge of the Bible, but they can only cull from the solutions to exegetical problems those that will be understood by the average reader.

Father Klein wisely keeps to subjects that do not demand any profound knowledge. The authorities he quotes most frequently are Lavaud de Lestrade, Reusch, Nicolas, Meignan, Vigouroux, Lapparent, and Barrande: and the rationalists he chiefly refutes are Renan, Strauss, Noldeke, Soury, and Wellhausen.

It is by no means a pleasant task, yet it is part of a reviewer's

duty, to mention some glaring defects in the work. Certain parts of it—we refer to the preliminary chapters of Vol. IV.—bristle with facts, but the author's language will not enable a *tyro* to learn much about these results of geological investigation. So many things are put before him simultaneously, that his mind is liable to be distracted, and all the while there is a notable lack of explanation. It is taken for granted that all readers will be able to estimate for themselves the relative value of geological or other theories, and to perceive their respective bearing on the interpretation of the sacred text. This is assuming too much. A fairly adequate exposition of a single question would require one of Father Klein's volumes. Guibert, in his *Origines*, and Knabenbauer, in his *Nochmals der biblische Schöpfungbericht* have shown that they understood the necessity of explanation. We notice also some unaccountable omissions. Thus, though there is a whole chapter on Ecclesiasticus, Father Klein does not tell his readers that about half of the original text has been recovered. This, and similar pieces of information that might have been given elsewhere, would have been interesting and welcome. They serve to show the value of the Church's tradition in such matters. In reading Father Klein's pages we have met countless expressions that are utterly foreign to the English language and opposed to its most rudimentary rules. They could not even be called 'Americanisms.' At first this violation of usage caused surprise, but as we read on it became only too evident that Father Klein had paid no regard to the language in which he was writing. In his vocabulary, 'until' is the word to express the relation of distance or of magnitude, *e.g.* —'The *Primary grounds* attain sometimes a thickness of several thousand yards; in North America until 16,000 yards.' 'We find it in all heights, until 1,500 yards in Europe and 3,500 yards in China.' Some of his phrases have a German prototype: for instance, '*it goes out*' to express that a thing is evident, comes from '*es geht aus*,' and '*to hold a similar language*' from '*eine ähnliche Sprache halten*.' Such faults in diction, besides wrong collocation of words and other blemishes occur repeatedly throughout the book. In some places the writer's disregard of the most necessary rules of composition makes his meaning obscure. Thus, on p. 21, Vol. IV., where he wishes to say that contrary to an opinion which was once held, the red diluvium is not different from the Loess; this is how he says it—'At first they believed to be constituting a distinct deposit; but a more careful inquiry revealed that it is only

the result of a superficial alteration of the Loess or alluvions, alteration,' etc. On p. 23, he wishes to explain the presence of 'blocks' on the 'erratic ground' of northern Europe; this is how he explains it—'The length of the voyage travelled by large blocks with intact angles, joint with the presence of arctic-marine shells, which they believed of having established, caused them to attribute, till lately, these deposits to a phenomenon of transport through icebergs across submerged plains. etc.

The book should have been submitted to a careful revision. In its present condition it will hardly be of benefit to the cause which the author has at heart.

R. W.

MEDITATIONS AND EXERCISES FOR THE ILLUMINATIVE WAY. By R. P. J. Michael of Coutances, Prior of the Grand Chartreuse, and forty-fifth General of the Carthusian Order. Translated by Kenelm Digby Best, Priest of the Oratory. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son; London: Burns and Oates.

THERE is an old-time flavour of warm, fervid piety, about the ten exercises of the *Illuminative Way*, which compose this little volume, that ought to bespeak for them an intelligent curiosity. Composed towards the end of the sixteenth century, they reveal to us the fact, that a most elaborate system of mental prayer was in vogue, at least among some religious communities, at a time almost synchronous with that at which the celebrated *Spiritual Exercises* issued from their devout author's pen in the gloomy cave of Manresa. Father John Michael, the author of these exercises of the *Illuminative Way*, was born in Coutances in the first part of the sixteenth century. He received the Carthusian habit from the Prior of the Paris Chartreuse, became Prior of this latter institute later on, and finally succeeded to the Generalship of the Grand Chartreuse. It was during his tenure of this high office that the present volume was composed. To give an idea of the subjects and scope of these Exercises we cannot do better than borrow the words of the Preface:—

'In the exercise of the Passion, which is divided into ten Meditations, it is set forth Who and What Christ the Lord is Who suffers, For Whom and in What Dispositions, With what Manner and Measure of Love, What Kind and what Amount of Sufferings, For what Fruit and End He undergoes it all. Then follows an especial Exercise of Love,

consisting of considerations of the diverse adorable and sweet Names of God, and then a most fervent Prayer to obtain the love of God, with acts of love. Thirdly, there come Exercises of self-denial, and an embracing and carrying of the Cross. Fourthly, is added a petition to imitate the virtues of Christ. Fifthly, an Imploring of Pardon for all faults and vices contrary to those virtues. Lastly, there is an Oblation of the whole Exercise, with a Prayer to obtain the fruits and end of our Saviour's Passion.'

The casual reader will, very likely, find these Exercises dry and insipid, but the seeker after closer and more intimate union with God will discover in them the soul-sustaining bread of true genuine spirituality. The translator's work leaves no room for cavil. While adhering, in the main, to the author's plan he has, by a free and forcible rendering, preserved, in its entirety, the spirit of the original.

P. M.

MAGISTER ADEST; OR, WHO IS LIKE UNTO GOD? With preface by Rev. Charles Blount, S.J. London: Keegan, Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., Paternoster House Charing Cross Road. 1900.

THIS handsomely got up volume aims at giving us a series of meditations on the Life of our Divine Saviour in a purely Scriptural setting. It may be described as an attempt to emphasize and illustrate, by means of apt passages and texts from the Old Testament, the principal mysteries and salient features in the human life of Christ. The authoress, who modestly withdraws her name from the title page, is a religious of the Order of the Good Shepherd. Recognising the largely prefigurative character of the sacred writings of the Old Law, and realising also that our Lord Himself was frequently foreshadowed, in them by type and symbol and prophecy, she adopted, in her meditations on His earthly life, the practice of dwelling at the same time upon those passages from the Old Testament that could be referred, even in an accommodated sense, to the subject-matter under her immediate consideration. After a time, running concurrently with the chief phases of our Saviour's human life, she had grouped together a series of old Scriptural texts to correspond with them. Thus, in the meditation on the Sacred Passion we have gathered together, with great care and skill, those strikingly beautiful passages from the Psalms and Prophets in which the sufferings of the God-Man are depicted with a felicity of expression and power

of eloquence unsurpassed in the writings of men. This method of contemplating our Lord, as it were, in the perspective of the ancient Scriptures, our authoress found to be a great stimulus to her devotion and a strong incentive to Divine Love. We are sure that those into whose hands this little book may fall, will have a similarly joyous experience. Indeed its chaste and touching language tends to elevate the thoughts and supernaturalize the affections of the soul.

The book has many other original features. Not the least prominent of these is the excellent set of illustrations with which it is enriched. These pictures, many of which are after the best religious painters of the early centuries, form quite an essential part of the volume, being designed to influence and impress the faculties of the soul through the eye in the same way that music operates on them through the ear.

The publishers have turned out the book in excellent style. The paper is good, the type is clear, and the binding durable.

P. M. .

THE HISTORY OF THE PASSION OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST. Explained by the Rev. James Groenings, S.J. St. Louis, Mo. : B. Herder.

WE extend a sincere welcome to this book, the notice of which has been accidentally held over. It deals with the chief scenes of our Lord's Passion in a way that is remarkably striking and direct, and with a thoughtful reflection that shows the piety of the author.

Moreover, it is a learned book, full, after the Scriptures, with the wisdom of all the great commentators down to our own time. Thus it is a book that may afford anyone most effective spiritual reading, while for the student it will possess some interest, as well as being of undoubted service to the missionary priest who for any purpose addresses himself to the study of the Passion.

J. W. M.

"*Ut Christiani sitis et Romani sitis.*" "As you are children of Christ, so be you children of Rome."
Ex Dictis S. Patricii, in Libro Armacano, fol. 9.

The Irish Ecclesiastical Record

A Monthly Journal, under Episcopal Sanction.

Thirtieth-fourth Year] NOVEMBER, 1901. [Fourth Series
No. 407.] Vol. X.

Lord Iveagh, and other Irish Officers in France

Very Rev. Patrick Boyle, C.M., President, Irish College, Paris.

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Very Rev. Dr. Murphy, V.F., Macroom.

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
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LORD IVEAGH, AND OTHER IRISH OFFICERS, STUDENTS AT THE COLLÈGE DES GRASSINS, IN PARIS, FROM 1684 TO 1710

IN a collection of miscellaneous papers,¹ in the Mazarin Library in Paris, there is preserved a list of Irish officers, who were educated in the Collège des Grassins, between 1684 and 1710. The names of these gallant Irishmen will doubtless be interesting to many in Ireland; and the object of the present paper is to rescue them from oblivion. But first an account of the Collège des Grassins must be given; and how it came to be the residence of Irish students must be explained.

In Felibien's history of Paris,² there is an official report of a visitation of the Collège des Grassins, made by order of the University, in 1708, and ratified by the Parliament of Paris, in 1710. From that document authentic information may be gathered with respect to the foundation and discipline of the College, as well as concerning the residence of Irish students in it.

The Collège des Grassins was founded by the will of Pierre Grassin, Lord of Ablon, in 1569. The liberality of Thierry Grassin, brother, and of Pierre Grassin, son of the

¹ *Récueil des Pièces*, A. 10,816.

² *Histoire de la Ville de Paris*, vol. iii., pp. 687-689.

founder, augmented the original endowment.¹ The College was incorporated in the University of Paris, and was subject to the authority of the Archbishop of Sens, who by the act of foundation was named Provisor. Under the Provisor it was governed by a Principal. The College was one of *plein exercice*, and had a staff of professors of its own. The course of studies extended from the lowest class of grammar to philosophy, inclusive.

From October to Easter the students rose at 5.30 a.m. ; and at 5.45 they assembled for morning prayers. From Easter to vacation they rose at 5.0, and met for prayers at 5.15. At 7.15 they assisted at Mass. Dinner was served at 11 a.m., and supper at 6 p.m., except on fast days when the time of those repasts was half an hour later.

Each evening, after class, the students visited the chapel, and sang the *Salve Regina*, or another antiphon, in honour of the Blessed Virgin Mary according to the season, and the antiphon, *Da pacem*, with its appropriate prayer. They also recited the *De Profundis*, for the souls of the deceased founders and benefactors of the College. At 8.45 p.m. night prayer was said, after which the door was locked and the keys deposited with the Principal.

On Sundays High Mass was celebrated at 7.30, and the Principal preached after the Gospel. On festivals High Mass was chanted, but without a sermon. Vespers on Sundays and festivals were sung at 5.15 p.m. On Fridays the antiphon, *Domine non secundum peccata*, etc., was sung at Mass.

Each year three greater obits were celebrated, consisting of an office of nine lessons, and a Requiem Mass with deacon, sub-deacon, and cope bearers. Twelve lesser obits, one on the first Monday of each month, were also celebrated with Mass and an office of three lessons. The Principal was charged to see that the students approached the

¹ The College was situated in rue des Sept Voies, now rue Valette, near the Pantheon. On the opposite side of the street stood the old parish church of St. Hilaire du Mont, which has disappeared. At the distance of a few paces stood the Lombard College. The rue de l'Ecole Polytechnique, where it meets the rue Valette and the rue des Carmes, passes through the site of old Collège des Grassins.

Sacraments from time to time. The professors were obliged to attend the offices in the chapel, and were exhorted, if competent, to join in the chant. In what concerned the periods for the opening and close of class, as well respecting vacant days, they were directed to conform to the usages of the College and the statutes of the University.

But it may be asked, how did it come to pass that Irishmen were to be found amongst the students at the Collège des Grassins? The College, as already stated, was one of *plein exercice*, and its lecture halls were open to extern pupils. Irishmen attended it for lectures in philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From Lynch's manuscript¹ lives of the Bishops of Ireland we gather, that Dr. Molony, Bishop of Killaloe, before his consecration in 1630, gave lectures at the Grassins' College. In 1763 the Provisors of Lombard College stated, in a petition to the University, that the priests of that establishment had from time immemorial attended the classes at the Grassins in philosophy. But for some years, between 1684 and 1710, not only were there Irishmen among the extern pupils, but a little colony of Irishmen was resident in the College itself.

Dr. Patrick Maginn, one of the restorers of the Lombard College, died in 1683. By his will he bequeathed a sum of ten thousand livres² for the general benefit of the establishment he had done so much to found. Moreover, he bequeathed an annual sum of two thousand five hundred livres, invested in the 'aides et gabelles,' and payable at the Hotel de Ville of Paris, for the education of students. This bequest was subject to an annual pension of five hundred livres, payable to his aged mother, *née* Catherine MacDonnell, during her life. The testator was sixty-four years of age at the date when he made his will. But neither age, nor the

¹ Joannes autem studiorum Theologicorum stadia tandem permensus, Aureliam, peste Parisiis infestante, concessit; inde post animum jurisprudentiâ non tenuiter tinctum, Parisios reversus, ad discipulos philosophicis disciplinis in Collegio Beccediano, et Grassano excolendos curam vertit. Postea Parisiis diu moratus, liberalem se cum aliis tum præcipue popularibus suis præbuit, ac nominatim iis adolescentibus qui ad litteras capeendas animum adjunxerunt; militiam quoque æcutis crebro subveniens.—MS., p. 836.

² A livre was equal in value to a franc.

atmosphere of courts, nor zeal for religion had rendered him insensible to the duties of filial piety. He directed that after the death of his mother the whole sum of two thousand five hundred livres should be devoted to the education of students.

Relatives of the testator, of the families of Maginn, Mageniz, O'Neill, and White, were to be preferred to all others. Next to these were to come natives of the dioceses of Down and Dromore, and in defect of these, natives of the province of Ulster. The relations of the founder had the right of presentation, and failing these, the Bishops of Down and Dromore. The Prior and Council of St. Victor's in Paris were appointed trustees, and were charged to fulfil their trust according to the advice of the Provisor for Ulster at the Irish College.

The testator directed that there should be two categories of students on the foundation, one consisting of priests, and the other of junior students; and he expressed a desire that, as far as possible, the number of the latter should be double that of the former. But it is evident from the terms of his will that his intention was to provide for the education of ecclesiastics. It is thus expressed:—

The said testator having seriously and with sorrow considered the pitiable state of ecclesiastics and of the people in the kingdom of Ireland, and especially in the province of Ulster, in which he was born, where heresy increases every day for want of learned ecclesiastics, who are fewer in that province than in any other, since they have no establishment in other Catholic countries, nor any refuge or assistance like the other provinces of Ireland; the said testator desiring as far as in him lies to provide a remedy thereunto, whereby poor souls and the Church may be succoured by persons of learning, gives and bequeaths to the Lombard College, etc., etc.

He did not indeed require that the vocation of the junior students should have been already decided; but he directed that 'if any of the bursars, after their studies in philosophy, do not desire to become priests, they shall be dismissed by the Sieurs of St. Victor's,' etc.

At the time of Dr. Maginn's death, the Lombard College was exclusively reserved for priests. It was found,

therefore, necessary to place the junior students in some other college, and in 1696 a formal contract was entered into between the Principal of the Collège des Grassins and the Prior of St. Victor's, in virtue of which the Maginn Bursars were admitted to reside in that college. Here they continued to reside until 1710. The Rev. Charles Mageniz, Provisor for Ulster at the Lombard College, watched over their interests, and Evaristus Mageniz acted as their procurator. Meanwhile the Lombard College was by royal authority thrown open to junior students, as well as to priests,¹ and the Prior of St. Victor's presented a petition to the University asking to have the Maginn Bursars sent thither.

At this time the Collège des Grassins became financially embarrassed. Considerable debts had accumulated, and the capital of the foundation had been drawn upon. To provide a remedy for this state of things, a Visitation of the College was made by order of the University. Dr. Pirot, Chancellor of the University and of the Church of Paris, and Edmund Pourchet, ex-rector of the University, were the Visitors. After a careful investigation of the state of the College, they recommended that the bursas should be suspended until all debts were paid. When this was effected, they directed that a partial suspension of the bursas should be maintained until the capital of the foundation had been replaced; and when the financial prosperity of the College was restored, they recommended that a fixed sum should be reserved annually to meet the cost of repairs and other unusual expenses. They further recommended that the Procurator, who was non-resident, should be replaced by a person who would reside in the College. The new Procurator was forbidden to make any extraordinary outlay beyond the amount of thirty livres, without a written order signed by the Principal and by the Senior Bursar. The Principal himself was ordered not to expend beyond the amount of three hundred livres without the written approval of the Provisor, the Archbishop of Sens.

The Visitors examined also the contract entered into

¹ See *The Irish College in Paris, 1578 to 1901*, p. 30.

with the trustees of the Maginn Bursars, and inspected the apartments occupied by them. They reported that the aforesaid contract was prejudicial to the College, partly on account of incompatibility of dispositions, which disturbed discipline, and hindered good; and partly on account of its financial aspect. The apartments occupied by the Irish students had formerly produced a rent higher by one-third than they paid. An outlay, too, upon them was imminent for the repairs of a wall that had suffered at the hands of the Irish. In consequence the Visitors recommended that the request of the Prior of St. Victor's should be granted, and that the Irish students should be sent to the Lombard College. The report of the Visitors was dated 2nd March, 1708, and was ratified by a decree of the Parliament of Paris on 4th May, 1710.¹

At this juncture a demand was made on the Maginn foundation for the payment of taxes to the amount of over one thousand livres. The Bursars petitioned for an exemption from the tax. In support of their appeal they presented a statement, giving the names of students educated on the foundation, who had embraced a military career. They enumerated the rank they held, the services they had rendered to France, and the battles in which they fought or fell. That document, which is here given in the

¹ En troisième lieu, quant à ce qui touche le contract d'association des Irlandois au Collège des Grassins, du 22 Mars 1696, nous estimons qu'il est tout à fait contraire aux droits et usages de l'université, et très préjudiciable au dit collège tant pour l'incompatibilité des humeurs qui troublent entièrement la discipline, et qui empêchent que le bien ne se fasse, que par la lésion énorme qu'il cause au temporel du dit Collège des Grassins, qui estant déjà fort obéré, avance beaucoup sa ruine totale par le dit contract, d'association : partant notre avis est qu'attendu que le dit contract a été fait très légèrement par le feu Sieur Framery principal sans appeler l'université; et pour profiter de quelques légères sommes présentes dont il avait besoin dans le desordre de ses affaires au grand detrimment du dit collège qui après de grosses depenses pour l'augmentation et amelioration du corps de logis habité par les dits Irlandois en tiro près d'un tiers moins qu'il ne faisait auparavant; et qui se voit encore à la veille d'estre obligé de refaire un gros mur qui s'endommage beaucoup par les immondices et autres dégats des dits Irlandois: il y a lieu d'ordonner que conformément aux intentions du Sieur Maginn exprimées dans son testament du 3 Juillet 1682, et à la demande des Sieurs Prieurs et chambre de St. Victor contenue dans leur requête, mentionnée cydessus, les dits Irlandois seront renvoyés dans le Collège des Lombards, sauf à leur restituer, si le cas y échet, les impenses utiles faites par eux dans le corps de logis par eux habité dans le dit collège.—Félibien, vol. iii. pp. 587-9.

language and in the form in which it was drawn up, is as follows :—

MEMOIRE

EXACT ET VERITABLE

du nombre des Officiers Irlandois qui ont été élevés dans la Fondation de feu l'Abbé Patrice Maginn, depuis l'établissement de cette fondation sous la protection de Messieurs de St. Victor, en l'année 1684, pour des jeunes étudiants Irlandois de famille, qui ont été naturalizés et établis au Collège des Grassins, par Lettres Patentes du Roy homologuées en Parlement en 1696 jusqu'à l'année courante 1710.

Outre plusieurs Prêtres qui en sont sortis pour la Mission d'Irlande.

Roger Magenis Vicomte d'Iveah, ancien Pair d'Irlande, lequel après avoir servi le Roy pendant quelques années dans le Régiment Irlandois de Lée et ensuite dans celui de Dillon mourut en Espagne au mois de Septembre 1709. Son frère aîné Bernard Magenis Vicomte d'Iveah, mort sans enfans, leva un régiment d'Infanterie pour le service de son Roy légitime en Irlande & y épousa la fille aînée du Comte de Clanricard soeur de fette Madame la Duchesse de Berwick, nièce de Mylord Moncassell, Lieutenant Général des Armées du Roy, mort de ses blessures reçues au service de sa Majesté, & petite nièce du feu duc d'Ormond. Arthur Magenis Vicomte d'Iveah, oncle de ces deux Seigneurs, et père de Madame de Lée, épouse de Monsieur de Lée, Lieutenant Général, et Commandeur de l'ordre de S. Lotis, mena en France pendant la minorité du Roy un Régiment d'Infanterie de quinze cens hommes.

Antoine Ôneill, présentement Lieutenant Colonel du Régiment Irlandois de Lée.

Louis Ôneill, frère du dit Antoine, Capitaine, au même Régiment : leur frère Constantin Ôneill mourut Capitaine au Régiment de Frustemberg en 1685 des blessures qu'il avait reçues au siège de Girone après trente ans de service, et avoir refusé plutôt que de quitter le service de la France, le titre de Comte de Tyrone, avec la pension y attachée en Espagne, qu'avait eu feu son frère.

Roger Magenis, fils de Bernard Magenis Chevalier, Lieutenant Colonel du Régiment d'Infanterie Irlandoise de Galmoy, est actuellement officier au Régiment de Galmoy après avoir eu l'honneur d'être Page du Roy.

Jean Magenis, Lieutenant dans le Régiment de Lée.

Arthur Magenis, frère du dit Jean, Enseigne dans le même Régiment : leur père Maurice Magenis après avoir été gouverneur de Neury en Irlande, riche en fonds de terre, & fort considéré de son Roy, & de ses compatriotes pour ses services fut tué à l'affaire de Spire en 1692.

Autre Arthur Magenis, fils de feu sieur Magenis, Ecuyer de le

Reine d'Angleterre ; Chevalier de l'ordre de S. Louis, et Capitaine dans la Brigade d'officiers détachés du Régiment de Lée.

Autre Arthur Magenis, neveu du dit Sieur Ecuyer, Capitaine dans la même Brigade : ces deux officiers ont eu des grâces de la Cour pour avoir bien fait leur devoir au Siège de l'Isle & sont actuellement de la garnison qui défend Douay.

Edme Magenis, Enseigne dans le Régiment de Lée, mort au service du Roy en Italie, son père Arthur Magenis, Capitaine au Régiment de Mylord Magenis, fut tué à la bataille d'Aghrim en Irlande.

Daniel Magenis, Capitaine dans ledit Régiment de Magenis fut tué à la même bataille.

Gelase Magenis, Lieutenant dans le Régiment de Lée.

Henry O'Neill, Capitaine dans le Régiment d'Infanterie Irlandoise d'Ô'Brien, oy-devant de Clare.

Daniel O'Neill, Capitaine dans le Régiment d'Infanterie Irlandoise d'Athlone ; mourut au service du Roy en Italie ; son frère Tullius O'Neill, Cadet dans le Régiment Royal d'Irlande Infanterie, fut tué en Angleterre, en voulant avec d'autres Irlandois forcer un bâtiment pour passer en France.

Bernard O'Neill, Lieutenant au service du Roy d'Espagne ; son frère est mort Cadet au Régiment Irlandois de Dorrington ; leur père Hugo O'Neill et leur oncle Félix O'Neill, l'un Lieutenant-Colonel, l'autre Colonel, ont été tués à la bataille d'Aghrim.

Félix O'Neill, Lieutenant dans le Régiment d'Infanterie Irlandoise d'O'Neill, dit Charlemont, mort en Allemagne.

Henry White, Lieutenant dans le Régiment de Lée, tué à la bataille de Hocsted.¹

Jacques Maginn, présentement Capitaine au dit Régiment de Lée.

Edme MacDermott, Capitaine au Régiment de Galmoy, et ayde de camp le Monsieur de Chevalier de Maulevrier, mort en Espagne.

Bernard O'Neill, Cornette dans le Régiment des dragons de Mahony, fut tué en Espagne, et son frère Capitaine dans le Régiment de Bourk tué à Crémone.

Outre les susdits officiers, il y a eu d'autres jeunes gentilshommes élevez dans cette fondation qui ont porté les armes comme Cadets, et qui sont morts dans le service, la plupart tués dans les occasions de la présente et dernière guerre.

Ceux qui occupent présentement les bourses sont :

Maurice Magenis, fils d'un autre Maurice Magenis. Capitaine, tué au service du Roy comme il est mentionné au sixième article de ce mémoire.

Christophe Russell, fils de Nicolas Russell, Capitaine au Régiment de Galmoy, tué à la bataille de Cassano.

¹ Known in English history as the Battle of Blenheim.—P. B.

Patrice O'Lavery, fils d'Arthur ÔLavery tué à l'affaire de Chiari.

Bernard Burne.

Deux ecclésiastiques qui étudient pour se rendre capables d'aller à la Mission d'Irlande à l'exemple des autres bons prêtres qui ont été élevés dans cette fondation.

Ce détail qu'on peut justifier par le témoignage de la Cour d'Angleterre, & par le certificat de Messieurs de St. Victor, qui tiennent Registre de l'entrée et de la sortie desdits boursiers fait bien voir que feu l'Abbé Patrice Maginn en faisant cette fondation des deniers qu'il avait apporté d'Angleterre où il avait été longtemps premier aumônier de la Reine, épouse de Charles II., avait intention de faire une petite pépinière de Missionnaires et d'Officiers Irlandois; ses bonnes intentions ont été fidèlement suivies, et ces Boursiers ont parfaitement bien rempli les devoirs de leurs états différents, les Ecclésiastiques ont tous hasardé pour aller à la Mission d'Irlande où les Catholiques persécutés ont besoin de pareil secours & les officiers ont versé leur sang dans les occasions, & mérité la protection & les grâces du Roy, tant par leurs services personnels que par ceux de leurs familles & proches parens; ils n'ont rien au monde pour leur entretien que des rentes constituées sur l'Hôtel de Ville par un Ecclésiastique leur Compatriote & seul Bienfaiteur; ces rentes ne sont point sujettes à des taxes. Tout cela cependant n'a pu mettre cette jeunesse étrangère, Catholique, & affectionnée, à l'abri de l'avidité d'un Partisan, qui a surpris un Arrêt du Conseil pour leur faire paier une taxe de Mille livres avec les deux sols par livre.

Ils supplient très humblement Monseigneur DesMarais de leur accorder l'honneur de sa protection auprès du Roy afin qu'il plaise à Sa Majesté d'ordonner qu'ils soient déchargés d'une imposition si injuste, si contraire à sa bonté & même à son service, et que le Partisan et ses Cautious soient contraints même par Corps, de rendre & restituer ce qu'ils ont touché pour cette taxe des Payeurs des rentes sur l'Hôtel de Ville.

What was the result of this appeal we have not ascertained.

The Collège des Grassins continued to exist down to the dissolution of the University of Paris in 1793. But after 1710 the Maginn Bursars resided at the Lombard College, which, in the eighteenth century, besides priests, had a section for junior students. The loss of documents has made it impossible to continue the list of the Maginn Bursars after 1710. That foundation was the only one for the education

of students for the dioceses of Down and Dromore. In the eighteenth century the Most Rev. John Armstrong, Most Rev. Hugh McMullan, and Most Rev. Patrick McMullan, Bishops of Down, and Most Rev. Matthew Lennon, Bishop of Dromore, were, doubtless, students on this foundation. In 1785, when Rev. James O'Coigly claimed one of the Maginn burses, two priests—Rev. John McAlister of Dromore, and Rev. Edward McMullen of Down—were in possession.

After the Revolution the Most Rev. Edward Maginn, Coadjutor of Derry, is said to have been a student on this foundation from 1823 to 1825.¹ At the present time there are many priests in the dioceses of Down and Conor and of Dromore, who were educated on the same foundation.

But the foregoing list of officers has more than a local interest. It shows that the policy of those bishops who relied less on junior students for a supply of clergy than upon such as had received orders before proceeding to France, was not unreasonable. More than this, the foregoing document is, as it were, the history of the period in miniature. It recalls the time when the Catholic Lords of Iveagh and of Tyrone ranked with the nobles of France and Spain, and when the flower of the Catholic youth of Ireland fought and died on the battlefields of Spain and Italy, Austria and France. Two centuries have since elapsed, and it is encouraging to note that, in spite of persecution, the names of Russell and O'Neill, Magenis and Maginn, are still borne by Ulstermen, some of whom, as ecclesiastics, are as zealous as Dr. Maginn, Abbot of Thuley; and others, as laymen, are as loyal to the faith of their fathers as the gallant men who fought and fell at Aughrim, Höchstædt, and Cremona.

PATRICK BOYLE, C.M.

¹ See *Memoirs of the Bishops of Derry*, by Rev. James McLaughlin, P.P., p. 74.

DR. SALMON'S 'INFALLIBILITY'

V

'THERE is nothing new,' we are told, 'under the sun ;' and certainly there is nothing in Dr. Salmon's controversial lectures calculated to bring this old saying into doubt. He goes along the beaten path ; he exhibits the old stock-in-trade of Protestant disputants ; he repeats calumnies that have been a thousand times refuted ; and all this with an air of confidence, with an assumption of learning, that are not warranted by his lectures. The Doctor seems to think that he is a champion specially raised up to battle with Rome, that in his lectures he is striking a decisive blow at the whole Roman system. When, in his first lecture, he was unfolding his general programme of attack on us, he said : ' I hold that it is unworthy of any man who possesses knowledge to keep his knowledge to himself, and rejoice in his own enlightenment, without making any effort to bring others to share in his privileges ' (page 7). And after making this modest profession of superior knowledge, the Regius Professor pledges himself not ' to shrink from a full and candid examination of the Roman claims ' (page 8). Dr. Salmon has not redeemed his pledge. He has misrepresented the Roman claims very grossly and very frequently, but he has not examined them—indeed, he seems to be incapable of examining them—and his pompous profession of superior knowledge is borne out only by puerile platitudes, which his students could have read for themselves in the leaflets that are scattered broadcast by the Church Mission agents, or could have heard from any ordinary street preacher. When such is the erudition displayed by the University Professor it is not difficult to gauge the knowledge which his students imbibe.

It is safe, however, to say that Rome shall survive such assailants. Here is a specimen of Dr. Salmon's arguments against us, which will be at once recognised as

an old acquaintance by anyone even slightly familiar with Protestant controversial literature—the argument in a circle, the vicious circle. He told his students that we can give no proof of the doctrine of Infallibility ‘without being guilty of the logical fallacy of arguing in a circle’ (page 53). ‘They say the Church is infallible because the Scriptures testify that she is so; and the Scriptures testify this because the Church infallibly declares that such is their meaning’ (page 54). In other words, according to Dr. Salmon, Catholics prove the Church by the Bible, and the Bible by the Church—a vicious circle, ‘a *petitio principii* in the most outrageous form’ (page 59). Now, if one of Dr. Salmon’s students were to ask him how Catholics proved the Church for the first hundred years of her existence, one would be curious to know what answer the Regius Professor would give.

The Church could not then be proved by the Bible, for the Bible was not in existence. The Church existed before the Bible; it was fully established and widely diffused, its claims were recognised, before the Bible, as we have it, came into existence. And, therefore, for that century, the Church was not proved by the Bible. Now, if the Church could be proved without the Bible for the first century of her life, why may not she be equally proved for the second century, and for the third, and for every century up to the present? If there has been an essential change in the mode of proof, will the Doctor say when the change was made, and by what authority. Again, if he were asked why Catholics should not be allowed to draw a logical conclusion from his own doctrine, what would he answer? He admits the Bible to be the inspired Word of God, infallibly true. If, then, the Infallibility of the Church be conclusively proved from the Bible, Dr. Salmon is bound to admit that doctrine, and he cannot take refuge in the allegation of a vicious circle to save himself from the logical consequences of his own teaching. Whether the Catholic proof of the Inspiration of Scripture be logical or illogical, Dr. Salmon holds the doctrine, and he is, therefore, bound to admit all that it certainly contains. If the Bible

prove the Church for Catholics Dr. Salmon is bound to admit it, no matter how Catholics prove the Bible. But there is no need of having recourse to an *argumentum ad hominem* to dispose of Dr. Salmon's fallacy; and if his students had thus questioned him he could give no satisfactory answer. But there was no danger of his being put to the test—no risk of any awkward cross-examination. To Dr. Salmon's students an attack on the Catholic Church was honey, and there was no fear of any scrutiny as to the logic in which the attack was conveyed. The Doctor and his students are in reality in a vicious circle, hemmed in by prejudices and self-interest; they have not the slightest intention of going out of it, and the Professor's concern was to find some flimsy pretext for remaining within that circle. 'Great efforts have,' he says, 'been made by Roman Catholic divines to clear their mode of procedure from the charge of logical fallacy, but in the nature of things such efforts must be hopeless' (page 55). That Dr. Salmon should be ignorant of what Catholic divines say on this matter is quite natural; but surely he ought to know something of what Protestant divines say regarding it. And he will find Palmer, one of his most respectable divines saying, in his treatise on the Church (vol. ii. page 63), that in our argument there is no fallacy at all; and as Palmer's book is dedicated to the Protestant Archbishops of Canterbury and Armagh it may be taken as agreeable to Irish as well as to English Protestants. Mr. Palmer tells the divinity students at Oxford that there is no vicious circle in a process which Dr. Salmon tells the Trinity men is one 'of a most outrageous form.' Can it be that the arguments which the Oxford students would have scouted, are considered quite good enough for the *alumni* of the 'silent sister'? The Doctor says, 'Since this lecture was delivered a Roman Catholic Bishop (Clifford) has attempted . . . to meet the difficulty here raised' (page 55). One would fancy from this that Dr. Salmon was not aware of any answer to the 'difficulty,' before the attempt, attributed to Dr. Clifford.

This shows how little he knows of the subject on which he is lecturing. The alleged 'difficulty' was frequently

answered; long before Dr. Salmon was born it was answered it any ordinary treatise on the Church, and answered, too, just as it is by Dr. Clifford. And Dr. Salmon does not even attempt to meet that answer. He says of Dr. Clifford that 'he brings out the infallibility of the Church as the result of a long line of argument. The doctrine which is wanted for the foundation of the building is with him the coping-stone of the structure' (page 57). Now what is the meaning or use of a good argument except to bring out, as a conclusion, the truth to be proved? If, instead of bringing out that truth, 'as a result of a long line of argument,' Dr. Clifford had laid it down as 'a foundation,' then there would have been room for Dr. Salmon's declamation. But to censure him for proving his doctrine instead of taking it for granted is simple nonsense; and Dr. Salmon must have thought his students fools when he made such a ridiculous statement to them. The answer given by Dr. Clifford to the imaginary difficulty is merely a repetition of what Catholic theologians have frequently said, and it is quite sufficient for its purpose. The New Testament is used as historical evidence to show, as other historical documents also show, that our Lord lived on earth for a time; that He declared Himself to be the Son of God, and justified His declaration by extraordinary signs; that He established a religious society of a certain character, and for a certain end; that He commissioned a certain number of men to continue after His own death the work of the society so established. And this historical fact, established by the New Testament, is confirmed by the writings of early fathers, and by some pagan writers also.

Now, from this fact, thus historically established, we infer that, since Christ was God, and founded a Church for a certain purpose,—to teach truth—and since He sent men to carry out this purpose, He would not have allowed them, in the execution of their work, to depart from the plan which He had laid down. They must continue to teach the truth. In other words, the Divine authority of the Church follows immediately from the fact, historically

established, that a Divine Person founded the Church, with a certain character, and for a definite purpose. Historical evidence of this fact is given by the New Testament as well as by other writings. Now, the value of the New Testament as a historical record is not taken from the Church. Its reliability as a history is calculated in the same way as that of Livy or Tacitus. The Church is proved on the historical authority of the New Testament, but the historical authority of the New Testament is not proved from the Church, and, therefore, there is no vicious circle. But whilst the New Testament has the character of an historical record, it has also the much higher character of an inspired record. The historical character is altogether independent of the inspiration. It neither presupposes nor involves inspiration, and the inspiration, which can only be proved from the Church, is not taken into account at all in proving the Church itself. Therefore there is no trace of a vicious circle in the process of proof. And Dr. Salmon himself seems to feel this, for he does not even attempt to examine the argument. He says: 'But this is not the time to examine the goodness of Bishop Clifford's argument; that will come under discussion at a later stage' (page 57). It would seem to be just the time to examine it when he introduced it. But for reasons that are quite intelligible he deferred the matter, promising that it would 'come under discussion' later on; but he conveniently forgot his promise, and it does not 'come on for discussion.' We hear no more of it in the lectures.

Now, though this is a more than sufficient answer to Dr. Salmon's clumsy quibble, it is not our only one, nor our principal one. The argument of the first century is valid still in favour of the unchanged and unchangeable Church of God. She did not appeal to the New Testament then to prove her authority; she need not appeal to it now. And she would have been all that she is even though a line of it had not been written. *Incessu patuit Dea* is true of her. She bears on her brow the marks of her Divine origin. She exhibits her Divine commission to teach the nations as conspicuously now, and as unmistakably, as she did in the days of the Apostles; and on that ground she

claims to be heard and obeyed. And Dr. Salmon cannot be ignorant of this claim of hers, for he gives it in his Appendix amongst the Acts of the Vatican Council. 'Nay, more, the Church herself, because of her wonderful propagation, her extraordinary sanctity, her inexhaustible richness in all good things, her Catholic unity, and her indomitable strength, supplies a great and unfailing motive of credibility, and an indisputable proof of her Divine mission.' This is the Church's argument in her own words. She is her own argument, her own witness, and she needs no other. From the day of her institution the devil and the world conspired to overthrow her. Not content with crucifying her Founder, the Jews persecuted the Apostles and first Christians, and banished them away, only to carry the knowledge of saving faith to other nations. Persecutions the most cruel known to human history raged against the Church for nearly three centuries, and Christian blood was shed like rain, but it became the seed of Christianity. The heroism of Christian martyrs, the sanctity of their lives, their love even for their enemies, confounded and bewildered the pagan world, and was a standing and convincing argument of the truth and power of the Christian faith. And before that power Paganism fell back defeated, and its expiring cry was that of Julian the Apostate: 'Galilean, thou hast conquered.' The extraordinary spread of the Christian faith in the face of such difficulties, its absolute unity notwithstanding its wide diffusion, its sanctifying influence on the lives of those who embraced it, its victories over all that earth and hell could raise up against it;—this was the argument of the early Church which made even pagans to feel like the magicians before Pharaoh. 'Verily the finger of God is here.'

And this is the great argument of the Church to-day, as Dr. Salmon must know, for he gives it in his book. And where does he find in it any grounds for his ridiculous charge of vicious circle—proving the Church from the Bible, and the Bible from the Church? He knew well that his silly charge is groundless, and hence it is that instead of 'a full and candid examination of the Roman claims,' he gives

his students a ridiculous caricature. He panders to their prejudices, deepens their ignorance instead of removing it, and he sends out his militant theologians to assail us in absolute ignorance of our lines of attack or defence. Here is his version to his theologians of 'the Roman claims' given in an imaginary dialogue between himself and the Pope. "'You must believe everything I say,'" demands the Pope. "Why should we?" we inquire. "Well, perhaps I cannot give you any quite convincing reason; but just try it. If you trust me with doubt or hesitation, I make no promise; but if you really believe everything I say, you will find—that you will believe everything I say'" (page 59). And so this is the outcome of the full and candid examination of the Roman claims; this is Protestant divinity as taught in Trinity College, and by its Regius Professor; this is the theological training of those who are expected to pull down Roman domination in Ireland! The task should be an easy one if their Professor be correct. But time will tell them.

Any one who reads Dr. Salmon's book, will not be surprised at the extravagance of anything he says against Catholics; but no one can cease to be surprised, and amazed, that, even he should exhibit on a serious subject such levity and such folly; should make such ridiculous statements in presence of any body of young men who have come to the age of understanding. If Dr. Salmon would only set before his young men one genuine Papal document—say the *Bull Ineffabilis* of Pius IX., the Encyclical on the Scriptures of Leo XIII., or the chapter *De Justificatione impii* of the Council of Trent—and let them analyze it, they would soon learn to discount their Professor's version of Papal documents, and learn also the nature of the work before them in the 'controversy with Rome' much more accurately than from all the rhetoric of their Professor. Or, if they require mental exercise to prepare them for their assault on us, let them take the argument of the Vatican Council, given above, as the ground of the 'Roman claims.' And that argument has a sequel which is respectfully submitted for Dr. Salmon's consideration. It is this: When the persecuted Church emerged from the catacombs to take possession of the

throne of the Cæsars, she found the world as dangerous a friend as it had been a dangerous and determined enemy. Kings soon began to fight for her treasures; worldliness crept in amongst her children; schismatics sought to rend her asunder, heretics sought to poison the source of her life. But the spirit of her Founder animated her; His strength sustained her; His promise was the guarantee of her triumph. She cast out both heretics and schismatics, branded with her anathema. As she conquered Roman Cæsars, so, too, has she conquered German emperors and French and English kings. She has baffled infidel philosophers and impious statesmen. Of her was it said: 'The hand that will smite her shall perish,' and the saying has been verified in every age of her history. The enemies of her youth have passed away, and of many of them scarcely a trace remains in history. A like fate awaits those who now seek to mar her work. Amid all the changes that time is bringing she alone remains unchanged—the same in truth, in sanctity, and in strength as she was in the days of her Founder, as she has been in the days of her suffering, and as she is certain to be when Antichrist shall come to test her fidelity. What Tertullian said of her in his day is true also in ours:—

She asks no favour, because she is not surprised at her own condition. She knows that she is a pilgrim on earth, that she shall easily find enemies amongst strangers, but as her origin, so, too, her home, her hope, her reward, her dignity, are in heaven. Meanwhile she earnestly desires one thing—that she should not be condemned without being known.¹

And this one reasonable request, Dr. Salmon denies her. He is teaching his students to condemn her without telling them what she is. This is his way of examining the validity of 'the Roman claims.'

Now, as Dr. Salmon knows so much about our shortcomings, it may be well to ask him to set his own house in order. As he has shown, presumably to his own satisfaction, that we are involved in an inextricable labyrinth by our effort to prove Church from Bible, and Bible from Church,

¹ *Apol.*, ci.; n. 2.

it may be time to ask him how he proves either Church or Bible. He has devoted two long lectures to an attack on the Catholic rule of faith, as explained by Dr. Milner. Has he any rule of his own, and is it quite invulnerable? And as it is quite possible that these questions may, some time or other, be put to his theologians, it would have been good strategy on his part, and a most important portion of their training, to have provided them, if possible, with a satisfactory answer. And as to the Church, Dr. Salmon seems to have one, and only one, fixed conviction—that she is fallible. Dislike of Infallibility seems to be his predominant passion. His whole book is designed to justify and to gratify that ruling sentiment of his mind. He seems so anxious to vindicate for himself and for others the liberty to go astray; he is so jealous of that privilege that the idea of Infallibility is intolerable to him, or in fact any assurance in religious truth, above 'that homely kind of certainty which suffices to govern our practical decisions in all the most important affairs of life' (page 73). In fact he seems to have a lurking dislike even of that certainty also, for he says 'that the more people talk of this certainty the less they really have' (page 76). Now, as Dr. Salmon maintains that Infallibility is a doctrine of 'cardinal importance,' one would expect that, as he felt its importance, this Protestant Regius Professor would have made himself acquainted with what other Protestant divines say on the subject; and would have communicated that knowledge to his juvenile theologians. He could hardly be so emphatic in his condemnation of Infallibility if he were aware that a very large number of his brother theologians are equally emphatic in maintaining that doctrine. This is another proof that the Regius Professor knows as little of his own theology (if the expression be allowable) as he does of our theology. Field, an ultra-Protestant, in his book on the Church says, when speaking of the Universal Church:—'So that touching the Church taken in this sense there is no question, but it is absolutely led into all truth without any mixture of ignorance, error, or danger of being deceived.'¹

¹ Book iv. c. 2.

Bramhall says :—‘She (the Catholic Church) cannot err universally in anything that is necessary to salvation nor with obstinacy,’¹ and he repeats this at page 334 of the same volume. Bishop Bull in the preface to his *Defence of the Nicene Creed*, in speaking of our Lord’s Divinity, says :—

If in this question of the greatest importance we admit that all the rulers of the Church fell into error, and persuaded the Christians to accept that error, how shall we be sure of the fidelity of our Lord to His promise, that He would be with the Apostles, and, therefore, with their successors even to the end of the world. For since the promise extends to the end of the world, and the Apostles were not to live so long, Christ must have addressed, in the persons of His Apostles, their successors, who were to fill that office (s. 2).

Tillotson holds this doctrine in his forty-ninth sermon. Even Chillingworth, in his Conference with Lewgar, is prepared to admit it. Palmer says of the decision of the Universal Church : ‘I maintain that such a judgment is irrevocable, irreformable, never to be altered.’² And he adds : ‘I believe that scarcely any Christian writer can be found who has ventured actually to maintain that the judgment of the Universal Church, freely and deliberately given, . . . might in fact be heretical and contrary to the Gospel’ (page 93). Dr. Salmon had not written then, but the statement is rather severe on him. Now these are all standard Protestant theologians, and Dr. Salmon might be expected to know what they hold on a question of such importance. But it must be said for him that he is more true to the spirit of Protestantism than they are. They maintain the infallibility of an imaginary Church—a doctrine which can never be tested—whilst Dr. Salmon maintains the fallibility of all Churches, as becomes the loyal son of a Church which proclaims, and has repeatedly and most conclusively proved, her own fallibility. Dr. Salmon has, in fact, placed his own orthodoxy as a Protestant above all suspicion by insisting so strongly on this cardinal doctrine of his Church—her own fallibility. There is just one thing remaining for him to do, in order to convince the most sceptical of the sincerity of his

¹ Works, vol. ii., p. 82.

² Church, vol. ii., p. 86.

belief in this fundamental article of his Church—that is, to abandon her. Let him leave her and no one can question his belief in her fallibility. The Doctor has probably subscribed to the Articles, and the 20th Article declares 'the Church hath . . . : authority in controversies of faith, yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's written word . . . so besides the same ought it not to enforce anything to be believed for necessity of salvation.' Now, though this Article opens with a declaration of Church authority, it proceeds at once to limit that authority, or rather more correctly to eliminate it altogether. The language clearly admits it as possible, that the Church may decree something not found in Scripture, and may enforce that as necessary to salvation. Since then the case is possible, and since, moreover, the 6th Article distinctly recognises the right of the individual to oppose such dictation, to refuse submission to it, who is to decide when the case occurs?

As the authority of the Church is limited there must be some tribunal to decide whether she has gone beyond her proper sphere, and, if so, how far. If the God-given right of the individual be invaded, there must be some tribunal to which he can appeal to protect his right of private judgment. Dr. Harold Brown in his book on the Thirty-nine Articles gives a very long and elaborate proof of Church authority. In fact he goes to the full extent of Infallibility, for he says: 'Now if the Church has no power to determine what is true and what is false, such authority would be a dead letter, and the Apostle's injunction would be in vain' (page 477). He admits, however, later on, that her authority is not supreme, and he compares it to that of a judge in a law court (page 478). But in the case of the judge there remains a court of final appeal:—the king can do no wrong. But what is the appeal in the case of a conflict between the individual and the Church? It cannot be the Scripture, for that is dumb; and the controversy is about its meaning. At page 480 he gives, with approval, a quotation from Archbishop Sharp, which is a complete surrender of Church authority. The substance of it is, that the individual is advised to submit for decorum sake. 'He ought to submit.

Yes, certainly, if the Church have real authority; but certainly not, if her authority be the phantom laid down in the 20th Article. Mr. Palmer, in his treatise on the Church (vol. ii., page 72, 3rd ed.), maintains from a somewhat High Church point of view, that the Church is 'divinely authorised to judge in questions of religious controversy, that is to determine whether a disputed doctrine is or is not a part of revelation.' And his very first argument for this authority is certainly an amusing one. 'It is admitted,' he says, 'by all the opponents of Church authority who believe in revelation, that individual Christians are authorised by God to judge what are the doctrines of the Gospel. Therefore, as a necessary consequence, many or all Christians, *i.e.*, the Church collectively, must have the same right' (page 72).

Now, if the Church have the right of judging as well as the individual, the individual has it as well as the Church, and neither can be deprived of it by the other, since by the supposition both have it equally from God. Therefore there is a standstill—a theological deadlock. The Low Church theory is a bad one; the High Church is much worse. But it will be seen that Dr. Salmon explains the 20th Article in such a way as to relieve it of all inconvenient assumption of authority, and to remove completely from the minds of his militant theologians the nightmare of Church dictation. He adopts the formula of Dr. Hawkins: 'The Church to teach, the Bible to prove.' After a dissertation on the way in which secular knowledge is acquired, taken, too, almost verbatim, and, of course, without acknowledgment, from Dr. Whately, he says:—

There need be no difficulty in coming to an agreement that the divinely-appointed methods for man's acquirement of secular and of religious knowledge are not so very dissimilar. . . . We do not imagine that God meant each man to learn his religion from the Bible without getting help from anybody else. We freely confess that we need not only the Bible, but human instruction in it. . . . In the institution of His Church Christ has provided for the instruction of those who, either from youth or lack of time, or of knowledge, might be unable or unlikely to study His Word for themselves. (Page 113.)

This clearly implies that those who have time, and are learned, and able to study for themselves, like Dr. Salmon, can dispense with the Church. This is so far well. Dr. Salmon then proceeds to notice some difficulties raised by Catholics against his theory, and he repeats that God has anticipated this by the

Institution of His Church, whose special duty it is to preserve His truth and proclaim it to the world. I need scarcely say how well this duty has been performed. . . . Ever since the Church was founded the work she has done in upholding the truth has been such that the world's 'pillar and ground of truth' are not too strong to express the services she has rendered. (Page 114.)

It is certainly a high tribute to the judgment of St. Paul, who applied these words to the Church, to say that they 'are not too strong.' But Dr. Salmon's panegyric on the services done by the Church comes to a rather awkward climax. He says:—

When every concession to the authority of the Church and to the services she has rendered has been made, we come very far short of teaching her infallibility. A town-clock is of excellent use in publicly making known with authority the correct time—making it known to many who, perhaps at no time, and certainly not at all times, would find it convenient, or even possible, to verify its correctness for themselves. And yet it is clear that one who maintained the great desirability of having such a clock, and believed it to be of great use in the neighbourhood, would not be in the least inconsistent if he also maintained that it was possible for the clock to go astray, and if on that account he inculcated the necessity of frequently comparing it with and regulating it by the dial which receives its light from heaven. And if we desired to remove an error which had accumulated during a long season of neglect, it would be very unfair to represent us as wishing to silence the clock, or else as wishing to allow any townsman to get up and push the hands back or forward as he pleased. (Pages 115, 116.)

And so this is the character of the Church's services after all! And for these she deserves to be called the pillar and the ground of truth! And after our Lord's promise to be with her 'all days even to the consummation of the world,' to send her the spirit of truth, to teach all things, and to

abide with her for ever, after all the promises of supernatural gifts and endowments, and guidance and protection, and in the face of her extraordinary history, she is just as useful, just as infallible as a town-clock—neither more nor less, according to the Regius Professor of Trinity! What an exalted idea of the Church's work and office his students must have carried away from his lectures! How they must have felt that she is worth fighting for! How they must have felt that their professor was the one man duly qualified to care this town-clock Church, 'to get up and push the hands back or forward as he pleased.' Really the words 'pillar and ground of truth' are not too strong to be applied to Dr. Salmon himself. He is indeed a theologian of rare endowments, and of extensive knowledge—a genuine offspring of town-clock infallibility! And with a monopoly of that infallibility, he, of course, denounces any other, and regards us as in a state of intellectual paralysis, owing to our belief in the Infallibility of God's Church. 'We can see,' he says, 'what a benumbing effect the doctrine of Infallibility has on the intellects of Roman Catholics, by the absence at present of religious disputes in their Communion' (page 106). This is one of Dr. Salmon's most sapient observations, and it must have carried conviction to his students. We are not fighting about our articles of faith, owing to our belief in the Infallibility of the Church. Therefore we ought to renounce that belief in order to enjoy the privilege of fighting, and thus to have ourselves 'braced and strengthened for the conflict.' As Dr. Salmon's students probably agree in nothing except in their hatred of the Catholic Church, they enjoy the privilege of fighting to their heart's content, and must, therefore, be well 'braced and strengthened for the conflict' with us. When, however, that conflict comes, they shall find it no sham-battle, they shall find town-clock infallibility a very poor protection then.

Now, one would fancy that after Dr. Salmon's very accurate and striking analysis of Church authority, his students would have been satisfied that their Church could not impose on them any very trying doctrinal burthens; but

in order, if possible, to comfort them still more, he sums up her teaching authority as follows :—

In sum then I maintain that it is the office of the Church to teach ; but that it is her duty to do so, not by making assertion merely, but by offering proof, and again, that while it is the duty of the individual Christian to receive with deference the teaching of the Church, it is his duty also not listlessly to acquiesce in her statements, but to satisfy himself of the validity of her proofs. (Page 116.)

Whatever, therefore, the Articles say about Church authority in controversies of faith, Dr. Salmon holds that the individual is the supreme judge. The Church is to teach, 'not by making assertions, but by offering proof,' and the individual is to satisfy himself, that is to judge for himself, the validity of her proofs. He ought, no doubt, 'to receive with deference the teaching of the Church'—this is only common politeness—but he himself is to judge the validity of the proofs, and consequently the truth or falsehood of the doctrine grounded on the proofs. 'Our Church,' he says, 'accepts the obligation to give proof of her assertions, and she declares that Scripture is the source whence she draws her proofs' (page 127), and she accepts also the obligation of having the validity of her proofs tested and judged by the 'individual Christian.' The individual, therefore, teaches the Church instead of the Church teaching him ; he corrects her errors, he is the supreme judge in controversies of faith, and so unnecessary, so useless is the Church in Dr. Salmon's theory, that even the parallel with the town-clock is complimentary to her. Such, then, is the Church according to Dr. Salmon's theology.

Now, what is his estimate of the Bible ? What is its place and its value in his teaching ? According to the 6th and 20th Articles combined the Scriptures contain all that is necessary to be believed, and the Church is limited, both for doctrine and proof, to the Scripture. 'The Church to teach, the Bible to prove,' is Dr. Salmon's own favourite formula. Now, since the Church must take her teaching and her proofs from the Bible, and from it alone, and since

according to Dr. Salmon the 'individual Christian' is the supreme judge of proof, and consequently of the doctrine to be accepted or rejected, it follows that the Bible, and the Bible only, and that too interpreted by each 'individual Christian' for himself, is the sum total of Dr. Salmon's theology: his rule of faith. And the sum of his teaching is, that if his young controversialists go out equipped with this, the fortress of Roman Infallibility in Ireland must surrender soon. He notices some difficulties raised by Catholics against his rule, such as the want of Bibles in the early Church, the difficulty of circulating them before the invention of printing, the number of person unable to read or to understand the Bible; but he maintains that these difficulties do not affect the Protestant position by any means, because God has anticipated them by the institution of His Church as a Teacher; and because, moreover, 'We do not imagine,' he says, 'that God meant each man to learn his religion from the Bible without getting help from anybody else' (page 113). Now here is a complete abandonment of the Doctor's position. By his very striking and appropriate parallel with the town-clock, he has disposed of the Church as an authority, and in maintaining that it is the duty of the 'individual Christian' to sit in judgment on the Church, and to verify for himself her proofs and her teaching, he has completely shut out every other 'individual Christian' from any right of interfering in the process of verification. If it be the right and duty of the individual, as Dr. Salmon says it is, to sit in judgment on the teaching of the Church, which comprises a multitude of individuals, it must be still more his right and his duty to sit in judgment on any individual of the multitude, who may undertake to enlighten him. And if it be his duty, as it clearly is, to verify the teaching of the individual as well as of the Church, then he no more needs the individual than he needs the Church. And thus Dr. Salmon is brought back to his own theory, stripped of all its adjuncts—the Bible, and the Bible only, and that, too, interpreted by each one for himself.

Dr. Salmon has a special lecture on the Rule of Faith, and after some preliminary remarks irrelevant to the subject,

he says : ' However, I have thought it the simplest plan to avoid all cavil as to the use of the phrase, " rule of faith," and merely to state the question of fact we have got to determine : Is there besides the Scripture any trustworthy source of information as to the teaching of our Lord and His Apostles ? ' (page 140). This innocent man is so anxious ' to avoid all cavil,' and to be brief and plain ; and hence he begins by laying it down as an indisputable fact that Scripture is an authority. Besides his desire ' to avoid cavil,' perhaps he may be anxious also to avoid the awkward question : How does he know what Scripture is, and what on his principles is the character of its authority ? For him, however, there is no evading these questions, though his anxiety to evade them is quite intelligible. And, moreover, he has not stated at all ' the question of fact we have got to determine,' for we need an interpreter of Tradition quite as much as of Scripture, and hence the real vital question of fact is : Is there any divinely-appointed guide to tell us with a certainty sufficient for faith what Scripture and Tradition contain ? That guide, according to Dr. Salmon, is the Bible alone, interpreted by each individual for himself. This is the sum of his theology. ' The Church to teach, the Bible to prove,' and the individual to satisfy himself of the validity of the proofs ; that is, the individual is to see for himself whether the Church's teaching is really contained in the Bible to which she appeals. The individual, therefore, is supreme, and this is the fatal crux for the town-clock Church. And here again Dr. Salmon seems to be quite unconscious of the fact that a number of Protestant divines of high standing emphatically and explicitly reject and condemn his teaching. Mr. Palmer, already quoted, says of it :—

The divisions of modern sects afford a strong argument for the necessity of submission to the judgment of the universal Church : for surely it is impossible that Christ could have designed His disciples to break into a hundred different sects, contending with each other on every doctrine of religion. It is impossible, I say, that this system of endless division can be Christian. It cannot but be the result of some deep-rooted, some universal error, some radically false principle which is common to all these sects. And

what principle do they hold in common except the right of each individual to oppose his judgment to that of all the Church. This principle, then, must be utterly false and unfounded.¹

The whole body of High Church theologians reject Dr. Salmon's teaching, and to the Ritualists it is simply an abomination. There is another school of Protestant divines, numerous and aggressive, who agree with Dr. Salmon in rejecting the infallibility of every Church, but who, with characteristic modesty, claim what is tantamount to personal infallibility for each of themselves. They hold that when they come in sincerity to search the Scripture, and when they pray for light and guidance, they are assisted by the Holy Spirit in their search for truth, and are enabled infallibly to find it. Indeed Dr. Salmon himself seem to lean towards this view, for he speaks of texts of Scripture (though he does not quote them) 'which give us,' he says, 'reason to believe that he who studies it in prayer, for the Holy Spirit's guidance, will find in its pages all things necessary for his salvation' (page 132). In this view each one is his own Pope. Dean Farrar says: 'The Bible is amply sufficient for our instruction in all those truths which are necessary to salvation. . . . The lessons contained in Scripture, with the co-ordinate help of the Spirit by whom its writers were moved to aid us in this discrimination, are an infallible guide to us in things necessary.'²

That all these conflicting views on so vital a matter are freely maintained by Protestant divines, is conclusive proof of the comprehensive character of their Church. And Dr. Salmon, if he knew them, should have set them before his young controversialists that they may the better appreciate the privileges of Protestantism, and feel comforted by the conviction that in attacking Catholic doctrines they were not to be encumbered by any definite convictions of their own. Now, all those whose views have been quoted subscribe to the Article which declares that 'the Church hath authority in controversies of faith,' and they show their respect for that authority by sitting in judgment

¹ *Church*, vol. ii., p. 85.

² *The Bible : its Meaning and Supremacy*, p. 13.

on the Church, and declining to accept her teaching till they shall have satisfied themselves as to its Scriptural character. The Low Church Protestant claims the right to sit in judgment on Church and Bible both; the High Churchman sits in judgment on Church and Bible, Fathers and Councils. Either claim is a rather liberal assumption of authority, especially having regard to the grounds on which the claim is made. The votaries of private judgment, who claim the guidance of the Holy Ghost in their search for truth, stand, if their claim be well founded, on much higher ground.

But then one's confidence in their claim is rudely shattered by the notorious fact that under the alleged guidance they arrive at contradictory conclusions on the most vital doctrines of Christianity. The Catholic Church claims to be guided by the Holy Spirit in her teaching, and it is at least a circumstance in her favour that she has never contradicted herself—never yet unsaid anything she once taught; but the Protestants who claim the same guidance are eternally contradicting one another, changing their creeds almost as often as they change their clothes. Dr. Salmon, too, accepts the 20th Article, but from his own words it is clear that the teaching authority of the Church is not high in his estimation. As already stated, the Bible, and the Bible only, and that, too, interpreted by each one for himself, is Dr. Salmon's sole and sufficient rule of faith. Now, it must be that he feels this rule itself is not to be found in Scripture, when he appeals to Tradition to prove it. Let us test the value of his proof. 'There is,' he says, 'a clear and full Tradition to prove that the Scriptures are a full and perfect rule of faith, and that what is outside of them need not be regarded. To go into details of the proof would scarcely be suitable to a *viva voce* lecture . . . I will, therefore, refer you to the second part of Taylor's *Dissuasive*,' etc. (page 143). Now, thus to evade the proof of a statement so much disputed, so vehemently denied, is not fair to his young controversialists; it leaves a serious defect in their training. But even though Dr. Salmon's assertion were as true as it is untrue, all the difficulties of his

position remain in full force. Whether the Bible contains the whole word of God, or only part of it, the whole difficulty of the interpretation remains. How can an ordinary Protestant, or even an extraordinary one like Dr. Salmon, find in that Bible, by his own private judgment, and with a certainty sufficient for faith, the full body of doctrine which he is bound to know and to believe? How can he establish the divine authority, the inspiration of Scripture? Is he quite certain that God has not established an interpreter of His word which men are bound, on very serious penalties, to hear and to obey? All these difficulties, and many more, remain in full force, whether the Scriptures contain all or only part of God's revelation. And Dr. Salmon has not met them, and on his principle he cannot meet them. Instead of giving a proof of his assertion, Dr. Salmon says :

I merely give you as a sample, the following from St. Basil :— ' Without doubt it is a most manifest fall from faith and a most certain sign of pride to introduce anything that is not written in the Scriptures, . . . and to detract from Scripture, or to add anything to the faith that is not there, is most manifestly forbidden by the Apostle, saying : Yet he had a man's testament ; no man added thereto.' (Page 143.)

He gives, later on, a quotation from St. Cyprian. He quotes these two fathers, 'an Eastern and a Western witness,' to show that there is a clear tradition that the Scriptures are a full and perfect rule of faith, and that they contain the whole word of God. Now, in speaking of the fathers, Dr. Salmon says : 'I suppose there is not one of them to whose opinion on all points we should like to pledge ourselves' (page 124) ; and again : 'Not one of the fathers is recognised as singly a trustworthy guide' (page 131) ; and again : 'Such a list [of fathers], imposing as it may appear to the unlearned, is only glanced at with contempt by one who understands the subject' (page 402). Now, when Dr. Salmon speaks in such a manner of the authority of fathers, individually and collectively, how can he rely on two of them as establishing a tradition against Catholic doctrine? Surely, if he feels at liberty to 'glance with contempt' at a whole 'list' of fathers, he cannot expect

us to bow unhesitatingly to the alleged authority of two of the number. And, even though St. Basil and St. Cyprian had said what Dr. Salmon attributes to them, his rule of faith would receive no strength from their statements. For there is still the difficulty of finding out the full profession of faith out of Scripture, even though it were a full, complete record of God's Word. The vital question is: 'Is there a divinely-commissioned interpreter of God's Word wherever that Word is contained?' and the quotations from St. Basil and St. Cyprian leave the question untouched. But the saints named do not maintain it at all; they explicitly contradict the doctrine attributed to them by Dr. Salmon. St. Basil is quoted as teaching that the 'Scriptures are a full and perfect rule of faith . . . and that what is outside of them need not be regarded.' Now, compare this statement with St. Basil's own words. In his book, *De Spiritu Sancto*, c. 27, he says:—

Of the truths and ordinances that are preached in the Church, there are some which we have handed down to us in written doctrine, and some also which we have from the tradition of the Apostles . . . and both contribute equally to piety, neither does anyone contradict these [Traditions] who has even the slightest knowledge of the Church's claims.

The language of the Council of Trent accepting Scripture and Tradition with equal veneration (*pari pietatis affectu*) is almost a transcript of St. Basil's words 'parem vim habent ad pietatem.' St. Basil then gives several instances of the influence of Tradition on the faith and discipline of the Church, and concludes thus: 'The day would fail me if I were to recount the unwritten mysteries of the Church. I pass by others. The very confession of faith in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, from what written documents have we it?'

Again in chapter 29, *De Spiritu Sancto*, in answer to an objection that his way of saying the Doxology ('cum spiritu') was not to be found in Scripture, he says:—

If nothing else has been received without Scripture authority, let not this either be received, but if we have already received many mysteries without Scripture testimony, let us receive this also

with the rest. For I hold it an apostolic precept to hold to unwritten traditions. . . . If I should stand before a tribunal bereft of proof from the written law, and if I should produce before you many witnesses of any innocence, would I not obtain from you a verdict of acquittal. . . . For the ancient dogmas are to be venerated, since from their antiquity, their grey old age, they have a claim to veneration.

It would be impossible for St. Basil to use clearer or stronger language than this in repudiating the teaching attributed to him by Dr. Salmon. St. Basil does not believe that 'the Scriptures are a full and perfect rule of faith, and that they contain all God's Word,' for he asserts that we believe mysteries that are not in Scripture—that have come to us by Tradition; and he holds that Tradition has as much influence as Scripture in guiding us in God's service—*parem vim habent ad pietatem*. And he pays a very poor compliment to men like Dr. Salmon who deny this teaching; they have not, he says, the merest knowledge of the Church's claims. But then, what is to be said of the text quoted by Dr. Salmon? This is to be said of it—that he neither quotes it fairly, nor translates it correctly. It is taken from St. Basil's letter, or sermon, *De Vera Fide*, which appears to have been written at the request of some persons (probably some of his monks), who asked him for a plain statement of some most important doctrines. After some hesitation he consents to give a plain simple statement of what he found in Scripture. He tells them that on other occasions, when defending the faith against heretics, he has gone outside Scripture for arguments as the occasion required. 'But this time,' he says, 'I think I shall be acting more in accordance with your express wish, and with my own, if I do in simplicity what your Christian charity has imposed on me, and say what I myself have got from the Sacred Scriptures.' This leads on to the passage which Dr. Salmon has so cleverly manipulated. Again St. Basil repeats his resolution to confine himself to Scripture, and he gives his reason as before stated—that he is giving a simple instruction to those who believe. He then gives a profession of faith, substantially the same as the Nicene Creed, and he concludes by saying that he has written this in accordance

with their wish, and as a reply also to some calumnies that embittered the closing years of his life. Because of his kindness and charity to some men of questionable orthodoxy, he himself was suspected of heresies which his soul abhorred. He was friendly with men who perverted the Scriptures, and rejected vital doctrines of Christianity, and his enemies represented him as sharing in the errors of his friends, and hence this allusion to his calumniators with which this short treatise concludes. Now, bearing in mind that St. Basil had promised to confine himself to Scripture in this treatise *De Fide*, and moreover that he was himself suspected (unjustly) of want of respect for Scripture, and for vital doctrines contained in it, we can easily understand his language in the passage to which Dr. Salmon refers. Dr. Salmon's translation has been already given (page 414), and as it is given within inverted commas, he puts it forward as correct. It is however incorrect, and grossly misleading. The correct translation is: 'It is a plain fall from the faith, and a clear mark of pride, either to set aside what is written, or to bring in what is not written. Since our Lord said My sheep hear My voice, etc., . . . and since the Apostle taking an example from human things most strictly forbids to add to, or take from, the inspired Scriptures.' In the first part of the quotation the thing condemned is, either to set aside what is written, or to introduce what is not written; and as St. Basil wrote good Greek, it is significant that he uses for 'bringing in' the word *ἐκιστάγειν*, to bring in upon or beside. And from the example given by Liddell and Scott it is clear that the thing brought in assumes the position, the character, of the thing that it supersedes. The meaning, therefore, is that it is a fall from faith, either to reject real Scripture or to introduce as Scripture something that is not Scripture. And St. Basil makes this quite clear in the second part of the quotation, where the Apostle is quoted as forbidding 'to add to or take from the Scripture.' He is therefore condemning the perversion or corruption of Scripture itself, and this is confirmed by his proof from Galatians iii., 15 and 16, where the argument depends on the correctness of one

written word—where a mere change from singular to plural number would vitiate the argument of St. Paul. Thus, then, in the first part of the quotation, the perversion of Scripture is condemned on the authority of our Lord, and in the second part it is condemned on St. Paul's authority. But Dr. Salmon has recourse to his usual tactics in order to find an argument in St. Basil's text for the all-sufficiency of Scripture. He omitted some of what St. Basil said, and introduced what St. Basil did not say, and moreover he omits all reference to the context. In the early part of the quotation he omits the phrase 'to set aside the things that are written,' and thus conceals the contrast between rejecting and introducing. His students are thus unable to see that both the rejection and the introduction referred to Scripture, and they are told that the thing condemned is not the introduction of spurious Scripture but of any tradition.

Again, in the second part of the quotation Dr. Salmon says, 'To detract from Scripture, or to add anything to the faith that is not there, is most manifestly condemned,' etc. Here Dr. Salmon introduces the words, 'or to add *anything to the faith that is not there.*' These are Dr. Salmon's own words introduced for a purpose. They are not St. Basil's, and they have no foundation in his text. The text is: 'To add to or take from the inspired Scripture is forbidden,' etc. There is no question of 'faith,' it is a question of the text itself of Scripture; and Dr. Salmon perverts St. Basil's text in order to bring from it a doctrine which the saint most emphatically rejects and condemns. St. Basil does not say that Scripture contains all God's Word. He maintains that God's Word is contained in Tradition as well as in Scripture, and that both have an equal influence on our spiritual lives. We take our faith from Scripture and Tradition alike, says St. Basil himself; and, therefore, says Dr. Salmon, it is, according to St. Basil, 'a manifest fall from faith' to take any truths of our faith from Tradition at all! No wonder the young Trinity men are profound theologians! But Dr. Salmon finds even more aid from St. Basil. He quotes the saint—and, strange to say, the quotation this time is substantially correct—as saying: 'Those

who are instructed in the Scriptures ought to test the things that are said by their teachers, to receive what agrees with Scripture, and reject what disagrees' (page 143). Certainly those who are so instructed should follow St. Basil's advice. For what have they superior knowledge if not to make use of it? But what are those to do who are not so well instructed in Scripture? What provision does Dr. Salmon make for these? He might as well have appealed to the Polar Star as to St. Basil for evidence of the 'Bible, and the Bible only.' So much for his 'Eastern witness.'

And now let us see what his 'Western witness' does for his theory. 'For a Western witness,' he says, 'I cannot take a better than St. Cyprian, because as his controversy was with the Bishop of Rome, the quotation will also serve to show how little the supremacy or infallibility of the Roman See was acknowledged in the third century' (page 144). How far the alleged action of St. Cyprian can be regarded as an objection to the primacy of the Pope, will be considered later on, but it is only one of Dr. Salmon's peculiar logical acumen that can see in it an argument against Papal Infallibility. And the argument is this: In the controversy of St. Cyprian with Pope Stephen, the Pope was right, and St. Cyprian was wrong. Therefore the Pope is fallible, concludes Dr. Salmon! Dr. Salmon admits the first proposition. How then can he hold that the defence of true doctrines by the Pope is an argument against his infallibility? If the defence of true doctrine be an argument of the fallibility of the defender, then the promulgation of false doctrine must be an argument of infallibility, and Dr. Salmon's own Church will be one of the most infallible Churches in existence. This is what his logic leads him to. 'The question is not who was right in that particular dispute,' Dr. Salmon says, 'but what were the principles on which the Fathers of the Church then argued' (page 74). Dr. Salmon quotes at length the seventy-fourth of St. Cyprian's letters to show what these 'principles' were. And he concludes: 'Plainly St. Cyprian here maintains that the way to find out what traditions are genuine

is . . . to search the Scriptures as the only trustworthy record of Apostolic tradition' (page 145). Now, no Catholic theologian is much concerned to defend St. Cyprian. He was a very able man, zealous, austere, and holy, but if the history of this controversy and his letters be genuine, he was clearly very obstinate and vehement in his temper, and he used very uncharitable language of his opponents. On the main question, which he seems to have regarded as a matter of discipline, in which each particular Church should be permitted to retain its own customs, he was in error, but he nobly redeemed his conduct by his martyrdom. Dr. Salmon's quotation from St. Cyprian's letter is substantially correct, but even as he gives it, it excludes his inference. The quotation shows that St. Cyprian condemned the tradition alleged by Pope Stephen, not alone on the ground that it was not contained in Scripture, but on the additional ground that it was opposed to Scripture—condemned by Scripture—and he argues at considerable length to justify this assertion. St. Cyprian then, instead of maintaining the views attributed to him by Dr. Salmon, states that if the tradition alleged by the Pope were contained in Scripture, he would of course accept; but since he finds that it is not only not contained in Scripture, but distinctly and repeatedly condemned and reprobated in Scripture, therefore he rejects and condemns it. To reject a doctrine which Scripture condemns is a very different thing from rejecting it because of the silence of Scripture. The former is what St. Cyprian does, and hence it is, that his action affords no support to Dr. Salmon's theory of the all sufficiency of Scripture. And thus his Western witness like his Eastern witness is a failure. But before Dr. Salmon set his conclusions from this controversy before his students, he should have informed them that a great many learned men have regarded this whole controversy as spurious, and the documents bearing on it as simple forgeries, and the reasons for this view are by no means trivial. No matter what the Doctor's personal opinion may be on the controversy, it is not fair to his students to keep them ignorant of what learned men have said on the very subject on which he

was lecturing. The quotations from the other fathers—St. Jerome St. Chrysostom, and St. Athanasius—have been already discussed. They are misquotations every one of them. Instead of studying the authorities he quoted, he consulted Taylor's *Dissuasive*, and advised his students to do in like manner. This system did well as long as Dr. Salmon was lecturing his sympathetic audience; but when he took the public into his confidence by the publication of his lectures, he showed great imprudence, and he must take the penalty. There is no relying on his quotations, and his controversial tactics are the worst of the bad. At all events, should he again take to lecturing on theology, his students should exact from him a solemn and rigorous pledge on no account to rely on Taylor's *Dissuasive*.

And now, even though the fathers, quoted by Dr. Salmon, had held what he erroneously attributes to them, the difficulties of his rule of faith remain—whether the Word of God be wholly or partly in the Bible, the vital question is what does that Word mean. It cannot be a reliable rule unless we have its real meaning—the meaning intended by God Himself. How is Dr. Salmon to determine that? And for him there is a 'previous question' to be settled. As the Bible is his sole authority he has first to show that it is an authority at all. How does he, on his principles, show that it is the Word of God, divinely inspired? He is not pleased with us Catholics for putting this awkward question, and for having done so he charges us with denying the authority of Scripture ourselves. 'I own,' he says, 'it is with a very bad grace they here assume the attitude of unbelievers' (page 83). But the Doctor must recollect that there is a great difference between denying a doctrine and not permitting him to take it for granted. Then how does he prove it? Dr. Salmon has one class of proof for all such doctrines: 'That Jesus Christ lived more than eighteen centuries ago; that he died, rose again, and taught such and such doctrines, are things proved by the same kind of argument as that by which we know that Augustus was Emperor of Rome, and that there is such a country as China' (page 63). Now, we

know 'that Augustus was Emperor of Rome,' etc., on human testimony, and such testimony necessarily resolves itself ultimately into that of eye-witnesses. We believe in the existence of Augustus because we can trace back the tradition of his existence until we reach reliable witnesses who saw him, and who stated that they saw him, and we find the chain of evidence sound all along the line. Here is a sensible, external fact coming directly under the cognizance of eye-witnesses. Inspiration is a very different kind of fact. It is internal and supernatural, known only to God, and, perhaps, to the inspired person. Dr. Salmon's historical proof, then, in order to be valid, must reach up in an unbroken chain either to God Himself, directly or indirectly informing him, or to the inspired writer testifying to the fact of Inspiration. Now this testimony is not contained in the Bible; the writers do not tell us that they were inspired. The texts usually quoted by Protestants fall altogether short of the requirements of the case; and the text of II. Tim. iii. 16, hitherto quoted as conclusive, is now abandoned in the Revised New Testament, and by all Protestant Biblical scholars of any authority. In order, therefore, to complete his historical proof of Inspiration, Dr. Salmon must go outside the Bible. But to go outside the Bible is to abandon his own principles, and to appeal to Tradition, and thus to surrender himself to a guide which may lead him astray, unless there be a competent reliable authority to distinguish true from false Traditions. The early fathers held the Inspiration of Scripture, as Dr. Salmon himself maintains, but where did they get that doctrine? Not in the Bible, for it was not there. It must have come down to them then by Tradition from the Apostles, and they accepted Tradition as a reliable source or channel of doctrine. But then the fathers were Catholics, and Dr. Salmon is too good a Protestant to follow their example. That the Bible is the inspired Word of God is with him a fundamental article, if any article be such; and he cannot accept such an article unless it be contained in Scripture, and unless, moreover, he can satisfy himself that it is contained there. It is not contained in Scripture nor

provable from it alone. And, therefore, on his own principles he is bound to abandon that doctrine. But if he be determined to maintain the doctrine, since the Bible fails him at the critical point, he has no alternative but one, which presupposes Tradition as a reliable channel of doctrine, and the Infallibility of the Church as a guardian and interpreter of Tradition; and both truths Dr. Salmon vehemently denies. If he adheres to his rule, the Bible, and the Bible only, he must abandon the Inspiration; if he desires to maintain Inspiration, he must abandon his rule. What, then, is he to do? How is he to get out of his difficulty? Only by abandoning the principle that has led him into it. He can never get out of it as long as he remains a Protestant. In one of his heroic moments, when there was no one to question or to contradict him, Dr. Salmon said: 'I think it much better, then, instead of running away from the ghost of Tradition which Roman Catholic controversialists dress up to frighten us with, to walk up to it and pull it to pieces when it is found to be a mere bogey' (page 133). Very good and very brave, too! Now is the Doctor's time to immortalize himself, but it may be prudent for him to reflect that if he succeed the fate of Samson awaits him—he himself and his whole theological system will be buried in the ruins.

But Dr. Salmon has to meet a difficulty, perhaps even more perplexing than the fact of Inspiration, that is—how far Inspiration extends. And this question is every day becoming more and more difficult for him. As long as the Bible was regarded as inspired throughout, and thus outside the range of criticism, Dr. Salmon's difficulty was limited to its interpretation. But he has now, first of all, to determine what precisely he is to interpret, for Protestants generally have, at the bidding of the 'higher criticism,' abandoned their old theory of Plenary Inspiration. All parties, in what is supposed to be Dr. Salmon's Church, admit now—proclaim, in fact—that in the Bible, side by side with God's Word, there is much also that is not His Word. Professor Stewart, writing on Inspiration in Hasting's *Bible Dictionary*, after a review of the various theories on

the subject, concludes, 'that the determination of its nature, degrees, and limits must be the result of an induction from all the available facts.' And certainly the process of criticism of 'the available facts' has gone on almost with a vengeance. Let anyone glance even at the catalogue of the 'Foreign Theological Library' of Messrs. Clarke, of Edinburgh, and he shall see at once the process of dilution that is going on in what is called Protestant theology. And there is no need of importing from Germany startling theories on the Inspiration of Scripture. We have them at home. A key-note is supplied by Dr. Percevall, Bishop of Hereford, in his introduction to a volume of essays by various Protestant divines, and called *Church and Faith*. At page viii., 'Their desire is,' he says, 'to set forth the truths of the Gospel and the history and principles of our Church, as they have come to be read, and must in future be read, in the light of modern knowledge, and by those methods of dispassionate study which are now accepted as the only sure and safe guides, whether in history or in theology, or in any other branch of learning.' Canon Gore, in *Lux Mundi*, writes on Inspiration from a somewhat High Church standpoint; but he is just as liberal as Low Church writers, and more illogical than they are. Dean Farrar, in his *Bible: its Meaning and Supremacy*, gives a definition of Inspiration not remarkably lucid. He says: 'It is an indeterminate symbol used by different men in different senses which none of them will define' (page 117). But the definition is not of much importance in the Dean's theology, for he says, 'the Bible, as a whole, may be spoken of as the Word of God, because it contains words and messages of God to the human soul; but it is not in its whole extent and throughout identical with the Word of God' (page 131). 'And though a stricter theory may seem to be implied in the looser rhetoric of the fathers . . . it is in fact—an error of yesterday'! And he quotes, with approbation, Mr. Ruskin as saying: 'It is a grave heresy (or wilful source of division) to call any book, or collection of books, the Word of God.' And Dean Farrar maintains that his theory of Inspiration is the teaching of the Catholic Church, and certainly the teaching of the Anglican

Church in the 6th Article, and that it is the only theory that can save the Bible from utter rejection. Now, if only portions of the Bible are God's Word, before Dr. Salmon can take his faith from them he must first discover them; he must sort them, and separate the portions that are God's Word from those that are not. And how is he to do this? Mr. Mallock in a criticism on Dean Farrar, puts this matter amusingly but most accurately thus:—

The Dean of Canterbury, we shall suppose, desires to find five respectable persons to fill the post of vergers in Canterbury Cathedral. He is unable personally to search for such moral paragons himself; but a friend of his knows of five for whose character he can vouch absolutely, and he engages to send their names and addresses to the Dean. He writes them on slips of paper and puts them into a bag, but for some reason or other into the same bag he puts also the names and addresses of twenty others who are drunkards, mole-catchers, dog-stealers, burglars, —anything that is least eligible—and he sends them to the Dean all shaken up together. What would the Dean reply to a messenger who would bring him the bag and say: 'This bag contains (*complectitur*) an infallible revelation of the names and addresses you require?' He would say, and probably with a touch of excusable anger: 'The contents of your infallible bag tell me nothing at all, unless together with this I have somebody who will infallibly sort them and pick out the names and addresses which reveal to me what I want to know, from the names and addresses which would mislead me and make a fool of me.' And with regard to the Bible it is obvious that the case is precisely similar. Its inspired and infallible portions can convey to us no instruction till some authority altogether outside the Bible is able to tell us which these infallible portions are.¹

This expresses very accurately the preliminary difficulty Dr. Salmon has to meet before he can avail of his rule, the Bible, and the Bible only. Now, the Bible and Bible only sounds well as a formula, a profession. It is one, and ought to lead to unity and harmony in faith. But instead of being a guarantee of harmony, it is found by experience to be an apple of discord, for each one interprets for himself and so the Bible becomes Babel. And no wonder. Dr. Salmon himself admits that it is undeniable that it is natural to us all to read the Bible in the light of the previous instruction

¹ *Doctrine and Doctrinal Disruption*, p. 59.

we received in our youth. How else is it that the members of so many different sects, each find in the Bible what they have been trained to expect to find there? Now, if this be true, if men come to read the Bible with their beliefs already formed, how can Dr. Salmon say that they get their faith from it? They read it in the light of their own prejudices. But whatever view they bring to the reading of the Bible it is perfectly notorious that they carry away from it contradictory creeds. One Protestant finds in the Bible the doctrine of Priesthood, and Real Presence; another finds in it that these doctrines are blasphemous; one Protestant finds in it the Visible Church with the Infallibility of the 'Church Universal'; another finds in it a Church with some teaching authority, the nature and extent of which is to be determined by each individual member; other equally orthodox Protestants find in it the invisible Church, which is another name for no Church at all; one finds in it Justification by Faith, another Absolute Election; one Protestant finds in the Bible the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration—the new birth; another finds this doctrine condemned and yet others find it left an open question. And Dr. Salmon's 'Church of Ireland,' with what Mr. Mallock calls an 'ingenious Catholicity,' adopts all these views on this important subject. In the Preface prefixed to the Irish Book of Common Prayer, after the Disestablishment, in paragraph 4, reference is made to different views as to the formularies regarding Baptism, and the latitude hitherto allowed in their interpretation is sanctioned for the future. And on this same paragraph we have what must be regarded as an official authentic interpretation by Dr. Day, Protestant Bishop of Cashel, in a booklet called *Some Things to be Noted of the Church of Ireland*. At page 15 he gives the three views hitherto held and included in the sanction of the Preface:—

One is that the word 'regeneration' here made use of does not mean any change of nature or work accomplished by the Holy Spirit in the heart and character of the person, but only a change of state by which he is admitted into the Church. . . . A second view . . . is that regeneration means a real spiritual change in the infant who is baptized. . . . The third view entertained on this truly important subject is that regeneration is

indeed a new life imparted to the soul, but one which will surely show itself in due time wherever it is received, that as Baptism is the Sacrament or outward visible sign of this blessing we have a right to pray that the blessing may at the same time be given but afterwards it is to be seen whether the blessing has been given or not. (Pages 15, 16.)

This last view is not very transparent. It means that though the new life may not be given with the Baptism we shall know subsequently whether it was, or was not given. The three views, briefly, and stripped of Dr. Day's mystifying language, are:—1. That Baptism confers spiritual life. 2. That though the rite may not have conferred spiritual life, time and circumstance will tell whether it did or did not confer it. 3. That Baptism does not, and never will give spiritual life. It is a mere ceremony of incorporation. Now, according to the Preface of the Common Prayer Book, and to Dr. Day's official explanation of it, an Irish Churchman may hold either of these views, 'but,' adds Dr. Day, 'he has no right to say concerning any of these three, that one who holds it is contradicting the teaching of our Church' (page 18). Now, if one who holds any one of these opinions is not contradicting the teaching of the Church then the Church must hold all three, a theological feat which fully warrants the individual Churchman in sitting in judgment upon her. Dr. Salmon's town-clock is here cast into the shade completely, for it only tells one time, which may be either right or wrong. But here his Church in the same breath professes three doctrines 'on this truly important subject,' two of which must be wrong, and none of which may be right as far as she can decide.

Now, when such are the fruits which learned men, the masters in Israel, get from the Bible, and the Bible only, what a lucid rule of faith it must be to the uneducated masses! Dr. Salmon clearly sees the difficulty, and he meets it thus: 'We do not imagine that God meant each man to learn his religion from the Bible without getting help from anybody else. We freely confess that we need not only the Bible but human instruction in it' (page 113). But if he did 'not imagine' this why has he so distinctly and so emphatically stated that it is the duty of each man

to do so? Three pages further on in his book he says :— ' While it is the duty of the individual Christian to receive with deference the teaching of the Church, it is his duty also not listlessly to acquiesce in her statements but to satisfy himself of the validity of her proofs ' (page 116). Surely if it be ' the duty of the individual Christian ' to test the value of the Church's teaching, its harmony with or its opposition to Scripture, it must be equally his duty to test, to verify, or falsify, as the case may be, the teaching of any individual member of the Church who may undertake to enlighten him. He must be at least as competent to sit in judgment on the individual as on the body, and each must be equally his duty, ' the duty of each individual Christian ' no matter how uneducated.

Dr. Salmon knows the history of the Bible, both text and translation, and, therefore, knows well what the Bible, as a rule of faith, would have meant in past time ; but the ordinary Protestant who takes his theology from the Doctor has little conception of what is involved in that rule. In those days of steam-press printing and steel-plate stereo type, we forget that our forefathers had to contend unaided against difficulties which science has removed from our path. We have not to go far back to reach a time when there was no printing, and when, therefore, a Bible, or any other book, could be produced only by the slow process of transcription, at enormous labour and enormous cost. And the writing, too, had to be done on rough pieces of papyrus, or on skins of vellum or parchment ; and thus it will be found that our present handsome pocket Bible is the lineal descendant and representative of a gigantic pile of parchment which could be carried about only by one as strong as Samson, and could be written only by one as patient as Job. The Bible is a collection of sacred books written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, by different writers, in different places and at different times. The books of the New Testament appeared at times varying between the tenth year after our Lord's Ascension and the year preceding the death of St. John. Up to that time a Bible, in our sense, was impossible, and yet at that time quite as much as now man's

salvation depended on belief in God's revelation. The mission of the Apostles was one of teaching, not one of writing, and their written instructions were occasional and fragmentary; and from the very nature of the case it would take some considerable time to have the authority of such writings universally recognized. When, for instance, St. Paul addressed his letter to the Romans, they should be satisfied as to its genuineness before they would accept it as authoritative. And this fact being established at Rome, it could not for some time be equally well known at Alexandria, Athens, Ephesus, or Jerusalem. Thus, from the very nature of the case, the formation of the canon of Scripture was gradual; it required time. It may be admitted that the sacred books, as known to us, were generally known to Christians about A.D. 200. Up to that there was no one book to represent the Bible of the present day. But the formation of the canon was still retarded by the persecutions which the early Christians had to endure, and also by the spread of apocryphal writings; and until the canon was settled the Bible could not be a reliable guide in religious matters. There is evidence that the canon of Scripture, as we have it, was universally acknowledged towards the close of the fourth century. But it must be borne in mind that not a line in the handwriting of the inspired writers was then known to exist. The originals were lost, and so the Bible was, at best, a copy, or perhaps a copy of a copy. Each copy was written by hand and in large capital letters. There was no punctuation, no means of distinguishing one word or sentence from another, and bearing this in mind we can fancy what a huge perplexing volume the complete Bible of these early times must have been. The old Itala version came into use early, but errors in transcription became so numerous that St. Jerome was requested by Pope Damasus to correct it. Hence arose St. Jerome's Vulgate. Other versions, too, of parts of Scripture, arose, and all were copied and multiplied with great zeal and labour, and with great cost also. And with the rise and spread of Monasticism a fresh impetus was given to the transcription and circulation of the Scripture, but errors of transcription were also multiplied.

The invention of printing, of course, facilitated very much the circulation of the Scripture. The eagerness with which copies were sought was a temptation to mercenary speculators, and hence we find issuing from the press editions carelessly prepared by incompetent persons. The evil was much magnified when Luther proclaimed to all, ignorant and educated, that the Bible was the one passport to Heaven. And hence it was that the Church, in the sixteenth century, found herself face to face with an evil the same in kind as that which confronted Pope Damascus in the fourth century, though to a much greater degree—the multiplication of corrupted Bibles. To meet this evil the Council of Trent adopted St. Jerome's version, and steps were taken to issue a corrected version of it, and to regulate its issue in the future. This is a brief view of the history of the Bible. It is the Word of God, precious above all price, but like all God's gifts to be used in accordance with His will. To rely on it further than is God's will and ordinance would be to abuse it, to misapply it, and would be quite as fatal an error as its summary rejection.

Now, as already stated, for one hundred years of our era the Bible was not yet complete, and at least two hundred years had passed before it assumed a collected form such as it has to-day, and during all these years saints lived and died, and martyrs suffered, and souls made their way to Heaven whose eyes never once rested on the sacred books. To these holy souls, of whom the world was not worthy, the Bible could not, by possibility, have been a rule of faith. Faith they had, intense and ardent, but they did not get it from a book which they never saw. It is, therefore, as clear as the noon-day sun that in those early centuries the Bible could not fill, was not designed by God to fill, the place which certain loud talkers claim for it now. It was not the rule of faith. And, considering its formation, its character, its history, as already glanced at, and judging them by the ordinary laws of logic and common sense, it is perfectly clear and certain that 'the Bible, and the Bible only,' never was, never can be, and was never designed by God to be, the rule of faith. Even after it had

assumed a collected form, you see it a huge mass of parchment or papyrus, written in large uncial letters, sometimes carefully, sometimes very carelessly. As you glance along the lines you seldom find the slightest indication of where a word or a sentence begins or ends. The whole line looks like one word. If Dr. Salmon had set before his students a few specimen sheets of such a manuscript there would be little use in his telling them that the Bible was the rule of faith. They would have before their eyes the argument of its impossibility.

Now, as God wishes all to be saved, and to come to a knowledge of the truth, how can it be held for a moment that all men, or one in ten thousand, could arrive at the knowledge of all the truths of faith by the study of such a cumbrous and perplexing book. To make one's salvation depend on the reading and understanding of such a book would be a system of salvation by scholarship, far more rigidly exclusive than that for which the Catholic Church is abused. And even if it were admitted that a few persons of extraordinary learning, and of still more extraordinary patience, could determine, with some degree of probability, the meaning of the Bible, what is to become of the great multitude of those who are poorly educated, and the still greater number of those who are not educated at all? Are they cut off from all hope for not using what is to them, through no fault of their own, an impossible rule? But even a greater difficulty remains. Our Lord gave the clearest evidence of His special predilection for the poor, and He gave it as a mark of His mission that 'the Gospel was preached' to them. But if at any time up to the invention of printing the reading of the Bible had been necessary to salvation, then indeed would the poor man be cut off from all hope. Mr. L. A. Buckingham, in his *Bible in the Middle Ages* (page 2), shows that at the present day a Bible got up on the old system would cost £218. The rule of faith at this price would have a very limited number of purchasers, and the poor would be outside the pale of salvation. Our Lord said that it was easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of Heaven, but the Bible

only as a rule of faith would open Heaven to the rich man, and seal its gates for ever against the poor. It will avail nothing to say that Bibles are now within the reach of all, and may be thus designed to supersede the teaching Church and thus become a rule of faith as soon as available. Canon Gore, in fact, is bold enough to say so. 'The canon of which [Scripture] gradually takes the place of the living authority of Apostolic teachers as the ultimate Court of Christian Appeal.'¹

Now, Canon Gore holds as strongly as Dr. Salmon 'the Church to teach, the Bible to prove—that is the rule of faith' (page 45); and like Dr. Salmon he subscribed to the Article, that nothing is to be believed as of faith that is not contained in Scripture. And how can it be shown from the Bible that a rule of faith which worked well for some centuries was then superseded by a rule which cannot work at all. The change took place, if it took place at all, long after the Bible was written; how then can he find in the Bible evidence of the change? Canon Gore's theory has all the difficulties of Dr. Salmon's with the addition of being more illogical. Canon Gore and his High Church friends claim the universal, undivided Church as the infallible guide to the meaning of the Bible, but as they have suspended that Church for twelve hundred years, she can neither tell them what the Bible means now, nor what she thought it meant so long ago. From a fallible divided Church they appeal to an undivided and infallible Church, but they shall have ceased to be members of the Visible Church before the appeal comes to be tried. Dr. Salmon and Dean Farrar held that the 'prayerful man,' under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, can find for himself all the saving truths in the Bible, but unfortunately under the alleged guidance they find in the Bible most contradictory creeds. It is, therefore, much more likely that they are deceived as to the spirit that guides them, than that the Holy Spirit deceives them. Dean Farrar says that the Bible is so plain that 'even fools need not err therein,' and yet there are almost as many creeds as readers. This is

¹ *Mission of Christ*, p. 28.

what comes of the Bible, and the Bible only, as a rule of faith.

Canon Gore and 'Father' Puller, who believe in the infallibility of an imaginary Church; Dr. Hatch, who believes that the Church is 'as divine as the solar system;' Dr. Salmon, who holds that the Church is as infallible as a town-clock, and Dean Farrar, who dispenses with the Church altogether, since 'even fools' can interpret the Bible for themselves—all these are equally orthodox Protestant dignitaries; and all alike find their faith in the Bible only. No wonder that even the Calvinist Werenfels said of a Bible so interpreted:—

Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.

Of these lines Dean Farrar gives an excellent translation, apparently unconscious that he is accurately describing his own theological position:—

His own opinions here by each are sought,
And here to each his own opinions taught.

Dr. Newman, while yet a Protestant, and writing bitterly against Catholics, said in the *Via Media*, lect. 6, in 1837, 'I conclude then that the popular theory of rejecting all other helps, and reading the Bible only, though, in most cases maintained through ignorance, is yet in itself presumption.' And Dr. Ward, also while a Protestant, said of this theory: 'It seems paradoxical to the degree of insanity.'¹ And a greater authority than either, the great St. Jerome, said of it: 'A doctor is an authority on medicine; a blacksmith knows his own trade: the Scriptures alone are claimed by each one as within each one's province. The babbling old woman, the crazy old man, the windy sophist; every impudent person takes it up, . . . they mutilate it, they teach it before they have learned it.'² Such is Dr. Salmon's rule of faith in itself and in its fruits. According to him nothing is to be believed as of faith that is not in the Bible and provable from it. But this doctrine

¹ *Ideal*, p. 391.

² *Ep. Paulino*.

is not in the Bible nor provable from it; and therefore, on his own principles, it is not to be believed. In maintaining this doctrine he contradicts himself; in the very assertion of it he denies it.

[To be continued.]

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A HANDBOOK OF CHRISTIAN ARCHAEOLOGY¹

THE end of religious controversy is not yet; neither is the time come when the guardians of the Church's doctrines can afford to put aside their armour and go to sleep. No one, indeed, dare hope for a millenium of this kind. And when we consider all the new mines that are laying for the subversion of the Church's authority, all the violent and shameless assaults made upon her doctrines by false believers and unbelievers, in the Press and the Parliament, in the book of the month, and in the gutter-literature foul and infectious, in the club and at the street corner, we are convinced that St. Paul's charge to Timothy must be repeated with even greater urgency in our day, and that an unmistakable duty lies before us, to be discharged in *omni patientia et doctrina*.

The dogmas of Faith, in the light of Revelation, Reason, History, and Tradition, have been set forth with a mastery which we can hardly hope to see surpassed. No frontal attack is likely ever more to be made against the ramparts raised by the great theologians of the Church. But there are endless stratagems in war; and hard pressure often drives men to base resources. 'It is necessary,' says Voltaire, 'to lie like a devil, not timidly and for a time, but boldly, and always.' The enemies of religion had acted fully upon this principle long before it was thus enunciated by the French atheist; and faithfully they adhere to it even

¹ *Éléments d'Archéologie Chrétienne*, par Horace Marucchi. 3 vols. Paris: Desclée, Lefebvre et Cie. 30 rue St. Sulpice.

now ; nor does the old method of nailing such lies seem to have any longer much effect. In fact, the dull, dogged persistency with which exploded falsehoods are daily reiterated, by those from whom better might be expected, is simply nauseating. Often it is hard to conclude whether this arises from sheer ignorance, or a blind desire of perpetuating error and calumny. The English author who can command a hundred thousand readers, and is yet really or feignedly ignorant of the simple meaning of the expression 'Papal Infallibility' is surely a sight pitiable to gods and men.

As everybody knows, one of the favourite fields in which our opponents seek to raise issues is that of Ecclesiastical History, and by preference they generally appeal to that of the first few centuries. We have been continually hearing that many of our most important tenets are opposed to Apostolic teaching and the belief of the early Christians. Documents testifying to the contrary have been declared forged, garbled, or interpolated. In a word, the Roman Catholic Church had abandoned Apostolic doctrine, in part at least, and has long been trading on a system of error and fraud introduced by monkish craft during the Dark Ages ! These shoddy statements take well with the crowd : better by far than the sober web of truth.

It is often difficult, it is sometimes impossible, on purely historic grounds, to combat such calumnies. The fact is that documentary evidence is often either very meagre, or entirely wanting. We know that during the persecution of Diocletian, at the end of the third and beginning of the fourth century, the Christian archives were almost totally destroyed. That vast numbers of important documents perished subsequently, during the frequent struggles of the Church against paganism and heresy, is beyond all doubt. Regarding very many persons, institutions, and events of those early days, therefore, history has nothing to say.

But while history is silent the stones of Rome have begun to cry out. The study of Christian Archæology, successfully begun by Bosio about the middle of the seventeenth

century, and carried on with varying zeal and results for two hundred years, became, in the hands of the great de Rossi, some few decades ago, one of the most powerful allies ever enlisted on the side of Catholic truth. We are no longer dependent solely on the pages of Eusebius and other early writers for our knowledge of the early days of Christianity. We read their annals also from the marbles, frescoes, and 'graffiti' of the catacombs. History and archæology are complementary sciences, forming a powerful binocle through which we may clearly scan those remote ages. These two must go hand in hand—history to illuminate the mine of archæological research; archæology to confirm the testimony of history, to fill up its blank spaces, to solve its knotty points, and strengthen its weak ones. The man who would presume to investigate the early history of the Church or defend its doctrines against modern error, without the aid of sacred archæology, would be no better than a man with one leg competing in a foot-race, or a man without an arm contending in the ring.

Since the days of de Rossi, under the impulse of Pius the Ninth, and the present great Pontiff, the study of Christian Archæology is being taken up with enthusiasm in most European countries and in America; nor is there a doubt that it will one day be taught in our principal Irish colleges, and studied in private, with something of the earnestness it deserves. One has but to look over the names of the many volumes on the subject published abroad, especially in Italy, France, and Germany, to realize what a hold it has already taken in those countries.

The works of this kind in English are few, and for the most part very unsatisfactory. If we accept Lady MacDonald's translation of de la Gournerie's treatise—a book well written, but wanting in many necessary details—there is no work worthy of the name, as far as we are aware, within the reach of the ordinary student, but Northcote and Brownlow's *Roma Sotterranea*, published for the first time some thirty years ago, and based, of course, on the work of the same name by Cavaliere de Rossi. It is a readable and useful work, and well deserves perusal; but it is

quite inadequate for even an elementary knowledge of the subject, and by no means up to the present stage of archæological discovery. Doubtless, much of the apathy shown towards the subject in this country is due to this dearth of handbooks adapted to the requirements of those who have no opportunity of examining the actual objects treated of, and embodying in a truly scientific classification all the latest discoveries from various sources.

The work referred to at the beginning of this paper, seems to us to combine all the best qualities of a student's handbook. It is to consist of three handy volumes, two of which have been already published by the firm of Desclée, Lefebvre et Cie, whose name is a guarantee of first-class book-making. The first thing, doubtless, which will impress one on examining these volumes is the remarkable profusion of illustrations—woodcuts and photogravures—scattered over almost every page. Every district has its plan, there is hardly an important inscription that has not been copied with scrupulous exactness, nor a fresco or other object of interest which has not been faithfully drawn or photographed. An examination of the originals has unquestionably its advantages; but we fail to see that anything is wanting in the publication before us to supply the student in any part of the world with sufficient matter for acquiring an extensive and accurate knowledge of the subject.

Professor Marucchi, though an Italian himself, has written his work in French, as in this language it will be accessible to by far the greatest number of readers. It is probable that an English translation of it will be forthcoming by-and-by, but even in its present garb it will prove a very suitable textbook for most priests and students in this country, as the language is beautifully clear and simple.

The author is eminently qualified for a work of this kind. The whole of his life up to the present—and he looks over fifty—has been devoted with an industry unflagging to the immediate subject, and to every branch of knowledge which could aid in its pursuit. Signor Marucchi has published within the last twenty years almost as many volumes on antiquities, Oriental, Roman, and Christian,

besides a continuous output of articles for various leading magazines. As a profound and accomplished scholar he has few equals. He is a classicist and Orientalist amongst the foremost, speaks French and German with the same fluency as he does his own Italian, and has more than a working knowledge of English, Spanish, modern Greek, and some other languages. His apprehension is quick and keen, his judgment generally sound, his expression apt and terse. With the exception of de Rossi himself, the St. Thomas of Christian Archæology, the past century has probably seen no rival in the science for Professor Marucchi. The late Armellini was certainly as honestly devoted to the subject, but he lacked, in some degree, the learning of his successor.

In a very modest preface the author puts forward the object and plan of his work :—

One need not seek [he says] in this book a work of great erudition or profound originality. Both its title and its pretensions are humble. Yet, perhaps, it will be considered capable of doing some little service in bringing down to the level of all, and especially of ecclesiastical students, the elements of a science of great importance from many points of view. . . . It is easy to understand the interest and utility of this study. It furnishes inedited documents to the historian, new arguments to the apologist and theologian. The time seems to have arrived for the more extensive use of the resources furnished by Christian Archæology. A great number of its conclusions are now sufficiently certain to yield to dogma a solid support. In the catacombs have been preserved testimonies to the faith from contemporaries and immediate successors of the Apostles—the words of their prayers, the symbols of their worship. What better arguments can be opposed to the objections of rationalism or Protestantism, especially in an age as eager for facts as it is indifferent to metaphysics?

Before proceeding to a detailed study of the cemeteries of ancient Christian Rome [he goes on to say] it is highly necessary to possess some general notions of the history, epigraphy, and art of that epoch.

This calls for an abridged account of the persecutions of the first four centuries, a description of the catacombs, their origin and development, and a general survey of inscriptions, paintings, and various works of art discovered therein. This constitutes the subject-matter of the first volume;

the second gives a detailed account of the several catacombs surrounding the city. The third volume, not yet published, as far as we know, will deal with the various buildings raised by the early Christians.

We will give the concluding paragraph of the preface of the first volume, written some two years ago, in the words of the author :—

J'offre humblement ce livre au Christ Rédempteur. De plus dignes hommages lui seront rendus, au nom de l'archéologie chrétienne, par le Congrès qui se tiendra à Rome pour la fin de ce siècle. J'ose espérer qu'Il agréera celui-ci. Puisse mon travail, béni par Lui, contribuer à la diffusion des connaissances archéologiques, à la défense de la Sainte Église, et à la gloire des martyrs !

These words, we believe, very faithfully express the character and motive of this learned Italian layman.

A few extracts drawn from the first volume will, doubtless, prove interesting, as illustrating the nature of the subject and the author's style of handling it. He begins by enumerating the various *Fontes* of this science, which, he tells us, are of two kinds, general and particular. Under the former come Church history, the works of apologists, and the writings of the fathers. To the latter belong (a) the acts of the martyrs, (b) martyrologies, (c) calendars, (d) the *Liber Pontificalis*, (e) sacramentaries, (f) itineraries, and (g) epigraphic collections, regarding each of which he gives a very interesting section, explaining their origin and showing how far they are authentic. In the ninth section of this general introduction he takes a cursory view of the chief modern writers on the subject. And here we might refer the reader to four very interesting articles already contributed to the I. E. RECORD, on Subterranean Rome. Two will be found in the June and August numbers of 1868. They are well written, and contain a large amount of information, and are evidently the work of some one quite familiar with the environments of the Eternal City. By a kind of coincidence the remaining two are of June and August, 1888—just twenty years after. They are not so carefully written, to say the least; for example, the

author says that the catacombs all lie within a *radius* of three miles from the wall of Servius, where he probably intended to write the word *zone*. Nevertheless these articles form very interesting reading, and will more than repay perusal.

Referring to his illustrious friend, Marucchi says :—

John Baptist de Rossi (1822-1894) has merited, even more than Bosio, the name of the 'Christopher Columbus of the Catacombs.' His labours as a Christian antiquary commenced at the age of twenty and were only interrupted by his death. During half a century he advanced from discovery to discovery, remodelling the topography of subterranean Rome, penetrating into cemeteries long forgotten and choked with rubbish, explaining each monument by his learned dissertations, bringing together again from most distant points the fragments of Christian inscriptions, and, especially, formulating the true principles of Christian Archæology. . . . His moral qualities were, moreover, on a level with his knowledge. On his very modest monument is graven the following inscription, differing from most others in this, that it is no more than a faithful expression of the truth :—

JOHANNI . BAPTISTAE . DE . ROSSI.

CUJUS . ROMANAE . ANTIQUITATIS . DOCTRINAM . OMNIGENAM

SOLA . RELIGIO . ANIMIQUE . INTEGRITAS . SUPERAVIT

PAUPERIBUS . DIVITI . SIBI . PARCO . OMNIBUS . CARISSIMO

ETC.

The learned author devotes the first eighty pages or so to the times of persecution, with a terseness of expression and a richness of illustration which could not well be surpassed. Some of the *obiter dicta* in this part of the volume are particularly good. In referring to the origin of some absurd popular traditions, during the Middle Ages, he gives in a footnote the following story from Benedict XIV. (*De Servorum Dei Beatificatione*): A Spanish envoy was on one occasion sent to supplicate Urban VIII. for leave to build a church over the body of a certain St. Viar, and for indulgences to be attached to the feast of the same. On investigation it was discovered that the *cultus* of this reputed saint was founded solely on a fragment of an inscription composed of the letters S VIAR, and that instead of forming the name of a saint these were but the end and beginning of the two words 'PraefectuS VIARum.'

At page 39 we find a reproduction of the blasphemous 'graffiti' belonging to the time of Septimus Severus, discovered several years ago, during excavations on the Palatin Hill; scratched on one of the walls of the emperor's palace, probably by one of the soldiers, in mockery of his Christian companions. It is now in the Kircher Museum. It represents a man with the head of an ass, upon a cross; another man beside him in an attitude of prayer, with the inscription, 'Alexemenes adores his God,' underneath.

In the remarks on the persecution under Decius, we find the photograph of an exceedingly rare and interesting document written in Greek, called the *Libellus of Diogenes Aurelois*. This fragment of papyrus was found at Carthage by the German Krebs, and first published in 1893. It is the sad monument of an apostacy then not quite uncommon among the Christians in that part of Africa, attesting that a certain Diogenes Aurelios, son of Satibos, had 'conformed' to paganism by sacrificing to the gods, and eating of the flesh of the victim. It bears date of 6 June, 250, and makes clear the meaning of the expressions, 'libellum accipere,' and 'libellum tradere,' sometimes occurring in early historic documents.

The chapter on Palæography, with illustrations showing the various forms in which the letters of the alphabet are to be met with, gives us an object-lesson on some of the acquirements necessary for the work of an archæologist. For example, there are twenty-six different forms of the cursive *a* found in Pompeian inscriptions alone!

The Dogmatic inscriptions occupy a peculiarly interesting section of this volume. They are classified under various headings, according to the particular doctrine they testify to, as, for example—(1) Faith in One God, (2) the Divinity of Jesus Christ, (3) the Holy Ghost, (4) the Blessed Trinity, (5) the Worship of the Saints, (6) Prayer for the Dead and the Doctrine of Purgatory, (7) the Resurrection, etc.

The last hundred pages are taken up with an excellent survey of primitive Christian art. This is probably the most interesting and fascinating portion of the whole work. The remains, illustrating the doctrine of the Sacraments,

are beautifully treated. We will close this article with a brief account of the famous *cippus* of Abercius, following pretty closely the words of the author. It refers, of course, to the doctrine of the Eucharist: and it should be remembered that the practice of the consecrated species being carried about and self-administered was quite common, even in the case of laymen, in the earliest ages of the Church.

Abercius, a Phrygian saint, was Bishop of Hieropolis about the end of the second century. Little is known of him beyond what is found in the acts relating to his life, and there we read the text of a long inscription purporting to have been dictated by himself and afterwards inscribed on his monument. Being a 'Dogmatic' inscription, and testifying to his belief in the Mystery of the Holy Eucharist, it did not escape charges directed by Protestants against such documents generally. It might be a mere monkish fabrication, without any sculptured original in Phrygia, or any other part of the world. In 1882, however, Mr. Ramsey, a Scotch antiquarian, found in Asia Minor an inscription in stone, identical with that given in the Acts of St. Abercius, with this important exception—that it bore the name Alexander instead of Abercius. It was dated to correspond with 216 of our era. It was noticed, however, that the word Alexander did not fit into the hexameter in which it was written, while the word Abercius would have done so perfectly. This must, then, be but a borrowed copy of the original, and the latter must have been written anterior to A.D. 216. Fortunately, some years after, Mr. Ramsey came upon two fragments of the real monument, or *cippus*, of Abercius, the smaller of which he brought home. The larger portion was sent by the Sultan Abdul-Hamid, as a present to Leo XIII. on the occasion of his sacerdotal jubilee; and to complete the favour, Mr. Ramsey then sent to his Holiness the other part which he had brought to Scotland. The inscription was carved on three sides of the *cippus*, and consists of twenty-two double lines in Greek. The saintly bishop refers to his journey to Rome (which probably took place in the beginning of the reign of Septimus Severus), and to what he saw there, adhering throughout to the phrases current in the *disciplina arcana*.

We give, together with a Latin translation, that portion to which the above-mentioned fragments belong, which are now in the Lateran Museum. The capitals show the parts found; the small letters are supplied from the Acts. The reader will note how perfectly they fit in:—

(ΕΙΣ ΡΩΜΗΝ ὅς ἐπεμψεν	Qui Romam me misit regnum
(ΕΜΕΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑΝ ἀθρήσαι	contemplaturum
(ΚΑΙ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΣΣΑΝ ἰδεῖν χρυσος	Visurumque reginam aurea stola
(ΤΟΛΟΝ ΧΡΥΣΟΠΕΔΙΛΟΝ	aureis calceis decoram
(ΛΑΟΝ ΔΕΙΔΟΝ ἐκεί λαμπραν	Ibique vidi populum splendido
(ΣΦΡΑΓΕΙΔΑΝΕχοντι	sigillo insignem
(ΚΑΙΣΥΡΙΗΣΠΕΔΟΝ ἔιδα	Et Syriae vidi campos urbesque
(ΚΑΙΑΣΤΕΑΠΑΝΤΑ Νίσιβιν	cunctas Nisibin quoque
(ΕΥΦΡΑΤΗΝΔΙΑΒΑΣ παν	Transgresso Euphrate. Ubique
(ΤΗΔΕΣΧΟΝΣΥΝΟμίλους	vero nactus sum (familiater)
	colloquente;
ΠΑΥΛΟΝΕΧΟΝΕΠΟ	Paulum habens
(ΠΙΣΤΙΣ πάντα δὲ προῆγε	Fides vero ubique mihi dux
(ΚΑΙΠΑΡΗΘΗΚΕτροφήν	fuit
(ΠᾶΝΤΗΧΘΥΝΑπὸ πηγῆς	Prebuitque ubique cibum piscem
(ΠΑΝΜΕΓΕΘΗΚΑΘαρον ὕν	e fonte
(ΕΔΡΑΣΑΤΟΠΑΡΘένος ἀγνῆ	Ingentem purum quem pre-
(ΚΑΙΤΟΥΟΝ ΕΠΕδωκε φί	hendit virgo casta
ΛΟΙΣΕΞΘίειν διὰ παντός	Deditque amicis perpetuo eden-
	dum.
δινον χρυστον ἔχουσα	Vinum optimum habens minis-
κέρασμα διδοῦσα μετ' ἄρτων.	trans (vinum aquae) mixtum
	cum pane.

The study of Sacred Archæology is of a much lighter kind than the appearance of the above inscription might suggest. It is here reproduced not as a type of the subject matter, but on account of its peculiar history, and as illustrating in a striking way the importance of the archæologist's work in synchronizing and bringing together the valuable remains of antiquity often scattered in fragments far and wide.

In these few remarks we have merely presumed to draw the attention of students and others to a subject now creating a universal and lively interest; and in doing so we have taken occasion to bring under notice a work which we feel sure will do much to spread this class of study, and make it still more interesting.

J. HASSAN, C.C.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

THE INTEGRITY OF CONFESSION

REV. DEAR SIR,—I should feel obliged if you give your opinion on the following practical question. A person comes to confession, and, through shame or some other reason, he is very unwilling that his confessor should understand that he has been guilty, since his last confession, of a grievous mortal sin. He, therefore, confesses this mortal sin in such a way that the confessor believes it to be a sin of the penitent's past life from which he has been already absolved. Is such a confession valid? I find that Génicot, vol. ii., n. 288, states that such a confession would be valid, even if the penitent distinctly stated to his confessor that his sin had been already confessed and absolved. No doubt it would be going too far to assert that every lie told in confession is a mortal sin. But certainly it seems to me that it is going to the opposite extreme to say that a penitent escapes mortal sin, who falsely asserts that a mortal sin, now confessed by him for the first time, has been already absolved.

SIMPLEX CONFESSARIUS.

Theologians commonly raise the general question of the guilt of a person who tells a lie in confession. And in giving a reply, they note that a false assertion of a penitent in the course of confession may regard the matter of his confession, or may relate to some extraneous matter. Even though the false assertion made in confession regards some extraneous matter, it undoubtedly involves additional guilt owing to the irreverence shown towards the Sacrament of Penance. But, it is the practically unanimous teaching of the theologians, that the additional malice thus arising does not *per se* amount to mortal sin. If, therefore, for example, a penitent gives a false name in confession, or falsely states that his sin was committed on a certain day, or in a certain place, or that he was at confession a month previously, whereas

five weeks had elapsed since his last confession, he is not—*per se*—guilty of mortal sin, nor is his confession invalid. Of course, *per accidens* such a penitent would, by his falsehood, be guilty of mortal sin, and consequently of a mortal sin of sacrilege also, in receiving the Sacrament of Penance, if (a) he erroneously thought that a lie told in confession was always mortally sinful; or if (b) the lie itself happened to be mortally sinful, *v.g.*, a grave calumny.

If the falsehood regards, not an extraneous matter, but the matter of the penitent's confession, then its effect is to lead the confessor into error regarding some sin or circumstance of a sin confessed, or regarding the penitent's dispositions. Now, that sin or circumstance may, or may not, be one of which the penitent is bound to accuse himself. In other words, the falsehood is concerned either with (a) *materia necessaria*, or (b) *materia libera confessionis*. If (a) the penitent tells a falsehood regarding *necessary* matter, he is guilty of sacrilege. Hence, there is sacrilege, *v.g.* (1) if he falsely denies, or confesses as merely doubtful, a sin which is certainly mortal and has not yet been remitted in the Sacrament of Penance; (2) if he accuses himself of a mortal sin of which he is not guilty, or exaggerates the number of his mortal sins; (3) if he deceives the confessor regarding any circumstance which involves mortal guilt; (4) if he feigns sorrow or the purpose of amendment; (5) if he falsely conveys to the confessor that he is not living in the proximate occasion of mortal sin, or that he is not a habitual or relapsing sinner, and thereby hinders the confessor from forming a just judgment on the state of his soul and applying proper remedies. On the other hand, (b) if the falsehood regards some sin or circumstance, which the penitent is not bound to confess, the penitent is *per se* guilty of venial sin only, and the Sacrament is not rendered invalid. For example—(1) if a penitent falsely denies that he was guilty of a certain venial sin, or of a mortal sin already remitted; (2) if a penitent confesses that he is guilty of a grave sin of theft but deceives his confessor regarding the amount stolen; (3) if he accuses himself of a venial sin which he has never committed. *Per accidens*, a penitent who tells

such a falsehood is guilty of a mortal sin of sacrilege—(1) if he erroneously believes that such a falsehood involves mortal sin; (2) if he accuses himself of only one venial and of that sin falsely, because, in that case, he supplies no matter for absolution and he thereby invalidates the Sacrament; (3) if, by his falsehood, he retracts the sorrow which he had elicited in preparing for and making his confession; for if, *v.g.*, a penitent confesses only venial sins of lying, it is manifest that he is no longer sorry for these sins, when in the very act of confessing them he tells a lie of equal malice.

So far the theologians are practically unanimous. There is little, if any, divergence of view regarding the principles on which they estimate the guilt of one who tells a lie in confession. It might seem, therefore, that there should be equal unanimity in regard to the question proposed by our correspondent, *viz.*: Does a penitent satisfy the obligation of confession by confessing a mortal sin not yet remitted in the Sacrament of Penance, as if it were already confessed and sacramentally remitted? But instead of agreement we find a sharp conflict of opinion. Fr. Génicot, to whom our correspondent refers, writes as follows:—

Se vero poenitens deserte significaret peccatum reapse recens jam fuisse alias accusatum multi AA censent hanc confessionem esse invalidam. . . . Plures probabilius negant existimantes in his per se non reperiri nisi veniale mendacium.¹

Ballerini,² D'Annibale,³ Bucceroni,⁴ and Noldin,⁵ among recent writers, have also adopted the opinion to which our correspondent calls attention in Fr. Génicot's work. We shall give Fr. Noldin's own words:—

Obligationi integre confitendi satisfacit. . . . qui in confessione generali ab aliis peccatis non distinguit peccata mortalia ab ultima confessione commissa, etsi de industria id faciat ad dissimulandum tempus, quo peccatum commisit. Quod si poenitens de tempore interrogatus mentiatur et peccatum hodie commissum

¹ Génicot, *Theol. Moralis*, vol. ii., n. 288, edit prima.

² *Ibid.*, Gury-Ballerini, ii., n. 458, nota.

³ *Summata Theol. Moralis*, iii., n. 309.

⁴ *Theol. Moralis*, n. 58.

⁵ *Summa Theol. Moralis*, iii., De Sacramentis, n. 270.

declaret factum tempore remoto, leve mendacium sacrilegum committere videtur, nec probanda videtur sententia eorum qui opinentur ejusmodi poenitentem non satisfacere obligationi confitendi.¹

On the other side Fr. Lehmkuhl is equally clear and emphatic. He writes:—

Quare graviter peccat. . . . qui peccatum recenter commissum aut expresse aut aequivatenter fatetur ut peccatum antiquum jam antea declaratum.²

And further on in the same place he says:—

Grave peccatum est in accusando peccato gravi recenter commissio hac formula uti post alia peccata dicta. ‘Dein accuso me de peccatis vitae praeteritae praesertim de hoc’ Nam haec formula ea est ex omnium praxi, ut non designet nisi peccata jam antea declarata.

Where it is impossible to reconcile the opinions of theologians, we can only give our own and the reasons which weigh with us. Two distinct questions should be kept carefully apart. (1) Is the precept of confession satisfied by a penitent, who expressly or equivalently states to his confessor that a mortal sin—which he confesses now for the first time—has been already confessed and remitted by sacramental absolution? Such a penitent is, of course, guilty of a falsehood; and the guilt is aggravated by the circumstances. But still the confession may be sufficient and integral, if we admit, that it is not necessary to state in confession, whether a mortal sin submitted for absolution has been already sacramentally remitted. Another, and a totally distinct question is (2) whether the precept of confession is satisfied by a penitent who, by a false statement, or what is equivalent to a false statement, deceives his confessor regarding some other circumstance of a mortal sin. For example, a penitent confesses a grievous sin of injustice, but, for some reason, he falsely asserts that the sin was committed six months previously, whereas it was committed a few days before his confession; or he states that the injustice was committed against a stranger, whereas it was committed against a neighbour.

¹ Noldin, *loc. cit.*

² *Theol. Moralis*, ii., n. 313.

Again, of course, this penitent is guilty of falsehood. But it does not necessarily follow that the confession is invalid.

The second question proposed does not seem to us to present much difficulty. *Per accidens*, a falsehood regarding the time at which a sin was committed, the person with or against whom it was committed, or any similar circumstance may invalidate the confession. For, in the language of the theologians, the circumstance may be *circumstantia mutans speciem*. The guilt of an additional mortal sin, or the freedom from it, may depend on that circumstance regarding which the false statement is made. Again, the circumstance of the time at which or of place in which the sin was committed, may, *per accidens*, determine whether the sin be reserved or unreserved. And lastly, but again *per accidens*, such a falsehood will render a confession invalid, where the penitent believes that his falsehood involves a mortal sin of sacrilege. But there seems to be no good reason to think that, *per se*, a falsehood regarding the time, place, or other such accompanying circumstance of sin, renders the confession of that sin invalid. For *per se* the sin is the same whether it be committed in January or June, against Peter or against Paul.

It is urged,¹ indeed, that, if a penitent has committed murder in June, and then states to his confessor that he has been guilty of murder in January, his confession is invalid for two reasons. First, because he confesses a murder in January, which he has not committed, and secondly, because he conceals a murder which he has committed in June. This is too like a quibble. The penitent's confession contains equivalently three assertions: (1) That he has been guilty of murder; (2) that the murder was committed in January; and (3), by implication, he asserts that he did not commit murder in June. The first of these statements is wholly true, and *per se* is in itself a complete fulfilment of the precept of confession in regard to that sin. The other statements are, indeed, false, but fortunately they are

¹ *Conf. v.g.*, Gury, *Theol. Mor.*, ii., n. 488, Resp. 2°; Morino, *Theol. Mor.*, ii., n. 458.

irrelevant, as far as the precept of confession is concerned. They neither assert nor deny anything on which the precept of confession requires that the confessor should be accurately informed.

In reply to the second question proposed above, we would, therefore, say that a lie in confession regarding the time, place, or other attendant circumstance of a mortal sin does not *per se* invalidate the confession; *per accidens* it may invalidate the confession, as we have already explained.

We return now to the first question raised. On this point, Lehmkuhl's teaching seems to us undoubtedly true. He lays down unequivocally, in the passage already quoted, that a penitent who confesses a mortal sin and, by express statement or by implication, falsely conveys that this sin has been already confessed and remitted, does not satisfy the precept of confession, but becomes guilty of a grievous sin of sacrilege. It is said, on the other hand, that a sin is the same specifically, whether it has been already remitted or not and, therefore, that the fact that a sin has not been yet remitted need not be mentioned in confession. No doubt, a mortal sin is the same specifically before and after absolution. But before absolution it is *necessary* matter for confession, after absolution it is *free* matter. And if there be any one thing more than all others to which a penitent would seem bound, it is to state to his confessor whether his soul is at the time of confession burdened with *necessary* matter, *i.e.*, with mortal sin not yet directly remitted *vi clavium*. It certainly seems an extraordinary opinion that would allow a man who has been guilty, since his last confession, of several mortal sins, to satisfy the obligation of confession by telling his confessor one or two venial faults and then mentioning his recent mortal sins as sins of his past life already remitted. Even Fr. Genicot,¹ in a clause that has, possibly, escaped the notice of our correspondent, assumes the insufficiency of such a confession on the ground that such a confession, *prorsus perverteret iudicium confessarii de statu conscientiae* [poenitentis]. We quite agree with him that a penitent who represents himself to be in the state

¹ *Loc. cit.*

of grace, while he is really burdened with mortal sin, misleads his confessor in a vital matter. But with Fr. Lehmkuhl we believe, moreover, that the judgment of the confessor is also perverted in an essential matter by a penitent, who has been guilty, since his last confession, of say ten mortal sins, and who confesses one of them as recent, and the others as already remitted.

Moreover, as Fr. Lehmkuhl points out,¹ a confessor is admittedly bound, not only to form a prudent judgment regarding the state of the penitent's soul, but also to impose a penance proportionate to the gravity and number of the sins confessed. And in explaining this obligation of the confessor, theologians unanimously teach that a grave penance is to be imposed for mortal sins not yet remitted in the Sacrament of Penance, a light penance for venial sins, and for mortal sins already remitted in the Sacrament. It is manifest, therefore, that the obligation of the confessor to deal differently with mortal sins, according as they have or have not been already remitted in the Sacrament of Penance, connotes a correlative obligation on the part of the penitent, to state, whether or not his mortal sins still remain necessary matter for confession.

For these reasons it seems to us evident that a penitent does not satisfy the obligation of confession, if, by express or implied statement, he falsely asserts that his mortal sins have been already confessed and directly remitted in the Sacrament of Penance.

If the view we have taken so far be correct, then it would seem to follow as a consequence, that a penitent is not justified, at a general confession, in confessing his recent mortal sins in such a way as to leave it doubtful whether they are necessary matter or not. Fr. Lehmkuhl himself and writers very commonly defend this practice. But, if we may be candid, we think the practice is attended with difficulty. For, if, as Fr. Lehmkuhl rightly contends, the knowledge of the circumstance that a particular mortal sin has not been yet remitted *vi clavium* be necessary [*eo fine*

¹ Lehmkuhl, *loc. cit.*

*ut] confessarius judicium atque poenitentiae impositionem recte exercere possit,*¹ it seems to be the manifest duty of the penitent to make known that circumstance. True, if the penitent puts the matter in a doubtful way, the confessor can elicit the truth by interrogation. But, why should a penitent attempt to withhold a circumstance which the confessor is bound to discover, if he wishes *judicium atque poenitentiae impositionem recte exercere*?

Confessors and penitents, therefore, are but following the safe opinion when they take care, as they do, to distinguish between mortal sins committed since the last confession and those which have been already directly remitted by sacramental absolution. For our part, authority notwithstanding, we do not feel disposed to adopt in practice the more indulgent teaching.

D. MANNIX.

LITURGY

THE IRISH PRIVILEGE OF ANTICIPATION OF MATINS AND LAUDS.

REV. DEAR SIR,—In the last issue of the I. E. RECORD an inquirer asked on which of the two, custom or Papal grant, was founded the practice in Ireland of commencing Matins, etc., for the next day at 2 p.m., at all seasons of the year.

The answer to this question was that the practice was founded on custom, and not on a grant, as it is likely that if a 'grant ever existed there would be some trace of it, which would be known to those whom we have consulted.'

Now there appears to be evidence of the existence of a Papal grant for the Irish privilege. Nor is the privilege confined, as stated, to the secular clergy. In proof of this statement we have the public and solemn testimony of Dr. Bray, Archbishop of Cashel. Addressing the assembled priests of Cashel and Emly, at a public synod which was held during the first week of September, in the year 1810, the Archbishop made the following statement:—

'Sciunt sacerdotes nostros quod obtentum sit pro illis et pro omnibus sacerdotibus hujus regni, tam secularibus quam regularibus, privilegium in perpetuum a sanctae memoriae Pio Papa VI.

¹ *Loc. cit.*

inchoandi Matutinum cum Laudibus hora secunda pomeridiana pro sequenti die, toto anni decursu.'—*Statuta Synodalia*, chapter xxvii.

From this, as well as from the concluding paragraphs of this chapter, I fairly infer that the privilege can be used even by those in choir.

I am, Yours, etc.,

SYLVESTER MALONE.

The Very Rev. Dr. Malone deals with three points:—

- (1) the origin of the privilege; (2) its extension in regard to individuals; (3) choral recitation.

1. We agree with our correspondent that the above public and solemn testimony of Dr. Bray is very strong evidence of the existence of a Papal grant, and we are thankful that it has been brought to light.

Before the receipt of Dr. Malone's communication, we had learned from another correspondent that he had heard from an old priest, some years ago, that there was a document in the Kilkenny archives allowing all Irish priests to begin Matins and Lauds at 2 p.m. A search is being made which we hope will result in the discovery of the Papal Indult itself.

2. With regard to the extension of the privilege to individuals, Dr. Malone says: 'Nor is the privilege confined, as stated, to the secular clergy.' We have no objection to any part of this statement except the phrase 'as stated.' We did not state that the privilege was confined to the secular clergy. We wrote: 'But we have no doubt that all others, who are bound to the Breviary, enjoy it' (the custom). 'All others' means all, both secular and regular, except 'some' Orders who disclaimed the custom. They were four in number, as we ought perhaps to have stated definitely. Even these we did not undertake to exclude: 'Whether the fact that they have not made use of the custom is a proof that they have not a right to it, we cannot decide.'

3. The two concluding paragraphs of the *Statuta Synodalia*, chapter xxvii., express precisely our opinion about the recitation *in choro*. Our opinion was: 'Our view

of the custom is that it did not mean to interfere with the regular hours of recitation *in choro*.' The paragraphs of the *Statuta* run thus :—

Quod spectat ad tempus, quo horae canonicae dicendae sunt : pro officio publico, hoc est in choro, servanda est consuetudo recepta. In officio privato, magis etiam expedit, ut *quantum fieri potest*, singulae horae suis respective temporibus, per intervalla dicantur.

Prima potest inchoari immediate post ortum solis, *tertia*, *sexta* et *nona* possunt etiam tunc legi ; vel alia quacumque hora ante duodecimam pomeridianam. *Vesperae* et completorium possunt dici post meridiem. Et *Matutinum* cum *Laudibus*, ut antea diximus, pro sequente die, ex indulto Apostolico potest in choari hora secunda pomeridiana.

It is plain that the regulation for the recitation *in choro* ends with the word 'recepta,' and that the words, 'In officio privata,' cover all that follows the second paragraph specifying *sua respectio tempora* of the first.

MARRIAGE SERVICE WITHIN THE 'TEMPUS CLAUSUM'

REV. DEAR SIR,—Will you kindly give your opinion in your valuable review as to the best way of acting in the following practical question :—

In a church where all the marriages of Catholics take place with a Nuptial Mass, what kind of marriage service is advisable, when the ceremony takes place in *tempore clauso*, especially during the Octaves of Christmas and Easter, when the *sensus communis* of the people naturally think the solemnities of marriages are all over, and when, as a matter of fact, many marriages take place ?

1. Is there any objection to the married couple, *after* the marriage ceremony, occupying a conspicuous place *outside* of the sanctuary, and having the ordinary Mass of the day, *without the nuptial blessing* said for them ?

2. Or, would you go further, and allow the couple to occupy the usual places as at a Nuptial Mass ?

3. Could the same method be followed for a widow who is married in the regular time, but who cannot receive the nuptial blessing on account of having received it in former marriage ?

I remain, yours sincerely in Christ,

J. L.

1. There is no objection to the service described in the first query.

The *Opus Theologicum Morale*, vol. vi., p. 404, says :—

Neque item prohibetur quominus sponsi Missæ assistant et Eucharistiam in illa percipiant ut consentaneum est, dummodo in Missa omittantur prædictæ benedictiones.

The *prædictæ benedictiones* are those mentioned in the description of a nuptial blessing given on page 403 :—

Parro benedictio nuptiarum intelligitur, quando Missa dicitur quæ votiva in Missali habetur pro '*Sponso et Sponsa*,' et siquidem non liceat per rubricas Missam votivam ea die celebrare, saltem Missæ præscriptæ additur oratio pro '*Sponso et Sponsa*,' et insuper post Orationem dominicam et '*Ite Missa est*' adduntur Orationes quæ ad hoc in Missa memorata pro sponsis habentur. Temporibus ergo feriatis et Missa illa, seu illæ orationes omittendæ sunt.

Therefore there is nothing forbidden, as far as the marriage service is concerned, except (a) that the Mass *pro Sponso et Sponsa* be said ; (b) that even a commemoration from this Mass be added to the Mass of the day ; (c) that the prayers, etc., after the '*Pater Noster*' and '*Ite Missa est*' or '*Benedicamus Domino*' be used.

2. The couple may occupy the usual place as if in a Nuptial Mass, provided that the usual place be not expressly forbidden by the rubrics even outside the *tempus clausum*. The only thing that could make it unlawful would be that the occupying of this place would constitute such a solemnity as is forbidden by the rubric of the Ritual. There is no reason for supposing that it does.

3. The same method may be followed for a widow who gets married at any time. There is nothing forbidden in this case except the repetition of the nuptial blessing.

VOTIVE MASS OF THE SACRED HEART

REV. DEAR SIR,—There is a footnote at the beginning of the *Ordo*—published for the current year—with regard to the Votive Mass of the Sacred Heart for First Fridays. You will oblige by saying in your next issue if it is allowable to offer the Votive Mass in a church or parish where the Confraternity of the Sacred Heart was never erected, but where the devotion of the First

Fridays has been long established with the sanction of the bishop of the diocese.—Yours truly,

C.C.

It is allowable to offer the Votive Mass in the circumstances described. The decree of June 28, 1889, does not require that a Confraternity be erected.

ROSARY DURING MASS. HOLY COMMUNION IN A PRIVATE HOUSE

REV. DEAR SIR,—I wish to ask two questions which I hope you will kindly answer in the I. E. RECORD.

1. Where the Rosary is said during Mass, in the month of October, should the people stand at the Gospel and say the Rosary standing?

2. When Holy Communion is given in a private house, to a person fasting and in no danger of death, should the same prayers and ceremonies be observed as in the administration of the Viaticum, including the blessing with the Pyxis, or should the ceremonies, etc., prescribed for Communion *extra Missam* be observed, just as if the Sacrament were administered in the church.—I remain, rev. dear Sir, yours faithfully,

NEOSACERDOS.

Oct. 13th, 1901.

1. As standing is the rubrical posture for the Gospel, and as there is no objection to saying the Rosary in this posture, we think that the people should stand during the Gospel.

2. We understand the case to be that of a person who, though in no immediate danger of death, is yet infirm enough to be entitled to have Holy Communion administered in his house.

The same prayers and ceremonies should be observed, as in the administration of the Viaticum, including the blessing with the Pyxis, except that the form '*Corpus Domini*,' etc., is used instead of '*Accipe, frater*,' etc., as is evident from the Ritnal, Tit. iv., cap. 4.

P. O'LEARY.

DOCUMENTS

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE IRISH HIERARCHY AND
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD REGARDING NUNS
AS HOSPITAL NURSES

THE following correspondence, which took place in 1895 and 1899 between the Representatives of the Bishops and the Local Government Board, fully sets forth, *inter alia*, the qualifications required of Nuns for appointment as Nurses (Assistant) in Workhouse Hospitals, and also the status and authority of the particular Nun who is *The Nurse* of an hospital. The regulations here laid down are still in force. The letters which passed in 1895 were published in the I. E. RECORD of 1896 (pp. 1035 and 1036), but it will, perhaps, be convenient to republish them in connexion with those of 1899:—

THE COLLEGE, MAYNOOTH,
17th October, 1895.

GENTLEMEN,—We, as Secretaries, have been directed to convey to you the unanimous request of the Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, assembled at Maynooth on the 16th instant, that you would extend the recent Athlone regulation as to night-nursing to the other unions of Ireland where nuns are engaged in hospital work. The regulation referred to is the one notified to the Bishop of Ardagh by Major Rutledge Fair. The Bishops further request that nuns should not be required to be present at surgical operations, a duty that may, without difficulty, be imposed upon the trained nurses.—We have the honour to be, your faithful Servants,

✠ F. J. M'CORMACK,	} Hon. Secretaries.
✠ J. HEALY,	

The Commissioners,
Local Government Board, Dublin.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD, DUBLIN,
18th October, 1895.

MY LORD,—I am directed by the Local Government Board for Ireland to acknowledge the receipt of a letter, dated the

17th instant, signed by you and the Coadjutor Bishop of Clonfert and to state that the subject to which it relates will receive the attention of the Board.—I am, my Lord, your obedient Servant,

J. MACSHEAHAN,
Assistant Secretary.

To the Most Rev. F. J. M'Cormack, D.D.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD, DUBLIN,
24th October, 1895.

MY LORDS,—I am directed by the Local Government Board for Ireland to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordships' letter of the 17th instant, on the subject of the duties of nuns acting as nurses in workhouse infirmaries.

The Board desires me to inform you that a General Order was issued on the 28th of June last, including the office of Nurse of the Workhouse among the appointments which the Boards of Guardians are required to make. This order has the effect of constituting the nurse of the workhouse the head of the nursing staff, and all the other nurses are, therefore, in the position of assistants to her, and must be subject to her directions and control.

In unions where nuns already officiate as nurses, the superiress as head nurse is the responsible officer, and must exercise entire control over the other nurses, whether lay nurses or otherwise; and the Board will request Guardians of these unions to notify this to the member of the community who is acting as head nurse.

In unions where a lay nurse already occupies the position of nurse of the workhouse, if nuns are hereafter appointed in addition, the lay nurse will continue to hold her present position as head nurse unless some other arrangement or division of responsibility is made with the concurrence of the Guardians and the officers concerned.

With regard to Your Lordships' request that nuns should not be required to be present at surgical operations, I am to state that the Board do not consider it would be competent for them to make this distinction in the case of nuns who may be acting as hospital nurses; but they desire to point out that wherever there is a lay trained nurse in an hospital under the nuns, it will b

within the power of the superioress, as head nurse, to assign the duty of attending operations to her trained assistant.—I am, my Lords, your obedient Servant,

D. J. MACSHEAHAN,
Assistant Secretary.

To the Most Rev. Dr. M'Cormack,
Bishop of Galway ; and
The Most Rev. Dr. Healy,
Coadjutor Bishop of Clonfert.

LIMERICK,
23rd October, 1899.

DEAR SIR,—In the course of the interview, which we had the honour of having with you and Dr. Stafford at Local Government Board Office on the 13th instant, you were good enough to say that you would give us a written memorandum of the views which you then expressed on various questions connected with the position of nuns as nurses in workhouse hospitals, and you suggested that we should furnish you with a statement of the particular points to which you might address yourself.

Accordingly, we have the honour to submit to you that the principal topics which you then dealt with may be brought under the following heads :—

(1) As to the introduction of a trained nurse into each workhouse hospital, we should desire to have a statement, (a) of the principle that has governed the action of the Local Government Board ; (b) as to the special duties for which it is considered desirable to introduce such a nurse ; (c) as to her relations with the nuns in case they are already in charge of the hospital ; (d) as to the extent to which the Local Government Board can go in contributing to the payment of salary of such trained nurses.

(2) In cases in which Boards of Guardians may desire to introduce nuns for the first time into workhouse hospitals instead of lay nurses, what are the requirements of the Local Government Board (a) as to formalities to be gone through, (b) as to qualifications as nurses of the nuns ?

(3) Where nuns are already in charge of an hospital and require to change one of their staff, what are the requirements of the Local Government Board (a) as to formalities, (b) as to the

qualifications of the incoming sister?—We have the honour to be,
dear Sir, your obedient Servants,

✠ ABRAHAM,

Bishop of Ossory.

✠ EDWARD THOMAS,

Bishop of Limerick.

To H. Robinson, Esq.,

Vice-President, L. G. Board.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD,

DUBLIN, 14th November, 1899.

MY LORD,—I have received your letter of the 23rd ult., asking for some information as to the views of the Local Government Board with regard to the introduction of nuns into workhouses, and to the object of the Government in making provision for the appointment of a trained nurse in workhouses in which nuns are already in charge of the hospitals.

With respect to the first question I desire to assure your Lordship that the Board have invariably supported proposals made by Boards of Guardians to place their hospitals under the charge of nuns, and they have been influenced in doing so by the fact, that the presence of the nuns in hospitals goes a long way towards removing the objections which the sick poor have to entering these institutions. Furthermore, the Board are fully sensible of the excellent work of reform which has been effected by the nuns in the workhouses which have been placed under their charge. The cleanliness, good order, and comfort, and the improved moral tone which seems invariably to follow upon the introduction of the nuns is very striking.

With respect to the appointment of trained nurses in each workhouse, the Board have for some time past been strongly urging on the Guardians of all workhouses the propriety of appointing at least one trained nurse in their infirmary with the highest possible qualifications, and they believe this course is desirable both in workhouse hospitals which are already in charge of nuns, as well as in those which are in charge of lay officials. The Board were confirmed in this opinion by the recommendations made to them by the Bishops at Maynooth, to the effect that nuns in workhouse hospitals should not be required to attend at surgical operations, and that this duty should be assigned to a trained nurse. Moreover it was felt that not only would it be of

the utmost advantage to the nuns to have the assistance of a highly skilled nurse in case of serious emergency, but that the appointment of such an officer would prevent certain nursing duties, which some nuns are prohibited by the rules of their Order from personally undertaking, from falling into the hands of paupers or unskilled wardsmaids.

The other special duties which a trained nurse would be required to perform must be a matter of arrangement with the hospital authorities, but the trained nurse, if appointed to a workhouse which is in charge of the nuns, would be under the authority and control of the sister superioress officiating as 'nurse of the workhouse,' and would take directions from her in precisely the same way as every assistant nurse is required to do.

From the foregoing statement of the position and duties of the trained assistant nurse, it will be seen that any impression which may have gained ground that the restriction of the Government Grant to one trained nurse in each workhouse is prejudicial to the interests of the nuns, is entirely the reverse of the fact, and that the effect of the provision will rather be to strengthen their hands by giving them skilled instead of unskilled assistance.

I trust it is clear to Your Lordship from this explanation that there is no desire or intention to supersede the nuns, who will not cease to be the responsible officers in charge of every workhouse in which they at present officiate, whether a trained nurse is appointed hereafter or not.

In the case, however, of nuns being introduced for the first time to a workhouse where there is already a head nurse, whether trained or untrained, the latter officer would retain her position until she dies, resigns, or is removed by the Local Government Board. If the Guardians, therefore, in such a case, desire to introduce nuns for the first time to the workhouse, it would be better to wait for the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of head nurse, unless by agreement with the latter officer some satisfactory arrangement for the apportionment of the nursing duties can be made. The requirements of the Local Government Board in regard to the appointment of nuns are mainly that they should agree to conform to the provisions of the Poor-Law and to the orders and regulations of the Local Government Board.

While the Board have not hitherto required from the nuns appointed as nurses any specific term of training in a union or other hospital, they have at present under consideration the

advisability of fixing a period during which it will be necessary for them to receive instruction and gain practical experience in the care and management of the sick previous to their appointment as head nurses or charge nurses in union infirmaries. The standard of training thus contemplated would, of course, be considerably lower than is required to qualify a 'trained' nurse in the technical sense of the term.

The Board would be glad to be favoured with the Bishops' views as to what minimum period of hospital training could be fixed in the case of nuns, and whether there would be any objection to the nuns submitting to an examination and obtaining a certificate of proficiency after they have undergone the necessary tuition from competent teachers. It would be desirable that the head nurse should have had considerably more experience than the charge or assistant nurses, and the Board think that two years' training in a union or other hospital in the case of the head nurse of the workhouse, and one year's training in the case of a charge nurse, would be reasonable periods to prescribe.

The Board have found, as a rule, every desire on the part of the nursing sisters to fall in with the General Regulations. In one or two unions, however, difficulties have, from time to time, occurred owing to the nuns being changed without the knowledge of the Board of Guardians or the Local Government Board. This is irregular, and should not be done, as the payment to the substitute in such circumstances would be illegal, and the auditor would be bound to surcharge it if it came to his knowledge. The proper course for the sisters to adopt in such cases involves very little trouble. The superioress, acting as head nurse, should report the sickness or unavoidable absence of any of her staff to the Guardians, and should recommend to them a substitute who is competent and willing to take up the duties temporarily, and the Guardians could then make an appointment forthwith.

In the case of the resignation of a nurse and the appointment of a permanent successor, the Guardians can only make the appointment after public notification of the vacancy, and after due notice in writing to each Guardian. This position may seem unnecessary in the case of nuns, but it is in accordance with the law, and the Local Government Board have no power to vary it in the case of particular officers.

The Board hope that, having regard to the foregoing explanation, the steps which they are taking towards placing the nursing

in workhouses upon a proper and efficient footing will receive the support of the Bishops.—I have the honour to be, my Lord, your obedient Servant,

H. A. ROBINSON.

The Most Rev. E. T. O'Dwyer, D.D.,
Lord Bishop of Limerick.

THE PALACE, CORBALLY,
LIMERICK, 15th November, '99.

DEAR MR. ROBINSON,—Many thanks for your letter and the very full memorandum which you have sent me.

The Bishop of Ossory and myself will submit it to the Bishops at their next meeting, but I fear that it will not be held for some months. The only point about which there may be some difficulty is that of the preparation of nuns for undertaking the duties of nursing, and on that I am quite sure we shall be able to strike out a good working *modus vivendi*.

With reference to a certificate it may be worth while to observe that the Commissioners of National Education require certificates of competence and classification from their secular teachers, but not from nuns. Is there not an *a fortiori* case for them as nurses?—I am, very truly yours,

✠ E. T.,
Bishop of Limerick.

To H. Robinson, Esq.,
Vice-President L. G. Board.

THE PALACE, CORBALLY,
LIMERICK, 20th November, '99.

DEAR MR. ROBINSON,—From what I can gather I do not think that there will be any objection to nuns being required to go through some previous training before undertaking charge of a workhouse hospital for the first time, but I am quite sure that a proposal to submit them to any formal examination, and to require them to get a certificate, would be regarded with grave dissatisfaction.

I should like to submit to your consideration as a suggestion, coming entirely from myself, an idea that strikes me. It is that it might meet all your purposes if a certificate were given by the nun in charge of a workhouse hospital which you regarded as efficient, to the effect that Sister X. had gone through, say, a period of training for two years, and was competent to take charge of a

workhouse hospital. This would be thoroughly reliable as to the fact of the training, and would be a reasonable assurance of the fitness of the candidate for appointment. I prefer it to a doctor's certificate for many reasons. I should think, too, that the periods you suggest of two years and one year for sister superior and assistants would be considered reasonable.—I am, very truly yours,

✠ E. T.,

Bishop of Limerick.

To H. Robinson, Esq.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD,
DUBLIN, 22/11/'99.

DEAR LORD BISHOP,—I have received yours of the 20th inst., and we shall gladly accept your proposal as to the certificate to be given by the nuns, as it will go a very long way towards meeting our difficulties in the matter. But at the same time I would put it to their Lordships whether it would not be far better calculated to give all sections of the public confidence in the skill and competence of the nuns as nurses if they could get the certificates from qualified medical men.

If this could be arranged it would greatly strengthen our hands in our efforts to extend the authority and the sphere of influence of the nuns in Poor-Law institutions.

Therefore, while we welcome your suggestion, we hope that their Lordships may ultimately see their way to go a step further in the matter.—I beg to remain, very truly yours,

H. ROBINSON.

The Most Rev. E. T. O'Dwyer, D.D.,
Lord Bishop of Limerick.

**DECREE CONDEMNING DEVOTION TO THE SOUL OF
OUR LORD**

DECRETA CONDEMNATORIA DEVOTIONIS ERGA ANIMAM SSAM.

D. N. I. C.

Feria IV, die 1 Maii, 1901. .

Delatis ad Supremam Congregationem S. Officii supplicibus literis, una cum nonnullis precandi formulis, pro approbatione devotionis erga SSmam. Animam D. N. I. C., Emi. DD. Cardinales Inquisitores Generales decreverunt: 'Publicentur decreta condemnatoria devotionis, de qua sermo.'

Haec decreta sunt sequentia :

1. Cum a S. Rituum Congregatione nonnulla ad S. Officium remissa fuissent circa devotionem erga Ss. Animam D. N. I. C., fer. IV die 10 Martii 1875 decretum fuit: 'Providendum ne in publico Ecclesiae cultu, praetextu devotionis erga Ssmam. Animam Christi, improbandae novitates in imaginibus et precationum formulis aliisque rebus sacris irreparent aut, inconsulta S. Sede, quidquam novi inducatur, maxime si deriventur ex revelationibus aut visionibus, nec examinatis, nec approbatis. In scriptis vero ad S. Rituum Congregationem missis nonnulla reperiri minime probanda, sine quorum emendatione permittendum non esse, ut illa in vulgus edantur.'

2. Anno 1893, exhibitis precibus pro fundatione Instituti pro adoratione Animae Ssmae D. N. I. C., fer. IV die 10 Maii eiusdem anni, iidem Emi. Patres decretum tulere: 'S. Congregatio precibus respondet: Negative. Idque scribendum Episcopo, qui retrahat indulgentias adfixas orationibus et cuilibet earum verbo, fidemque non adhibeat revelationibus, de quibus agitur; et communicetur Episcopo decretum latum anno 1875.'

3. Tandem eodem anno eademque fer. IV ad examen vocata quadam precandi formula Animae Iesu Christi, Emi. Patres eam emendandam mandarunt, et communicandum Episcopo, qui eam probaverat, decretum supra relatum.

Quae omnia in solita audientia Ssmo. D. N. Leone Papa XIII approbata et confirmata fuere.

I. Can. MANCINI, *S. R. et U. Iquisit. Notarius.*

THE TRANSMISSION OF THE HOLY OILS

DUBIA QUOAD TRANSMISSIONEM OLEORUM SACRORUM PER SOCIETATES MERCATORIAS

BEATISSIME PATER,

Ludovicus M. Fink O. S. B. Episcopus Lavenworthien in statu Kansas Americ. Septentrion. Statibus Unitis ad pedes S. V. quam humillime provolutus exponit ac petit ut sequitur:

1. Brevi tempore ante Pascha anni praeteriti in ephemeride Americana pro Rev. do Clero edita, quaestio discussa est, utrum sacra olea ad sacerdotes missionarios, salva conscientia, per *Express* transmitti possint? *The Express* est societas Mercatoria, quae res varias transmittendas recipit, verbi gratia: esculenta ac poculenta, pecuniam, aves, canes, feles, vitulos, sues, aliaque animalia resque diversas. Personae illas res tractantes generaliter

sunt haeretici vel ethnici, inter quos hic et nunc vix catholicus invenitur.

2. Transmissio per *Express* ss. Oleorum multis sacerdotibus valde arridet, quia minore pecuniae summa fit quam eorum itinere ad urbem Cathedralis Ecclesiae, minorem temporis iacturam sacerdotes patiuntur et meliore modo ad sacras functiones Hebdomadae Sanctae et Paschatis sese praeparare valent.

3. Multis Episcopis et sacerdotibus talis ss. Oleorum transmissio scandalosa permixtio rei sacrae cum rebus profanis, et contra religiosam pietatem; aliis autem perfecte legitimus modus ac nullam indecentiam prae se ferens esse videtur. Addere licet quod Episcopi tali modo transmissionis adversi tamquam viri morosi, nimis rigorosi ac fautores viarum aevi medii habeantur.

Res cum ita sint a S. Sede Apostolica petitur solutio huius quaestionis:

I. Licet ne sacra olea ab Episcopo consecrata per *Express* ad sacerdotes transmittere, ut supra expositum est?

II. Licet ne illa sacra olea ad Sacerdotes mittere per viros laicos, quo sacerdotum convenientiae valde consulatur?

Feria IV, die 1 Maii, 1901.

In Congregatione Generali habita ab Emis. ac Rmis. DD. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus, propositis suprascriptis dubiis, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum S. O. voto, iidem Emi. respondendum censuerunt:

Ad I. *Non licere.*

Ad II. *Deficientibus clericis, affirmative, modo constet de laicorum, qui ad id deputantur, fidelitate.*

Insequenti vero feria VI, die 3 eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita relatione a R. P. D. Commissario Gen. S. Officii facta SSmo. D. N. D. Leoni Div. Prov. PP. XIII., idem SSmus. Dnus. responsionem Emorum. Patrum approbavit.

I. Can. MANCINI, S. R. et U. Inquisit. Notarius.

THE LITANY OF LORETTO AND PRAYERS AFTER MASS

EX S. CONGREGATIONE RITUUM

BRUNEN. DUBIA QUOAD LITANIAS LAURETANAS ET PRECES POST
MISSAM DICENDAS

Rmus. Dnus. Franciscus Salesius Bauer, Episcopus Brunensis, a Sacrorum Rituum Congregatione sequentium dubiorum solutionem humiliter expostulavit; nimirum:

I. Utrum Litaniae Lauretanae post tertium *Agnus Dei* rite ac recte absolvi possint, addito statim versiculo, responsorio et oratione, vel inserto prius *Christe, audi nos*, etc., prouti fit in Litanis Sanctorum, cum *Pater* et *Ave* vel uno alterove?

II. Oratio ad S. Ioseph, in mense Octobri ponenda est inter Rosarium et Litanias, an post Litanias rite absolutas?

III. Quandonam dicendae sunt cum populo preces post quamvis Missam sine cantu praescriptae, si S. Rosarium, Litaniae et oratio ad S. Ioseph non eodem cum Missa momento finiunt?

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, audito voto Commissionis Liturgicae omnibusque perpensis respondendum censuit:

Ad I. Litaniae Lauretanae concludendae sunt uti in Appendice Ritualis Romani, omissis *Christe, audi nos*, etc.; versiculus autem, responsorium et oratio post dictas Litanias mutari possunt pro temporis diversitate.

Ad II. Oratio ad S. Ioseph in fine Litaniarum Lauretanarum adiungi potest, iuxta prudens arbitrium Episcopi.

Ad III. 'Preces a SSmo. D. N. Leone Papa XIII in fine Missae praescriptae recitandae sunt immediate, expleto ultimo Evangelio,' ita ut aliae preces interponi nequeant, iuxta decisionem S.R.C. in una *Basileen.* N. 3682, diei 23 Novembris 1887; et si, Missa absoluta, Rosarium a populo recitandum, non sit finitum, Celebrans dictas preces recitet cum Ministro solo.

Atque ita rescripsit. Die 7 Decembris, 1900.

DOMINICUS Card. FERRATA, S.R.C. Praefectus.

L. ✱ S.

✱ DIOMEDES PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen.

S.R.C. Secretarius.

CHANGES IN THE ROMAN MARTYROLOGY

VARIATIONES ET ADDITIONES. PRO MARTYROLOGIO ROMANO

Die 11 Februarii

Tertio Idus Februarii.

Hetruriae in Monte Senario Sanctorum Septem Fundatorum Ordinis Servorum Beatae Mariae Virginis, qui post asperrimum vitae genus, meritis et prodigiis clari, pretiosam in Domino mortem obierunt. Quos autem in vita unas verae fraternitatis spiritus sociavit et indivisa post obitum populi veneratio prosecuta est, Leo Decimustertius una pariter Sanctorum fastis accensuit.

In Africa natalis Sanctorum Martyrum, etc.

Die 8 Martii

Octavo Idus Martii

Granatae in Hispania, Sancti Ioannis de Deo, Ordinis Fratrum Hospitalitatis Infirmorum Institutoris, misericordia in pauperes et sui desipientia celebris; quem Leo Decimustertius Pontifex Maximus omnium hospitalium et infirmorum caelestem Patronum renuntiavit.

Die 14 Aprilis

Decimoctavo Kalendas Maii

Sancti Iustini Martyris, cuius memoria pridie huius diei recensetur.

Die 16 Aprilis

Sextodecimo Kalendas Maii

Romae, natalis Sancti Benedicti Iosephi Labre Confessoris, contemptu sui et extremae voluntariae paupertatis laude insignis.

Die 15 Maii

Idibus Maii

Rothomagi, Sancti Ioannis Baptistae de La Selle Confessoris: qui in erudienda adolescentia praesertim paupere excellens, et de religione civilique societate praeclare meritus, Fratrum Scholarum Christianarum sodalitatem instituit.

Die 17 Maii

Sextodecimo Kalendas Iunii

Apud Villam Regalem in Regno Valentino, Sancti Paschalis, Ordinis Minorum, mirae innocentiae et poenitentiae viri, quem Leo Decimustertius coetuum eucharisticorum et societatum a Sanctissima Eucharistia Patronum caelestem declaravit.

Die 23 Maii

Decimo Kalendas Iunii

Romae, natalis Sancti Ioannis Baptistae De Rossi Confessoris, patientia et charitate in evangelizandis pauperibus insignis.

Die 22 Iunii

Decimo Kalendas Iulii

Romae, Beati Innocentii Papae quinti, qui ad tuendam Ecclesiae libertatem et Christianorum concordiam suavi prudentia adlaboravit. Cultum ei exhibitum Leo Decimustertius Pontifex Maximus ratum habuit et confirmavit.

Die 5 Iulii

Tertio Nonas Iulii

Cremonae in Insubria, Sancti Antonii Mariae Zaccaria Confessoris, Clericorum Regularium S. Pauli et Angelicarum Virginum Institutoris, quem virtutibus omnibus et miraculis insignem Leo Decimustertius inter Sanctos adscripsit. Eius corpus Mediolani in ecclesia S. Barnabae colitur.

Die 8 Iulii

Octavo Idus Iulii

Romae, Beati Eugenii Papae tertii, qui postquam coenobium Sanctorum Vicentii et Anastasii ad Aquas Salvias magna sanctimoniae ac prudentia laude rexisset, Pontifex Maximus renunciatus, Ecclesiam universam sanctissime gubernavit. Pius Nonus Pontifex Maximus cultum ei exhibitum ratum habuit et confirmavit.

Die 18 Iulii

Quintodecimo Kalendas Augusti

Sancti Camilli De Lellis Confessoris, Clericorum Regularium infirmis ministrantium Institutoris, cuius natalis dies pridie Idus Iulii recensetur: Quem Leo Decimustertius Pontifex Maximus hospitalium et infirmorum caelestem Patronum renunciavit.

Die 19 Iulii

Quartodecimo Kalendas Augusti

Sancti Vincentii a Paulo Confessoris, qui obdormivit in Domino quinto Kalendas Octobris. Hunc Leo Decimustertius omnium societatum caritatis in toto catholico orbe existentium et ab eo quomocumque promanantium, caelestem apud Deum Patronum constituit.

Die 22 Iulii

Undecimo Kalendas Augusti

Ulyssipone, Sancti Laurentii a Brundusio Confessoris Ordinis Minorum Sancti Francisci Capuccinorum Ministri Generalis divini verbi praedicatione et arduis pro Dei gloria gestis praeclari a Leoni Decimotertio Summo Pontifice Sanctorum fastis adscripti, assignata eius festivitata Nonis Iulii.

Dio 13 Augusti

Idibus Augusti

Romae, natalis Sancti Ioannis Berchmans scholastici e Societate Iesu, vitae innocentia et religiosae disciplinae custodia insignis, cui Leo Decimustertius Pontifex Maximus caelitem Sanctorum honores decrevit.

Die 18 Augusti

Quintodecimo Kalendas Septembris

In Montefalco Umbriae, Beatae Clarae Virginis, Monialis Ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini, in cuius visceribus Dominicae Passionis mysteria renovata, maxima cum devotione venerantur. Eam Leo Decimustertius Summus Pontifex Sanctarum Virginum albo solemniter ritu adscripsit.

Die 19 Augusti

Quartodecimo Kalendas Septembris

Romae, Beati Urbani Papae secundi, qui Sancti Gregorii septimi vestigia sequutus, doctrinae et religionis studio enituit, et fideles cruce signatos ad sacra Palestinae loca ab infidelium potestate redimenda excitavit. Cultum ab immemorabili tempore eidem exhibitum Leo Decimustertius Pontifex Maximus ratum habuit et confirmavit.

Die 7 Septembris

Septimo Idus Septembris

Nonantulae in Aemilia, S. Hadriani Papae tertii, studio conciliandi Ecclesiae Romanae Orientales insignis. Sanctissime obiit Spinae Lamberti ac miraculis claruit.

Die 9 Septembris

Quinto Idus Septembris

Carthagine nova in America meridionali, Sancti Petri Claver Confessoris e Societate Iesu, qui mira sui abnegatione et eximia caritate Nigritis in servitutum abductis, annos amplius quadraginta,

operam impendens, tercenta fere eorum millia Christo sua ipse manu regeneravit, et a Leone Decimotertio Pontifice Maximo in Sanctorum numerum relatus est.

Die 10 Octobris

Sexto Idus Octobris

Romae, Beati Ioannes Leonardi Confessoris, Fundatoris Congregationis Clericorum Regularium a Matre Dei, laboribus ac miraculis clari: cuius opera Missiones a Propaganda Fide institutae sunt.

Die 16 Octobris

Decimoseptimo Kalendas Novembris

Cassini, Beati Victoris Papae tertii, qui Gregorii septimi successor Apostolicam Sedem novo splendore illustravit, insignem de Saracensis triumphum divina ope consecutus. Cultum ab immemorabili tempore eidem exhibitum Leo Decimustertius Pontifex Maximus ratum habuit et confirmavit.

Die 30 Octobris

Tertio Kalendas Novembris

Palmae in Maiorica, Sancti Alphonsi Rodriguez Confessoris coadiutoris temporalis formati Societatis Iesu, humilitate ac iugi mortificationis studio insignis, quem Leo Duodecimus Beatorum, Leo vero Decimustertius Sanctorum fastis adscripsit.

Die 9 Decembris

Quinto Idus Decembris

Graii in Burgundia, Sancti Patri Fourier Canonici Regularis Salvatoris Nostri, Canonissarum Regularium Dominae Nostrae edocendis puellis Institutoris, quem virtutibus ac miraculis clarum Leo Decimustertius Sanctorum catalogo adiunxit.

Die 19 Decembris

Quartodecimo Kalendas Ianuarii

Avenione, Beati Urbani Papae quinti: qui, Sede Apostolica Romae restituta, Graecorum cum Latinis coniunctione perfecta, infidelibus coercitis, de Ecclesia optime meritis est. Eius cultum pervetustum Pius Nonus Pontifex Maximus ratum habuit et confirmavit.

Concordant cum Originalibus. In fidem, etc.
Ex Secretaria Sacrorum Rituum Congregationis, die 11 Martii,
1901.

Pro R. P. D. DIOMEDE PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen.,*
L. ✙ S. *Secretario.*
PHILIPPUS CAN. DI FAVA, *Substitutus.*

THE FEAST OF ST. JOHN BAPTIST DE LA SALLE

URBIS ET ORBIS, QUOAD FESTUM S. IOANNIS BAPTISTAE DE LA SALLE

Ad humillimas preces Rev. Fr. Robustiani, Procuratoris Generalis et Postulatoris Congregationis Fratrum Scholarum Christianarum, ab infrascripto Cardinali Sacro Consilio legitimis Ritibus cognoscendis ac tuendis Praefecto relatas, Sanctissimus Dominus Noster Leo Papa XIII, ex ipsius Sacrae Congregationis consulto, benigne, concedere dignatus est, ut festum Sancti Ioannis Baptistae de la Salle Conf., cum Officio et Missa de Communi Conf. non Pont., exceptis Oratione et Lectionibus secundi ac tertii Nocturni propriis, sub ritu duplo minoris, die decimaquinta Maii, post annum 1902, ab universa Ecclesia quotannis recolatur; mandavitque ut Calendario Universali ac novis editionibus Breviarii et Missalis Romani eiusmodi festum cum supradicto Officio ac Missa (de eodem Communi *Os iusti* praeter Orationem et Evangelium) inscribatur, nec non elogium, prout huic praeiacet Decreto, Martyrologia Romano inseratur. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque. Die 10 Februarii, 1901.

D. Card. FERRATA, *Praef.*

L. ✙ S.

✙ DIOMEDES PANICI, *S.R.C. Secretarius.*

THE DEVOTION OF THE NEW CROSS

DUBIUM. AN LICITA SIT DEVOTIO NOVAE CRUCIS IMMACULATAE
BEATISSIMO PADRE,

L'Arcivescovo di N. nelle Americhe, prostrato ai piedi della S. V., umilmente espone che un nuovo articolo di divozione è stato ivi messo in commercio sotto il nome di *Nuova Croce della Immacolata Concezione*. E una medaglia in forma di croce, portante la Immagine non di N. S. G. C. ma della Immacolata da una parte e de' Sacri Cuori col monogramma della B. V. dall' altra. Chiede perciò l' oracolo della S. V. se siffatta divozione possa o pur no approvarsi.

Feria IV, die 13 Martii, 1901.

In Congregatione Generali S. R. et U. Inquisitionis, ab Emis.

ac Rmis. DD. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus habita, propositis supradictis precibus, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, iidem EE. ac RR. Patres respondendum mandarunt :

Devotionem praedictam, uti est, non esse probandam.

Sequenti vero feria VI eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita audientia SS. D. N. Leonis Div. Prov. Pp. XIII, a R. P. D. Assessore S. Officii habita, SSmus. D. N. resolutionem EE. et RR. Patrum approbavit.

I. Can. MANCINI, S. R. et U. Inquisit. Notarius.

THE POWERS OF A VICAR-GENERAL

RESCRIPTUM. INDULGETUR UT VICARIUS GENERALIS EPISCOPI N. DUM HIC ABSENS SIT VEL IMPEDITUS, VALEAT DELEGARE CONFESSARIIS FACULTATEM RECIPIENDI DENUNTIATIONES SOLLICITATIONUM.

BEATISSIME PATER,

Archiepiscopus N. N., ad Sanctitatis Vestrae pedes provolutus, humiliter quae sequuntur exponit :

Instructio S. C. Inquisitionis 14 Iulii 1753 negat Vicariis Episcoporum facultatem delegandi confessarium ut denuntiationem excipiat sollicitationis ad turpia. Iam vero saepe occurrit, vel occurrere potest, ut Episcopus ab Urbe residentiali absit, vel domi aegrotet, vel alio quocumque modo impediatur, et interim casus sit urgentior, ita ut confessarius qui delegationem petit, nequeat eum adire. Hac de causa a Sanctitate Vestra humiliter rogo praedictam facultatem, qua Vicarii Generales huius Archidieceaseos delegare possint in casibus necessariis simplices confessarios ut denuntiationes excipiant.

Quod et Deus, etc.

Feria IV, die 20 Martii, 1901.

In Congregatione Generale S. R. et U. Inquisitionis ab Emis. ac Rmus. DD. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus habita, propositis supradictis precibus, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, iidem EE. ac RR. Patres rescribendum mandarunt :

Supplicandum SSmo. iuxta preces.

Sequenti vero feria VI, die 22 eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita audientia SS. D. N. Leonis Div. Prov. Pp. XIII, a R. P. D. Assessore S. Officii habita, SSmus. D. N. petitam gratiam benigne concessit.

I. Can. MANCINI, S. R. et U. Inquisit. Notarius.

VALIDITY OF DISPENSATIONS

RESPONSUM. DISPENSATIO NON INVALIDATUR ETIAMSI POENITENTIA
EXCEPTA FUERIT CUM ANIMO EAM NON IMPLENDI

BEATISSIMO PADRE,

Nelle dispense di occulto impedimento gli autori provati insegnano che se il Confessore, per colpevole negligenza, non impone la penitenza, gravemente pecca, ma secondo la quasi comune sentenza, in dispensa si esegue validamente: 'non vero si poenitens, gravem suscipiendo poenitentiam, intentionem eam implendi non habeat.' Insegnano che pur valida sarà la dispensa se la confessione sarà nulla e sacrilega, o anche se non si riceva assoluzione. Sicché non dalla invalidità della confessione, o dall' inadempimento posteriore della penitenza, ma dall'intenzione di non adempirla i predetti Teologi fan derivare l'invalidità della dispensa. Di tali finzioni ne avvengono continuamente, cioè di accettare la penitenza senza intenzione di adempirla. Per questo si mandò la prima supplica, senza di questo motivo quella supplica sarebbe stata per lo meno inopportuna.

Sacra Poenitentiaria Dilecto in Christo Vicario Generali scribenti super praemissis respondet: Clausulae praescribenti impositionem poenitentiae censi satisfactum etiamsi ficto animo ab iis suscipiatur qui dispensantur.

Datum Romae in S. Poenitentiari, 12 Novembris, 1891.

R. Card. MONACO, *P.M.*

P. Can. MARTINI, *S.P. Secretarius.*

SOLUTION OF VARIOUS DOUBTS

EX S. CONGREGATIONE RITUUM

SENOGALLIEN. DUBIA VARIA

R. D. Primus Battistini, Mansionarius et Caeremoniarum Magister Ecclesiae Cathedralis Senogallien. de consensu Rmi. sui Ordinarii, a Sacrorum Rituum Congregatione sequentium dubiorum solutionem humillime expostulavit, nimirum:

I. Ad quos spectet Missam Conventualem sive de feria sive de festo diebus ferialibus in Cathedrali Ecclesia celebrare?

II. Utrum dies 19 et 25 Martii computandi sint inter feriales, ita ut Missa Conventualis de feria ad Mansionarios spectet, cum in illis Festa S. Ioseph et Annuntiationis Deiparae occurrant?

III. Nam Mansionariis legitime impeditis in casu liceat pro Missa Conventuali sibi substituere Sacerdotem, qui non sit de gremio Ecclesiae Cathedralis?

IV. Utrum tolerari possit consuetudo recitandi Sextam et Nonam Horam ante Missam Conventualem?

V. Possuntne psalmi ita alternatim dici, ut versus alter concinatur a choro, alter vero recitetur sub organo, clara ac distincta voce, ab uno ex Mansionariis?

VI. Utrum, absente vel deficiente sacri concentus schola, quae ex Ecclesiae huius consuetudine relativas Missae partes cantabiles et Vesperarum psalmos, uti quandoque et Matutini, exequi solet, Canonici et Mansionarii teneantur a seipsis supplere saltem in Cantu Gregoriano?

VII. Utrum Chorales ad asteriscum psalmorum pausam facere teneantur?

VIII. Utrum organa pulsari queant feria V in Coena Domini per totum hymnum Angelicum et Sabbato Sancto ab eiusdem hymni initio et deinceps?

Sacra porro Rituum Congregatio, referente subscripto Secretario, praehabita informatione et sententia Rmi. Dni. Ordinarii Senogallien. audito etiam Rmo. Capitulo illius Ecclesiae Cathedralis aliisque interesse habentibus, atque exquisito voto Commissionis Liturgicae omnibusque accurate perpensis, ita respondendum censuit:

Ad I. Ad Mansionarios per turnum iuxta Decretum 2548, Senogallien. diei 18 Februarii, 1794.

Ad II. Affirmative.

Ad III. Negative et ad mentem.

Ad IV. Regulariter negative et servantur Rubricae.

Ad V. Affirmative: dummodo et organa non sileant, et insufficienti habeatur choralium numerus.

Ad VI. Affirmative.

Ad VII. Affirmative et servetur Decretum 3122 S. Iacobi de Chile diei 9 Iulii, 1864.

Ad VIII. Affirmative iuxta Decretum 3515 Viglevanen. diei 11 Iunii, 1880, ad IV, et Rubricas.

Atque ita rescripsit, Die 4 Martii, 1901.

DOMINICUS Card. FERRATA, *S.R.C. Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

✠ DIOMEDES PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen., Secr.*

THE FEAST OF THE ANGEL GUARDIAN OF A KINGDOM
DUBIUM QUOAD FESTUM PARTICULARE S. ANGELI CUSTODIS REGNI

Ab hodiernis Calendariorum redactoribus quarundam dioecesium Hispaniae Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi sequens dubium pro opportuna declaratione humiliter expositum fuit, nimirum :

An Festum particulare Sancti Angeli Custodis Regni sit primarium vel secundarium ?

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, exquisito voto Commissionis Liturgicae etiam typis impresso, in Ordinariis Comitibus die 5 Februarii vertentis anni 1901 ad Vaticanum habitis, proposito dubio per infrascriptum Cardinalem ipsius Sacrae Congregationi Praefectum, omnibus accurate perpensis, respondendum esse censuit : *Negative* ad primam partem ; *Affirmative* ad secundam.

Quam Sacri Consilii resolutionem SSmo. Domino Nostro Leoni Papae XIII per ipsum infrascriptum Cardinalem relattam Sanctitas Sua probavit et confirmavit.

Die 9 Februarii, 1901.

DOMINICUS Card. FERRATA, *S. Rit. Congr. Praef.*

L. ✠ S.

✠ DIOMEDES PANICI, *Archiep. Laodicen. Secret.*

NOTICES OF BOOKS

CONCILIUM TRIDENTINUM DIARIORUM, ACTORUM, EPISTULARUM, TRACTATUUM NOVA COLLECTIO. Edidit Societas Goerresiana, promovendis inter Germanos Catholicos Litterarum Studiis. Tomus I. Diariorum Pars Prima. Friburgi Brisgoviae : Sumptibus Herder. Unbound, 60 marks ; bound, 66 marks, 40 pfennigs.

THE 'Goerresgesellschaft' have undertaken the noble project of bringing together and publishing in one great collection all the original literature of the Council of Trent, its diaries, acts, letters and treatises, and of thus giving to the public in one series of volumes the truest and most authentic account of one of the most momentous events in the history of the world. We have before us the first volume of the series, a splendid tome of 930 pages well printed, well arranged and most carefully edited.

The first volume is mainly occupied by the commentary of Severoli, and the diary of Angelo Massarelli. Massarelli was secretary to the Council, and an authentic and carefully edited transcript of his diary was much needed, those hitherto in existence being incomplete and inaccurate. The thanks of the whole ecclesiastical world are due to the learned Würzburg professor Dr. Sebastian Merkle, for the infinite pains that he has taken to give us a perfect edition of this most valuable work, and to the Goerres Society for having taken upon itself the financial responsibility of the whole project.

No theological library can afford to ignore this publication. It is one of the great works of the time. On the subject with which it proposes to deal, it will supersede all other works. Whoever wishes to ascertain the reasons and the arguments that swayed the Council in its most momentous decisions will find them in this collection.

Pope Leo XIII. gives his blessing to the editor and publisher of the collection, and congratulates them both on their zeal and their enterprise. We are happy to bring such a publication to the notice of our readers, and to give it the recommendation which it deserves. The price of this first volume is £3 unbound, £3 6s. 4d. bound.

J. F. H.

ROADS TO ROME. Being Personal Records of some of the more recent Converts to the Catholic Faith. Compiled and edited by the author of *Ten Years in Anglican Orders*. London : Longmans, Green & Co. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

WE are happy to mark a good book when we get it. If one is inclined to say a favourable word for the off-spring of a struggling author when the occasion offers, how much more readily should he welcome a volume of this kind. The present reviewer has to reproach himself with having more than once stretched the web of charity beyond the limit. It is scarcely fair to the public. But what can one do? There is a duty to literature as well as to the public; and if out of a hundred books highly recommended the public gets one good one it ought not to grumble. At all events the public is welcome to the hint here conveyed.

Now the volume before us is one which needs no apology. Every Catholic will read it with pleasure, and every Protestant ought to read it with profit. It gives in brief the experience of fifty different persons who have recently joined the Catholic Church, and who, though belonging to different grades of life and following the most diverse occupations, have all converged and met in the one true fold. Here Lord Brampton, formerly Sir Henry Hawkins, tells us merely that for reasons which have seemed to him sufficient he has become a Catholic. He does not care to analyze the process that led him. He is now at peace after years of study and anxious thought. There is no more to be said. Here Mr. Hartwell Grissell informs us that it was the study of the liturgy that first put him on the path. Mr. Kegan Paul was greatly impressed by things which are a stumbling block to many others, viz. :—the pilgrimages, the cures, the devotions of the poor, the heaps of crutches in French shrines, the pious practices of Catholic nations. Three bishops figure in the list. Dr. Brownlow of Clifton, Dr. Wilkinson of Hexham and Newcastle, and Dr. Patterson, Bishop of Emmanus. Dr. Brownlow was brought into the Church by the study of history. Dr. Wilkinson almost forgets the reasons that moved him it is so long ago. There is no doubt at all events as to his present attitude.

‘I have nothing to say of my conversion,’ he writes, ‘God be thanked for it. After fifty-two years of priesthood I can only say that I hardly as yet realize the great mercy God has extended to

me in bringing me out of the darkness of Puseyite Protestantism into the glorious light of the one true faith and making me a loyal and loving subject of my Lord the Pope.'

Dr. Patterson was influenced by the unity of the Church and the chaos that prevails outside her pale.

Perhaps the most charming declarations in the book are those of Commander Paget, of the Royal Navy, and of Sir Henry Bellingham, of Co. Louth. Very striking also are the short 'Apologies' of Miss Adeline Sargeant, Mrs. Helen Langrishe, and Lady Loder.

The influence of Cardinal Newman is acknowledged by a great number of the contributors to this volume. If the evil that men do lives after them so does the good. The blessed influence of that great and venerable servant of Christ will still continue to enlighten and to move when the very last of his contemporaries shall have passed away. How many souls he has led to the haven of rest? What glory he must reap from it in heaven!

Protestants will affect to make little of this book and of its testimony to truth. Sour grapes! With what alacrity they would turn it to account if it were the other way? Then, indeed, the 'Los von Rom' movement would have assumed wonderful proportions.

J. B.

TERRA PATERNA VALE. Being a Latin Verse Translation of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, and other Poems. By the Rev N. J. Brennan, C.S.Sp., B.A., President of Rockwell College, Cashel. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. Price, 2s.

MANY people, no doubt, will be anything but complimentary in their criticisms of Father Brennan's attempt at translating a poem like *Childe Harold* into Latin, and will ask with amazement if any sensible man could dream of turning such a book into a dead language, or if anyone could be found so foolish as to waste his time in reading a metrical paraphrase which must necessarily fail to reproduce much of the spirit and dash of the original. Argument with such critics is worse than useless. They fail to see any ingenuity in the close, verse-for-verse translation, or to appreciate that wide and careful reading of the Latin poets which has enabled the writer to fit in, mosaic-like, the happy phrases

and turns of expression such as one finds in Virgil or Horace. This book deserves a place besides such works as the *Arundines Cami* of Cambridge and the *Dublin Translations* of Trinity College. If there is any fault in Father Brennan's rendering, it is that of excessive smoothness. For instance, in that portion of *Childe Harold* beginning with the words: 'Adieu, adieu, my native shore,' etc., which he has taken from the *Arundines Cami*, he makes some changes that are hardly improvements. The words: 'For I have from my father gone, a mother whom I love,' are rendered in the *Arundines*: 'Nempe abiens carumque patrem matremque reliqui,' and are altered by Father Brennan to 'Carum nempe patrem fugiens matremque reliqui.' He evidently wished to avoid the elision, but has overlooked the awkwardness of 'fugiens.' Such defects as these, however, if they be defects at all, are extremely rare, and do not detract from the value of Father Brennan's ingenious and scholarly work.

We agree with the suggestion in the preface that the book might be found useful to Intermediate teachers; that is to say, when they have first put their pupils through the exercises in some such elementary book as Pantin's *First Latin Verse*, Macmillan series.

MEDITATIONS ON THE DUTIES OF RELIGIOUS, ESPECIALLY THOSE DEVOTED TO THE INSTRUCTION OF YOUTH.

Translated from the French by a Member of the Ursuline Community, Sligo. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son.

ONLY a few months ago there was favourably noticed in these pages an *Abridgment of Church History* from the pen of one of the members of the Sligo Ursuline Sisterhood. Here is another work from the same source, following its predecessor in quick succession. We think, then, that it is right, at the outset, to accord our hearty recognition of this display of literary activity on the part of these learned Sisters, and to offer our congratulations to the Community on these signs of vigorous intellectual life and culture of which it is giving such splendid proof.

The book before us is a translation of a French work by a Superioress of the Order in Montargis, which saw the light over two centuries ago. It is made up of two parts. The first part, which embraces 250 out of the 279 pages, which make up the whole, consists of twenty-five meditations on the second part of the Constitutions of the Order, so arranged as to provide matter for an eight-day retreat allowing three exercises for each day exclusive

of the introductory meditation. Though primarily intended for members of the Order, there is much in these exercises that will be found suitable for all religious, and even for those among the faithful who aspire to the practices of a devout life. In many cases passages from the Constitutions are used as texts or preambles to the meditation, and this shows at once how eminently practical they are for all living in seclusion of the cloister, for, indeed, the rules of all Orders agree in their main features and outline. Thus, to select a few of the subjects dealt with, we find treated the Religious Life, Solemn Vows, Cloister, Divine Office, Holy Mass, Examen of Conscience, Silence, Modesty, etc. The method followed is simple. There are two introductory Preludes—one an Act of Adoration to some of the Divine Persons, and the other a Petition for Light—then three Points, each of which is devoted to the demonstration and amplification of some pregnant spiritual truth, and, finally, the Affections excited by the subjects reflected upon. Most of these meditations are full of matter, and savour strongly of the Inspired Writings. Indeed the whole fabric of these exercises, warp and woof, is Scripture, and we have read many of them, especially those in the Divine Office and the Excellence of the Soul, with interest and profit.

The second part consists of eight considerations on the first part of the Constitutions. These are chiefly designed for the instructors of youth, so that religious and others engaged in the painstaking, if praiseworthy task, of moulding the minds of young girls in a virtuous and cultured groove, will find here many relevant hints and pertinent observations. And for the sake of all on whose shoulders this serious responsibility rests, we trust this volume will find its way into many schools and convents.

It only remains to say that the work of the translator has been done in a manner to leave no cause for cavil. One reads the book through without scarcely suspecting that the thoughts expressed in it with such ease and grace of diction are not native to the mind of the writer. The durable character of the binding, and the clearness and lightness of the type, evidence the care with which Messrs Gill & Son have brought out the book.

P. M.

The Irish Ecclesiastical Record

A Monthly Journal, under Episcopal Sanction.

Thirty-fourth Year] DECEMBER, 1901. [Fourth Series
 No. 408. Vol. X.

Dr. Aiken on Buddhism.

Rev. W. McDonald, D.D., Maynooth College.

The Rise and Progress of Higher Criticism.

Rev. Reginald Walsh, O.P., Maynooth College.

Agnosticism: A Special Study.

Rev. P. Coffey, Maynooth College.

A Plea for the Study of the Fathers.

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Notices of Books.

Special Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament. Wer War der Verfasser der Nachfolge Christi. Novum Testamentum, Graece et Latinae, editio critica altera. First Confession. 'Forgive us our Trespases.' First Confession Book for Little Ones. Simple Confession Book.

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
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DR. AIKEN ON BUDDHISM

WE welcome this book¹ as a contribution to the History of Religion,—a comparatively recent branch of theology, which is daily growing in importance, and to which sufficient attention has not been paid in our schools. There are, it is true, a certain number of Catholic writers—Lenormant, Renouf, de Harlez, de Broglie, and others—who devoted their lives to this most attractive study, and left behind them works which may be said to have attained the rank of classics. It must be admitted, nevertheless, that Catholics of this class are few; that their works have had but little influence, so far, on the courses of theology in our ecclesiastical colleges; and that, speaking generally, the history of religion, like the sciences of anthropology, philology, biblical archaeology—in a word, all those subjects that demand original thinking and research—has been left too much in the hands of the enemies of the faith. Dr. Aiken's book, composed of lectures delivered in the University of Washington, is an example of how the course of theology may be changed or supplemented to meet the requirements of the time.

The system of religion known as Buddhism is of interest

¹ *The Dhamma of Gotama the Buddha and the Gospel of Jesus the Christ, a Critical Inquiry into the Alleged Relations of Buddhism with Primitive Christianity.* By Charles Francis Aiken, S.T.D., Instructor in Apologetics in the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. Boston: Marlier & Co. 1900.

to Catholics chiefly in so far as it may be and has been applied as a test of the validity of the arguments usually advanced to prove the divine supernatural mission of the founder of Christianity. These arguments are reduced ultimately to evidence of miracles performed, either in the shape of prophecy uttered and fulfilled, or such extraordinary events as the healing of the sick and restoring life to the dead, or the propagation and conservation of a religious and ethical system remarkable for the elevation and purity of its dogmas, in face of enormous difficulties, and by agents who, from the natural and human point of view and apart from any supernatural divine assistance, must be regarded as out of all proportion to the effect produced.

But Buddha also is said to have performed miracles ; whilst the ethical system which he spent his life in preaching is of so pure and elevated a character as, even on the admission of Christians, to fall little short of that of our Divine Lord :—

Lust, covetousness, envy, pride, harshness, are fittingly condemned. But what, perhaps, brings Buddhism most strikingly in contact with Christianity, is its spirit of gentleness and forgiveness of injuries. To cultivate benevolence towards men of all classes, to avoid anger and physical violence, to return good for evil, all this was inculcated in Buddhism and helped to make it one of the gentlest of religions. Buddha did not originate this notion of gentleness and forgiveness of wrongs. It already existed in Brahmanic teaching. But in Buddhism it seems to have been brought into greater prominence :

‘Let a man leave anger, let him forsake pride, let him overcome all bondage. . . . He who holds back rising anger like a rolling chariot, him I call a real driver ; other people are but holding the reins. Let a man overcome anger by love ; let him overcome evil by good ; let him overcome greed by liberality, the liar by truth. Speak the truth, do not yield to anger ; give, if thou art asked for little ; by these three steps wilt thou go near the gods.’¹

A law which not only forbade unchastity in act and thought, but commanded celibacy, which inculcated total abstinence from intoxicating liquors and forbade the killing

¹ So Aiken, p. 106, quoting the *Dhammapada*, 221-224.

of any living thing, which not only insisted on veracity and just dealing but taught that all desire of whatsoever kind is evil, whose propagandists were expected to be as chaste and obedient as St. Francis Xavier, and as devoted to poverty as his namesake of Assisi,¹ to be clothed in rags, to subsist every day on one poor meal which they were to obtain by begging from door to door, not to touch money;—such a system may be said to have had almost as many difficulties to contend with as those by which in the Roman Empire the way was barred to the spread of the Gospel. In addition, the Buddhist missionary had to preach an absolute equality to a people saturated with notions of caste,—notions which our propagandists find it so difficult to eradicate, and so efficacious an obstacle to the reception of the religion of Christ. In face of all these hindrances the followers of Gotama have succeeded in winning over to the doctrines of their master among the nations of the East at least as many souls as there are Christians of every shade of belief.²

It is no part of what may be called the direct object of Dr. Aiken's lectures to touch on these aspects of Buddhism; still his readers are not left without an answer to the difficulties thus raised against the proofs of the supernatural divine mission of Jesus Christ.

¹ 'Le religieux bouddhiste, semblable au franciscain, ne doit rien posséder. Il doit vivre d'aumônes. Dans les premiers temps du bouddhisme, cette prescription de la mendicité a été appliquée de la manière la plus rigoureuse. Les discussions des premiers conciles portaient sur la question de savoir si le religieux a le droit d'assaisonner la nourriture qu'il recoit et d'y mettre du sel.'—De Broglie, *L'Histoire des Religions*, p. 177.

² In an appendix to his work on *L'Histoire des Religions* (note iii. p. 394), M. de Broglie gives five estimates of the number of adherents of the different forms of religion. The Buddhists are variously regarded as being from four hundred to five hundred millions. M. de Broglie himself puts the number at three hundred and fifty millions. We shall see later on what Dr. Aiken thinks (see p. 487). The number of adherents must have been at one time much larger, as in India, except for the comparatively small districts of Nepal and Ceylon, Buddhism has been almost entirely displaced by Hinduism. It prevails still in Tibet, China, Japan, Burma, and the countries forming the south-eastern extremity of the continent of Asia, together with some of the adjacent islands. M. de Broglie says it differs from all others forms of belief, Christianity excepted, in being 'une religion universelle, destinée par son principe et son dogme à être, non le culte d'un seul peuple, mais celui de l'humanité entière, et à réunir tous les hommes dans une croyance déterminée et uniforme.' Cette universalité de principe a été réalisée en fait sur une assez large échelle.'

I. And in the first place with regard to the personal miracles whether of Christ or of Gotama, everything depends on the nature of the historical evidence for the facts. The contention of the rationalists, that inasmuch as the accounts of the supernatural events ascribed to the Indian teacher are mythical, the Gospel records deserve no higher character,—this leaves out of calculation the kind of testimony on which these different accounts are based. No Christian apologist denies the existence of legendary miracles, just as no historian pins his faith to everything that early chroniclers have recorded as authentic history. But because there may have never been, let us say, a Jason or a Hercules, are we to regard Marathon or Philippi as legendary battles?

It is a question of testimony. We know how slow rationalists are to accept the traditional dates for the composition of the Gospels, although some writers of the school are quick enough to satisfy themselves as to the age of the Buddhist sacred books. Their object is, of course, to ascribe the accounts of Buddha's miracles to a period not longer after the death of that preacher than may be made out to have elapsed between the death of Christ and the composition of the Gospels, so that the argument for mythical accretions might be the same in both cases. Hence it is said that the Buddhist canon was determined at a kind of general council held at Patna in the time of Asoka, who began to reign about 273 B.C.—that is, about two hundred years after the death of Buddha. Others go so far as to assert that the canon was settled a century earlier at the council of Vaisali. For the latter assertion there is much less evidence than for the former, although that rests entirely on Ceylonese traditions which were committed to writing only six hundred years after the council of Patna is said to have taken place. What an Indian tradition is worth as a source of history may be estimated from a statement of Mr. Fergusson, quoted by Dr. Aiken¹:—‘Anyone who has

¹ Page 159, note. He quotes from Fergusson's *Rude Stone Monuments*, p. 403

travelled in India knows what sort of information he gets even from the best and most intelligent Brahmans with regard to the dates of the temples they and their forefathers have administered in ever since their erection. One or two thousand years is a moderate age for temples which we know were certainly erected within the last two or three centuries.'

In an important chapter on 'The Buddhist Sacred Books,' Dr. Aiken shows an acquaintance with the literature of his subject to which it is impossible to do justice in a review such as this, even though, unlike the present writer, one were possessed of the necessary scholarship. The whole question is of interest to the apologist as tending to illustrate the growth of myths, and as supplying a possible means of determining in a rough way the length of time that may suffice for the appearance and acceptance of documents pretending to be veracious accounts of miracles wrought in confirmation of the authority of a religious teacher. In two of the oldest of the sacred books of Buddhism, the *Book of the Great Decease* and the *Mahavagga*, there are descriptions of numerous miraculous events of this kind; but inasmuch as these documents were not written, at the very earliest, until more than one hundred and fifty years had elapsed after the events they commemorate, the miracles ascribed to Buddha cannot be compared, from the point of view of historical evidence, with those of Christ. In particular there are two supreme facts which have always been put forward as the basis of Christianity—the death of Christ and His being seen alive after death—which, apart altogether from the value of the Gospel testimony, are known to have been preached by the Apostles from the beginning. Needless to say, there is nothing to be compared to this in all Buddhist tradition.¹

Dr. Aiken discusses at some length the date of three other documents in which most of Buddha's miracles are detailed,—three lives or partial lives of the sage,—the one

¹ There is also a very important difference of character between the miracles ascribed to Buddha and those of Christ. The former are so fantastic as to betray at once their legendary origin. See Aiken, pp. 304, 399.

which has best claim to priority in point of age being the Sanskrit poem known as the *Buddha Charita*. Dr. Aiken ascribes this to a period not earlier than 70 A.D., adding that it may well be as late as 100 A.D. The other two are the *Lalita Vistara* (*Book of Exploits*) and the *Abhinishkramana Sutra* (*Book of the Great Renunciation*). Dr. Aiken regards both these documents, and, indeed, all, or almost all, on either canon, as consisting of a nucleus to which additions were made from time to time. He thinks the *Lalita Vistara* cannot have assumed its present form earlier than the third century of our era, while the date of the *Book of Great Renunciation* is unknown. He quotes Professor Barth for the statement that 'it is very probable that among the elements that go to make the *Tri-pithaka* there are some that belong to a past more remote [than the reign of Asoka (270-220 B.C. approximately)]; for it is certain that the Buddhism of the inscriptions . . . was already in possession of a literature. But there are many reasons for doubting that the Buddhists of that time had come to recognise a canon. At any rate there is not a single portion of canon in its present form, Pali as well as Sanskrit,¹ that can be assigned with certitude to so distant a period.' This is confirmed by the authority of M. Senart and others.

Practically the only means we have of estimating the age of these documents are Chinese translations made from 300 to 600 A.D.—that is, from eight to eleven hundred years after the miraculous events are said to have occurred. When we take into account, moreover, that 'the oldest Buddhist MSS. extant are of mediæval origin'—dating, that is, from the Middle Ages of the Christian era—and that the integrity of these MSS. 'has to a large extent

¹ There are two branches of Buddhism or schools of Buddhists; one belonging to the North of India and extending into China, Tartary, and Japan, the other belonging to Ceylon, Burma, Java, and the South. Each school has a canon of its own, the two canons being made up only in part of the same books; the Southern is the more ancient and respectable (Aiken, p. 153). It would, we think, be an improvement if Dr. Aiken could give, possibly as an appendix, the two canons in something like tabular form, with the dates of the various documents as far as these can be ascertained. We should like, in particular, to see a dissertation on the date of the admittedly pre-Christian documents, such as *Mahavagga* and the *Book of the Great Decesse*.

to be taken on faith,' we cannot have the least hesitation in rejecting the rationalistic contention that the miracles ascribed to Buddha and those of Christ have the same foundation or want of foundation in history.

II. Turning now to the propagation of the religion of Gotama, we note that while Dr. Aiken recognises it as a world-religion, in the sense that it is catholic at least in tendency, he regards as exaggerations the estimates so commonly made as to the present number of its adherents :—

The number of Buddhists throughout the world is commonly estimated to be about four hundred and fifty millions, or one-third of the human race. But in this estimate the error is made of classifying all the Chinese and Japanese as Buddhists. The majority of the Chinese are Confucianists and Taoists. A large part of the people of Japan adhere to the traditions of Shintoism. Professor Legge declares that the Buddhists in the whole world are not more than one hundred millions, being far outnumbered, not only by Christians, but also by the adherents of Confucianism and Hinduism. To this estimate Professor Monier Williams gives his approval. Whatever their exact number may be, this much is certain, that the vast majority adhere to forms of religion which Buddha himself would be the first to repudiate. It is the Southern Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, who alone deserve to be identified with the order founded by Buddha. They number at the most but thirty millions of souls.¹

As regards this aspect of the question the Christian apologist is bound to consider how the argument which he draws from the wonderful propagation of the Christian religion to prove the supernatural divine mission of its Founder, is affected by the phenomenon of the equally successful propagation of a false religion among the Eastern peoples. Were the obstacles to be overcome of the same character in both cases? Are we justified in regarding Buddhism as a perfectly natural development of forces previously existing? And, above all, may its missionaries have succeeded in their propagandism by sacrificing the less pleasing doctrines of their creed? Every one will acknowledge how much more easy it would be to propagate the

¹ Page 151.

religion of Christ among pagan nations, if missionaries could tolerate polygamy and the simultaneous worship of other deities. And as an example of the tendency of religious thought to develop naturally in certain directions, one might indicate the modern rationalistic movement, which has made and is making so much progress among non-Catholics, without needing, even according to its own advocates, anything like a special help from on high. There can be little doubt that the religion even of the Jews could have been easily modified at the time of Christ, if the reform had been made to follow lines agreeable to popular prejudice, such as might be connected with the temporal kingdom which the people had long associated with the Messiah.

In connection with the spread of Buddhism it is well to bear in mind that at least in India, the country of its origin, it was preceded by Brahmanism, which was essentially a priestly religion, and that like the rationalism of our own time the doctrine of Gotama was a revolt from this priestly authority. To bring about such a revolution is not near so difficult as to establish a positive system, and the Apostles would hardly have to face death if they had confined their efforts to sneering at Jupiter and his fellow divinities, and maintaining that no good was to be derived from the most assiduous pagan worship. Such preaching seems to have been plentiful in the Roman Empire in the days of the persecutions, though it was only the disciples of Christ who were imprisoned and put to death.

No one supposes that the Polytheism of the Romans of the reign of Augustus would have survived to our day, if Christ had not come nor His Gospel been preached to the peoples of the West. And if one may be allowed to speculate on what might have happened in such an hypothesis, it does not seem at all unlikely that, as the natural sciences developed, people would have come first to doubt about the old gods, and then to regard them as mere figments—representations, at the most, of some single energy at the back of the universe of matter, an energy which itself would in course of time be called in question and denied. All this

would have gone on without revelation or other supernatural interposition. Revelation does not seem to have been necessary for the development of the physical sciences or the exact study of history ; and development on these lines is quite inconsistent with continued belief in and worship of Jupiter or Minerva.

As a matter of fact such was the course of religious events which preceded the rise of Buddhism among the peoples of India. There had been first a system of Polytheism which, as in Greece and Rome, showed a strong Monotheistic tendency, until finally it was acknowledged that Prajapati or Brahman was Supreme God. Who, however, was Brahman? He manifested himself in the sun, the heavens, the clouds, the winds, the earth, fire, life—in all the phenomena by which we are surrounded, and not least in the worshippers themselves. It is not in India alone that the objects wherein God manifests Himself have been made into divinities, and where people came to worship, not so much the Being who shows His energy in sun or fire, as the sun or fire in which the divine energy is manifested. Pantheistic ideas were introduced in this way, and were widely spread, at least among the ascetics and holy men who reflected most on these matters, and as a consequence were regarded as most likely to know the truth.¹

It was while the Brahmins—the dominant priestly caste—were confronted with Pantheism of this kind, which tended to depreciate their sacrifices, the source of their influence, that Gotama initiated the new stage of development. The time was ripe in many ways, some of which must be indicated briefly.

(1.) In the first place there was the influence and character of the Brahmins and their relations towards the Kshatriyas

¹ It is very interesting, though perhaps not so very profitable, to speculate as to how precisely and under what influence the ancient Polytheism of the *Vedas* developed into a worship of one God, and this again into Pantheism. It has been suggested that the first part of the process may have been due to supernatural aid, such as, according to Catholic theology, may be given to good men who have no faith, to enable them to avoid error and do good. It seems more likely that in the case of Brahmanism the process of evolution was entirely the result of natural causes.

—the warriors or nobles—whom they had reduced to a position of comparative insignificance. It was no small matter for the advocates of religious change in the sixteenth century of our era, to be able to point out to the greedy nobility how much power had passed into and might be wrested from the hands of the clergy, the Roman Court in particular. There is hardly a country in Europe in which similar appeals have not been successfully made within the last century. The path is smooth for the reformer who can hold out hopes of this kind; and Gotama was fortunate in being in a position to relieve the nobility of his time from subjection to the priests.

Inhabitants of the Western hemisphere, in these democratic days, can have but a faint idea of the privileges claimed by the Brahmins or priestly caste :—

As guardians and teachers of the sacred *Veda*, and as the officiating priests of the august sacrifices, they professed to be the very representatives of the gods, and hence the peers of the human race. No honours were too great for them. Their persons were inviolate; to lay hands on them was a sacrilege. Even the king had no right to do or say what was calculated to stir them to anger. . . . The comparative worth in which the four castes were held is revealed in the following text from the *Laws of Manu* : ‘One-fourth the penance for the murder of a Brahman is prescribed for intentionally killing a Kehatriya; one-eighth for killing a Vaisya; know that it is one-sixteenth for killing a virtuous Sudra.’¹

Accordingly one is not surprised to hear that even before the appearance of Gotama the warriors or nobles had begun to revolt :—

From the first the new Pantheistic religion seems to have found a welcome in the caste of nobles or warriors. Doubtless they felt the burden of a religion which put so many restraints on their freedom of action, whose forms of worship were so many and so complicated, whose liturgical language was an archaic tongue that few could fully understand, whose official ministers were exalted to a position of importance far above themselves. They would naturally look kindly on a movement which offered them an escape from the tyranny of the popular religion, without

¹ Aiken, p. 17.

at the same time, exposing them to the charge of unorthodoxy. And so, in fact, we are told in the *Upanishads* of kings and nobles professing the new faith, and taking part in discussions and conversations concerning it.¹

(2.) This suggests another consideration. The Brahmans had introduced into their ethical system a vast number of puerilities which were not only extremely frivolous in themselves, but rendered life intolerable to one who wished to observe the law. The use of flesh and fish was greatly restricted; social intercourse was hampered by reason of the many objects and occupations which were held to be impure; insects, however repulsive and noxious, could not be killed; water could not be drunk till it was first strained, lest minute forms of life should be destroyed by the consumer; ascetics, who aimed at leading the higher life,

Had, in walking, to scan the ground carefully before them, so as to avoid crushing any living creature. It was forbidden them to tread on a ploughed field. During the rainy season, when insects swarmed on the ground in greatest number, they were allowed to move about as little as possible. . . . It is not surprising that the more scrupulous felt life to be a burden, and became imbued with the spirit of pessimism.²

Now, as far as anything can be known with certainty of the life of Buddha, it would appear that he belonged to the warrior caste, and after leading for some time a life of pleasure, retired to the forest, where he devoted himself to the most austere form of asceticism. Years of continuous reflection and rigorous mortification resulted in a conviction of the vanity of these external observances, and that salvation was to be wrought from within. This was the enlightenment whereby he reached Nirvana and became a Buddha. It consisted essentially in putting off all desire, apparently even the desire of shaking off this miserable existence. It is remarkable that his first converts should be five ascetics, his companions, who had deserted him when he gave up the practice of fasting; and that his death should be caused by a meal of boar's flesh—a dish of which he alone participated, while his monks, by his orders, had

¹ Aiken, p. 64.

² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

to be content with cakes and rice. We do not mean to convey that Buddha was a sensualist, or that his life, even after his enlightenment, was not one of mortification ; but only that he preached and practised a much less ascetic rule than that of the Brahmans, from which he revolted and which he effectually modified. Neither is it necessary to suppose that Buddha's enlightenment was a conscious deceit. It may easily have been the result of long-continued morbid brooding, apart altogether from effects, possibly hypnotic, which such a life is calculated to produce.

(3.) Further, however upright and austere Buddha and his order may have been in their own lives and conduct, they were not exacting on what we may call the laity, who must, of necessity, form the vast body of every religious system. If the preachers did not marry, they allowed their converts to have as many wives as they chose, and to divorce them almost as often as they pleased ; if they did not worship the gods, they allowed others to do so, making no distinction between the gods of one nation and those of another. Had the Apostles and early disciples of Christ been equally tolerant, they would not have had much difficulty in modifying the belief of the Roman Empire.

Taking all these things into account the Christian apologist may urge with reason that there is no parallelism between the spread of Buddhism and the propagation of the Gospel ; and that the natural causes that sufficed to produce the former effect, must be regarded as insufficient for the production of the latter. For the validity of this argument it is not necessary to detract from the many true and beautiful things in the ethical teaching of the Brahmans and of Buddha, with regard to chastity, justice, temperance, meekness, patience, truthfulness, and the rest. A question might be raised as to the extent to which these exalted moral views were accepted by the nations of the East, so that not only a certain number of ascetics, but the people generally might be said to have had a body of ethical teaching sufficient for working purposes, and this without any supernatural assistance. The blight that has lain so long on India and China

points to the conclusion that life among these teeming populations must have been stunted and depraved, if it be true that actions which are morally good in the natural order, are, as a rule, such as put no bar to the development of the race. The principle may, of course, be pushed too far, as has been done not unfrequently by those who have compared the progress of Protestant with that of Catholic countries.

III. The aspects of Buddhism, which we have been considering so far, are those which supply negative arguments against the proving force of the Christian evidences; that is, which go to show that the miracles connected with our religion in its Founder and its propagation, must be capable of being explained naturally, since they have their parallels in the case of a religious system which is false. The adversaries of revelation draw from Buddhism another argument of a more direct and positive character, which Dr. Aiken does not fail to examine, scrutinizing the details so minutely that this may be regarded as the main object of his book.

It is a matter of common knowledge that there are many striking points of resemblance between the liturgy of the Catholic Church and that of Lamaism in Tibet. In both systems there are croziers, mitres, dalmatics, copes, service with two choirs, psalmody, exorcisms, censors, blessing accompanied by the extension of the right hand of the priest over the faithful, the use of beads, celibacy of the clergy, spiritual retreats, worship of saints, fasting, processions, litanies, and holy water. The first missionaries from Europe who noticed these things were at a loss to account for the extraordinary resemblance to what they had seen at home, and were inclined to suspect diabolical interference. It is now regarded as practically certain that many, if not all, of these ideas were borrowed by the Lamas from Christian missionaries, chiefly Nestorians, who evangelized Western China in the seventh and eighth centuries; and thus what so puzzled the good Père Huc has been satisfactorily explained.¹

¹ See Max Müller's *Last Essays*, First Series, p. 251.

There are, however, other points of resemblance between Buddhism and Christianity, with regard to which it has been contended that the reverse process has taken place, and that it was the Western form of religion which received an impress from the East. And as these latter similarities are connected with points of doctrine, so that if Christianity received any impression from Buddhism, whatever influence there may have been must have made itself felt in the composition of the Old and New Testaments, it becomes a matter of importance for the apologist of Christianity to determine how far such a modification is compatible with inspiration, and whether it is likely that the writers of the Old and especially of the New Testament drew their materials in part from the Buddhist sacred books.

Now, if we consider merely what a Christian may regard as possible in this matter, there is no reason why an inspired writer or speaker should not make use of the ideas of others, provided only they are true or contain the truth. No Catholic would think of denying that the writer of the Fourth Gospel might have taken the term *logos*, with its corresponding concept, from the disciples of Plato; and we are familiar with the view, now held so commonly, that the author of the Pentateuch may have incorporated into his narrative written documents of an earlier date and not necessarily of an inspired character. If such borrowing is not incompatible with inspiration, there does not seem to be any reason why the parable of Lazarus and Dives or that of the prodigal son may not have been an old moral tale to which a new form was given by our Saviour.

Imitations of another kind are no less possible—in religious rites and what may be called the material of religious worship. Thus, for instance, there is no reason why in the early stages of Christian liturgy the Church may not have borrowed from paganism the form of her temples, the robes of her priests, and many of the rites which accompany her sacrificial and sacramental acts. We know now that Moses must have seen in Egypt not a few of the details of the liturgy of the tabernacle, although that

place of worship with its belongings was fashioned after models which had been shown him on the mountain when he received the law from God. So, too, circumcision was practised before the time of Abraham; and who knows when and where the rite of baptism was first introduced?

But if there are pagan rites and documents which under the guidance of inspiration may have been adapted to a purer service, there are other forms of adaptation which are as certainly excluded. It could not be admitted, for instance, that it was some Indian legend that suggested the idea of the Incarnation or the Trinity, or that the story of the Annunciation as given by St. Luke is but a modification of the myth regarding the conception of Buddha. Max Müller does not see any difficulty in supposing that the account of St. Peter's walking on the water and sinking for lack of faith, may have been taken by St. Matthew from one of the *Jātakas* of the Buddhists; nor, possibly, with Müller's notion of inspiration would any difficulty arise. But a statement of fact is not exactly like a parable; and it is one thing to say that our divine Lord may be conceived to have adapted His story of the prodigal son from a legend of earlier date, and a very different thing to maintain that in the course of His preaching He never made use of the story, but that it was found by St. Luke floating somewhere, and by him put into the mouth of our Saviour, as being admirably adapted to convey the moral of His teaching.¹

Three writers—Ernst von Bunsen, Rudolf Seydel, and Arthur Lillie—are brought forward in a special way by Dr. Aiken as protagonists of the view that the doctrinal parts and miracle stories of the New Testament are, to a large extent, Graeco-Jewish modifications of the Indian legends regarding the nature, life, and wonderful works of Buddha. Thus both Christ and Buddha are represented as having had an eternity of existence before the last human

¹ There are a certain small number of Catholic apologists who seem to maintain that some of the historical events recorded in the Old Testament were adapted in this way, the facts not having occurred as they are recorded, and the truth of the story consisting apparently in some moral or religious lesson lying underneath.

birth ; both are said to be conceived and born of a virgin, the mothers' names being singularly alike—Maya and Mary, both of royal parentage ; the mothers in each case were delivered while on a journey, under the influence of a peculiar star, the glad tidings being announced by the songs of heavenly spirits ; the future greatness of both infants was prophetically announced by old saints, Asita and Simeon ; both gave a wonderful display of learning at an early age ; they prepared for their public mission by a prolonged fast, and were tempted by the evil spirit ; both were transfigured, multiplied food at a feast, had among their friends women of sinful lives who had repented ; besides a number of other real or fancied resemblances for which the reader must refer to Dr. Aiken's book.

There also he will find a satisfactory explanation. The facts on which these resemblances are based, from the Buddhist side, are shown to be drawn in part from documents which date from a period long after the Gospels were written ; while those which are described in the earlier legends are very much exaggerated. It is not remarkable, for instance, that in a system based on the doctrine of metempsychosis, it should be recognised that the deliverer had existed under many previous forms ; this is, if anything, less like the doctrine of the Incarnation than is the Pantheistic concept of the Brahmans. It does not appear that in Indian legends Maya, the mother of Gotama, is represented as a virgin ; and the circumstances which, according to the story, attended the birth of Buddha, were of the most gorgeous character that Eastern imagination could body forth—the very antithesis of those in which Jesus was born, according to the Gospel of St. Luke. And so for the rest : in a notice such as this it is impossible to enter into all the details.

Of course there were resemblances ; as was natural, given the fundamental ideas from which both religions started ; of a race involved in sin ; of the necessity of a teacher and redeemer who should be removed from the sphere of human misery, and, therefore, more than human ; of supernatural beings with forms different from those with which we are

familiar, capable of bringing their powers to bear on the life of man. Given these data, which are not peculiar to any form of religion, together with certain principles of natural ethics and religion, there could not fail to be developed a system of doctrine and ritual whose features could be twisted into a resemblance to any other system which may be based ultimately on principles of a similar kind. Human nature is everywhere the same, and may be trusted to work out similar results from like data, whether in India or Judea, or elsewhere; nor is it any portion of the creed of a Christian that the life and the doctrine of our Saviour were not to a large extent human—in accordance with the natural law,—nor that even His miracles do not fit in connaturally with the supposition of human misery on the one side and His own omnipotence and infinite compassion on the other.

It will still remain a question—a perfectly open one, as far as the Catholic Church is concerned—for scholars to determine how far the language and even the ideas in either Testament may have been influenced by the legends and religious myths of countries East of Judea. The books of the Old Testament are no less inspired than those of the New, although in the former we can discern the impress of the legends and the literature of the nations in the midst of whom the people of Israel passed their lives. The forms of Greek thought are no less indelibly stamped on the books of the New Testament. There is no reason *a priori* why the literature of India should not have produced similar results, if only it were known to the inspired writers or the people among whom they lived. Was there any such interchange of thought between India and Syria or Asia Minor in or before the first century of our era? That is a question about which scholars hold different views, and which, as has been said, has but an academic interest for the apologist of the Christian religion.

It only remains to repeat that the writer of this notice has read Dr. Aiken's book with great interest. He does not pretend to anything like the scholarship that would entitle him to pass on it any other judgment than this, that it

very suggestive, and that it seems to be a real attempt to grapple with the arguments of living adversaries in a department of theology where the writer had little or no advantage in the way of guidance from previous apologists. Whatever may be the value of the work from the point of view of scholarship, it is a pleasure to receive from the University of Washington a contribution to a branch of theology which may be said to have been hitherto almost completely neglected by Catholic scholars. As such we extend a hearty welcome to Dr. Aiken's book.

W. McDONALD.

THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF HIGHER CRITICISM

PERHAPS one of the most significant occurrences in modern times is the fate which has befallen the old Protestant notion of the Bible. It is vanishing, and in all probability will soon have disappeared for ever.

As is well known, the superstitious awe with which the reformers, and also many of their more ardent followers down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, regarded the Bible, prompted them to give utterance to the most absurd fancies. Not only was the Bible the all-sufficient and sole guide in matters of religion, but it possessed *ab intrinseco* a regenerating and sanctifying efficacy and, moreover, was the subject of a hypostatic union. Thus they placed it on a level with the Sacraments in one respect, and in another even with the Sacred Humanity. But this is not all. Hollaz asserted that 'formaliter' the Bible could not be considered a 'res creata,' and Tholuck informs us that in 1714 a certain Lutheran Superintendent-General in Gotha gravely discussed the question: 'Is not the Bible God Himself?'¹

¹ There was, of course, another less erroneous notion of Biblical attributes commonly held by Protestants during that period and afterwards. It is thus described in Hasting's *Bible Dictionary* (a work avowedly written on 'critical' principles):—'From the theory of inspiration thus formulated and (exaggerated) followed the attributes (*affectiones seu proprietates Scripturae sacrae*), which the

But the reaction was already approaching, it was in fact much nearer than those enthusiastic Protestants would have believed, and when it did come Luther's shibboleth, 'Das Wort sie sollen lassen stan' (Respect the Bible), was found unavailing. In 1774 Lessing commenced to edit the blasphemous tracts since known as the *Fragments of Wolfenbüttel*.² They advocated Deism, denied even the possibility of revelation, and scoffed at the most sacred truths of Scripture—beginning with those in the Old Testament, and ending with those in the New. The publication of the tracts raised, it is true, a storm of indignation in the camp of orthodox Protestantism, but Lessing heeded it not. 'Luther,' he exclaimed, 'has freed men from the yoke of tradition; who will deliver them from the still heavier yoke of the Bible?' Lessing himself did the deed, and in grateful recognition of his services Lessing's admirers have bestowed on him the proud title of 'the Luther of the eighteenth century.' It was he, dramatist and stage critic, more conversant with the songs of Anacreon than with the laws of Moses, that laid the foundations of that disbelief in

dogmatic writers ascribed to the Bible. 'These are primary and secondary. The primary are: 1. *Divina auctoritas*, resting upon its external evidences and internal qualities; but, above all, on the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, or the witness of God in the soul. This authority constitutes the Scriptures the sole tribunal in matters of faith and life. 2. *Perfectio ex sufficientia*. The Bible contains all that is necessary to salvation. 3. *Perspicuitas*. The Bible is self-explanatory. Passages may be more or less obscure, but these must be explained by means of the simpler and clearer declarations. Rightly used, it requires no other interpreter. 4. *Efficacia*. The Bible is a means of grace, having the power of converting the sinful and consoling the sad. The secondary attributes are *necessitas, integritas et perennitas, puritas et sinceritas fontium, authentica dignitas*. These indicate generally that a revelation must be written, and that in all respects the Bible, as we have it, is the Bible as it was intended to be.'

² These were seven extracts from the MS., 'A Plea for the Worship of God according to Reason' (Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes), by Reimar, a professor of philosophy, who died at Hamburg in 1768. Reimar's sister gave a transcript of the work to her friend Lessing, who was in 1770 appointed the Duke of Brunswick's librarian at Wolfenbüttel. He promised never to reveal the author's name, and entitled the selections he made for publication, *Fragments eines Unbekannten* (Passages of an Unknown Writer,) whose MS. he professed to have found in the ducal library. So well, indeed, was the secret of the authorship kept, that the truth was not discovered till 1827. A very complete account of the nature of the work is given in the *Kirchenlexicon*.

Scripture which is now so common among Protestants. It is the Nemesis of Bibliolatry.

Needless to say, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, at its first appearance, the tide of reaction carried almost all before it. Amand Saintes explains, in his *Histoire du Rationalisme*, how the rapid spread of the new error was also negatively due to the feeble attempts to oppose the naturalism of Lessing which were made by German Protestants, such as Eichhorn, Ernesti, Henke, and Semler. Their efforts were doomed to be ineffectual. It was in vain they strove to save at least something from the wreck of the Bible, for the false principles of the Reformation, on which they relied, betrayed them, and, as it were, in spite of their reason, made them Rationalists. In fact, Semler is regarded to this day in Germany as the founder of Rationalism, and he is honoured by crowds of unbelievers as the man that first called systematic opposition to Scripture by the name 'Rationalism'; yet from 1780 on, according to himself, Semler was defending Christianity against Lessing! Semler's intentions are said to have been good. If they were, then, his accommodation theory caused his ruin. He discarded the idea of inspiration, held that those books only were divine that led to moral improvement, and, finally, left it to every man's experience and judgment to decide for himself which parts of Scripture were from God.

Thus the heresy of the sixteenth century was utterly unable to withstand the monstrous error taught by Lessing, and the only result of the controversy was that a still more dangerous system arose. So true is this that Strauss glories in the remembrance that Rationalism sprang from the soil of Protestant Germany: 'Deutsche, Protestanten, haben der Menschheit gegeben, was von den Franzosen auf dem Boden des Katholicismus erwachsen, nicht verlangt werden dürfte.'¹ Gass, in his *Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik*, also acknowledges that Rationalism is the natural consequence of Lutheranism. It is 'die durchgreifendste, durch die allgemeine Anlage des Protestantismus herbeigeführte

¹ *Lecture on Voltaire.*

kritische Auseinandersetzung über das in diesem überlieferte Glaubenssystem und dessen Grundlagen.' And Lecky, in his *Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*,¹ remarks that 'the two writers who have done most to supply the principles of the movement are Lessing and Kant.' In this he is right; but Lessing's part was by far the greater. Kant was the founder of critical philosophy rather than of critical exegesis, and besides his influence did not begin quite so early as that of Lessing.

In order to trace the course which Lessing's error took and to study its development, we need to understand the distinction between Naturalism and Rationalism, though practically the difference is not very great. Naturalism denies the possibility, or, at least, the existence, of any revelation. On the contrary, Rationalism does not refuse to accept one written revelation; *i.e.*, the Bible; but it condemns belief in it. Rationalism asserts that the contents of the Bible are the proper object of human reason, and that what reason approves of in the Bible is *ipso facto* to be considered true religion. It denies that the divine veracity is the guarantee of true religion, and it repudiates the notion of faith. Thus both Naturalism and Rationalism are opposed, but from quite different standpoints, to Supernaturalism, which is the acceptance by faith of a divine revelation as, in the present order of things, the necessary foundation of religion. Naturalism affirms that religion sufficient for salvation is a purely human development. So that Naturalism is opposed to revelation considered in itself, and to its objective necessity; while Rationalism is opposed to its claims on our reverence and belief, or subjectively. Rationalism assents to all the teaching in Scripture (moral, etc.) that reason vouches for; but it denies that there is need of faith for the spiritual life of man, and insists on reason being recognised as the sole arbiter of religion and morality. As regards the word 'revelation,' when Lessing and his school use it, they mean nothing more than the result of that power which man naturally possesses of

¹ Vol. ii., p. 299.

acquiring knowledge about religion, just as about light and heat and whatever else surrounds him in his earthly habitation. On the other hand, when rationalists employ the expression, they only imply that Providence has occasionally raised up men endowed with extraordinary gifts, men in advance of their time, who taught what was true religion ; but they hold that the truth of those men's teaching is made known to us only by reason, and that the responsibility of assenting to it arises so far forth as it commends itself to our reason. In similar fashion the idea of inspiration is minimized and then got rid of. Hence, shocking as is the language of rationalists about prophets, evangelists, and our divine Lord Himself, we need not be surprised at it, for such language is only the faithful and adequate expression of an accursed system.

We do not intend to trace any further the origin and development of Biblical Rationalism in general, our subject being that department of it which boasts the name of 'Higher Criticism.' The man who made it known in Germany, who drew out this form of unbelief systematically and gave its name to it, was Eichhorn. He called it 'Higher Criticism,' to distinguish it from the textual or lower criticism which is concerned about variants, etc. His words on the subject are :—

I am obliged to give the utmost pains to a hitherto entirely unworked field, the investigation of the internal condition of the several books of the Old Testament by help of the Higher Criticism (a new name to no Humanist.) . . . If the Higher Criticism has now, for the first time, distinguished author from author, and in general characterized each according to his diction, style, and other peculiarities, then her lower sister, who busies herself only with words, will get rules by which to test the comparative worth of various readings.

Eichhorn was, as we have seen, one of the earliest rationalists. In an autobiographical passage he describes the deep impression made by the *Fragments of Wolfenbüttel*. Though they did not succeed so far as to make him consider Moses an impostor, they induced him to deny the inspiration of the Pentateuch, and so he was led on to regard the other historical books of the Old Testament as a

collection of myths, legends, and lays, to reject the miracles which they describe, and then, that he might be able to defend the veracity of the Hebrew historians, to excuse them by saying that they wrote under the influence of the erroneous notions prevalent in their time! Another work made a deep impression on Eichhorn, namely, Astruc's *Conjectures*, about which we shall presently have something to say. It is indeed quite true that Astruc's hypothesis might for ever have remained an exegetical curiosity or perhaps a dangerous toy, had it not been for Eichhorn's perception of its serviceableness for his own purpose, and for his scientific development of it. As improved by him, Astruc's book became the strategic manual of Higher Criticism.

At the present day this species of Rationalism is apparently the phase of anti-religious thought in reference to the Bible that most engages the attention of educated Catholics. Not only do students of exegesis occupy themselves with the objections of the higher critics, but many scholars, whose special work lies in other departments, are desirous of knowing what precisely is the nature, and what is the outcome, of these long-continued discussions. Perhaps the easiest, and at the same time most satisfactory, explanation will be to give a succinct account of the birth and growth of the four successive systems that are comprised under the generic name of Higher Criticism. They are known respectively as the old Document-Hypothesis, the Fragment-Hypothesis, the Supplement-Hypothesis, the new Document-Hypothesis. This is the order, logical and chronological, in which the systems were developed. By observing singly these four generations of Higher Criticism, and by noting their several characteristics, we shall easily get an accurate idea of the whole movement. It is obviously impossible within the limits of articles like the present, to describe in detail the numerous sub-divisions of the four hypothesis, or the heterogeneous theories of those among the higher critics who have left the beaten paths. Neither would it be possible to animadvert in detail upon all the errors they contain. Our readers will see them for themselves.

THE (OLD) DOCUMENT HYPOTHESIS.

This was originated by a Catholic, whose name was Astruc.¹ He was the son of a Huguenot minister, who became a convert before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Astruc himself was a celebrated physician, and professor of medicine, successively, in the Universities of Montpellier and of Paris. Notwithstanding his professional work and his numerous treatises on medical subjects, he found time to learn Hebrew and as the fruits of his study of the original text, he published in 1753 at Brussels (at Paris, some say,) the anonymous book which was fated to have such far-reaching results. Its title was *Conjectures sur les memoires dont il parsoit que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Genese.*² Astruc says that he hesitated a long time before giving to the world the result of his investigations, lest free-thinkers might make use of it in their attacks on the Pentateuch, but that a learned person

¹ Contradictory opinions prevail in respect of Astruc's moral character. The learned Austrian Jesuit, Fluck, calls him a pious man; speaking of the old Document-Hypothesis, he says:—'Diese zum Schutz der mosaïschen Abfassung ersonnene Theorie bewirkte das gerade Gegentheil von dem, was ihr frommer Urheber gewollt hatte.' (*Kirchenlexicon*, IX., art. Pentateuch.) Professor Kennedy of Aberdeen also speaks highly of Astruc's character, and it is evident from his biographical sketch that he has consulted very many sources of information. He blames Osgood for the unfavourable judgment he passes on Astruc. But he has made no reply to Osgood's defence which appeared in the *Expository Times*, December, 1896, Osgood there says:—'Until the united testimony of the highest authorities (Sismondi, Michellet, Martin, Marais, d'Argenson, de Luynes, Venault, Grimm, Buvat, Boingbroke, Ducloux, Aisé, Lescure, etc.), on Astruc's age is disproved, Astruc will be known as a very learned and able man, and also, as Grimm says, a bad man. For with a devoted wife and grown up children, he became the paramour of the most notorious woman in Paris, and so remained for nineteen years, covering the time of his writings on the Bible. By her will Astruc was left the sole legatee of her large property, to the heartless exclusion of her only child, her poor, but famous son, D'Alembert.'

² Criticism as now understood began with Astruc, but long before his time doubts had been expressed about the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. They are first found in the Pseudo-Clementine homilies and in a letter of the Valentinian gnostic, Ptolemy. These objections did not, however, arise exclusively from critical grounds, they were due rather to the opposition on doctrinal points that existed between Gnosticism and the Old Testament. This is true also of the hostile attitude towards the Pentateuch of the Nazarenes, a Jewish sect that condemned sacrifices, etc. (See St. Epiphanius and St. John Damascene.) In the Middle Ages two Jewish rabbis also found fault with a considerable number of statements in the Pentateuch and apparently denied that the statements had been made by Moses. Carlstadt (Andreas

had removed his doubts. Astruc's words on the subject are :—

Cet ouvrage estoit composé depuis quelque tems, mais j'hésitois à le publier dans la crainte que les pretendus Esprits-forts qui cherchent à s'étaier de tout ne pussent en abuser pour diminuer l'autorité du Pentateuque. Un homme instruit et trez zélé pour la Religion, à qui je l'ai communiqué, a dissipé mes scrupules. . . . Sur son avis, j'ai donc pris le parti de donner cet ouvrage et de le soumettre au jugement des personnes éclairées, dont j'écouterai les observations avec plaisir. Je proteste d'avance trez sincerement, que si ceux qui ont droit d'en decider trouvent mes conjectures ou fausses, ou dangereuses, je suis prêt à les abandonner, ou pour mieux dire, je les abandonne à present. Jamais la prévention pour mes idees ne prévaudra chez moi à l'amour de la verité et de la religion.

Astruc had observed in alternate passages of Genesis a uniform and consistent use of Elohim and Jehova respectively as names of God. For instance, in the history of the creation of the universe (i.-ii. 4a) God is invariably called Elobim (the word occurs there thirty-one times), and

Bodenstein, 1483-1541), one of Luther's associates, was the first in more recent times to assert that the historical portions of the Pentateuch were not written by Moses. His main argument was that while the death of Moses is recorded in Deuteronomy, the narrative of events subsequent to that occurrence is precisely the same in point of style as that of the events which happened during the lifetime of the great lawgiver. 'Ex quibus demonstratur defendi posse, Moesen non fuisse scriptorem quinque librorum, quum sepulto Moese filium orationis idem videmus, non eundem Moesen.' Hobbes repeated this objection, and added some of his own—of very small value. But Isaac de la Pereyre deserves more than a passing mention. As is well known, he interpreted the 'law' ('For until the law, sin was in the world.'—Rom. v. 13) to mean the prohibition or law given to Adam: now if in this world sin preceded this law, there must have been men before Adam. In defence of his pre-Adamite hypothesis, de la Pereyre found himself obliged to assert that the Pentateuch describes, not the origin of mankind but only that of the Jewish people. But what about Moses? In support of his last statement, de la Pereyre said that our Pentateuch which commenced the history with Adam was not the Pentateuch as written by Moses. The original work contained the history of mankind from the beginning, but our compendium dealt with the history of the Jews, and, therefore, it gave the first place to their progenitor, Adam. In proof of the alleged double edition of Genesis, de la Pereyre asserted that our one was fragmentary in some parts, and contradicted itself in others. But the original Genesis, the one written by Moses, the one that contained an account of the pre-Adamites, must have been free from such blemishes! If de la Pereyre was fanciful, Spinoza who comes next was thoroughly scientific in his mode of attack. In consequence of certain chronological indications which he professed to find, Spinoza held that all the books from Genesis to Kings originally formed one work, that Esdras compiled it from various sources, but did not give the finishing touch to his composition. Very few of the sources are from the pen of Moses. Holzinger, who is at present one of

in the account of Cain and Abel (iv.) He is always called Jehova (six times). All passages of the first kind (thirty-one) were designated by Astruc as A, and those of the second kind (thirty-four) as B. These two classes extend throughout the book. When he was examining a part of the history of the deluge ¹ (vii. 20-23) Astruc noticed that God was not mentioned, and that the same fact, i.e., the total destruction of living things, was stated thrice, so he marked this passage as C. Then finding more passages in which God was either not mentioned at all, or was called by another name than Elohim or Jehova (e.g., El-Elyon in the fourteenth chapter), Astruc used the following nine letters of the alphabet. Thus, xxxv. 28 was D; xiv., E; xix. 29-38, F; xxii. 20-24, xxv. 12-18, H; xxxiv. I; xxvi. 34, xxviii. 6-9, K; xxxvi. 1-21, 31-43, L; xxxvi. 20-30, M. As most of these heterogeneous passages treat of events that lie outside the main course of the patriarchal history, or contain accounts of foreign tribes, Astruc considered them to have been derived from non-Hebrew sources, and conjectured that Moses got all this information from the Midianites among whom he sojourned, or from the

the chief exponents of Higher Criticism, gives Spinoza high praise for the skill he displays in negative or destructive criticism, and adds that though Spinoza's own constructive theory of explanation is unsatisfactory, nevertheless, he deserves the credit of having introduced the literary-historical problem. Spinoza's chief adversary, Richard Simon, the Oratorian, granted the probability that a great many additions to the original Mosaic text had been made in course of time by inspired writers. According to Simon's theory, Moses instituted a system of keeping the sacred, or public records. That the duty was discharged by inspired writers, appears from the fact that in the Jewish canon, four historical books are ascribed to the earlier prophets. Simon is said to have been the first to direct attention to the two accounts of creation, and to the two accounts of the flood which are fused together in Genesis. From these *alleged* twofold descriptions of the same event, Simon inferred that passages by different authors had been combined by Moses. Le Clerc in his review of Simon's book rejected the theory of public archivists, and instead of it suggested that the Pentateuch was written after the fall of the kingdom of Israel (A.C. 722) by a man that lived in Chaldaea. Le Clerc afterwards retracted this opinion. It was with the hope of putting an end to these unseemly controversies, and with the intention of defending the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, that Astruc published his *Conjectures*. But the result of the publication was just the opposite of what the learned author expected.

¹It may be observed that in v. 22 the Vulgate differs slightly from the Hebrew. The translation of the Hebrew is: 'All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life, of all that was in the dry land died.'

nomads whom he met in the desert. But, as the second chapter of Exodus (beyond which Astruc's analysis was not carried) narrates the birth of Moses and his preservation from death in the waters of the Nile, the account it contains was ascribed to Amram, the father of Moses. And since the same chapter is Elohist, Astruc concluded that all the Elohist chapters (*i.e.*, those in which God is called Elohim, Astruc's A) contained information derived from Amram. This certainly was a very weak foundation to build on. The name of Moses's mother was Jochabed (*Jehova is my glory*), and one almost wonders why Astruc did not guess that Moses got all the Jehovist passages from her. Astruc explained to his own satisfaction what he considered to be the disorder in the present text of Genesis by supposing that the A and B documents, and the subsidiary C to M passages, which Moses had properly arranged in four parallel columns, were afterwards mixed up by some copyist. Now so far from being in a state of confusion, the book, as we have it, is a masterpiece of order. Its unity is evident to anyone that understands it.

Astruc's first proof of the use of documents was derived from the repetitions in Genesis. He said that they became intelligible only on the supposition that Moses inserted the documents entire in his anxiety 'to preserve all that he had received from his ancestors regarding the first ages of the history of the world.'

His second proof is taken from the alternate use of the divine names, Elohim and Jehova. With regard to this he remarks :—

This variation is so striking and so often repeated, that I defy anyone to bring forward even one valid reason for it, so long as it is supposed that the whole of Genesis comes from one and the same pen, and that it has been composed by the same person, while this difficulty vanishes as soon as one brings oneself to accept my conjectures and to suppose that the document in which God is called Elohim comes from one pen, and that the document in which God receives the name Jehova comes from another pen.

Tertullian and St. Augustine had long before called attention to the employment of 'Deus' in the account of the

creation of the universe, and to that of 'Dominus Deus' in the special history of man's formation. St. John Chrysostom also makes an observation about the latter passage, but neither he nor any other of the Fathers inferred a plurality of sources. Astruc was the first to do so, and the first to mention that that the alternation extended throughout the book of Genesis. Of course in some places both names occur together, while in many others Jehova is found in an Elobist passage, or *vice versa*. Then there are places where it is doubtful which name is the true reading. The Hebrew MSS. have one name where the ancient versions have another (this is frequently true of the Septuagint), or the MSS. are at variance, or the versions differ among themselves. The following rough list will serve to give a general view of the use of Jehova and Elohim respectively. Broadly speaking, Genesis i.-ii. 4 (first creation-narrative), E; ii. 4, iii. (second creation-narrative) JE; iv. (Cain and Cainites), J; v. (Sethites), E; vi. 1-8 (cause of the deluge), mostly J; vi. 9, ix. 19 (the building of the ark), vii. 17-24 (the deluge, no mention of God), Noah's sacrifice, etc., mostly E; x.-xi. 9 ('table of the nations,' and tower of Babel), J; xi. 10-26 (generations of Sem), no mention of God, xii.-xiii. (vocation of Abraham, etc.), J; xiv. (Melchisedech, etc., El-Elyon, 'the most High God,' xv. (covenant with Abraham), J; xvi. (Agar), J; xvii. (Circumcision), E; xviii.-xx. (promise regarding Isaac, etc.), J; xxi. (birth of Isaac, etc.), E; xxii. 1-19 (sacrifice of Isaac), JE; 20-24 (Nachor's descendants), God not mentioned, nor with one exception in xxiii. (death and burial of Sara); xxiv.-xxv. 18 (Rebecca, etc.), mostly J, also xxv. 19, xxvii. (Jacob and Esau); xxviii. (Jacob's ladder), mostly E; xxix.-xxxv. (Jacob's marriage, etc.), E; xxxvi. (generations of Esau) no mention of God, xxxvii. (Joseph's trials), J; xl.-l. (Joseph's exaltations) E. Sometimes both divine names are found in the same verse, as in vii. 16.

Astruc's enumeration was of course much more detailed and precise than this, but even this shows sufficiently for our purpose what was the ground of his second argument. It remain the chief proof till the present

day. As one of the ablest opponents of Higher Criticism remarks :—

The alternation of the divine names remains the corner-stone of the critical edifice in all its forms. In the recent refinements of the hypothesis and attempts to render the analysis more subtle and searching, increased stress has been laid on the collateral supports, and many discriminations have been made which rest on them alone. But the divine names are, after all, the starting point of the hypothesis, and that on which it ultimately reposes. . . . The divine names are thus cardinal and fundamental to the hypothesis, while all beside is secondary and subsidiary.

So far from justifying the inference of separate authorship, in many instances though not in all, the context shows that one of the names in question was the appropriate appellation. Elohim connotes creation, the natural order, its preservation, its temporary disarrangement by the deluge, the law of the Sabbath, etc. Jehova connotes the supernatural order, the mercy of God to man, His relations with the chosen people, especially the ancestors of the Messias, etc. Similarly the name El-Shaddai, used in the history of the three patriarchs (xvii. 8, xxviii. 3, xxxv. 11, xliii. 14, xlviii. 3, xlix. 25) connotes omnipotence, and implies that God is the Giver of abundance and prosperity. There are, however, several verses in which if either name was chosen for a special reason, its use cannot be satisfactorily explained. Some uncertainty is acknowledged even by the best commentators. Hummelauer and others who lay down rules to account for the respective occurrence of Elohim and Jehova, have to make many exceptions. Nor is this to be wondered at. In many places the text and the versions disagree : half the weight of critical evidence may be for Jehova, or again some version of great authority may have Elohim. The difficulty, however, with which the higher critics have to contend with is far more perplexing, for they depend in their division of documents very much on the presence of either name, and this often leads to insoluble problems. Their favourite device of emending the text is in reality far from being an explanation.

¹ Professor Green, of Princeton, in *Hebraica*, June, 1890, p 110.

Astruc's third proof, viz., that the alternate use of the names ceases when Moses comes to narrate his own experiences, need not detain us. After the sixth chapter of Exodus, there are some E sections, though exceedingly rare, e.g., xiii. 17-19, xviii. 1-7, 12-27. On the other hand Jehova is used only in one chapter of Deuteronomy (ninth chapter, seven times).

Astruc's fourth and last argument rests on the inversions of chronological order. He might as well have argued against the unity of St. Matthew's Gospel.

We may now bring our remarks about Astruc to a close. As regards the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and its inspiration, he never had the slightest doubt. The *Conjectures* led however to his orthodoxy being questioned; so to remove the bad impression made by the book, the author published two essays on the immortality of the soul. Parts of Astruc's hypothesis are childish, and his analysis is harmless in comparison with that of Kuenen or Wellhausen. The *Conjectures* attracted but little notice in France, while in Germany they were at first despised by Michaelis and others.

Eichhorn, however, adopted the new theory, in consequence, he says, of his own independent investigations. He perceived that there was a considerable difference both in language and in style between the E and the J documents respectively. For instance, E speaks of *creating*, J of *making* the world; E says 'the beasts of the *earth*,' J says 'the beasts of the *field*.' But it is plain from the respective contexts, that it is not a difference of language, but a difference of subject, which exists here. However Eichhorn commenced the linguistic criticism which is now so commonly employed against the traditional view. And he thought that E followed a chronological method, while J's chief interest lay in cosmography! The critics of the present day speak very differently. Eichhorn also imagined that the tenth chapter ('the table of the nations') had been borrowed by J from the Phoenicians. Another surmise of his was the histories of Abraham and Isaac were taken from J, and those of Jacob and Joseph from E. Both were

written documents, about the age of which it would be vain to speculate. Here again the modern critics have gone far beyond Eichhorn. He held that the J document ended a little before the death of Joseph, and the E with the first appearance in public of Moses. Both documents were combined in their present form, though not without numerous glosses, in the time of Moses or soon after. Eichhorn also admitted in Genesis the presence of a number of originally separate documents, *e.g.*, ii. 4; iii. 24 (which was J according to Astruc), xiv., xxxvi., etc., and maintained that Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, had in part grown out of a group of similar documents, many of them incomplete and fragmentary, yet all belonging to the Mosaic age. Those now found in Exodus and Leviticus were written at Mount Sinai, those in Numbers were composed in the land of Moab. Eichhorn made no attempt to connect them with the sources of Genesis. In this again he acted very differently from modern critics. As regards Deuteronomy he said that, with the exception of the last chapter, it was all written by Moses. It was the law-book for the people, whereas the legislation of the middle books was the priestly code. Of course this notion has been developed to an extraordinary degree since his time. Eichhorn also maintained that the reason why the middle books of the Pentateuch were not referred to as having been written by Moses subsequently in the Old Testament was precisely because they contained the priestly code. The final result of Eichhorn's analysis was his denial of the Mosaic authorship. As we saw already, it was Eichhorn gave the name of Higher Criticism to the anti-religious system which he did so much to elaborate. In his own time, he was followed, more or less, by such men as Gabler, Bauer, Rosenmüller, Jahn, etc. Many of his views have also been accepted by subsequent critics, and form the basis of their theories down to the present day.

Ilgen¹ was the next rationalist that made a notable advance in Higher Criticism. He proposed to write a History

¹ He introduced the words 'Elohists' and 'Jehovists,' and was also the first to point out that the Elohist avoided the use of pronouns, and had a tendency to redundancy.

of the Jews, and began his task by trying to discover a firm and reliable basis for his literary structure. Abstractedly speaking, of course, the corner-stone should and would have been their own sacred books, but Ilgen asserted that these were no longer trustworthy, the reason being that the archives of the Temple had been plundered, so that the documents which they had formerly contained were now either lost or mutilated or else very badly pieced together. To extricate them from the confused mass, to restore their missing parts, to undo the work of ignorance or of superstition, was the noble task of Higher Criticism. As a preparation, therefore, for his projected history, Ilgen published the seventeen documents from which he believed that Genesis had originally been compiled, under the title of 'The Original Documents of the Temple Archives at Jerusalem in their genuine form; being a contribution towards the rectification of history, in religion and politics. Halle, 1798.' This certainly was an original book. Yet unless it found a place among the curiosities of literature, its title and even the name of its eccentric author would by this time be long forgotten, but for the one 'discovery' it contained. Ilgen found out that there were two Elohist. His argument, briefly put, was this. In the Elohist portion of Genesis there are repetitions or 'doublets,' numerous diversities of style, and contradictions. For instance, because in the Hexæmeron or first creation-narrative (Gen. i.-ii. 4) which is Elohist, it is asserted that there was evening and morning before the sun's existence began—a manifest impossibility [*sic*], Ilgen took out of the passage all the verses (six) which state that there was evening and morning, i.e., i. 5, 8, 13, 19, 23, 31, and attributed them to a second Elohist writer. To this writer also the second creation-narrative (ii. 4b, iv.) was ascribed. In it God is called Jehova-Elohim. We may observe in passing that contemporary critics mark this narrative as Jehovist. Ilgen also divided the history of Joseph between his two Elohist, in which, however, subsequent critics do not agree with him. He also held that the twelfth chapter was the beginning of the Jehovist document, and he appears to have considered

it probable that there were two Jehovahists. The latter conjecture is now the received opinion, but it rests on elaborate conjectures of which Ilgen could have had no idea. His discovery of the second E constitutes his only claim to critical fame. The excessive fondness which Ilgen had for conjectures prevented his theory becoming popular, but a hundred years later his distinction between the two E's was adopted by all critics, as soon as Hupfeld defended it on new grounds. This will come before us in its place, here it will be enough to say that the two Elohist writers of present-day criticism (*i.e.*, P and E) are not quite contemporaneous with Ilgen's two E's.

With Ilgen's vagaries, the old Document-Theory came to an end. It was succeeded by new theories which were supported by more plausible arguments.

(To be continued.)

REGINALD WALSH, O.P.

AGNOSTICISM: A SPECIAL STUDY

HAVING endeavoured in a previous paper¹ to give a general outline of our subject, we shall now try to deal with a special aspect of it somewhat more in detail. We may remark, however, that what we call a special aspect is, in reality, the only important one which now challenges attention; it is simply the latest development of the Agnostic Philosophy under the influence of such minds as Matthew Arnold's, and more especially Herbert Spencer's. The charm and elegance of Arnold's writings, both prose and poetry, have done much to popularize this newest and strangest product of human speculation,—the silent worship of a something in or behind Nature, an Unknown Deity which he very mysteriously reveals and describes to us as 'the eternal not-ourselves that makes for righteousness.' Nothing more explicit than this has he to tell us about the object of the new religion of Science.

The 'cult of the Unknowable,' the 'worship of the Absolute and Unconditioned,' these and such like high-

¹ I. E. RECORD, October, 1901.

sounding phrases are now currently used as so many definitions of Agnosticism in its latest and most restricted signification. They are to be found in the richest profusion in the writings of Herbert Spencer, a man whom Huxley referred to as 'our great philosopher,' and who is now justly regarded as the great exponent and apostle of modern Scientific Agnosticism. So closely indeed is his name identified with our subject nowadays, that 'Agnosticism' and 'Spencer's Philosophy' have become synonymous. His life work has been an attempt to build up a 'system of Synthetic Philosophy.' Of the some dozen large volumes which are the product of his fertile mind, the one that treats of 'First Principles,' deals explicitly in the opening chapters with the religion of the Unknowable. He takes up the attitude of the modern scientist; and in expounding the relations of Scientific Knowledge to Religion, he regards the latter from the point of view of the extreme evolutionist school. The basis of all religion, what it tells us, in common with science, about the Supreme Being, is simply this, that beyond nature, behind the visible universe, there is a Vast Power which is and must ever remain Unknowable to man. His whole system is a bold effort, such as genius only can make, to achieve an equally bold and ambitious project—to apply to all things the Theory of Evolution, and to explain thereby the Enigma of Life and the Ultimate Reason of all things. It would be difficult to determine whether Spencer's system is widely accepted, in whole or in part, by modern Englishmen of learning, for nearly everyone of that class has his own peculiar tenets in philosophy as well as in religion. Neither do we know, nor is it our present purpose to inquire, if its influence has reached or perceptibly affected the masses. But we do believe that it is the boldest attempt yet made to build up a comprehensive system of Philosophy, Ethics, and Religion on the very extraordinary basis furnished by Evolution, Empiricism, and Subjective Idealism, all combined. We may also presume that it is not only a masterly but also a fair presentation of the Agnostic position from the point of view of Science; and for that reason we consider it worth

while to devote our attention to a brief critical examination of Spencer's system. It will be our chief aim to lay bare the great fundamental psychological errors which lead up to his doctrine of the Unknowable. At first the connection of Psychology with the 'Unknowable' may not be apparent, but without examining the psychological basis of his theories we could not hope to give an intelligent answer to the question: How does Spencer admit the existence of a something, and deny absolutely that we can ever know anything else about this something, except that it exists? If he knows of its existence, why is it not at least possible for him to know more about it? This inconsistency—analogueous to Locke's admission of the existence of substance—Spencer tries to avoid by advocating, not a knowledge but only a consciousness of the existence of this Absolute Being. However, we anticipate.

Spencer, being an advanced evolutionist, does not, of course, admit the Catholic contention that man is endowed with a spiritual soul and faculties, capable of forming universal ideas and seeing necessary truths. Neither, however, does he cling to the bald experimentalism of Locke. He saw plainly that such a view is negatived by common sense, and cuts off the way to all advance in human knowledge. What then does he do? What others did before him; he has attempted to combine the extreme subjectivism of Germany with the extreme empiricism of England. He advocates the existence, in our cognitive faculties, of some subjective forms which are the results of accumulated experiences transmitted to us from our ancestors by heredity in the process of Evolution. These forms are somewhat akin to the subjective forms propounded by Kant; and so, to use Spencer's own words, 'Kant and Locke have both their views recognised[?]' in the theory that organized experiences produce forms of thought.¹ Indeed his attempt to explain the higher operations of mind, without committing himself to the Catholic position, is a curious and ingenious combination of the salient features of many systems. For example, with the gradual effects of Evolution

¹ *First Principles*, chap. i.

on the species, we find that he also combines the effects of surroundings and association, so strongly insisted on by Mill and the Associationist school. Those, and many other theories, and many other facts and fancies, he turns to the very best advantage in working out his whole system. We had intended to confine ourselves exclusively to the examination of that one portion of his system which deals expressly with the Unknowable—and a fuller examination of it would be necessarily clearer and more interesting—but we found it beyond our power to understand that section apart. An examination of it forced us to the conclusion that Psychology is the real battle-ground between Catholics and Agnostics. Granting to Spencer his strange theory about the nature of Consciousness and his scarcely less strange and no less erroneous distinction between so-called 'states of consciousness,' and 'clear concepts,' which go to make up 'Knowledge' proper, we shall find that his system is on the whole a fairly consistent structure—reared, however, on an unsound and false foundation. Of course there are contradictions and weak portions veiled here and there under a delightful verbiage and a rich wealth of illustration and analogy. But his work as a whole displays such undoubted genius, such a keen power of analysis, such classification and marshalling of facts, as make one sad to reflect that all was spent to no avail—attempting to give substance to a day-dream.¹ That is the predominant impression one carries away from a study of his theories. They contain what would be an elegant and noble monument of human effort were it spent in the cause of truth and not of error.

To understand his system at all we must try to take his point of view—to find what first principles he admits in common with us. Perhaps the trustworthiness of what each one's consciousness testifies to him is the last stronghold which any sceptic would venture to attack. But while direct imputations on its reliability would only provoke ridicule, much harm may be done by misunderstanding the

¹ *I*vide, *The Great Enigma*, Lilly, where he deals with Spencer's Agnosticism.

nature and misinterpreting the workings of this faculty. Now, Spencer contends that the experiences of past generations are registered in the organisms, transmitted by heredity, and develop, through evolution, into certain vaguely conscious tendencies towards certain beliefs and assents. Consciousness, then, he describes as an aggregate of one's experiences of natural phenomena, both subjective and objective—both within and without the conscious subject or *Ego*. All natural phenomena are, according to his theory, so many different manifestations of one dynamic energy everywhere diffused. The total aggregate of one's experience is made up partly of vivid manifestations, made through the senses, partly of vague manifestations, made through the memory, imagination, reflection, or through the nervous system modified by heredity, etc. The former, the vivid, are first in experience, and constitute the *non-Ego* (including, however, the body, perceived by the senses); the latter, the vague, are subsequent, and constitute the mind, the subject, the *Ego*. As a primary postulate and datum for his whole system, Spencer requires the acceptance of these two aggregates as forming the world of consciousness. He also supposes that a world beyond consciousness must be granted unless we would rashly presume to limit being to the confines of actual consciousness. These two worlds, he further maintains, we must ascribe to the action of one single cause, which, he says, must be unknowable. To him all nature is the working out, the eternal evolution of this One Power.¹

Now, about this curious theory, mixing up, as it does, German idealism with a thinly veiled scepticism, we may, for the present, only state that it plays an important part in Spencer's philosophy of the Unknowable, as we shall see later on. The theory does not seem to place any sufficient distinction between subject and object. Worse, still, it supposes consciousness to *constitute* the *Ego*; and if both the *Ego* and the *non-Ego* are eternal evolutions of one all-pervading energy—well, at least, it sounds like Pantheism.

¹ Lilly, *The Great Enigma*.

We are not sure whether we understand aright his attempted analysis of a faculty which does not seem capable of analysis, or the full import of those 'first principles' we are asked to accept. But we are at least reminded by those demands on our credulity that it is with no good grace our modern philosophers can accuse the schoolmen of assuming, as true, things which they could not prove. Our Agnostics, too, are forced, after all, to start with some assumptions that are incapable of proof. And we would not quarrel with them if their assumptions were the proper ones: they would then be following in the wake of the schoolmen.

Armed with such notions of consciousness, and professing an implicit belief in the truth of Evolution and the effeteness of Christianity, Spencer sets out to reconcile the 'conflicting' claims of Religion and Science by determing for us the subject matter of each, and so bringing to light the truth which is common to both: 'for,' he says, 'there is a grain of truth in every error.' There, by the way, is another sample of his 'primary assumptions.' And yet another is this 'skeleton in the cupboard'—this supposed conflict between Science and Religion. He had, of course, inherited the traditional prejudice that Science and Religion have ever been antagonistic. And now he undertakes to bring to light and destroy for ever the secret cause of discord. Let us see, then, what he understands by Religion. About revealed religion he has not a word. He recognises Natural Religion only, and with it he deals as with a question that must be met in any system of philosphy. Natural Religion is, in truth, the great Philosophy of Ultimate Causality, but Spencer does not regard it as such. For him it must fall in with the Evolution Philosophy, and be at war with Science. So, he quietly defines it for us as the 'worship of the Unknowable,' reminding us very forcibly of Huxley's manner of talking about Faith. This and nothing more, the 'cult of the Unknowable,' religion has ever been and must ever remain: a sentiment which has been slowly and naturally evolved through the ages, a vague consciousness which man feels about some great, external, Unknowable Fact, outside the world of human experience. 'Religion, under all-it forms,

is distinguished from everything else in this, that its subject matter is that which passes the sphere of experience. . . . Knowledge is like a sphere, bordering on the unknown all around.'¹ Outside that evergrowing sphere is the world of Religion: hence Religion is not and cannot be Knowledge.

Well, certainly, in this notion of Religion we have *ignotum pro magnifico* with a vengeance. But might we venture to suggest that there is such a science as Theology, a religious science, a science of Religion? Probably Spencer would tell us that in so far as it is a science containing knowable truths it is not Religion; in so far as it pretends to know what it does not it is Religion abused, or superstition; and in so far as it silently worships the unknowable it is Religion pure and simple. Anyhow this theory, such as it is, insists that there is actually behind and beyond the knowable universe a Something, a Power, a Being, call it what you will, about whose nature and attributes, however, man knows and can know absolutely nothing. This is the position we wish to examine. Religion even in this narrow sense, and Science, have, according to Spencer, a fundamental abstract truth common to both, and which he seeks as their 'basis of reconciliation.' This basis is nothing else than the recognition by both Science and Religion of the existence and unknowability of this Great Something.

Commencing his investigation in the second chapter of his *First Principles*, he takes up a psychological position from which he has already a clear view of the desired conclusion; and, to our mind, it is by overthrowing this position that the Catholic must proceed to vindicate his claims to some knowledge of God, against Spencer and his school. Our author is a skilful juggler in high sounding philosophical terms, though our modern thinkers regard that failing as characteristic only of the schoolmen, and when Logic does not suit his purpose he falls back upon Psychology. The salient features of his position deserve therefore some attention.

¹ *First Principles*, from which are taken all subsequent quotations.

With his own peculiar wealth of illustration, and great power of analysis, he informs us that our concepts of a great many things—things, for instance, of vast size, like the ocean, or of indefinite number, like the stars of the heavens—are purely symbolic concepts that may possibly no more resemble the reality than x in the algebraic equation would resemble the hundred pounds for which it stands. Those differ altogether from our real concepts of things so limited in size or number that the whole can be represented simultaneously in thought by one true mental picture. Of the former class of things we can in reality predicate nothing at all, or do so only by means of those symbolic concepts. But, he proceeds, we have no right whatever to trust those symbols unless when by some indirect process of thought or by the fulfilment of predictions based on them (as astronomical concepts are sometimes confirmed by such verification), they are proved to have been legitimate and trustworthy. Otherwise they may only lead us astray, and are all the more dangerous in proportion to our inclination to trust in them; for they bear on themselves no hall-mark of their own validity.

Such in brief is his theory of perception, and it prepares the way beautifully for his presentment of the Unknowable. But, lying as it does at the bottom of his system, it is an unsound and unreasonable theory, unwarranted by common sense, fanciful finally and inconsistent. We weigh the meaning of our words, and insist that they are just qualifications. We emphasize them, because the theory, if allowed to pass, would prove a very pernicious one. It clearly confounds the phantasm with the idea, and imagination with intellect. It practically ignores the existence of a cognitive faculty above sense. For the universal idea it substitutes a sort of partly natural, partly conventional sense image with outlines vague and blurred and undefined—an image which will stand as a sort of symbol for a large class of similar objects that cannot be pictured clearly in the imagination at the same time. When human reason, operating on the products of sense experience, and using as its instruments intuitive primary truths,

compares and increases the mind's stock of ideas, ascending ever to truths more universal, to reasons higher and more noble, Spencer would say of the whole process and its result that, for aught we know, it is a dream, that we cannot trust it till 'verified by some indirect processes of thought.' And if by the same process we mould out of 'the things that are made' a logically sound argument for the existence of a First Cause, personal, intelligent, and distinct from the universe, he would say: nay, you are in the world of pure symbolic concepts, and ones that you need not hope to be ever able to prove trustworthy.

Now all this is pure and simple scepticism about the reliability of man's perceptive powers and the truth of their primary dictates. Spencer admits and teaches that the transition from the real to the symbolic concept is by slow degrees and imperceptible stages. Where, then, draw the line? What is to tell us which concept is real and which only symbolic? Not consciousness, for it tells us only of the existence of such concepts in our minds. Not reason, for our author will not listen to its voice; and, moreover, if it tells us anything it tells us that while phantasms in the imagination become less and less vivid images of more and more complex objects, ideas are quite as true representations of great objects as of small ones. But we may pass over this point, for by-and-bye we shall have to ask what Spencer means by even a 'real concept,' and what knowledge it gives him of 'things as they are.' Here we would ask what are those 'indirect processes of thought' referred to. As far as we can gather, they are simply the findings of science—experience, in other words. But if we doubt our perceptive and reasoning faculties when they lead us on from simpler ideas and elementary judgments to ideas more universal and judgments more advanced, what right, pray, have we to trust them in those indirect processes? For are not our faculties the same throughout? And are not the metaphysical principles of causality and nature's uniformity and such like, at the very root of all the sciences inductive and deductive? And do not our 'processes of thought' verify just as fully the existence of God as the existence of Rome;

the nature of God, as the nature of the laws that govern the universe? We all talk, the very Agnostics themselves talk, and are constantly talking about 'substances' and 'causes' and 'spirit' and 'God,' 'mind' and 'intellect' and 'reason.' We could not talk about these things unless we had ideas about them. Are our concepts of them mere phantoms of the mind, or have they a something real and objective, outside the mind, to correspond to them? And if they have an objective world which they mirror to us, and about which they gave us knowledge, why accept that knowledge in part, and reject it in part? If reason tells us that 'God is,' and we believe it, why should we refuse to listen to it when it tells us something of what He is? And if that faculty informs us of the existence of a world of spirit of which itself is part, what right have we to doubt its teaching? Nothing could be more unreasonable than to draw arbitrary limits to the trustworthiness of reason. Much more consistent were the German idealists, who, when they began to doubt of their own faculties, kept on doubting, till, with Fichte and such men, they questioned consciousness itself, and found themselves face to face with—Nothing!

We are not sure, though, if Spencer has not in reality gone quite as far. At least he has gone so far that he escapes the evident inconsistency, just alluded to, of crediting reason up to a certain point, and refusing to follow it further in its findings. The inconsistency into which he has fallen is deeper down and less obvious. While reason, he says, deceives us regarding the nature of the Unknowable, consciousness is reliable in telling us of its existence. We shall see whether this be so or not in the sequel.

Having established the theory of symbolic concepts, and premising that universal ideas, or what we call universal ideas, are simply mere impressions or nerve-forms, generated by the stored-up sense-experiences of our ancestors in the process of evolution, he proceeds to analyse men's ultimate religious and scientific ideas, with the object of showing that according to the laws of Logic' both Religion and Science force us at last to recognise and admit the Unknowability of that which Religion worships and Science leads to. Now,

Logic is the science of the formal laws of thought; and since thought, to his mind, does not, and cannot, transcend sensation and experience, neither can these laws tell us aught of what man has never experienced. Hence these very laws, if, as he contends, they make the nature of the Ultimate Being unthinkable and unknowable, for the very same reasons and with the very same force forbid us to believe in the existence of such a thing as transcends the experience of our thinking faculties. It will be well to bear this in mind a little later on.

What Spencer calls 'thinkable,' 'conceivable,' we would call 'imaginable;' and 'knowable,' in his system, means 'fully and adequately comprehensible' in ours. Hence we need not be surprised that, in discussing the origin of the universe, he finds three 'verbally intelligible' hypotheses to be alike 'unthinkable' and 'inconceivable.' For example, about the creation hypothesis, he writes the following interesting tit-bit, which we may quote for the reader's entertainment and edification :—

Not only is this [creation] conception one that cannot by any cumulative process of thought, or the fulfilment of predictions based on it, be shown to answer to anything actual, and not only is it that, in the absence of all evidence respecting the process of creation, we have no proof of correspondence even between the limited conception and some limited portion of the fact, but it is that the conception is not even consistent with itself, cannot be realised in thought even, when all assumptions are granted.

A man who can write thus must have new and strange ideas about what 'conceptions' and 'thoughts' are—very new and strange notions indeed. Stranger still, treating of the nature of the universe, he calmly tells us that we must assume, and do assume the existence of a First Cause which *cannot be represented in thought!* But indeed he speaks truly if 'thought' is imagination, or subject to the same laws as imagination or sense perception generally. On such a hypothesis it is quite true that the First Cause cannot be 'conceived' at all; for, being infinite it should be conceived as finite, and as mutable being immutable, and as caused being uncaused. He admits the logical validity of the

Catholic argument from creature to First Cause; and then says that both the reasoning and its results are delusive, the former because based on symbolic concepts of the illegitimate order, the latter because 'inconceivable' and 'self-contradictory.' In giving reason this new rebuff he ignores the fact that Catholic philosophers and theologians who used the argument down to his own time did not mean faint phantasms when they said ideas, nor composite forms rooted by heredity in the nervous system when they spoke of universal concepts. He thinks it quite needless to prove that the materials of this argument are illegitimate symbolic concepts. The thing is obvious, he says. We, nevertheless, doubt gravely whether it is at all clear to ordinary mortals that each successive step reason takes in the ascent from the visible effect to the Invisible First Cause is at all illegitimate or unwarranted. However, instead of trying to clear up the point for us, our author treats us to a long dissertation on the innate superstitious instinct of the race to attribute visible effects to several unseen causes, and on the gradual purifying process by which this is being evolved into an instinct to regard all phenomena as the manifestations of some one Unseen and Inscrutable Power. Then, after an eloquent plea—in contradiction of all the facts of history—for the pet theory that religious progress has been from Polytheism to Monotheism and not *vice versa*, he returns once more to ring the changes on the 'mutual contradictions' which, 'according to the laws of Logic,' are involved in the ultimate conclusions of the accepted natural Theism. Clinging to the theory that a true conception is a mental image which mirrors to our consciousness fully and vividly every note and phase and aspect of the object at the same time, he quotes abundantly and approvingly from Dean Mansel to show that the current 'conceptions' of the Infinite and Absolute First Cause, Self-Existent, All-Just and All-Merciful and all the rest, are all mutually destructive and self-contradictory if they be taken not as mere symbols but as true concepts conveying real knowledge. Nor is he less decisive when he speaks of ultimate scientific ideas. 'Space and Time are wholly incomprehensible. The

immediate knowledge which we have of them proves, when examined, to be total ignorance.' To go on sub-dividing an atom 'is not really to conceive the infinite divisibility of matter but to form a symbolic conception incapable of expansion into a real one, and admitting of no other verification.' In the same fashion does he play havoc with the theories of the nature of Matter and Force of Rest and Motion;—involving our ordinary ideas in obscurity, giving prominence to what is negative in them, and trying to persuade us that such concepts tell us absolutely nothing about the objective realities for which they stand.

Now, whence all this muddling confusion? Can we know anything at all then, and, if so, how? This is the deeper question which will bring us nearer to Spencer's radical error by disclosing to us his strange distinction between consciousness and knowledge, and his still stranger theory of the relativity of all knowledge. By an analysis of the *product* of human thought he finds that 'the most general truth, not admitting inclusion in any other does not admit of interpretation.' What if it interprets itself?

Manifestly [he continues] as the most general cognition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one it cannot be understood. Of necessity, therefore, explanation must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get at must be unaccountable. Comprehension must be something other than comprehension before the Ultimate Fact can be comprehended.

By an analysis of the *process* of human thought he makes discoveries scarcely less unintelligible; namely, that the object of thought must be conceived as (1) distinct from the thinker, (2) as relative to the thinker, and (3) as similar in some way to certain other objects which, with it, make up a class of things. Now, distinction implies limitation, and the Infinite is not limited; nor can the Absolute be in any way relative. 'And to admit that it cannot be known as of any class or kind is to admit that it is unknowable.' In other words: 'A thought involves relation, difference, likeness: whatever does not present each of these does not admit of cognition. And hence we can say that the unconditioned, as presenting none of them, is trebly unthinkable.'

Such is Spencer's applied logic ; and our idea of it is that, if only pushed far enough, it negatives even the existence of an Absolute, and pushes its author into pure idealism. He must not be allowed to play fast and loose with his logic to suit his purpose. He has made full use of it so far, to show that the 'Absolute' is 'Unknowable.' Now, it is, of course, true that all knowledge is classification and that in order to have any knowledge of the First Cause, we must classify it as an existing Something, for if it does not exist it is nothing ; if it does we must call it a Thing, a Being of some sort. But what does consciousness tell us in this matter? Simply that we have the idea. No further information does it give us either about the origin of that idea or its objective prototype if it have such. That information we must seek from Reason, and if Reason tells us of the objective existence of such a Being why may it not possibly tell us more about it? 'But reason does not tell us any such thing, as the objective existence of the Absolute,' Spencer assures us. What then? About its existence, he informs us, we have only a vague consciousness, not a knowledge.

Here we pause to find our bearings and to ask two very serious questions : firstly, why not a knowledge? secondly, why a vague consciousness? In answer to number one, our author says : 'Not a Knowledge, for all Knowledge is only of the Relative, not of the Absolute.' And he goes on to explain what he means by the Relativity of all Knowledge. This simply, he means : 'that the reality existing behind all appearances is and must ever remain unknown.' After another pause and an effort to grasp the full import of this doctrine we may venture another 'Why so?' Because, he answers, all knowledge, all thought is nothing more than the ordering and comparing and classifying of different states of consciousness. It is the distinct orderly consciousness begotten of such classification of subjective states. There is his answer ; it creates in us an intense interest to see how he will bridge the gulf between the consciousness of the *Ego* and an ontological order, a world of reality outside self. He

defines truth for us. It is 'the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations.' We do not pretend to see very clearly how one 'relation' can 'correspond' with another 'relation.' But even if a 'subjective relation' can correspond (or 'be related') to an 'objective relation'—and we suppose it can—still we cannot see how Spencer has got to know yet that there exists such a thing as an 'objective relation' or an 'objective' anything at all. We fail, therefore, to understand his definition on his own principles; and we go on, looking for light. The following extract will help—not, indeed, to give the light we look for, but to instance how all-pervading is his notion of 'relativity' in the matter of 'knowledge':—

'If life in all its manifestations, inclusive of intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal to external relations, the necessarily relative character of our knowledge becomes obvious.

To us, we must confess, nothing at all becomes obvious after such an extraordinary 'if.' Leaving the unintelligible definition of life we proceed:—

The simplest cognition being the establishment of *some* connexion between subjective states *answering to some*¹ connexion between objective agencies . . . it is clear that the process, no matter how far carried, can never bring within the reach of intelligence either the states themselves or the agencies themselves. Ascertaining which things occur along with which and what things follow what, supposing it to be pursued exhaustively must still leave us with co-existences and sequences only. . . . Thinking being relationing no thought can ever express more than relations.

This very extraordinary paragraph calls for more than one comment. Let us premise a few observations. Firstly, we notice that it supposes the function of memory to be trustworthy in recalling the 'states' to be 'compared.' Secondly, we should like to know how the mind is to 'compare' and 'connect' 'states' and 'agencies,' if it can know absolutely nothing—not even the existence—of the said 'states' and 'agencies'? Surely it cannot compare

¹ The italics are our own.

things absolutely unknown? 'No thought can ever express more than relations.' What does that mean? To be sure, every idea implies a relation of its object to the thinking faculty, and every judgment a relation of its terms and of their objects with each other; from which it follows merely that, as Catholic theologians teach, the human mind cannot comprehend the Absolute and Infinite Deity as He is. But, we suspect, the phrase in question has not this meaning; and if it has not what can it mean? Thirdly, we observe that he speaks of 'objective agencies.' Now what does he mean by 'objective' in the context? We are tempted to ask the question because he has described knowledge and thought as the mere ordering of states of consciousness, and because he has defined truth as a correspondence of subjective with objective relations. What, then, does 'objective' mean in those contexts? Perhaps if we call to mind his theory of consciousness outlined some pages back, it will suggest something. Can it be that by 'objective' agencies and relations and all the rest, he simply refers to that part of the world of consciousness constituted by the aggregate of vivid manifestations? As far as we can gather, this is really all he means when he talks of 'objective' 'realities.'¹ Indeed, if he meant what men generally mean by the terms: the real, ontological, external order of things as opposed to the subjective order of thought and consciousness—he was making an unwarranted assumption of its existence, unwarranted by his principles. Moreover, let us suppose that he did mean what men generally mean by such terminology, and the passage quoted above becomes absurd and meaningless.

For how could a connection between subjective states answer in any way to an objective something that is *ex hypothesi* unknown? Furthermore, to describe cognition as the establishing of some subjective connexion, answering (some way or other) to some objective connexion, would be small information indeed, seeing that our difficulty all along is to find out what connexion, if any, between the subjective

¹ The same equivocation in the use of those terms runs through all Kantian Philosophy.

Ego and the world at large is implied in our knowledge of things ! Hence we conclude that his ' objective ' and ' subjective ' are simply the vivid and vague portions of the world of consciousness.

So we have not yet got beyond the *Ego*. We have still to bridge the gulf to a real world outside self, or rather to watch the efforts of our author to do so. He thinks that consciousness can do it for him. As a matter of fact he has nowhere yet admitted the existence of anything outside self, except in so far as consciousness tells him of such a world. But in reality it is not consciousness at all that tells us of an outside world. It is sense and memory and all the other perceptive faculties whose findings nature has taught us to accept without question. And he seems, at least in some places, to have tacitly accepted the testimony of sense and memory for the existence of the visible universe. Consciousness can never reach beyond the subjective state of the *Ego*. Yet what do we now find ? Consciousness, and it alone, says Spencer, tells us of the Absolute and Unconditioned ! Surely, to this we can answer with Hamilton and Mansel that the Absolute and Unconditioned and Unknowable to which conscience testifies is nothing positive whatsoever. How can it be anything outside the *Ego* ? And within the *Ego*, consciousness testifies merely to the conditions and limits and relations of all that comes within the sphere of its activity. The unknowable to which it testifies is the mere negation of conceivability.

At last we have come to the grand turning point where Spencer is put on the defensive. He has hitherto knocked down, now he must build up. He must now defend the reality of that something whose nature he has declared unknowable. And he must do so without abandoning those laws of Logic which he used to such effect in proving its unknowability. Further, we must see that his theory of consciousness is kept in the foreground, and that he does not usurp any of the Psychological positions which he spurned and rejected when they did not suit his purpose.

We are conscious of the Absolute not as a mere negation of ulterior knowledge or consciousness, but as something

real and positive and objective. Objective, that is, ontologically, existing as a Great Power beyond and behind the visible universe, and so forth. Such is our author's contention. And now let us see how he tries to make it good. The process will give us an admirable illustration of the adroitness with which he can manipulate sophisms and change his principles almost unnoticed. We shall let him speak for himself:—

Every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated [?] distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute is to say by implication that there is an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to know what the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is, and the making of this assumption proves that it has been present to the mind not as nothing, but as something. The noumenon everywhere conceived as the antithesis of the phenomenon is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. [?] It is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without at the same time conceiving a reality of which they are appearances; for appearance without reality is unthinkable. . . . We are conscious of the Relative as existence under conditions and limits. It is impossible that these conditions and limits can be thought of apart from something to which they give the form; the abstraction of these conditions and limits is by hypothesis the abstraction of them only; consequently there must be a residuary consciousness of something which filled up the outlines; and this indefinite something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative or Absolute. Impossible as it for us to give this consciousness any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever, it is not the less certain that it remains to us as a positive and undestructible element of thought. . . . It is quite true that in the absence of conceived limits this concept ceases to be a concept, properly so-called, but it is none the less true that it remains as a mode of consciousness.

By quoting at such length we have given our author the advantage; for every sentence could be questioned separately. We prefer, however, to let the full apparent force of his reasoning strike the reader. His argument is likely to be misunderstood by one accustomed to Catholic philosophy; for such a one will take its terms in a Catholic sense without questioning the grounds of the assumptions it contains. Even so, however, we are sure

its plausibility will not conceal from him the old sophism that lurks in it, the sophism that is rightly or wrongly connected in history, with the name of our own St. Anslem. Does not the reader recognize the old bone of contention? We can talk about the Absolute: which implies that we have some sort of 'residuary consciousness' of the Absolute, after we have abstracted all limits and conditions from the world of our conscious experience: which implies that the Absolute is not nothing but something: which finally implies that the Absolute actually exists! What a prodigy of logical reasoning, that! We once heard from a learned and honoured scholar, about that argument, a remark which impressed us deeply. 'It is a significant fact,' he said, 'that while the time-honoured proof of the existence of God are discredited in the English schools, sophisms such as this are persistently brought before the mind of the country, and by men who can scarcely be ignorant of their worthlessness. It bodes badly for the faith in England.'

We must, however, examine the passage quoted, not as it strikes the Catholic reader, but in the light of Spencer's own principles. In the early and critical stage of his theory he laboured to show that, according to the very laws of thought, the nature of the Ultimate Reality is unknowable. And it was an easy task, if thought be taken not to transcend experience, and its logic to be the laws of transformed nerve sensations. But, as we then remarked, such Logic will not allow us even to dream of the existence of such an Absolute. Nay, the whole line of reasoning just now adopted by our author, and the assumptions it involves, are a direct repudiation of his own Logic. If all knowledge and thought be only the classifying of states of consciousness, and if consciousness itself be an 'aggregate of experiences,' by what right can Spencer say that 'there is an Absolute present to his mind,' except he means by 'Absolute' an experienced state of consciousness? How can he call it an 'actuality,' except by actuality he means something like a persistent consciousness? Why, even should 'appearance without reality' be 'unthinkable,' if thought be exclusively the 'ordering' of 'appearances' which make up 'consciousness,'

if thought be confined to the world of 'appearances' or 'consciousness,' and if reality be something outside consciousness, something already proved by his 'logic of thought' to be 'unthinkable,' 'reality,' then, must mean something within consciousness; and so we find ourselves still in pure idealism. Nay, as long as Spencer maintains that all thought is definite consciousness, and that all knowledge is a classification of its states, he can never bridge the gulf to an ontological order, or prove an 'Absolute' that is anything more than a psychological mode of consciousness from beginning to end.

He does not claim that we have a 'concept properly so called' of the Absolute: all he claims is that we have a 'residuary consciousness' of its existence. Yielding so much to his own logic, he thinks he is safe in refusing to follow it further, and in appealing to Psychology for this consciousness of the Absolute, as a 'necessary datum,' a 'positive and indestructible element of thought.'

It is not to be denied [he says] that as long as we confine ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question . . . things in themselves cannot be known to us . . . but when we contemplate its more general or psychological aspect, we find that these propositions are imperfect statements of the truth, omitting, or rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To speak specifically, besides that definite consciousness of which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an indefinite consciousness which cannot be formulated, . . . there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and which are still normal affections of the intellect.

Some pages back we proposed two serious questions. Our author has answered the first for us, telling us that the laws of thought and the essential relativity of all knowledge precluded the possibility of our ever knowing anything about the Absolute. Let us now repeat the second question: how can we have even a vague consciousness of the Absolute? Why do not the same causes preclude it as well as that clear, vivid consciousness which our author calls knowledge? It is that the laws of thought are not true of all thought, indefinite as well as definite? The paragraph just quoted marks Spencer's complete abandonment of those principles on which he advocated the 'unknowability' of the Absolute,

and his assumption of the opposite principles, in order to vindicate a consciousness of its existence in the real, ontological order of things. A few comments to show the futility of this last transformation scene will bring our essay near its close. It will be needless to pursue the subject further when we shall have shown that the 'Unknowable' of Spencer's philosophy is of no value in the ontological order, is only a thing of consciousness; is not even that, but is a contradiction in terms, a self-destructive mental creation, an Absolute Nothing. All this can be now readily shown.

A philosophic system whose psychology is made to contradict its logic is, at best, suspicious. 'We are compelled by the constitution of our minds¹ to believe in the existence of an Infinite and Absolute,' which, however, the '*laws of thought*' have already declared to be unthinkable! 'The constitution of our minds' also demands 'a firm belief in objective reality,' though a while ago 'the analysis of vital actions in general' (including, therefore, necessarily, all modes of consciousness, definite and indefinite led) 'to the conclusion that things in themselves cannot be known'! So the laws of thought contradict the constitution of our minds! And that 'objective reality' whose 'positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness,' and constitutes a belief that 'has a higher warrant than any other whatever'—once more we ask what is that 'objective reality' in which we are forced by 'the constitution of our minds' to believe? It evidently cannot mean 'things in themselves'; for 'things in themselves' cannot be known by any vital action (as 'the analysis of vital actions in general' shows); while belief in this 'objective reality' is a vital action of some sort, if it be anything at all. It remains, therefore, that 'objective reality' is still a mere 'mode of consciousness,' and that we have not yet got to 'things in themselves' at all. The reader will, perhaps, have begun ere this to form some idea of the hopeless inconsistencies and contradictions into which plain reason forces our author when he has once deserted his principles, and tried to play fast and loose with

¹ The italics are our own.

Logic and Psychology and the meanings of words. He makes a long and sustained effort, nevertheless, to arrive at an 'Absolute' in the ontological order (and so escape the pure subjectivism of Fichte), without, at the same time sacrificing his principle of the relativity of all knowledge. The nature and justification of his belief in anything at all outside self are thus presented to us in his own words:—

When we are taught that a piece of matter, regarded by us as existing externally, *cannot be really known*,¹ but that we can know *only certain impressions produced upon us*, we are yet, *by the relativity of our thought*, compelled to think of *these* in relation to a positive cause, the *notion* of a real existence which generates these impressions *becomes nascent*.

Such passages as this we might misinterpret, as if they conveyed a belief in the external ontological world. They do not; they teach that the real order of things in themselves cannot be known; that our 'impressions' give rise, indeed, to a 'notion' of real existence; that the world of these 'notions' may be called (or miscalled) the 'ontological world' or the world of 'noumena,' as opposed to the world of 'impressions' or 'phenomena.' But as to whether these 'noumena' or 'notions,' which form (by a strange misnomer) an 'ontological world' in consciousness, as to whether or not they are trustworthy, or have a real ontological world outside consciousness to correspond to them, Spencer does not know, and says, further, that man can never know. See, then, how deep and fundamental is his scepticism, and yet withal he tries to vindicate a real existence for his Absolute. But his struggle is a vain one, how vain we shall just now even further see.

The point on which he insists and relies is the distinction between definite and indefinite consciousness of the Absolute. Though the laws of thought render the former impossible, not so, he says, the latter. But let us see now. Where does this vague residuary consciousness come from? Whence come those 'unformed thoughts,' those 'normal affections of the intellect,' which give rise to it? *Ex hypothesi*—and it is well to remember the hypothesis just

¹ The italics again are ours.

now—*ex hypothesi*, is not all consciousness, vague and vivid, an aggregate of experiences? Is it not limited to experiences, be they personal or ancestral, direct through the senses or indirect through the nervous system? Such was the theory we set out with. And, pray, how could the experience, whether of the individual or of the race, ever have embraced or reached to an ontological Absolute? It is out of the question. And so principles become awkward when we press them to their logical conclusions. Spencer's consciousness of the Absolute is either in experience or outside it. If in experience, then it is not the Absolute; if outside experience, then consciousness of its existence is an unwarranted and groundless assumption.

Or again: our consciousness of the Absolute, however vague, must represent it as Unconditioned. But all our consciousness is, according to our author, necessarily conditioned by experience. Hence there is no possible consciousness of the Unconditioned. Either we have experience of the Unconditioned or we have not: if we have we are ourselves the Unconditioned and Absolute,¹ which our author would reject as Pantheism; if we have not, we have no right to assert the existence of the Unconditioned. Spencer's attempted answer is that consciousness of the Absolute and Unconditioned 'cannot be constituted by any single mental act,' but it is the product of many mental acts the resultant of a series of states of consciousness. This is simply useless. If every act in the whole series which makes up that state of consciousness be essentially relative and conditioned, how can they collectively give rise to the Absolute and Unconditioned? This brings us to the last fatal difficulty. It will show that, considered even as a Thing of Consciousness; an *a simultaneo* Deity, the Spencerian Absolute is a contradiction in terms and a self-destructive impossibility of thought.

We are told that since all our consciousness is of the

¹ According to Spencer's principles the Absolute cannot be conscious of itself: nor can we be conscious of ourselves; nor is the substance of consciousness at all knowable. See art. by Dr. Barry, on 'Spencer's Agnosticism,' *Dub. R-view*, 1888.

Relative it necessarily implies an Absolute; that the very Relative itself cannot be present to consciousness, except in antithesis to the Absolute, and as related to the Absolute; that, therefore, the Absolute is a necessary condition for the possibility of any act of consciousness, a 'necessary datum of consciousness,' an 'indestructible element of all thought.' Very well; but what sort of an Absolute is this? Let us see Does not our very consciousness of It make It Relative? If It remains outside consciousness It does not exist for us; if It comes into consciousness It thereby becomes Relative, and is no longer the Absolute we require. If, then, there is an Absolute, It (even Its existence) remains utterly unknown: if It is known It is not the Absolute. Again, once more, what sort is this Absolute? We are told we cannot know or be conscious of the Relative except in relation to It. But if we are conscious of the Relative only as related to It, then are we conscious of It only as related to the Relative. This necessity follows from the very notion of a relation; and whither does it bring us? To this very extraordinary conclusion, that we have a related Absolute—that is, a related non-relative!

What, then, is our verdict? Sane Logic tells us that the unthinkable, the self-contradictory, the round-square, and the relative-absolute, and all such impossibilities of thought, are and must be non-existent, and necessarily nothing; and to the category of such nonentities, it relegates, with small ceremony, Mr. Spencer's Unknowable. There do we willingly leave it.

Nevertheless our author protests. To the logical issue whither we have led him, he will not submit. The original position which he tried to establish by appealing to Psychology, he embraces. However inconsistently, he will cling to that position from which Reason and Logic have driven him, the consciousness of a Real, Absolute Being, the nature and attributes of which are utterly and for ever Unknowable. Nay, more, standing by the Real Existence of his Unknowable Deity, he proceeds to lecture the whole Christian world for hitherto pretending to know anything about the nature of a God that is Unknowable. Now, in such a proceeding

there is a tacit assumption that the Deity which he has logically proved to be utterly Unknowable (and illogically presumed to really exist), is none other than He Who was Jehova to the Jews, and is God to the Christian world. This assumption—that his and our notions of the Deity have for their term the same objective Being—is vital to his theory that Religion, like all else, is a thing of evolution, and that his presentation of its Deity merely outlines a more evolved and less anthropomorphic phase of Religion than Christianity has presented to the world. The assumption, however, is altogether unwarranted. His Unknowable is not our God; and so his tirades against Christian Theism are simply beside the question; they aim at nothing and hit it.

Let us explain. There are two conceivable ways of meeting Spencer's position. A Catholic can say to him: Your own Logic which proves the nature of the Absolute to be Unknowable, equally proves that the existence of the Absolute (in the real order) is unknowable; and thereby convicts you of Atheism or Subjective Pantheism. For the Absolute of which you speak is a chimera of your own consciousness, and not our God. Our God your own Logic disallows. Say what you like then about your ideal Deity, we need not listen to you further, we have simply nothing to do with your newly-discovered Unknowable Divinity. This is the answer we have just made.

But a Catholic can also adopt the following offensive and defensive plan of campaign. He can say to our author:—Your Psychology, somehow or other, brings you to a belief in a real, ontological, objective Absolute Being; and you claim this Being to be our God, but contend that He is altogether unknowable, and accuse us of benighted, ignorant superstition and all the rest, for claiming some knowledge of His nature and attributes, and speaking of Him accordingly. Very well. Granting, now, the validity of your belief, I undertake to show you (1) that such a belief implies a Psychology which will bring you not only a knowledge of the existence of such a Being, but also some knowledge of His nature and (2) that this Psychology will overthrow

your peculiar Logic of 'symbolic' and 'real' concepts, and will justify everything that we teach in our Catholic Theology about the nature and personality and attributes of our God.

The method of defence and attack here outlined has been followed by some writers, at least in part. In the foregoing pages we have partly followed it ourselves, at least in substance, and when dealing with principles. We failed to see that Spencer's Psychology could ever take him out of pure idealism. If he wants, then, to believe in an external Absolute Being, it must be by abandoning his Psychology for the Catholic Psychology of moderate realism. We have shown how this latter, while consistent with its own Logic and in harmony with its own laws of thought, destroys that imaginary world of 'symbolic concepts,' and rejects that Logic of 'transformed nerve-impressions' which was supposed to govern them. While dealing thus with the principles which underlie the Philosophy of the Unknowable, we have, we think, convicted our author of abundant inconsistencies; thereby showing that it is, quite naturally, difficult to come to any certainty about what he really teaches. Indeed he teaches many conflicting things with many contradictions.

One point of comparatively minor importance we leave untouched. The latter part of the second section in the reply just outlined: the application of our principles to justify, against Spencer and his school, the teaching of Catholic Theology about our knowledge of the nature and attributes of God. That detail we leave undeveloped. Any manual of Catholic Theology will explain how we may speak of the First Cause in terms of the perfections of His creatures. English readers will find an able defence of the necessity and reasonableness of expressing our thoughts about God in human language, in Dr. Mivart's *Mind and Thought*. We must think of God, though our thoughts are gathered from finite creation: we must speak of God, and must do so in the highest and noblest terms—terms which attribute to Him pure and simple perfections, and do not imply imperfections, though even such terms, the highest that

human language yields, necessarily connote the imperfection of finitude. Even those, therefore, we must mentally correct while using them. But all this does not argue in any way the absolute unknowability of the Creator, nor does it in any way make for Spencer's dumb worship of an abstract speculation. It would be needless for us to enlarge on all this.¹ We content ourselves with having examined the principles of English Agnosticism from their inception in Locke to their culmination in Spencer. Our study of the latter author, in the light of the general view preceding it, will, we trust, help to show that such principles serve only to empty the mind of faith and hope, to deprive it of the vitalizing warmth of truth, and to leave it a cold barren waste parched by the blighting winds of doubt and despair; while it is only the philosophy of truth, the wisdom of Christianity, that can solve the enigma of life, give a reason for all things and bring peace and happiness to the heart of man.

PETER COFFEY.

¹ See art. on 'Mivart's Defence of Theism,' I. E. RECORD, November, 1887.

A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF THE FATHERS

'Let us now praise men of renown, and our fathers in their generation. . . . Such as have borne rule in their dominations, men of great power, and endued with their wisdom, shewing forth in the prophets the dignity of prophets . . . and by the strength of wisdom instructing the people in most holy words. . . . Rich men in virtue, studying beautifulness.'—*Eccli.* xliv. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

TO how many of us, alas! is the systematic study of the Fathers of the Church a *terra incognita*. We have learned, indeed, to look upon them with veneration and awe. They were giants in their day, master-minds, the pick of the talent, the genius, the industry, of the times in which they lived; chosen instruments of God to consolidate, by their writings, the doctrinal fabric of Christianity—channels through which the crystal streams of divine revelation might run clear and pure, unsullied by the false philosophies and warped theologies of erratic dogmatisers.

We have, moreover, learned to regard their utterances with a reverence second only to that of the Written Word of God; for of that Inspired Word they were the first commentators and interpreters. Of the traditions, the worship, ritual, practice, discipline, and influence of the Church they were the chief witnesses and representatives, if only for the reason that they drank of the living streams so near the fountain-head, when scarce as yet had died away the echo of the living voices of those to whom the Master had given the divine command: '*Euntes docete*'; or of those, again, whom the Apostles had warned to 'hold the form of sound words.'

The proximity of the early Fathers to Apostolic times, taken together with their encyclopædic erudition, their unremitting study, the saintliness of their lives, their unceasing meditation on divine truths, their indefatigable zeal, and their assiduity in prayer, rightly claims for them the most loyal allegiance; and while we deny to them *individuatim* the *charismata* of infallibility or inspiration, we have learned, nevertheless, to look upon them always as trustworthy and reliable exponents of the *eloquia Dei*; so much so that

the *ipse dixit* of any single one of them has to be duly and respectfully reckoned with, not easily brushed aside with an '*Interdum magnus dormitat Homerus*'—a last resource only, when in manifest contradiction to known theological truth.

It is interesting to note what even non-Catholic writers say on this subject. Dr. Cave thus speaks¹ :—

In this are all Protestant divines, with few exceptions, agreed, that the Scripture is the first and only infallible rule of faith and morals, and that the next place is due to the Fathers, as far as they accord with and approve and confirm by their testimony the truth contained in the Scriptures. We revere the Fathers; not indeed as judges of the faith, but as witnesses who deliver to us with fidelity what was in every age done and believed. They hand down to us the sacred deposit of faith, and clearly point out what and when heresies arose, and the article of faith which they opposed. The more ancient those witnesses, the stronger is their testimony and our reliance on them the more firm. Thus did those champions of old, Tertullian, Augustine, and others proceed in their defence of the new religion, unceasingly appealing to their forefathers; and among them no one has treated this argument more successfully than Vincentius Lerinensis in his *Commonitorium* against heretics.

The same is the language of Dr. Mills in his dedication of the works of St. Cyril of Jerusalem to the Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery.

Although you do not allow that the authority of the Fathers is sufficiently strong to establish a new dogma of faith, yet it is usual with you to adduce them as witnesses of the faith once delivered to the saints and as most faithful interpreters of the Word of God. For since the many controversies with which the Church in our days is harassed have arisen from the contending parties not admitting any certain rule whereby to interpret Scripture—different authors drawing from the same words different and absolutely contrary meanings—these contentions would be happily terminated if that which was held by the Church at all times and in all or most places were on both sides admitted as true, certain, and indisputable. And I myself have heard you reject, not without indignation the Scriptural interpretation adduced by the Arians and Socinians, for no other reason than because they are most remote from the sense of the Fathers.

Similar estimates of the importance and worth of the

¹ *Ep. Apolog. in Append.*, T. ii.; *Hist. Lit.*, p. 68. Oxonii, 1743. This and following are as quoted by Waterworth in Preface to *Faith of Catholics*.

Fathers' writings are to be found in Reeves, Grabe, Pearson, Beveridge, all of whom contend against the Socinians that Holy Scripture must be 'understood in accordance with the interpretation of the Fathers:' and testimony of this kind is somewhat refreshing when one recalls the anti-patristic wave that has inundated the religious world since the period of the Reformation—a necessary result, doubtless, of the newly set-up fetish of private judgment.

However, the torrent of abuse has now almost spent itself, and such names as Scultet, Daillé, Beausobre, Mossheim, and Whithy are fortunately well nigh lost in oblivion.

As Catholics, we maintain and show on theological principles that the *consensus patrum* is an infallible criterion of the divinity of any given tradition relating to faith or morals; and this fact comes to us with all the credentials of Church authority. The Council of Trent gives the following warning:—

Let no one trusting to his own wisdom in matters appertaining to faith or morals and the building up of Christian doctrine, dare, by twisting the Sacred Scriptures to his own sense, to interpret them against the unanimous consent of the Fathers.¹

And the Vatican Council not only renewed this Tridentine decree, but also explained thus its full sense and bearing:—

In matters of faith and morals appertaining to the building up of Christian doctrine, that is to be held as the true sense of Scripture which holy Mother Church has held and holds . . . and, therefore, no one is allowed to interpret that same Sacred Scripture against this sense or against the unanimous consent of the Fathers.²

Thus did the Church revive a similar decree issued by the Council in Trullo in 692; thus does she lend her public sanction to the same principle inculcated as early as the fifth century by Vincent de Lerins in the well-known passage, 'Quod ubique quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est,'³

¹ Sess. iv. Decret: de usu SS. librorum.

² Sess. iii. Cap. 2 de Rev.

³ C. 2. *Commonit.*

by St. Augustine before him, who regarded as irrefragable the unanimous opinion of the Doctors of the Church;¹ by Irenæus, who pleaded against heretics the necessity of following tradition;² and implicitly even by St. Ignatius the Martyr, who exhorts the faithful in all his letters to be docile and obedient to their pastors.

From all this it is clear that the Fathers of the Church have a distinct and well defined place in the mystical body of Christ. Their consentient voice echoes through the ages with no uncertain sound. It has the ring of infallible truth, and is one of the channels through which flow to us the precious streams of doctrine from the fountain head—the Spirit of Truth.

It will scarcely, however, be denied that the priest's acquaintance with the Fathers' writings should extend beyond the mere acquiescence in their doctrinal authority. Not only is he a member of the *Ecclesia discens*, he has his own place also in that other section of the mystical body of Christ—the *Ecclesia docens*. 'You have not chosen Me but I have chosen you that you may go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain.'

The Church has a teaching office. Not merely was it to hold the form of sound words; guard, that is, the *depositum fidei*; but the Master had specially deputed the units of that organism to make disciples—μαθητευσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη. He had given them a commission no less powerful, no less divine than His own: 'As the Father hath sent Me I also send you;' and, consequently, one of the necessary fruits of the Church's vitality, one of the phases of its exterior life, will be the universal never-tiring effort to promulgate the good tidings of the Gospel, to expound the mysteries of revealed doctrine, to unravel the truths, and dispense the treasures of the Written Word, to exhort the members of the flock in season and out of season—in a word, with St. Paul, to 'preach Jesus and Him crucified.'

¹ Op. imperf. contra Julian, L. 4, n. 112, and cf. Lib. 1, n. 29.

² Adv. Hæc. L. 3, c. 3, n. 1.

This important work devolves in great measure upon the priest. 'Sacerdotem etenim oportet offerre, benedicere, praeesse, *praedicari*' (Ord. Service). As it was under the Old Law so is it now: 'The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his mouth, because he is the Angel of the Lord of Hosts':¹—and there exists in consequence the paramount obligation of equipping himself by every possible means for the adequate discharge of so important a duty.

Now, in this matter, it would be impossible, perhaps, to exaggerate the utility of an intimate knowledge of the Fathers of the Church. 'Despise not,' says the author of Ecclesiasticus, 'the discourse of them that are ancient and wise, but acquaint thyself with their proverbs. For of them thou shalt learn wisdom, and instruction of understanding, and to serve great men without blame;' ² and the words are equally applicable to the 'Ancients' of the Christian Church. The light they shed in the brightness of their rising has not become dim; the brilliance of their theological and exegetical labours was not that of the comet, that attracts all eyes for the time and then is lost to sight, but it streams on through the ages dispelling the darkness of every heresy, and adding fresh lustre to the truths embodied in the deposit of faith. They are beacon lights from afar—ever burning, ever brilliant—illuminating the obscurities of doctrine and reflecting only the pure rays of Him who styled Himself the Light of the World.

The secret of their marvellous power—if secret it could be called—was that they were essentially men of prayer and men of the Sacred Scripture. Imbued with the Spirit of God, the dead letter of Scripture became to them a living audible voice. The divine books were their close companions, the constant theme of their meditation, the fount from which they drew their profound knowledge. They lived in God, for God, and from God. In the silence and solitude of mental prayer they became inebriated with the beauty of God's house, and their continuous commune with

¹ Mal. ii. 7.

² Eccli. viii. 9, 10.

the Giver of all good gifts was only interrupted in order to dispense His treasures to men. Hence their 'writings breathe all the spirit and power of inspired men. Their great works shine out with meteoric brilliance. They are like creations, and yet not creations, for in most instances Holy Scripture supplied the *materia ex quâ*. They were spiritual giants in those days, men of heavenly renown, 'men of great power, rich men in virtue, studying beautifulness.'

In the spirit of the Apostolic men before them they first secured the foundations of their own personal sanctity; and full of zeal in the cause of their divine Master they came forth from their solitude to meet fearlessly all the powers of the world, to oppose with all their might the vitiating influence of every fresh heresy, to combat the spirit of wickedness in the high places. Their life work was one long continued response to St. Paul's charge to Timothy:—

I charge thee, before God and Jesus Christ, . . . preach the word; be instant in season, out of season: reprove, entreat, rebuke in all patience and doctrine. . . . Be thou vigilant, labour in all things, do the work of an evangelist, fulfil thy ministry.

Their faithful souls grew vast in grace, full of love, profound in the experience of the Cross in their fiery furnace of trial amidst persecutions, martyrdoms, and monstrous heresies. Everything then was vast. Satan was strong in the world, and strong powers, zeal, and courage were given the saints to vanquish him. The barriers which irreligion and false religions erected to impede the progress of the Gospel were hurled down by them as fast as they could be erected; and the wonderful wealth of argument and expositions of Gospel truths that are to be found in their writings remain as serviceable as ever in the armoury of religious controversy. A reference to the work of the early Apologists will show that there has been nothing new from the adversary since: only feeble revivals of things grown old. St. Thomas, Bellarmine,

¹ II. Tim. iv. 1, 2, 5.

Bossuet, have drawn everything from the Fathers, they are only great by them. Of Bourdaloue and Bossuet it has been said that they both formed themselves more or less in the school of the Fathers, that Bossuet took the spirit of their manner, Bourdaloue only the substance of their matter; and the intense conviction which the former had of the power and worth of their writings may be gathered from his remark that :—‘What even escapes them beyond their design has in it more of solid nutriment than that which others deliberately bring forth from their meditations.’

But the essential charm and fascination of the Fathers is undoubtedly their knowledge of and treatment of Holy Scripture. There is nothing like it anywhere else in the whole range of Christian literature. What surely must strike the youthful patristic student is their extraordinary familiarity with the Sacred Text. They quote Scripture from beginning to end with as much readiness and facility as we should the penny catechism. Doubtless they were gifted with a prodigious power of memory, but it was supplemented, we may well suppose, by hours and years of patient study and humble prayer. How they accomplished such a task in the midst of other multitudinous and arduous labours will ever remain a mystery. To each of them could be applied the words that we used to read in the old office of St. Bede the Venerable—‘*Nunquam torpebat otio, nunquam a studio cessabat; semper legit, semper scripsit, semper docuit, semper oravit.*’

Whatever the subject they treat, always have they a marvellous wealth of appropriate citations from the Divine Book ready to hand. It was to them a vast store-house of treasures innumerable, a garden of delights in which to roam at large, plucking the most fragrant flowers as they went, and arranging them in exquisite and harmonious clusters—a vast symphony of heavenly music, the tuneful themes of which they developed and enriched as occasion demanded. What we cannot do without much difficulty, even with the aid of a copious concordance, they accomplished easily naturally, without effort.

It will be sufficient, perhaps, to adduce one short

passage, as an illustration of this, from St. Gregory the Great.¹ He is dealing with the very familiar truth that 'by the kingdom of heaven is to be understood the Church':—

Regnum coelorum praesens ecclesia nominatur. Congregatio quippe justorum regnum coelorum dicitur. Quia enim per prophetam Dominus dicit: 'Coelum mihi sedes est'; et Solomon ait: 'Anima justi sedes sapientiae.' Paulus etiam dicit: 'Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam'; liquido colligere debemus quia si Deus sapientia, anima autem justi sedes sapientiae, dum coelum dicitur sedes Dei.

Coelum ergo est anima justi.

Hinc per psalmistam de Sanctis praedicatoribus dicitur: 'Caeli enarrant gloriam Dei.'

Here is closely-knit reasoning on a very simple truth, its remarkable feature being that it is Scripture from beginning to end. The writer seems simply to revel in the Written Word, and handles it as a *virtuoso* would a favourite instrument, drawing from it the most delicious harmonies. From evangelist to psalmist he goes, from psalmist to prophet, from the prophet to the wisdom of Solomon; then to the Doctor of the Gentiles, and back again to the psalmist; and all with a vivacity and clearness that evidences the master-mind engaged in a labour of love.

With every truth does St. Francis of Sales remark² that the Fathers contain nothing but the '*Evangelium explicatum*'—'*Sacram Scripturam compositam*,' the hidden truths of Holy Writ opened and unfolded before our eyes. Between the teaching of the Inspired Word, he says, and that set forth in their commentaries and expositions, there exists the same difference as between an unbroken nut and the kernel after the shell has been removed; or, again, between the whole loaf and the loaf divided into a number of parts. Their writings are to be looked upon as instruments in the hand of God for communicating to us the true sense of the Written Word; and very appositely he applies the words of the Book of Ecclesiasticus viii. 12 and 13: 'Let not the discourse of the ancients escape thee, for they

¹ Hom. xxxviii. in Matt. xxii.;

² *Modus concionandi*, c. 3.

have learned of their fathers; for of them thou shalt learn understanding, and to give an answer in time of need.'

Speaking of St. John Chrysostom as the model of the preacher, Archbishop Ullathorne says ¹ :—

The reading of St. Chrysostom is like contemplating a series of great pictures from the Catholic pencil, and listening at the same moment to the exposition of their sense and spirit from the lips of a St. Paul, for the saint has drawn forth the entire spirit of the Gospel, and presented to us its beautiful precepts and sublime doctrines in bodies of harmonious and exquisite colouring such as never satiate the gazing mind. St. Paul was his model. He had those divine epistles by memory. He wrote, it is said, with his portrait before his eye; certainly with the spirit of the Apostle animating his breast. . . . The Christian Demos-thenes spent years in the solitude of a cavern, meditating the Sacred Scripture, and chiefly St. Paul. He imbibed the whole spirit of his great master; and by his comprehension of the whole, he interprets and clears the obscurities of individual parts. Thus aided and wholly filled with the spirit of the Apostle, he was prepared to become the most clear, solid and eloquent expounder of the Gospel. . . . He preached to vast multitudes, and preached so often that he could have had but little time for immediate preparation, yet he produced the most surprising effects. His homilies on St. Paul and on St. Matthew, his discourses to the people of Antioch, and the treatises on Compunction should be the constant study of the preacher for the people.

It is not our desire, to extol the knowledge of the Fathers to the detriment of the study of Sacred Scripture, the claims of which are paramount; and the necessity of which to the priest, both for his own and his people's edification, is beyond dispute. But it may be well to point out that when engaged in the Fathers' writings he is indirectly pursuing also the study of the Inspired Word. It is not merely that those writings abound in Scripture lore—more than this, they teach us how to use the Sacred Text, how to adapt it to our purpose, how to sound its depths. Unconsciously we are enriched by their wonderful fertility and ingenuity in the treatment of the most familiar truths, our ideas are expanded, we are led farther afield into pastures

¹ *Cfr.* General Preface to *Sermons with Prefaces* which has been drawn upon *passim* throughout this essay.

new—a land flowing with milk and honey, where the plain truths of Revelation are clothed in the richest hues, the mind is taught how to assimilate them, and, as a natural consequence, how to impart them to others. A knowledge of the Fathers is, as it were, a professional training in Holy Scripture. Under their guidance we see how to handle it, how to acquire the scientific and orthodox methods and varieties of interpretation. Without their aid Biblical exegesis is stunted and shorn of much of its beauty.

Corresponding to the twofold sense of Scripture—the literal and the figurative—they teach us the twofold method of interpretation:—

(a) The literal (*sensus historicus*, or as the Greeks term it, Κατὰ το γράμμα), which considers the contents of Holy Writ according to the primary signification and application of the words, in the light of the context and of the historical facts narrated. This method was cultivated more especially by the Fathers of the School of Antioch.

(b) The figurative or typical or allegorical interpretation, which considers the contents of Holy Writ as signs, *i.e.*, types and figures of the grace, doctrine, and Church of Christ, and of the future life.¹ St. Justin Martyr says:—‘Interdum Spiritus Sanctus efficiebat ut clare et aperte *aliquid fieret* quod typus erat futuri, interdum autem et sermones prænuntiavit de futuris.’²

The Fathers of the Alexandrian School adopted this method, and in some cases we find both methods combined, as, *e.g.*, in the works of St. Chrysostom, St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great.

The result of the exegetical labours of the Fathers is to be found not only in their formal commentaries on Holy Scripture, but also, as the lessons in the Breviary show, in

¹ *Cfr. e.g.*, the Epistle of St. Barrabas, Number vii. 12, where the emissary-goat (Lev. xvi.) the red cow (Numbers xix.), are shown to be evident types of the Passion of Christ, and the institution of Circumcision, the commands of Moses concerning clean and unclean beasts, and numerous other incidents or passages in the Old Testament are designed for a spiritual signification.

C. Tryph. 114.

their homilies, in which they explain certain portions of Scripture or dwell upon some Scripture character ; again in their *Scholia*, which are short explanations of difficult passages, or again in prefaces or summaries of different books, or in answers or treatises about special portions or passages. Thus do they exercise their very welcome and necessary office of guide—' *Illuminare his qui in tenebris sedent.*'

Without them we are travellers in a land not altogether strange, perhaps, but unfamiliar. We have our compass, it is true—the Church—which keeps us on the beaten track and warns us of the pitfalls that heresy insidiously prepares for us, but over and above this there are many beauties that require pointing out, many objects of interest on the way ; many an historic episode, many glimpses of days gone by, and it is only the Fathers of the Church, with their vast fund of living tradition, who can adequately supply the deficiency.

The well-trained man is not to be judged so much according to the knowledge he may have stored up, but according to the degree in which he is able to apply it and his power of assimilation. A mass of information may be inert, a smaller amount may be far more useful if full of vitality, capable of easy growth, and absorbed into a mind that can reproduce it in others. Knowledge can only be said to beget knowledge, when one has learned the art of learning.

This the Fathers do for us in the all-important matter of Holy Scripture, and its use in our sermons to the people. They show us how to look at every side of a doctrine, a history, a prophecy, a figure or type, a parable : to turn it over in our minds, to collate, to apply, to draw appropriate lessons ; they show us that the Word of God is a two-edged sword, a weapon of defence or attack ; that 'all Scripture inspired of God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct to justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work' :—but, above all, we cannot be impervious to the lesson taught by their untiring zeal in the cause of truth. Like St. Paul, to spend themselves for

their divine Master, was the one continued object of their existence :—

Os, lingua, mens, sensus vigor
Confessionem personent.

Their lives were the substantial impersonation of their doctrine, and if they retired for a time from the din and conflict of battle, it was only to fortify themselves for renewed effort, to refurbish their weapons, and to resume their labours with rekindled love and redoubled vigour. In the light which streamed into their hearts from their daily meditation and converse with God they were able to behold things invisible to the flesh, with the facility and clearness with which we look upon things visible. It was their intimate and profound conviction, arising out of their constant union with God, which made them such zealous ‘dispensers of the mysteries of God.’

Manifestly, then, the study of the Fathers should not be looked upon as a luxury to be indulged in only by the learned, by seminary professors, or by the comfortable incumbent of a country mission, where time often hangs heavily—even the priest on a busy mission may very profitably devote an occasional hour to this subject, with benefit not merely to himself but through his sermons to his flock also.

It will be well, perhaps, to anticipate an objection which the hard working priest will naturally advance—the sheer impossibility, namely, of finding time for such study in an already formidable *horarium*.

Undoubtedly a thorough and exhaustive knowledge of patristic literature is the work of a specialist, a life's labour. It cannot be acquired by the cursory reading of sixpenny manuals any more than astronomy, chemistry, botany, or other sciences. A glance at the end of Schmid's *Manual of Patrology*, with its list of the works of no less than ninety-three Fathers, may well awe the spirit and damp the ardour of the most enthusiastic student; and when he sees the ponderous tomes in grim reality he may well be pardoned if somewhat overwhelmed by a feeling of sheer hopelessness in accomplishing the task of mastering them. But the

difficulty is not altogether an insurmountable one, and the first possible element of a solution would be to endeavour to regard them and treat them as distributive units rather than as an indivisible gigantic whole.

On this point Archbishop Ullathorne, in the work already quoted, thus writes :—

We familiarize ourselves with the *Confessions* of St. Augustine, the treatise on *The Priesthood* by St. Chrysostom, and the treatise on *Consideration* by St. Bernard, because they are brought to our hands in small, portable volumes. Present these and similar works as they lie in the mass of large folios, and they strike us with terror. We cannot bring ourselves to consider the Fathers individually and to take in hand their separate works singly, but a hundred and fifty folios fall with their smothering weight upon our imagination. Few of us, especially during the years of preparation, are without time to read those greater works of the greatest Fathers which make most to our purpose. And what can be a greater economy of our time than this employment? Instruct ourselves we must, if we would instruct others. Catholic tradition we must possess. The exhaustions of our mind must be repaired. 'Give thyself to reading' was the advice of St. Paul to an Apostolic pastor incessantly labouring amidst his flock. To take the most solid and catholic reading is the true economy of time. A little of this reading will go much further, and content the mind far more, than a great deal which is of a less catholic description. We read more pages of paraphrase on sentences of the Fathers and of other recent literature than would contain all the great works of the holy Fathers, without any complaint of want or loss of time. The greatest work of any Father does not reach beyond the fashionable extent of three volumes 12mo, and few extend beyond a small octavo. It is not necessary for this purpose that we should have the great and costly editions. Most of their principal works have been published in various cheaper forms. The quarto editions of France, or the yet cheaper octavos of Germany, or the collections of their select works, are accessible to the means of most of us. There is no one who cannot provide himself with a few of them, and gradually with all he may require.

It may be of service to mention also the excellent Edinburgh publications known as the 'An e-Nicene Christian Library,' which gives exhaustively all the patristic literature down to A.D. 325.¹ Again, there is the 'Library of the

¹ Edited by Rev. Alexander Roberts, D.D., and James Donaldson, LL.D. Published by Clark, Edinburgh. Twenty-four volumes.

Fathers,'¹ edited by Pusey, Keble, Newman, and others, which extends to forty-eight volumes. Comment on a work associated with such names as those just mentioned is superfluous.

More handy and enticing still are the dainty little volumes of the 'Ancient and Modern Library' series—in which a sufficient number² of the Fathers' dissertations has already been published in an English dress to enable one to make a good start in this direction; to give one a glimpse of the mine of wealth, theological and devotional, so near at hand, and to lead on to deeper research.

Lastly, mention should be made of the well-known serviceable little volumes of the '*Opuscula*,'³ of which upwards of forty have been published. For those who can read the Latin readily, this edition is to be preferred to those already mentioned. Not the least valuable portion of the work is the valuable alphabetical index of subject-matter, given at the end of each volume, by means of which the student is able to discover almost at a glance the passage or passages in which the Fathers deal with any subject he may have in hand.

Sometimes a well-meant intention is frustrated by abortive attempts to do too much at once; and it is well for the student of the Fathers to recognise *ab initio* the necessity of patience and perseverance; because after the first ebullition of patristic fervour the sight even of the miniature volumes of the '*Opuscula*' is calculated to beget no little anxiety, possibly dismay. Let each work be taken steadily, beginning with those which are likely to prove of greatest interest and service. It is not necessary, perhaps not even advisable, to purchase a whole set at once. A system of gradual collection is to be recommended for the majority of cases; and here is applicable as elsewhere the

¹ London, 1883-85.

² *Confessions* of St. Augustine; Tertullian's *Ecclesiastical History*; *Cur Deus homo*; *Orations* of St. Athanasius; *The Apostolic Fathers* (2 vols.), Clement of Rome, Barnabas, Ignatius, Pastor of Herinas, Polycarp; *Apology* of Justin Martyr; *Apology* of Tertullian; writings of Clem. Alex. London: Griffith, Farran, Browne & Co.

³ *Sanctorum Patrum Opuscula Selecta*, ad usum praesertim studiosorum theologiae. Edidit et commentariis auxit H. Hurter, S.J. (Oeniponti). Londini, apud David Nutt.

old adage, *Non gutta cavat sed saepe cadendo*. In this way, the writings of the greater Fathers, at least, may gradually be assimilated without producing a feeling of depression or *ennui*. Much depends also on making a judicious selection, for manifestly there is a great deal, especially in the homilies, which is applicable only to the times in which they were delivered. We may be students of the Fathers and acquire a solid and substantial knowledge of their writings without necessarily conning them individually from cover to cover; and much time will be saved if the selection be submitted to an expert patrologist.

We are not, however, without useful literature on this subject. The work to which reference has already been made is all that the average student could desire to aid him in the task of sifting or selecting for himself—namely, the *Manual of Patrology*, by Schmid.¹ This work purposes to be ‘a well-arranged guide to the *epochs*, the *authors*, and the *subjects* of patristic literature.’ It treats of the authority of the Fathers, their use in dogma, morals, ascetical theology, and Biblical exegesis; the origin, growth, and development of patristic literature. To this is added a short but most useful *résumé* of the works and lives of both Greek and Latin Fathers and writers.

Another work of the same kind, but more fully developed, is Fessler’s *Institutiones Patrologiae*,² of which the author sufficiently indicates his scope in the Preface:—

Ut Theologis, sacerdotibus et quibusvis SS. Patrum studiosis viam planam et facilem ad SS. Patrum lectionem sternerem eosque in isto negotio satis arduo, quasi manu ducerem. . . . Vitam singulorum eatenus descripsi, *quatenus inde Operum intelligentia pendebat*, ita ut eorum occasio et scopus pateret. . . . Opera singula non solum recensui, *rerum etiam argumentum unius cujusque ordine logico exposui* ita tamen, ut magis allicerem, quam satialem.

The utility of such a work is obvious. A right understanding of any of the Fathers demands some knowledge

¹ *Manual of Patrology*. By the Rev. Bernard Schmid, O.S.B. Revised, with notes and additions for English readers, by the Right Rev. Mgr. Schobel, D.D.

² Josephi Fessler, ‘*Institutiones Patrologiae*,’ quas denuo recensuit auxit, edidit Bernardus Jungmann: Oeniponte, 1890.

at least of the times in which they lived, the heresies they had to combat, the doctrines they had to defend. They must be read by the light of their period and surroundings. How much of Newman's best work—to institute a parallel—would be lost upon one who had no knowledge whatever of the Oxford Movement. Fessler supplies what we might term the necessary sidelights of information with untold advantage to the student.

A still more comprehensive and later work is the *Patrology* of Dr. Bardenhewer (professor at the University of Munich), which appeared in 1894, and of which a French translation was made in 1899.¹ It is a very erudite work and appeals rather to more advanced students, being practically a reference book on all matters patristic. The *Revue Thomiste* (March, 1900) says of the French edition :—

C'est une source abondante de renseignements : bibliographie, histoire des manuscrits, éditions principales, travaux les plus importants, tout s'y trouve. . . . La presse catholique et protestante loua d'une voix unanime cet important travail pour sa clarté, sa précision, la sûreté et l'ampleur de ses informations : ce n'était que justice.

There can be no doubt that the need of a knowledge of the Fathers is becoming more pronounced every day. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the study is progressing by leaps and bounds outside the Church, especially under the patronage of the latest development of Anglicanism, the English Church Union. It were a pity if we allowed the enemy in open daylight to appropriate and monopolise the treasures that are ours by right. Let them study the Fathers by all means. We can have no objection to their extricating themselves from the morass of doctrinal confusion into which their own divines have led them, and in which, for over three centuries, they have been wallowing in hopeless fashion, and harking back to the 'old paths'—to the clear fountains of unadulterated truth. Religious controversy in this country has assumed quite a different aspect within even the present generation. It has shifted its ground from the arena of strict theology to that of history; from private interpretation to the more authoritative dicta

¹ 'Les Pères de l'Eglise, leur vie et leurs œuvres,' par O. Bardenhewer : édition Française, 1899 : Bloud et Barral. 3 vols., 8vo.

of the first exegetes. What the early Church said or did is now the ultimate norm or criterion of orthodoxy, and of this the ancient Fathers and ecclesiastical writers are recognised as the legitimate exponents. Thus the study of the Fathers is in a manner forced upon us if we would keep pace with the times, and gladly should we avail ourselves of the test. We have everything to gain and nothing to lose in the search for truth.

In a word, there is a rich mine ever at our disposal, let us but work it, and it will yield inexhaustible treasures; and that not in matters of doctrine or controversy merely, but as Schmid points out¹—

In morals also, a rich harvest may be gathered from the works of the Fathers, for they are replete with moral precepts and suggest motives for conduct and action. Some of the Fathers, too, have written entire treatises on particular virtues, and laid special stress in their Biblical commentaries upon the moral sense of Scripture passages. Nor are they of less service in the department of ascetical, pastoral and homiletical theology. For those Fathers who were conspicuous for their piety have left us most vivid and beautiful explanations in their writings, especially in their letters, not only as to how each individual soul may direct itself, but also how others may be led, kept and advanced in the way of Christian perfection. Again, from their homilies and sermons we may learn how the truths of the faith can be explained and proved and practically applied to the everyday life of the Christian.

Let us borrow all the light and wisdom we possibly can from those transcendent luminaries of ages long since gone by. *Opera enim illorum sequuntur illos.*

The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets. He will keep the sayings of renowned men, and will enter withal into the subtilties of parables.²

Stand ye on the ways, and see, and ask for the old paths.³

Let not the discourse of the ancients escape thee, for they have learned of their fathers; for of them thou shalt learn understanding, and to give an answer in time of need.⁴

Inquire of the former generation, and search diligently into the memory of the fathers, . . . and they shall teach thee: they shall speak to thee, and utter words out of their hearts.⁵

G. E. PRICE.

¹ *Manual of Patrology*, p. 49.

² Jer. vi. 16.

⁴ Eccli. viii. 11, 12.

³ Eccli. xxxix. 1, 2.

Job viii. 8, 10.

Notes and Queries

THEOLOGY

RECEPTION OF CONVERTS INTO THE CHURCH

REV. DEAR SIR,—Will you be good enough to give an answer to the following in the next number (if convenient) of the I. E. RECORD?

1. Is it necessary to have witnesses at the reception of a convert into the Church?

2. Is there any decree on the point, and, if there is, will you please quote it?

A SUBSCRIBER.

Our correspondent will find the solution of his questions in a reply of the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, given 28th March, 1900, and published in the I. E. RECORD for November, 1900, page 472.

LAW OF ABSTINENCE DURING ADVENT

REV. DEAR SIR,—Now that Advent is approaching, might I ask you for a reply to the following question?—If the bishop of this diocese states that on fast days these persons who are excused from fasting by age, ill-health, or hard labour, cannot take eggs or butter at their breakfast, are persons in his diocese bound by that interpretation of the law?

JEJUNANS.

This matter has been repeatedly discussed in the I. E. RECORD.¹ In a few words, however, we shall try to satisfy our correspondent.

Those persons for whom our correspondent is concerned are bound by the law of abstinence only. In Lent, the law of abstinence forbids not merely meat, but also eggs and *lacticinia* of all kinds. If a bishop, in relaxing the Lenten law, restricts his dispensation for the use of eggs and butter to one meal, even in the case of those exempted from

¹ *Vide, v.g.*, I. E. RECORD, December, 1900, page 538.

fasting, he is certainly within his right, and all such persons are bound to observe his restriction.

Outside Lent, however, the general law of abstinence does not restrict the use of eggs¹ and *lactinia* at all. Our correspondent is, therefore, mistaken, we may assume, in thinking that his bishop means to restrict the use of eggs and butter on fast days outside Lent, in the case of those who are exempt from the law of fasting. But, however that may be, an erroneous interpretation on the part of the bishop could not modify the general law of the Church. Consequently, persons exempt from fasting may take eggs² and *lactinia*, as often as they wish, on the fast days of Advent, and on all other fast days outside Lent.

D. MANNIX.

LITURGY

THE DIVISION OF THE AGNUS DEI. REMOVAL OF STATIONS OF THE CROSS

REV. DEAR SIR,—1. I have heard it contended that the dividing and distributing of parts of an *Agnus Dei* amongst the faithful is a useless, not to say a somewhat superstitious, practice, just as it would be to cut in two a blessed medal, with a view to communicate to two persons the spiritual advantage conferred by the blessing. The cases seem to be parallel.

2. Similarly I have heard it contended that the simultaneous removal of all the wooden crosses of the Stations of the Cross vitiates the erection and deprives them of the indulgences, just as the simultaneous unwiring of a Rosary deprives the beads of their indulgences.

What is to be held on these two points?

Yours faithfully,

Kappa.

I. We do not intend to say, about the general subject of the *Agnus Dei*, anything more than is necessary for answering the question proposed; more would be out of place.

¹ By local law eggs are forbidden in most of the dioceses of Ireland when a vigil that is a fast day happens to fall on Friday.

² Observe, however, the restriction already mentioned regarding the use of eggs on certain vigils in Ireland.

The *Agnus Dei*, of which there is question above, is a medallion of white wax impressed with an image of the Lamb of God, and blessed by the Pope ordinarily within the Octave of Easter, in the first and every seventh year of his Pontificate. It is oval, and made in various sizes, the largest being about two inches long, an inch and three-quarters wide, and one-eighth of an inch thick. This medallion we shall refer to, for the sake of clearness, as the large *Agnus Dei*.

The large *Agnus Dei* is enumerated amongst the Sacramentals by St. Liguori¹ and theologians generally. The spiritual advantages, mentioned in the query, are those which are derived from it as a Sacramental. There are no indulgences attached to it.²

The practice of dividing and distributing, as we understand it, is that with which everyone in these countries is familiar. The large *Agnus Dei* is divided into a number of very small parts; each part is rolled in paper and placed between two pieces of cardboard; the whole is covered with silk, forming what is commonly known amongst us as an *Agnus Dei*. We shall speak of it as the small *Agnus Dei*.

It seems to be assumed by our correspondent that the small *Agnus Dei* is distributed with a view of communicating to several persons the spiritual advantages conferred by the blessing of the large *Agnus Dei*; in other words, with the belief that it is a Sacramental. We think this assumption quite warranted in most cases, if not in all.

The practice would be 'useless,' if the blessed wax of the large *Agnus Dei* were to entirely lose its blessing by being divided as described. It would be moreover somewhat superstitious, *superstitione falsi cultus*, if, for the purpose of exciting devotion, it be falsely represented that the small *Agnus Dei* is of the same virtue as the large one. It would be like some of the examples given by St. Liguori.³

The answer to the question will, therefore, depend on whether it be true or false that each part of a large *Agnus Dei* has the same virtue as the whole. If it be true,

¹ L. vi., n. 94.

² Beringer, vol. i., p. 416, 2^{ème} Ed.

³ L. iii., n. 3.

it is evident that the practice under discussion is no more useless or superstitious than that of distributing Holy Water. If it be false, then the use of the small *Agnus Dei* would be useless and somewhat superstitious, as explained above.

We hold it to be true that each part of a large *Agnus Dei* has the same virtue as the whole. Our reason is as follows:—

This opinion is by no means new. It was held by Joannes Molanus, who died in 1585. This theologian's work, *Oratio de Agnis Dei*, is cited as a great authority by those who have written since on the subject of the *Agnus Dei*. We quote from chapter xvii., which is headed *De Fragmentis Agnorum*:—

‘Perro inter Catholicos dubitant aliquando rudiores an Agni confracti, vel partes Agnorum maneant benedicti; et parem vim atque efficaciam habeant cum integris Agnis-Dei. Instituendi proinde sunt, eos, qui magnos Agnos habent, non plus habere quam qui parvos habent: et qui partes aut fragmenta habent, pares esse cum reliquis; adeo ut ex charitate liceat aliquando Agni figuram dividere, ut amico aliquid tribuatur. . . . In Urbani Pontificis Carminibus, quidam codices ultimo loco addunt.

“Parsque minor tantum tota valet, integra quantum.”’¹

Nothing could more clearly express the opinion we are advocating.

The learned Jesuit, Theophilus Raynaudus,² takes the lawfulness of our practice as granted:—

‘Itaque id tantum (albedo) curae fuit Pontifici; non autem ut sacra cerea conspiceretur vel ut imago Agni esset conspicua, quae in particulis Agni quarum frequens est usus, cerni non potest.’

‘n. 35: Evenisse tamen (falsificationem) scio non circa Agnos integros sed circa Agnorum particulas quas ex usu est convestire.’

He goes on to say that sometimes those whose business it was to cover these particles with silk, etc., from scarcity of the blessed wax, substituted unblessed wax, or no wax at all. This fraud he condemns; but he does not even hint that our practice is wrong.

¹ This, if genuine, was written about 1366.

² T. X. *De Agno Cereae a Pontifice Consecrato*, c. xiv., n. 11. Lugduni, 1665.

Julius III. blessed *Agnus-Dei* in 1550 and sent some to Henry II. of France. In a poem on the event, by Janus Vitalis, the two following lines occur :

‘ Ut sunt in seipsis pars totum quaelibet utque est,
Totum illud absque partibus.’

The *Analecta Juris Pontificii*¹ is very clear :—

‘ Il en est de l’Agnus comme des autres Sacramentaux . . qui quoique devisés à l’infini, conservent toujours dans chacune de leurs parties la benediction de l’Eglise et la vertu qui en est la consequence. Les fragments d’Agnus ont donc la même propriété que les Agnus entiers.’

A writer in the *Annuaire Pontifical Catholique* of 1901 pronounces the same judgment.

We are sure that many other authorities could be added, if we had an opportunity of consulting all the books mentioned in the extensive bibliography of the *Analecta*. Many that we have consulted do not raise the question at all, and must, therefore, have regarded the practice as right, for they must certainly have been aware of its existence.

Now, this opinion, which has prevailed for many centuries, is not a mere speculative one ; it is eminently practical. It has been acted on openly and frequently in many, if not in all, parts of the Church. It is not only tolerated, but encouraged and propagated, by the clergy, who both wear the small *Agnus Dei* and distribute it to the faithful, and who act thus, as we believe, with the idea that it is a Sacramental.

This being so, it is difficult to imagine that the Head of the Church, who has on many occasions safeguarded the reverence due to the *Agnus Dei*, and condemned as abuses other practices, such as the painting, gilding,² or counterfeiting of it, would have refrained so long from condemning our practice, if it were an abuse. No Roman authority has yet pronounced against it, nor, as far as we have seen, any other authority.

Until, then, the Church decides otherwise, which we do not consider likely, we hold that the practice referred to in

¹ 1865, col. 1504, n. 11.

² The painting or gilding of the case or cover is not forbidden, but that of the wax form itself.

the query is neither useless nor in any way superstitious, but, on the contrary, calculated to excite legitimate devotion.

We do not think the case of the medal parallel. The material of which it is composed is not suitable for division. Holy water is a better parallel. Besides parallels do not always hold in matters that depend wholly on the positive will of the Head of the Church.

II. The simultaneous removal of all the wooden crosses does not vitiate the erection and deprive them of the indulgences, if done for some special reason, and only for a time with the intention of replacing them. It does, if done with the intention of removing them permanently.

'Sac. Congregatio die 30 Januarii respondit.

'Ad 4^m: Si Stationes Viae Crucis per cruces erectae a loco removeantur ubi canonice erectae fuerint et in alium transferuntur, indulgentiae nec primo loco affixae remanent nec cruces sequuntur, sed nova canonica erectio requiritur.

'Ad 5^{am}: . . . Si penitus tollantur aliqua peculiari ratione, et ad tempus tantum, ut denuo eidem loco restituantur nec erectione nec benedictione opus est ad indulgentias lucrificiendas.'¹

The simultaneous unwiring of a Rosary *does not* deprive the beads of their indulgences:—

'Dans les chapelets et rosaires, l'Indulgence est attachée aux grains; aussi la rupture volontaire ou accidentelle du cordon ou de la chaîne ne leur fait pas perdre l'Indulgence, lors même, que tous les grains se seraient séparés et mêlés.'²

P. O'LEARY.

¹Dec. Auth. S. C. Indulg., n. 270.

²Beringer, vol. 1, p. 332, n. 9.

CORRESPONDENCE

FATHER MATHIEW UNION

REV. DEAR SIR,—May I beg to refer your readers back to your issue for June, 1896, page 515, in which there is a short article under the above heading, and to inform them that the 'Union' therein conceived has now arrived at birth, though it must be confessed that the period of gestation has been unduly prolonged; however, it is said, 'all things come to him that waits.'

At a meeting held in Cork, on the 29th of October, a number of priests, both regulars and seculars, who are Total Abstiners came together and formally launched the above-named society. After considerable discussion as to the *modus procedendi* they adjourned, having first instructed their secretary to write to their bishops and ask their blessing on the undertaking: this was most willingly granted. One bishop (*ab uno disce omnes*) wrote:—

'I have heard with the greatest satisfaction of the formation of a society or union of priests pledged to Total Abstinence. Such an organization should be very fruitful in good among the people by binding together, under a united and compact body, so many earnest priests devoted in a special way to the stemming of the torrent of sin and misery caused by the intemperate habits of so many of our people. I give to the "Union" my hearty blessing and earnestly pray that it may prosper for the benefit, material and spiritual, of our people.'

The 'Union' met again on the 19th November, when they elected a president, vice-president, a council and a secretary. They drew up a code of Rules, very short and very simple, imposing very few obligations upon the members beyond those already voluntarily undertaken by them.

I am preparing a short report, to be printed in booklet form, and in order that it may be as complete as possible I shall feel obliged by being furnished (1) with the names of all priests who are Total Abstiners, so that I may send them a copy of our rules and ask them to co-operate with us: there are a great many such scattered here and there over the country, and the very insertion of their names will give us strength. (2) I want the names of all the parishes wherein there exists a Total Abstinence (*not merely Temperance*) Society, giving the title, the name of the president,

how many members, stating whether they hold a Church service and have a hall and any other information they wish to impart. When all this comes in I hope to issue the report early in the new year.

'Unions' are the order of the day: Maynooth has its own, and a big success it is. There is room for another—let it be that of the Total Abstiners. We have at least one subject in common, and that of supreme importance. This 'Union' will confirm the strong, it will encourage the weak, and give all of us a greater zest for temperance work. There will, I doubt not, be found some 'prudent' persons to advise, as they did unfortunately in 1896, that the thing be allowed to drop, but I should like to be permitted to say that if the 'prudent' people had it all their own way some of the noblest deeds the world has seen would never have been done—the brave soldier would not have been decorated with the V.C., nor would Our Divine Lord have died at the premature age of 33.

We commence with a membership of over 70 contributed by the dioceses of Cork, Cloyne, Limerick, Waterford, Dublin, Killaloe, and Kildare, as also by the great religious Orders, Franciscans, Dominicans and Vincentians, and when the report is issued I trust it will be seen that we have several hundred members.

Your faithful servant in SS. Corde,

WALTER O'BRIEN, C.C.,
Secretary

DONERAILE,
Nov. 20th, 1901.

DOCUMENTS

DECREE OF THE SACRED CONGREGATION OF PROPAGANDA GRANTING THE BISHOP OF RAPHOE POWER TO ERECT A DIOCESAN CHAPTER

DECRETUM

Cum R. P. D. Patritius O'Donnell, Episcopus Rapotensis in Hibernia supplices preces porrexerit pro erigendo in ea Cathedrali Ecclesia Capitulo, quod praeter duas dignitates, Decani et Archidiaconi, decem insuper canonicos complectatur, Summus Pontifex Leo PP. XIII in Audientia diei 14 superioris Junii, referente infrascripto S. Congregationis Fidei Propagandae Secretario, precibus ac postulationibus praedictis benigne adnuere dignatus est. Itaque Capitulum Cathedralis Dioeceseos Rapotensis ad instar Capitulorum aliarum in Hibernia Dioecesium Sanctitas sua ita erexit, ut ex Decano, Archidiacono, et decem canonicis debeat constare. Ut autem proprio aliquo insigni decorentur canonici majusque exinde sacro cultui decus accedat, eadem Sanctitas sua facultatem iisdem concessit gestandi super arniculo manichato seu rochetto mozzettam laneam nigri coloris cum extremis oris violaceis. Super quibus omnibus praesens Decretum Summus Pontifex expediri mandavit.

Datum Romae ex Aedibus Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide die 4 Julii 1901.

M. Card. LEDOCHOWSKI.

L. ✠ S.

ALOISIUS VECCHIA, *Secretarius*.

DECREE ERECTING THE CATHEDRAL OF LETTERKENNY UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF ST. EUNAN AND ST. COLUMKILLE

DECRETUM

Cum R. P. D. Patritius O'Donnell, Episcopus Rapotensis, provinciae ecclesiasticae Armacinae in Hibernia, supplices exhibuerit preces SSmo. D. N. Leoni PP. XIII, ut novam Ecclesiam sub titulo Sanctorum Eunani et Columbae apud Letterkenney in sua Dioecesi recenter aedificatam in Cathedralis evehere dignaretur, Sanctitas sua, referente infrascripto Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide Secretario, in Audientia diei 4 vertentis mensis Junii, benigne adnuere dignata est pro gratia, eamque Ecclesiam tanquam Cathedralis haberi jussit cum

omnibus juribus et privilegiis quae Cathedralibus Ecclesiis competunt, ac praesens ea super re Decretum expediri mandavit.

Datum Romae ex Aedibus S. C. de Propa. Fide die 8 Junii an. 1901.

M. Card. LEDOCHOWSKI.

L. ✠ S.

ALOISIUS VECCIA, *Secretarius*.

DECREE DISPENSING THE FAITHFUL OF RAPHOE FROM FAST ON THE VIGIL OF THE FEAST OF THE DIOCESAN PATRONS AND TRANSFERRING THE OBLIGATION OF HEARING MASS AND OF ABSTAINING FROM SERVILE WORKS TO THE FOLLOWING SUNDAY

DECRETUM

Cum in Dioecesi Rapotensi, provinciae Armacanae in Hibernia, aedificata nuper fuerit nova Ecclesia Cathedralis apud Letterkenny, sub titulo sanctorum Eunani et Columbae mox dedicanda, praesens ejusdem Dioecesis Episcopus R. P. D. Patritius O'Donnell votis cleri atque fidelium pastoralis suae sollicitudini concreditorum obsecundare cupiens, SSimum. D. N. Leonem PP. XIII enixe rogavit ut in Patronos aequae praecipuos Dioecesis ipsius constituere dignaretur S. Eunanum Episcopum et S. Columbam Abbatem. Porro Sanctitas sua in Audientia 4 vertentis mensis Junii, referente infrascripto Secretario hujus S. Consilii Christiano Nomini Propagando benigne precibus adnuit, indulgendo scilicet ut utriusque festum in praedicta Dioecesi recoili valeat sub ritu, praerogativis atque honorificentius, quae praecipuis locorum Patronis de jure competunt. Attentis autem locorum adjunctis, eadem Sanctitas sua dispensationem a lege jejunii in vigilia praedictarum festivitatum concedere dignata est, addito privilegio, iis annis quibus alterutra festivitas in diem feriale incidat, transferendi ejusdem solemnitatem una cum duplici praecepto abstinendi scilicet ab operibus servilibus et sacrum audiendi, ad Dominicam proxime insequentem, in qua unica Missa sollemnis respective propria ut in festo celebrari valeat in omnibus ecclesiis praefatae Dioecesis, dummodo non occurrat duplex primae classis et servatis rubricis. Super quibus omnibus eadem Sanctitas sua praesens Decretum expediri mandavit.

Datum Romae ex Aedibus S. Congnii de Propaganda Fide die 7 Junii 1901.

M. Card. LEDOCHOWSKI.

L. ✠ S.

ALOISIUS VECCIA, *Secretarius*.

NOTICES OF BOOKS

SPECIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. (Part I., The Historical Books). Rev. Fr. E. Gigot, S.S. New York : Benziger, 1901.

EVERYONE will admit the opportuneness of a book of this kind. At the present day many and most momentous questions in connection with the historical parts of the Old Testament are discussed on all sides. This is the case with the Pentateuch, and particularly with Genesis. The Hexameron, the origin and antiquity of man, the unity of the human species, the universality of the deluge, etc., appear to be subjects of inexhaustible interest. And besides these, which may be called real problems, there is the manifold literary question which is engaging the attention of Biblical scholars all the world over, a question to which no ecclesiastic can afford to remain indifferent, viz., the great question about the authorship of these books themselves.

Within the past few years the field of battle has in great measure changed from the New Testament to the Old, and the higher critics are now waging war as desperately on Moses and Josue as their forerunners did against St. John and St. Paul. Yet on this subject, to pass in silence by the periodicals, there has scarcely been anything in English by a Catholic pen since 1868, when Dr. Smith's great work on the Pentateuch appeared. Hence it is an increased pleasure to announce Fr. Gigot's work, in which special attention is paid to the present state of the discussion, and in particular to the objections put forward by the Graf-Wellhausen school.

There are few more interesting chapters in any recent Catholic work on the Scripture, that we are acquainted with, than those which contain Fr. Gigot's summary of the arguments employed in support of the two opposite views regarding the origin of the Pentateuch—the traditional one, that it was written mainly by Moses; and the critical one, that all five books, *plus* the book of Josue (*i.e.*, the Hexateuch), are a compilation from documents of various ages, the earliest dating from the eighth century B.C. Fr. Gigot himself seems inclined to hold the possibility of a

via media. Speaking of some of our best scholars, he says (page 110):—

‘The conclusions they endorse point out perhaps a *via media* between the two extreme positions: between that of the rationalistic critic, whom religious bias leads to affirm more than is warranted by the internal grounds he has examined, and that of the ultra-conservative writer, whom prepossessions against all novel theories prevent from looking closely and appreciatively into the internal evidence in favour of the composite origin of the Pentateuch.’

Here we beg to differ from him. As regards the alleged internal arguments on which the higher critics exclusively rely, while addressing Catholics it will be sufficient to quote these words of the present Holy Father’s Encyclical, *Providentissimus Deus*:—

‘Perperam enim et cum religionis damno inductum est artificium, nomine honestatum criticae sublimioris, quo, ex solis internis, uti loquuntur, rationibus, cujuspiam libri origo, integritas, auctoritas dijudicata emergant. Contra perspicuum est, in quaestionibus rei historicae, cujusmodi origo et conservatio librorum, historiae testimonia valere prae ceteris, eaque esse quam studiosissime et conquirenda et excutienda: illas vero rationes internas plerumque non esse tanti, ut in causam, nisi ad quandam confirmationem, possint advocari. Secus si fiat, magna profecto consequentur incommoda. Nam hostibus religionis plus confidentiae futurum est ut sacrorum authenticitatem Librorum impetant et discerpant: illud ipsum quod extollunt genus criticae sublimioris, eo demum recidet, ut suum quisque studium praejudicatamque opinionem interpretando sectentur: inde neque Scripturis quaesitum lumen accedet, neque ulla doctrinae oritura utilitas est, sed certa illa patebit erroris nota, quae est varietas et dissimilitudo sentiendi, ut jam ipsi sunt documento hujusce novae principes disciplinae: inde etiam, quia plerique infecti sunt vanae philosophiae et rationalismi placitis, ideo prophetias miracula, cetera quaecumque naturae ordinem superent, ex Sacris Libris dimovere non verebuntur.’

There may be some uneducated Catholics that refuse to admit the likelihood of the use of either written documents or oral tradition by Moses, but all we can say is that we never heard of them. They are not the representatives of Catholic opinion. If the author of II. Machabees abridged the five books of Jason’s history, if an evangelist enquired diligently in order to learn the chronological order of the events in Christ’s life, why might not Moses have employed similar means to obtain information?

The description of the Hexaemeron (in Genesis i.) was in all probability revealed to Adam, and then owing, we think, to God's special providence, either preserved by the ancestors of Moses, or restored to them. That there was a primeval revelation appears incontestable, for the other Semitic cosmogonies coincide to a remarkable extent with the Mosaic, from which no one says they were derived, and that those cosmogonies were not preserved is also incontestable, for through man's fault they are disfigured by polytheism and absurd mythological fancies. Again, but for a different reason, it is unlikely that Moses got a revelation for his account of the deluge, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: tradition would be sufficient. While writing he was preserved from reproducing error (in case an error had crept into the tradition, oral or written), and he was preserved from any misconception as to its meaning; he wrote only what God willed him to write, so that the whole narrative, even though it were derived from non-inspired sources, as coming now through his pen is inspired. That, if this admissible origin is the real one, the style and the very words of those primeval records should be preserved in Genesis, is perfectly intelligible; and if the higher critics confined their energies to the investigation of the number and nature of these incorporated passages, no reasonable Catholic would disapprove of it. Again, on the other hand, no educated Catholic refuses to admit that additions to the Pentateuch were probably made at a subsequent period, but by inspiration. And these are not concessions made to the higher critics, they are old and established views.

But this will not satisfy most of the higher critics, neither will they confine themselves to the laudable work referred to above. They assert that in Scripture there are contradictions and errors, and that the sacred books were written, not by the traditional authors, but by J, E, P, D, etc. Wellhausen is apparently the great leader of the higher critics, but his irreverence towards the book of Chronicles (Paralipomenon) need not be mentioned here. Let us rather quote Driver, whom Fr. Gigot mentions as one of the Protestants who have adopted the *via media* conclusions, and who thoroughly believe in the divine character of the Old Testament (see page 110). For ourselves, we have no confidence in any Protestant's notion of Inspiration; it may be partially right, but it is so by chance, owing to the man, not to his Protestantism. In the article on 'Chronicles' (*Encycl. Bib.*), for which Driver is responsible, the following passage occurs: 'No. 9. Exaggerations.

Another peculiarity of the Chronicler is to be found in the incredibly high figures with which he deals. Manifestly such figures cannot be historical, etc. All that we have to say here is the only *via media* is to be found in the Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus*. Then we would observe that the real internal arguments are on the same side as tradition.

Let us now pass on to Fr. Gigot's presentation of what may be called real in contradistinction to literary problems. On page 164, he remarks that the milder form of transformation (*i.e.*, that man's body has been produced by the same action which produced the bodies of other animals—a view which we are glad to see Fr. Gigot himself rejects) has been held by several Catholic writers anxious to harmonize the Bible with recent scientific theories on this point. Among them he mentions Mivart and Leroy, O.P. We submit that for the young student's sake, he should have added, that in consequence of his opinions Mivart died outside the Church, and that Leroy, who was summoned to Rome, *ad audiendum verbum*, retracted this opinion. So, too, he refers several times to Loisy as an exponent of Catholic opinion, without once mentioning that in consequence of his opinions Loisy has been deprived of his professorship by ecclesiastical authority. Here again a warning note should have been added. Fr. Gigot also brings forward in his summary many of the rationalist objections and lets them pass without saying a word to inform the young student that these objections have been answered. We shall notice only the most important instance of omission. On pp. 128, fol., he exhibits at full length the objection, which is the fundamental one of Wellhausen's whole attack, *viz.*, that a plurality of altars which is sanctioned in Exodus xx. 24—in critical parlance, the JE Code; E's Book of the Covenant—is forbidden in the Priestly and the Deuteronomic Code, the inference being that the Codes contradict each other, that the JE Code belongs to a period anterior to Amos, the D Code to the time of Josias, and the P Code to the post-exilic period. But as Fr. Gigot incidentally remarks, though he omits to bespeak attention to its relevancy, the altars respectively spoken of are *different*. Those mentioned in Exodus xx. 24, were to be of earth or of unhewn stones, *that* mentioned in Exodus and often elsewhere was to be brazen (and so it was in the tabernacle and in Solomon's temple); *those* were not to have steps, *that* might, *i.e.*, there was no prohibition (the altar in the tabernacle was, in the opinion of some commentators, surrounded

at half its own height by a raised platform or step, while the altar of Solomon's temple, of Ezechiel's ideal temple (xliii. 17) and of the second temple, all had steps or an inclined plane or perhaps both); and last, but not least, on *those* any man might offer sacrifice, on *that* only a priest.' Hence, there is no contradiction. Yet on the alleged contradiction, and on the pretended promulgation of the D Code for the first time in the reign of Josias, rests the whole of the Graf-Wellhausen system.

And surely Fr. Gigot is aware, though he did not mention it, that in another part of the so-called JE Code, unity of sanctuary is as clearly implied as it is in the D Code. The words 'Thrice a year shall all thy males appear before the Lord,' Exodus xxiv. 17 (J's Book of the Covenant), are repeated in Deut. xvi. 16.

Lastly, Fr. Gigot must be perfectly well aware that the long list of sacrifices mentioned in Scripture, which he refers to on page 128 as being an argument used in support of the Wellhausen assertion, is by no means a homogeneous list. Some of them were offered on the one altar of the Levitical sanctuary, the others on the extra-ritual altars that might be erected anywhere. The sacrifices at Silo, Kings i. 3, were offered on the brazen altar of the Mosaic tabernacle, of which the two sons of Heli were priests. The sacrifices referred to in Judges xx. 26, were offered on the same altar. 'Wherefore all the children of Israel came to the house of God, and sat and wept before the Lord.' Here, in opposition to the Septuagint, Targum, Peshitta and Josephus, St. Jerome adds 'Hoc est in Silo.' So too in Judges xxi. 2, he has 'in Silo.' Thus Bethel and Bochim in the context (Hebrew Text) are not proper names, but signify respectively 'house of God' and 'place of weeping.'² Poels and Van Hoonacker agree with St. Jerome, who follows the Jewish rabbis, that the ark was at this time at Silo, where Josue had left it, but even if it were at Bethel, as Vigouroux and others think, the strength of our argument remains unimpaired. Wherever it was, the ark was the centre of worship, and its altar of holocausts was the one altar. It would seem, however, that the ark, etc., were at Silo till the fatal day of Eben-ezer (Stone of Help), I. Kings iv. 4.³ And when the ark was recovered, and after a time transferred from

¹ See Van Hoonacker's dissertation *Le lieu du culte*, etc., or his admirable *Le sacerdoce Levitique*, page 5, fo. 11.

² See the Vulgate.

³ See for Silo, Jos. xviii. 1, Judges xviii. 31, xxi. 19, I. Kings ii. 28, iv. 8, Ps. lxxvii. 60, Jer. vii. 12, 14, xxvi. 6.

Cariathiarim to Sion, Solomon and all the people went to Gibeon, because there was still the brazen altar.¹ In the judgment of Van Hoonacker, Poels has proved to demonstration that Gibeon, Gilbeath, and Cariathiarim, are in the same neighbourhood. With regard to Absalom's intended sacrifice at Hebron, II. Kings vii. 9, Poels shows that the word Gibeon is often changed into Hebron, and so may have been changed here, or that the meaning is that while ostensibly wishing to have sacrifice offered for himself by a priest, his only purpose was to get himself proclaimed King in Hebron. At any rate we do not read that the brazen altar was ever there. All the sacrifices on it should be offered by priests, and offered according to the Levitical rite.

Now we come to quite a different class of sacrifices, those offered anywhere by men that were not even Levites, much less priests. In the list which Fr. Gigot copies from the higher critics in order to show the critical argument of Wellhausen, sacrifices of both kinds are mixed up, the priestly and the private; we have only separated them, and in the case of the second class shown to what tribe the offerer belonged. The private or extra-ritual sacrifices are those of Josue (the Ephraimite) on the stone altar at Hebal, Josue viii. 31; by Gibeon (the Manassite) on the stone altar at Ephra, Judges vi. 28; by Samuel (the Ephraimite) on the altar he built at Ramatha, I. Kings vii. 17, the holocaust he offered at Maspha, *ib.* v. 9, the sacrifice of the people in the land of Suph, *ib.* ix. 22, 14, and at Galgal, *ib.* xi. 15; of Saul (the Benjaminite) at Galgal, *ib.* xiii. 10 (Samuel had commanded him, *ib.* x. 8), and at Ailon on a stone altar, *ib.* xiv. 35; of David's family (Judaite) in Bethlehem, *ib.* xx. 29, and of Absalom (Judaite) at Hebron, if the conjecture made above be not correct. If Absalom himself was to offer the sacrifice, there was no objection to his doing so at Hebron.

There is therefore no proof whatever of altars having being put on a level with the altar of the sanctuary.

If we have dwelt so long on these omissions, it is because Fr. Gigot's book is so good, that we should like to see it complete.

R. W.

¹ II. Par. i. 3, 6.

WER WAR DER VERFASSEN DER NACHFOLGE CHRISTI. Von Sir Francis Richard Cruise, D.L., M.D. Ins Deutsch Übertragen von J. Repen und A. Klöckner. Kempen (Rhein): Klöckner und Mausberg. 1901.

WE recognise under this German heading a series of articles that appeared in our own pages some years ago, and were subsequently published in a small volume by the distinguished author of the great work on the authorship of the *Imitation of Christ*. At the request of Dr. Browne and of the present Editor of the I. E. RECORD, Dr. Cruise kindly consented to give our readers the substance in condensed form of his remarkable volume. The articles were originally intended for the clergy, and were specially written for us; but it was subsequently felt that they would appeal to a much wider circle of readers, and Sir Francis was induced to put them together and publish them in a small volume. It is this volume that two townsmen of Thomas à Kempis have now translated into German and turned out in very artistic style. All the Kempen people feel deeply indebted to Sir Francis Cruise for having so ably vindicated the claim of their townsman, Thomas à Kempis, to the work which is known as the "Pearl of the Middle Ages." They are about to name a street in their town after the Dublin doctor, and when he paid them a visit last August we have been informed that he received a regular ovation.

Certainly Catholic Ireland, and the noble profession to which Sir Francis belongs, have reason to be proud of his achievement in the domain of literature and scholarship.

J. F. H.

NOVUM TESTAMENTUM, GRAECE ET LATINE, EDITIO CRITICA ALTERA. Franciscus Brandscheid. Herder, 1901. Two vols., pp. xxiv., 652, and 803.

THIS is a handy edition, and very well suited to the use of classes in our theological seminaries. The Vulgate is reprinted from the Vatican edition (Vercellone's) with the most scrupulous accuracy, as Fr. Brandscheid observes, 'ne minima quod sciam, particula de textu, mutata, addita vel ab eo detracta.' In addition he gives a selection of various readings from the more important MSS. of the Itala and the Vulgate. In combination with his Greek text he has a selection of various readings from more than forty uncial, and more than a dozen cursive MSS. Then the different Oriental versions (Syriac, Egyptian, Ethiopic, etc.), and

the works of some ancient Fathers, are laid under contribution. The variants thus noticed are not often the same as those in another recent critical edition by the Capuchin, Fr. Hetzenhauer, but then the purpose of the editors is not the same. One gives more information about the codices, the other about the readings preferred by critical editors.

A critical editor of the New Testament undertakes no easy task. Tischendorf devoted a lifetime to it, yet he left work enough to occupy Westcott and Hort for twenty-five years. Neither did they make any claim to finality, in fact all these scholars, while maintaining the correctness of their respective principles of criticism, would have been among the first to acknowledge that a mass of evidence remained to be sifted. But it is precisely in reference to their principles of textual criticism that Fr. Brandscheid—and Fr. Hetzenhauer as well—differs from them, for they attached undue importance to the readings of the Vatican and Sinaitic codices. It was for partly this reason that Lachmann said of one of Tischendorf's early editions, 'tota peccatum est,' and that Scrivener called Westcott and Hort's edition a 'splendidum peccatum.' And in his *Plain Introduction* (vol. ii., p. 287) Scrivener shows conclusively that Hort's pre-Syrian text is a chimera, and that his neutral text (represented by the Vatican MS.) is by no means likely to be a faithful representative of the original. On the contrary, in the Alexandrine group of codices, and notably in B, i.e., Vatican MS., as Fr. Brandscheid and other critics before him point out, there is a systematic abbreviation of the text. Dobbin counted no less than two thousand five hundred and fifty-six omissions in B (see Scrivener). Hence Lachmann, Brandscheid, and many others decline to pin their faith to Codex B, even though it belong to the fourth century, and is apparently the oldest manuscript in existence. They prefer to follow St. Jerome, who may have been revising the Latin version of the New Testament when Codex B was being written, and who certainly used older and more correct manuscripts.

Hence Fr. Brandscheid says, with good reason—

'Statui mihi ad rectam S. Hieronymi methodum esse revertendum; neminem enim potuisse illo melius antiquissimam Novi Testamenti formam perspicere.' 'Cum ab hoc viro exortam Vulgatam versionem latinam exinde ab Ecclesia Romana esse conservatam atque iterum restitutam constet, necesse est originalem graecae lectionis formam cum latina Vulgatae versionis consentire, nec quidquam graecae posse rectum esse, quod aperte et essentialiter latinae Vulgatae lectioni refragetur.'

These are the true and indispensable principles of textual criticism. Fr. Brandscheid, who mentions the readings of many more codices than Fr. Hetzenhauer has mentioned, does not, on the other hand, think it well to give all the variants that Fr. Hetzenhauer did, about forty thousand, but we venture to remark that it would have enhanced the value of the present work, had he given a fairly complete exhibition of the textual evidence in the Deuterocanonical passages, and in others of special importance and interest to the dogmatic theologian, as I. Cor. xv. 51, I. John v. 7, 8, etc.

As regards paper and type, nothing better could be desired, and it is certain that the editor has conferred a boon on both professors and students.

R. W.

FIRST CONFESSION. 'FORGIVE US OUR TRESPASSES.' FIRST CONFESSION BOOK FOR LITTLE ONES. SIMPLE CONFESSION BOOK. By Mother M. Loyola. Catholic Truth Society.

THESE are little books written for little people. If we consider not their size, but their importance, they deserve a long notice. We have already warmly recommended the larger works of Mother M. Loyola: *First Communion*,¹ *The Child of God*,² and *The Soldier of Christ*.³ These, because they were large, and for the better educated class of children, were comparatively for the few: the books at the head of this notice are for the many. Like the children's books of Fr. Furniss they have come to stay.

First Confession supplies a long felt want and is a delightful book. It is exact, simple, limpid, earnest, touching, and practical. We never lose sight of the subject matter, and the interest excited is such that whoever reads one chapter desires to go on to the next. Such has been our impression although it is by tens we count the years since our childhood.

Those who have had the good fortune to have used *First Confession*, when they approached for the first time the sacred tribunal, will be helped in all subsequent confessions by '*Forgive us our Trespases*.' This is a further development of the matter treated in *First Confession*. All the parts of Confession are fully explained with admirable exactness as to doctrine and with an art which reveals years of careful study of the workings in children of nature and grace. We abstain from citing passages since the book should be read entire, but we call special attention to the

¹ I. E. RECORD. ² *Ibid.* Fourth Series, vol. vi., p. 286. ³ *Ibid.*

manner in which the Motives of Contrition are proposed; *Motives of Sorrow*, p. 37, *et seq.* We consider the treatment very perfect. In the section *Starting Afresh* there are a few passages we should have omitted, at least for the present. The stories at the end, to occupy the penitent while waiting, are excellent.

When we had read these two books, which are well brought out at a shilling and sixpence respectively, we regretted that there was not a cheaper edition. While thus regretting the post brought us *A Confession Book for Little Ones* and *A Simple Confession Book*. Both are taken from *First Confession* and '*Forgive us our Trespasses*': both are admirable, and as each is only one penny, our regret ceases.

At the beginning of *First Confession* there are twenty-six most useful pages addressed to young teachers. There is a shorter address to the same in '*Forgive us our Trespasses*.'

We have yet one important remark to make. In his Preface to *First Confession*, Rev. Fr. Thurston, S.J., writes:—

'Probably most of the fruit of a first confession depends upon the tact and sympathy of the priest who hears it. In reading this little volume one is tempted to wish that not only mothers and teachers, but we confessors, also, had some one equally familiar with child nature to instruct us how the inevitable strangeness and nervousness of this formidable interview can be best lightened for the youthful penitent. It is eminently desirable that an ordeal which children often dread so much beforehand should leave behind it a pleasant memory of shyness overcome, sin forgiven, and happiness restored. . . . Let me conclude then by expressing a wish that some priest of experience, who has mastered this delicate problem of the right tone in dealing with the souls of very young children, may some day be induced to put his impressions on record for the use of those of us who are less happily gifted.'

The I. E. RECORD has again and again put its pages at the disposal of priests, who treated of the early instruction and training of our little ones. The article of the late Canon Ryan, '*Kindergarten and Catechism*,'¹ and that of Rev. Fr. Fitzhenry, '*The Moral Training of Children*,'² are fresh in the memory of our readers. Others will be welcomed. We may, however, venture to say what Fr. Thurston does not say, and what the author would not allow herself to think, namely, that *First Confession* and '*Forgive us our Trespasses*' are sure to prove useful to all priests who have to deal with children. J. M.

¹ Fourth Series, vol. viii., p. 325.

² Fourth Series, vol. x., p. 220.

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